Recurring concern

Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the inter-agency care information-sharing system, including inadequate arrangements, communication channels, shared records or contact mechanisms when these prevent timely access to relevant care, needs or risk information between agencies.

Not included

  • Excludes information-sharing failures unrelated to coordination between agencies supporting a person.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's records, assessment, documentation or communication process unless the report directly links them to inter-agency information sharing.
  • Excludes generic staffing, confidentiality, policy or technology deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the unsafe inter-agency information-sharing condition.
  • Excludes hazards involving public access to harmful information or physical communication and rescue equipment.
Reports
212

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
235

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
492

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care57
NHS England39
Ministry of Justice14
Home Office11
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership9
HM Prison and Probation Service8
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board8
Care Quality Commission7
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust7
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Metropolitan Police Service6
College of Policing5
Greater Manchester Police5
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Elizabeth Sarah Jayne McCann · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elizabeth Sarah Jayne McCann was raped and murdered on 25 August 2022 at the home address of her murderer. The report identifies failures in risk assessment, information sharing, safeguarding, and management of a high-risk offender by the Health and Wellbeing College, Probation, and Greater Manchester Police. It also identifies concerns about excessive caseloads, inadequate staffing, supervision, recording, and organisational learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited information-sharing protocols between probation and partner services

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Clear Information Sharing protocols between Probation and such groups as drug and alcohol services were limited. Without clear agreements understood by both sides there was a significant risk that crucial information that impacted risk assessments would not be shared. ”

    Source location

    Elizabeth Sarah Jayne McCann · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement mandatory professional registration for Probation Officers to support continuing development, performance and accountability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As well as improving information sharing protocols, we are committed to improving professional standards of practice and have introduced mandatory professional registration for Probation Officers, which aims to sharpen focus on Continuous Professional Development and drive improved performance and personal accountability to deliver public protection. The professional standards will, alongside increased staffing levels ensure that Probation Officers do all that is required of them, including the sharing of risk information with partner agencies, whose contribution is vital to the efficacy of risk management plans.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish information-sharing procedures and guidance for agreements with partner agencies, including drug and alcohol services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Clear Information Sharing protocols between Probation and such groups as drug and alcohol services were limited. Without clear agreements understood by both sides there was a significant risk that crucial information that impacted risk assessments would not be shared”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a multi-agency public protection system with improved offender-management functionality and information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report is clear that more must be done to enhance the police’s capability to sufficiently manage sex offender in the community, and I agree that is the case. To make sure that the police, prisons, probation service and others have the right systems in place to do this and share pertinent information on registered sex offenders and other dangerous individuals, the Home Office is developing a new”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a standard operating procedure governing referral, enrolment, clinical-system checks, external risk information, and managerial authorisation for College students.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The College has a new Standard Operating Procedure within which there is a clearly articulated protocol for the referral and enrolment process for any member of the public, referring agency or clinical team referral. This protocol has a stepped approach to risk management and includes cross-reference checks with Trust clinical systems (PARIS our Electronic Patient Record system and incident reporting systems). Any referral by an external agency, such as the probation or service [e.g., third sector] will be required to share risk information that is known about the person.”

    Source location

    Response from Pennine Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish information-sharing requirements for students, clinical teams, external agencies, and College partners through permissions, risk liaison, and signed partnership agreements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As outlined in our earlier response, since Elizabeth’s death, the College has developed a standard operating procedure that outlines the steps and processes required by College leads and administrators in relation to information received by the College and the steps required for every student’s successful enrolment to commence. These checks include self-disclosure by students relating to activity and engagement with other agencies in addition to checks against internal clinical systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Pennine Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a controlled generic College email account with defined access, daily checking, welfare and risk escalation routes, and absence cover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The College team have worked to develop and share protocols in relation to information governance with the staff group. These include the creation of a generic email account, access to the generic email account, standardised out of office for the account and escalation processes in relation to information received to the generic email account, an extract of which is provided here for assurance:”

    Source location

    Response from Pennine Care
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Probation staffing, supervision, referral risk management and information-sharing matters are primarily for the Ministry of Justice to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These four matters are primarily for the Ministry of Justice to reply to on behalf of the Probation Service, however, to promote effective communication between agencies and improve awareness of any challenges, the Head of Public Protection at Greater Manchester Police and the Head of Public Protection at Greater Manchester Probation service commenced monthly meetings in 2023.”

    Source location

    Response from GM Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Most concerns fall to the Ministry of Justice, Home Office and Greater Manchester Police, which will respond to the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Most of the concerns you have raised are matters for the Ministry of Justice, Home Office and Greater Manchester Police and I understand that these organisations will be responding to your report.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 May 2024

    Open published response
  2. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Lily Precious JAHANY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lily Precious Jahany was an 18-year-old medical student with a complex mental health history who died after taking increased doses of medication and suspending herself by a ligature in her student accommodation. The report identified concerns about the lack of first-aid training among student accommodation staff and failures to obtain and share relevant mental-health risk information, including from private clinicians.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Crisis Team procedure to require obtaining relevant risk information from other agencies at assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) I have spent a lot of time in this inquest investigating the information which was known about Lily, about her mental health and who had access to what information in the context of assessing her risk. In September of 2023, Miss Evans, Assistant Coroner sitting within the Rutland and North Leicestershire jurisdiction heard an inquest concerning a student at Loughborough University. Similar to Lily’s case he was under the care of a private psychiatrist elsewhere in the country where he had lived prior to attending university. As a result of concerns in that case (his death occurring 1 year before Lily’) around lack of contact by the Crisis Team at the time of assessment or otherwise with the private psychiatrist, the Coroner wrote to the Leicestershire Partnership Trust to share her concerns. The Trust referenced the Crisis Team Standard Operating procedure in the inquest in September 2023, the Coroner was concerned about the level of awareness that staff members had of any expectation required of them set within that procedure to seek information from other agencies. I now have sight of the Crisis Team Standard Operating Procedure. It sets out the keyworker responsibilities. The section is drafted presupposing that patients are receiving care and treatment from the Crisis Team and only at that point does the responsibility for seeking relevant information from other agencies kick in. Furthermore the emphasis upon that requirement is limited to one line which reads ‘responsibility for referrals and liaising with other agencies involved’. That is anything but clear as to any expectation upon staff to ensure they have at their disposal all of the relevant risk information at the time of making that assessment; nor does it in my view set out any expectation upon staff to proactively make contact with treating clinicians in the private sector to gain information. It would not capture situations such as Lily’s, who was discharged from the Crisis Team after an 1 hour assessment and therefore was not under their care and treatment, having found a failure to obtain all relevant information pertinent to her risk in assessing that risk. ”

    Source location

    Lily Precious JAHANY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team and Mental Health Central Access Point procedures to clarify information-gathering expectations and actions when key professionals cannot be contacted.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have undertaken a full review of the Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team Standard Operating Procedure and the Mental Health Central Access Point Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). These SOP’s have been updated to explicitly clarify the professional expectations regarding information gathering by liaising with key professionals which includes private providers and psychiatrists. The SOP’s also include a process for what to do when we are unable to contact key professionals including private sector care providers.”

    Source location

    2024-0273 Response from Leicestershire Partnership Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Student Roost is responsible for addressing the first matter of concern; the Trust will respond only to the second matter relevant to it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In your Report, you raised two Matters of Concern. The first of these Matters of Concern is better addressed by Student Roost who no doubt will respond direct. I will therefore respond to the second matter of concern which is relevant to the Trust.”

    Source location

    2024-0273 Response from Leicestershire Partnership Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 May 2024

    Open published response
  3. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Ash BANNISTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ash Bannister, a 16-year-old who was gender neutral, died in a residential care home on 7 August 2021 after being found hanging. Principal concerns included the removal of Ash’s personal Ligature Risk Assessment without documented reasons, inadequate documentation and communication, inconsistent waking-night cover, failure to follow the support plan, staff training gaps, and an investigation process described as not fit for purpose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate historic Child Sexual Exploitation risk between care homes

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence to confirm there was no documentation created by United Children’s Services to detail the date on which Ash’s Ligature Risk Assessment was deemed to be no longer required or to explain the rationale behind the making of that decision. There is no documentation to explain or justify the deviation from Ash’s care plan on the morning that Ash died. Further, the Court heard evidence to confirm that there was little or no communication of Ash’s historic Child Sexual Exploitation risk between the two United Children’s Services care homes when Ash moved from The Oaks to The Laurels in July 2020. Lack of documentation and poor communication is a concern. ”

    Source location

    Ash BANNISTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Finlay Stuart Ian FINLAYSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Finlay Stuart Ian FINLAYSON died following cardiac arrest at HMP Lewes on 25 January 2019; the stated causes were pulmonary thromboemboli due to deep vein thrombosis, against a background of metastatic carcinoma of the base of the tongue. Concerns included delays and possible omissions in transferring medical information between healthcare systems, poor record keeping, communication failures, delays in accessing healthcare, and failures in the emergency response.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reliably transfer key medical information between incompatible systems

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the Inquest the jury heard evidence about the difficulty in information being transferred over from Mr Finlayson's GP surgery system, which uses SystmOne to the prison system (also SystmOne). The evidence was that information was not able to be freely shared between the two and it meant that there was a delay in healthcare staff in the prison accessing relevant information about Mr Finlayson's long term health issues as well as contact with his GP as recent as a week before going in to prison. Mr Finlayson sadly died in 2019 and I have heard evidence that the functioning of SystmOne has improved since his death. I was told, however, that there remains an issue with the interaction between SystmOne and other medical databases used in England and Wales. SystmOne appears to be the preferred system for many prisons and detention centres but there are still many GP surgeries that use other systems. I heard evidence that if someone goes to prison and is linked to a surgery that uses another system (like EMIS) the notes have to be printed and scanned on to SystmOne and key information has to be input onto someone's record by hand. I am concerned about the potential delay this process could cause. I am also concerned that key information could be missed by virtue of these systems not communicating with each other. I have heard evidence as to the importance of someone's medical history being available for those within the prison setting to assist with careplanning and the provision of appropriate care and in my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken to make the transfer of this information more efficient. ”

    Source location

    Finlay Stuart Ian FINLAYSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake an internal review of EMIS Web interoperability and medical-record transfer issues raised in the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have undertaken an internal review of EMIS Web, focussing on the issues raised as areas of concern in the Report in relation to EMIS Web, namely a potential lack of interaction between clinical systems in prisons (predominantly SystmOne) and other clinical systems in community GP surgeries, and the evidence you heard that notes have to be printed and scanned on to SystmOne, with key information inputted manually, if an individual’s GP practice uses a clinical system other than SystmOne.”

    Source location

    Response from EMIS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain compliance with the latest NHS England GP2GP specifications and associated processes for electronic medical-record transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “EMIS are fully compliant, and have processes in place to remain compliant, with the latest versions of the NHS England GP2GP specification. Therefore, EMIS practices can receive medical record requests from prisons and return the requested information via the GP2GP process. EMIS practices also have the option to send printed medical records via courier when medical requests are not received from prisons via GP2GP (at the prison’s discretion). In either scenario, EMIS would not have any control over whether the prison requests the medical records via the GP2GP process, or via a manual process.”

    Source location

    Response from EMIS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue reviewing EMIS solutions to identify potential performance improvements affecting medical-record transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As detailed above, EMIS is compliant with NHS England GP2GP specifications, and we will continue to review our solutions to determine whether any performance improvements can be made. However, based on the information provided in the Report, and our subsequent review, we do not believe in this instance there are any software developments, beyond the existing functionality in the System, that are required to mitigate the specific risks raised in the Report.”

    Source location

    Response from EMIS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enable functionality supporting automatic electronic transfer of prisoners’ full community GP records to prison GPs and back on release.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the time of Mr Finlayson’s death, more has been done to improve matters. Full GP registration (‘GMS’) has been introduced into prisons in the last two years as a result of policy change by NHS England. Functionality was enabled by TPP to enact this policy change. As a result, prisoners can now opt to have their community GP registration (and their community GP record) transferred to the prison GP. This involves the automatic electronic transfer of the full community GP record to the prison GP, which is then transferred out again on release of the prisoner to the community GP practice. This is an enormous improvement. This change applies regardless of whether the community GP practice uses SystmOne or EMIS.”

    Source location

    Response from TPP
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing GP2GP functionality and NHS England specification compliance sufficiently mitigate the identified medical-record transfer risks; no further software development is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As detailed above, EMIS is compliant with NHS England GP2GP specifications, and we will continue to review our solutions to determine whether any performance improvements can be made. However, based on the information provided in the Report, and our subsequent review, we do not believe in this instance there are any software developments, beyond the existing functionality in the System, that are required to mitigate the specific risks raised in the Report.”

    Source location

    Response from EMIS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    EMIS cannot control whether prisons request medical records through GP2GP or a manual process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “EMIS are fully compliant, and have processes in place to remain compliant, with the latest versions of the NHS England GP2GP specification. Therefore, EMIS practices can receive medical record requests from prisons and return the requested information via the GP2GP process. EMIS practices also have the option to send printed medical records via courier when medical requests are not received from prisons via GP2GP (at the prison’s discretion). In either scenario, EMIS would not have any control over whether the prison requests the medical records via the GP2GP process, or via a manual process.”

    Source location

    Response from EMIS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    GP data controllers are responsible for permitting data sharing and enabling the relevant reciprocal controls under data protection legislation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report highlights that information was not freely shared between the GP (using SystmOne) and the prison service. Functionality to allow seamless sharing of data is available within SystmOne, and this functionality was available to the detained estate (including prisons) from well before 2019. However, as is still the case, the sharing of data is dependent on the data controller (in this case the GP) permitting the data to be made available to other healthcare organisations. This responsibility is set out in UK Data Protection Legislation. Without the control in SystmOne being turned on by the GP data controller (and a reciprocal control on the receiving side being enabled) the data is not visible. Dame Fiona Caldicott and other data champions have tried to make information sharing ‘the norm’ but there is still resistance in many areas.”

    Source location

    Response from TPP
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 March 2024

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Tobias Ryse Mannering-Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tobias Mannering-Jones became homeless, isolated and vulnerable, experienced mental health difficulties, drug use and sexual exploitation, and was found dead at Portland Basin Marina on 21 February 2023. The inquest identified concerns about delays in mental health support, inadequate housing and sustained support for vulnerable homeless young people, difficulties contacting people without telephones or addresses, failure to recognise exploitation, and the need for coordinated agency responsibility.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use regular MDTs to share and understand multi-agency information

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The evidence before the inquest was that where multiple agencies were involved it was fundamental that one agency/person took overall ownership/responsibility to ensure a coordinated and effective approach using regular MDTs to understand the information that all agencies had in their possession and to offer effective support. ”

    Source location

    Tobias Ryse Mannering-Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed multi-agency review processes after the death of someone experiencing homelessness or rough sleeping.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Alongside the work on SABs, DLUHC is working with sector organisations and LAs to embed multi-agency review processes following the death of someone who is homeless or rough sleeping, even where they do not meet the criteria for a formal Safeguarding Adult Review⁶.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Coordinate Changing Futures pilots to improve joined-up local support for people experiencing multiple disadvantages.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Secondly, my Department is co-ordinating a cross-government initiative to improve the way local public services engage and support people experiencing multiple disadvantages. ‘Changing Futures’ is a £77 million programme piloting innovative approaches across 15 local areas (covering 34 top-tier LAs in England), to join-up local systems and more effectively respond to the needs of people who are experiencing combinations of homelessness, substance misuse, mental health issues, domestic abuse and contact with the criminal justice system. The programme runs to March 2025 with an evaluation underway. I will publish the final learnings and outcomes from the pilots in 2025, and in the meantime interim evaluation reports and learning are published online to help disseminate learning⁷.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support NICE guidance improving access to coordinated, multidisciplinary health and social care for people experiencing homelessness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Department recognises the importance of reducing barriers to services for those experiencing rough sleeping. This is why we supported the development of NICE guidance which provides recommendations on ways to improve access to, and engagement with, health and social care services for people experiencing homelessness. It also provides advice on how commissioners, planners, providers and practitioners across disciplines and agencies can work together as part of a multi-disciplinary team to support and improve outcomes for people experiencing homelessness.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue transforming community mental health services toward personalised care planning, named key workers and multidisciplinary assessment and support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to your concern around waiting times for mental health support, we recognise that NHS mental health services are facing increased levels of demand. This means that some people are facing waiting times that are much longer than we would like in order to access the support they need. Through the NHS Long Term Plan, we are expanding and transforming mental health services to help address this. As part of this, the ongoing transformation of community mental health services sees a move away from the use of Care Programme Approach towards high-quality, personalised care and support planning for all service users in line with the NHS England Comprehensive Model of Personalised Care. This includes a named key worker for all service users with a clearer multidisciplinary team approach to both assess and meet the needs of service users.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 March 2024

    Open published response
  6. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Jacob Michael Nicholas BILLINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jacob Michael Nicholas Billington was unlawfully killed when he was stabbed in the neck during a night out in Birmingham on 6 September 2020. The concerns included inadequate coordination and information-sharing between agencies during the release of a high-risk prisoner with serious mental health difficulties, and a lack of clear cross-agency guidance and understanding of responsibilities.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to coordinate interagency release management and share critical information

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Management of release and lack of interagency working. The management of the perpetrators release was not coordinated and there was inadequate communication between relevant agencies. In effect agencies worked in silos. Critical information is not being shared and agencies work in different IT systems meaning there is no one place where information is collated and hence a comprehensive account of matters known to each agency is not easily available to those professionals who may need to know a high risk prisoner’s whereabouts on release. This concern was reinforced by evidence heard during the inquest that changes made since Jacob's death did not include the resettlement information being given to Mental Health In reach teams in the prison. The failure to share information leads to a concern of future deaths as high risk seriously unwell prisoners may be released without key agencies knowing where they are meaning any are not traced and treated assertively in the community. ”

    Source location

    Jacob Michael Nicholas BILLINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold monthly strategy meetings monitoring first-night accommodation and whether released prisoners’ whereabouts are known to community services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Monthly strategy meetings at the prison show consistently high (c 90%) levels of prisoners released from custody are housed on the first night of their release, so that their whereabouts immediately post release is known to relevant community services.”

    Source location

    Response from G4S Care Justice Services (UK) Ltd
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record travel-warrant destinations and email them to the OMU group for communication to relevant offender managers and agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• At HMP & YOI Parc, a member of the cashiers team issues a travel warrant for each prisoner shortly before they are released from custody. The cashier previously recorded on CMS, the prison’s central electronic messaging system, the fact that a travel warrant had been issued. The cashier now records where the travel warrant has been issued to, and, in addition, sends an email to a new OMU email group, which includes healthcare admin and the Heads of Offender Management, to indicate that a travel warrant has been issued with details of where the travel warrant has been issued to. This email is automatically received by all offender managers within OMU. This information is then communicated to the Community Offender Manager and any other individuals/agencies involved with the prisoner.”

    Source location

    Response from G4S Care Justice Services (UK) Ltd
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require offender managers to notify Community Offender Managers about sentence-end releases involving no fixed abode and provide release-destination information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Whilst Community Offender Managers have responsibility for the coordination of release planning, notice was given by email to all offender managers within HMP & YOI Parc that they must notify the relevant Community Offender Manager when a prisoner is being released at sentence end date and will be of no fixed abode. When doing so, they must provide any information relating to a prisoner’s intentions in terms of where they are going on the day of release. This will assist the Community Offender Manager to effectively manage the prisoner’s release, and to coordinate and link in with other external agencies believed by the Community Offender Manager to be relevant to coordinate interagency working.”

    Source location

    Response from G4S Care Justice Services (UK) Ltd
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue streamlining internal data recording so information is shared through the national prisons IT system, DPS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The HMPPS primary national electronic records system used in all prisons in England and Wales is DPS (formerly PNOMIS). Other agencies involved in OMU and resettlement utilise other records systems, including NDel ius (the Probation Service), SystmOne/other electronic clinical records systems, and other records systems used by third party providers. G4S has no power to implement changes to streamline IT systems used by HMPPS, the NHS and/or other third party providers. Other interested persons may be better able to assist HM Senior Coroner in relation to this issue. G4S will, however, continue to streamline its own data recording, to ensure as much information as possible is shared through the primary national prisons IT system, DPS. G4S has very limited access to NDel ius, but information on this system is regularly accessible to Probation Service”

    Source location

    Response from G4S Care Justice Services (UK) Ltd
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include the BSMHFT MAPPA Clinical Lead in developing a sustainable MAPPA engagement strategy and identifying alternative arrangements for gaps.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Deputy Medical Director chaired an initial scoping meeting in response to these issues identified by the PFD on 10th April 2024, culminating in agreement on 3 primary areas of focus:”

    Source location

    Response from BSMHFT
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Prison In-reach and CMHT interaction process, complete a gap analysis and develop a plan to strengthen continuity of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Interface between Prison In-reach and the CMHT- A comprehensive review of the current interaction process between the Prison In-reach team and the CMHT is planned. This will involve a detailed gap analysis to determine areas needing strengthening. We aim to develop a clear plan to enhance this interface, thereby improving continuity of care and ensuring that individuals receive the necessary support as they transition from prison to community-based services.”

    Source location

    Response from BSMHFT
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an improved referral and discharge procedure through the updated standard operating protocol.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the meantime we can offer you assurances that since the events that culminated in Mr Billington’s death the Trust has improved the structure and supervision surrounding the prison discharge coordinator roles, such that the practitioners have weekly supervision with opportunity to escalate cases of concern, and an improved system of referrals and discharge procedures, reflected in the updated standard operating protocol. This means that in the event of a similar situation occurring again, there would be sufficient structure to ensure and support the flexibility in service provision to prevent such an individual falling between services, even where they had been discharged from active multiagency management by MAPPA.”

    Source location

    Response from BSMHFT
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Approach SystemOne to discuss the feasibility of adding a local field for community mental health team information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Systemone Whilst this point is an issue which will need to be addressed at a more national level by other Interested Parties, the Trust has also looked at its own Systemone interface in HMP Birmingham to see if this can be amended locally.”

    Source location

    Response from BSMHFT
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold formal admission handovers and pre-release meetings with transferring mental-health teams or prisons and relevant agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Formal hand over of care is received from the transferring Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) or previous prison via a formal meeting”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct multidisciplinary pre-discharge reviews and formal pre-release planning meetings four to six weeks before known release dates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Discharge to Community”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide documented discharge summaries and comprehensive handovers to primary care, general practitioners, patients and, with consent, probation officers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Formal discharge meeting is also held between the MHIR and Primary Care Teams when patients / prisoners within the prison setting are being discharged from secondary care services (MHIR) back to primary care services within the prison. This meeting includes a full”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use weekly discharge information, prison NOMIS access and a Governor Grade officer at Single Point of Access meetings to verify release dates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• On a weekly basis the MHIR Team are sent the discharge information of prisoners from the Offender Management Unit (OMU). We don’t request travel warrant information as the travel warrant is only issued on the day of travel. We also now have access to the prison NOMIS system which we didn’t previously (training for use is being rolled out to the whole team with 50% already achieved). This system is updated by the Resettlement Team and OMU regarding release dates. These layered approaches help to avoid the risk of the team not being aware of relevant information”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue updating ViSOR records for each individual so information can be shared across agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Visor is the shared IT system accessible to numerous agencies. West Midlands Police will ensure we continue to update Visor records for each individual to ensure information can be shared across agencies.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with agencies to clarify key roles and systems, improve information sharing and management, and protect the public.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will work with all agencies to understand key roles and systems to better share information, manage individuals and protect the public.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Visit managed offenders after prison release regardless of their MAPPA process status.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, as explained in evidence during the inquest: West Midlands Police’s approach to visiting managed offenders has changed since Mr Billington’s death. The position now is that a West Midlands Police officer will try to visit a managed offender when they are released from prison, regardless of the status of the MAPPA process.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide policing support to partners concerning high-risk prisoners with mental health difficulties released at sentence end.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This issue will be addressed by HMPPS, however we will ensure we provide support from a policing perspective to partners in relation to high-risk prisoners with mental health difficulties at their sentence end date. From a policing perspective, it is important to note that the IT systems now in place (as described in evidence during the inquest) have changed meaning that there are now better opportunities to identify someone if they have been assessed as being at an increased risk to themselves or others.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and reissue the sentence-end-date release practice document, and embed its expectations in staff development sessions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For a prisoner to still be detained in custody at the point of sentence expiry is usually as a result of them having been recalled to custody. This means they remain the responsibility of the Probation Community Offender Manager (COM) until the point of release at the sentence end date (SED). There is no statutory authority for Probation supervision of a prisoner released into the community at SED. The sharing of information prior to release into the community in an effective manner with relevant agencies is therefore of paramount importance. The Probation Service West Midlands has a practice document which sets out the expectations for Practitioners when cases are being released at SED. This document has been revised and reissued to all staff and embedded in development sessions delivered by the Regional Quality Team.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue reviewing and refining MAPPA practices to improve interagency working and risk-information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “MAPPA arrangements are overseen by a Strategic Management Board (SMB) and in the West Midlands this Board will continue to review and refine practices to ensure interagency working is effective and to support the sharing of relevant risk information. The findings in this case have been presented to MAPPA SMB. The SMB is committed to ensuring their part in providing avenues to share information. Furthermore, the SMB has reinforced the statutory requirement for all duty to cooperate agencies in the MAPPA arena.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce the statutory information-sharing requirement for MAPPA duty-to-cooperate agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “MAPPA arrangements are overseen by a Strategic Management Board (SMB) and in the West Midlands this Board will continue to review and refine practices to ensure interagency working is effective and to support the sharing of relevant risk information. The findings in this case have been presented to MAPPA SMB. The SMB is committed to ensuring their part in providing avenues to share information. Furthermore, the SMB has reinforced the statutory requirement for all duty to cooperate agencies in the MAPPA arena.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Promote the NHS Reconnect Service to probation practitioners to support referrals for through-the-gate transition support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS-England are commissioned to provide healthcare in Prisons. The sharing of information between health in custody and health in the community is a core feature of the nationally rolled out NHS-England Reconnect Service. West Midlands Probation Service has actively promoted the Reconnect Service with Probation Practitioners in recent months to ensure they are aware of how to refer into this service in Prison for support “through the gate”, the transition period from prison into the community.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    G4S cannot influence release management or interagency working at private prisons operated by other providers or HMPPS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, G4S has no power to influence the management of release of prisoners from, and/or to ensure interagency working at, private prisons operated by other providers or HMPPS operations.”

    Source location

    Response from G4S Care Justice Services (UK) Ltd
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    HMPPS is responsible for providing and operating resettlement services, which are delivered by HMPPS-commissioned external providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HMPPS has responsibility for provision and operation of resettlement services. Such resettlement services at HMP & YOI Parc are commissioned by HMPPS from external providers who are based within the prison to facilitate resettlement services for prisoners approaching release from custody. G4S is not party to the procurement or placement of resettlement services within HMP & YOI Parc or the direct delivery of these services. G4S’ focus is on ensuring alignment and integration with third party service providers to ensure effective interagency working.”

    Source location

    Response from G4S Care Justice Services (UK) Ltd
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    G4S cannot implement changes to streamline IT systems used by HMPPS, the NHS and third-party providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The HMPPS primary national electronic records system used in all prisons in England and Wales is DPS (formerly PNOMIS). Other agencies involved in OMU and resettlement utilise other records systems, including NDel ius (the Probation Service), SystmOne/other electronic clinical records systems, and other records systems used by third party providers. G4S has no power to implement changes to streamline IT systems used by HMPPS, the NHS and/or other third party providers. Other interested persons may be better able to assist HM Senior Coroner in relation to this issue. G4S will, however, continue to streamline its own data recording, to ensure as much information as possible is shared through the primary national prisons IT system, DPS. G4S has very limited access to NDel ius, but information on this system is regularly accessible to Probation Service”

    Source location

    Response from G4S Care Justice Services (UK) Ltd
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issues concerning information sharing on NDelius should be addressed to HMPPS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The HMPPS primary national electronic records system used in all prisons in England and Wales is DPS (formerly PNOMIS). Other agencies involved in OMU and resettlement utilise other records systems, including NDel ius (the Probation Service), SystmOne/other electronic clinical records systems, and other records systems used by third party providers. G4S has no power to implement changes to streamline IT systems used by HMPPS, the NHS and/or other third party providers. Other interested persons may be better able to assist HM Senior Coroner in relation to this issue. G4S will, however, continue to streamline its own data recording, to ensure as much information as possible is shared through the primary national prisons IT system, DPS. G4S has very limited access to NDel ius, but information on this system is regularly accessible to Probation Service”

    Source location

    Response from G4S Care Justice Services (UK) Ltd
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National Systemone interface issues must be addressed by other Interested Parties, although the Trust is exploring a local amendment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Systemone Whilst this point is an issue which will need to be addressed at a more national level by other Interested Parties, the Trust has also looked at its own Systemone interface in HMP Birmingham to see if this can be amended locally.”

    Source location

    Response from BSMHFT
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A unified prison interagency IT system cannot be implemented because the Health Board lacks the necessary power.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Swansea University Health Board recognise that there is not a shared database for interagency working in place across England and Wales prison establishments to enable the transfer and access to key information by agencies coordinating the discharge of high risk individuals.”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaison with MAPPA is the Offender Management Unit’s responsibility, while the Responsible Authority must notify Health and arrange relevant meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of MAPPA, Swansea Bay University Health Board undertake the role of a ‘Duty to Cooperate Agency’ with Probation, HMP and the Police as the Responsible Authority – it is the Responsible Authority’s responsibility to inform Health if a MAPPA eligible individual is scheduled for discharge and ensure we are invited to relevant meetings to coordinate release / discharge management. The MHIR Team liaise directly with the prison based Offender Management Unit and not directly with MAPPA. Liaison with MAPPA is the responsibility of the Offender Management Unit.”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response
  7. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Alan William Rowland Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan William Rowland Smith developed severe leg swelling associated with venous insufficiency and probable venous thrombosis, followed by an infected leg and rapid deterioration. He died at Stepping Hill Hospital on 17 September 2023. The concerns included delayed recognition of the severity of his condition, late referral to vascular and district nursing services, poor communication across services, and failure to follow advice about a dermatology referral.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor communication and fragmented input across trusts

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The evidence before the inquest was that there were multiple specialisms across multiple GM Trusts with different IT systems involved in Mr Smith’s care. As a consequence communication was poor with a limited understanding of his overall condition and fragmented input. The inquest was told that a framework that promoted a structure for a multi-disciplinary team approach across trusts in GM would avoid many of the challenges around information sharing across trusts. ”

    Source location

    Alan William Rowland Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the GM Care Record webpage and relaunch the system to raise awareness of its information-sharing capabilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a ‘joint’ care record that exists across Greater Manchester (the GM Care Record) which holds information from various organisations including GP Practices, Acute Trusts, Adult Social Care (Local Authority) and Mental Health Trusts. Most clinicians have access to this system and to provide an indication of how often it is used, in February 2024, 708 individual acute trust staff accessed records 12,715 times, viewing 8,243 patients.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update GM Care Record eLearning to support access to and use of the system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst data tells us that the system is being accessed and patient information being appropriately shared via the GM Care Record, it is acknowledged that not all health care professionals are accessing the benefits of this system. With this in mind, there is a programme of work currently underway with a plan to update the web page and re-launch the GM Care Record in early June 2024. The re-launch aims to raise awareness further and I can confirm that eLearning has been updated in addition to which additional training will be provided on how to access and use the system.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide additional training on how to access and use the GM Care Record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst data tells us that the system is being accessed and patient information being appropriately shared via the GM Care Record, it is acknowledged that not all health care professionals are accessing the benefits of this system. With this in mind, there is a programme of work currently underway with a plan to update the web page and re-launch the GM Care Record in early June 2024. The re-launch aims to raise awareness further and I can confirm that eLearning has been updated in addition to which additional training will be provided on how to access and use the system.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response
  8. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Oliver Beswetherick · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Oliver Beswetherick, who had a history of depression, bulimia and bipolar affective disorder, was found dead after falling from his flat on 4 September 2020. The report raised concern that mental health crisis teams did not have contact details for psychiatric liaison services and crisis teams in neighbouring boroughs, hindering direct referrals and the sharing of case information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of contact details for neighbouring psychiatric liaison and crisis mental health teams

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) It became evidence during the inquest that CMHT/ Crisis teams do not have contact details of: (i) Psychiatric liaison nurse services in neighbouring (out of their locality) boroughs based in Accident & Emergency departments, or details of (ii) CMHT/ crisis teams in neighbouring boroughs. Such contact could provide for direct referral, contact and passing on of knowledge of cases between neighbouring organisations, especially when individuals have already been assessed and asked to attend for a face-to-face consultation. Otherwise, those individuals who seek help, may have to revisit the same process of being interviewed on multiple occasions with a sense of déjà vu and anxiety that they are not obtaining the urgent assistance and support that they require. That may lead to them not engaging when they had hitherto made every attempt to do so. To provide those contact details would seem a relatively simple task, so teams could contact each other, and the local psychiatric liaison nurses based within the A&Es. ”

    Source location

    Mr Oliver Beswetherick · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing NHS Service Finder and website directories provide professionals with current neighbouring mental health service contact details and referral information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report raises the concern that Community Mental Health and Crisis Teams do not have the contact details of Psychiatric Liaison, Community Mental Health, and Crisis Teams within neighbouring boroughs.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 February 2024

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Susan Wendy Bracegirdle · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Susan Wendy Bracegirdle, who had limited mobility and lived in a care home, developed a stage 3 pressure ulcer that deteriorated and was associated with osteomyelitis and sepsis. She died in hospital on 9 February 2023 after treatment was unsuccessful. Concerns included inadequate information sharing and joint working between district nurses, care staff, the GP, the family and the Tissue Viability team, which increased the risk that deterioration would not be recognised or managed promptly.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide the GP with sufficient information about pressure-ulcer deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The GP was asked to provide input. Due to a lack of information sharing the GP who dealt with Mrs Bracegirdle does not seem to have appreciated the extent of the issue and as a consequence there was no face-to-face examination and antibiotics were not started. ”

    Source location

    Susan Wendy Bracegirdle · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss with the nursing team the importance of following up concerns and actions directly with GPs rather than relying on care-home staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the Trust review of the pressure ulcer review, an area of learning was identified in relation to communication with the GP and an action was taken: This was to discuss with the nursing team the importance of following up any concerns or actions with the GP and not to rely on carers to ensure this is done. Since this rapid review, there have been no further incidents in relation to contact with GP practices.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Follow up actions establishing clear responsibility for escalating wound-care concerns to GPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The district nursing notes dated 09 December 2022 refer to the wound having a strong malodour and heavy grey-yellow exudate. It was recorded “follow up with the GP as I suspect the wound is infected”. However, it is not clear whether the district nurses or care home staff had the responsibility for doing this. The second rapid review undertaken by the district nurse team leader on 16 December 2022 identified that there was no evidence that the concerns were escalated to the GP and a referral to the GP was only made on 13 December 2022, at which time antibiotics were commenced for a wound infection. Action arising from the rapid review was to discuss with the district nursing team the importance of following up any concerns or actions with the GP and not relying on the care staff to ensure this is done.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The registered GP had access to current District Nursing information through the shared electronic record, contrary to the concern that information was unavailable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Members of the District Nursing Team input their clinical notes onto the Emis clinical system; these notes are visible to a patient’s GP as they use the same clinical system. This does ensure that the registered GP does have access to full details of all District Nurse visits and treatments. This would include confirmation of referral to Tissue Viability Service and access to any wound photographs which may have been taken as these are uploaded into Emis.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 5 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The GP could reasonably expect tissue viability specialists to lead pressure-ulcer treatment and advise the GP if treatment became ineffective.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The GP was asked to provide input. Due to a lack of information sharing the GP who dealt with Mrs Bracegirdle does not seem to have appreciated the extent of the issue and as a consequence there was no face-to-face examination and antibiotics were not started.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response
  10. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Philip David Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip David Taylor had mental health difficulties, was admitted to a private psychiatric unit outside the NHS North Wales area, and died by suicide at home on 23 August 2023 after discharge to the Home Treatment Team. The concerns included inadequate information sharing and coordination between the Health Board and the private unit, including delayed or missing discharge documentation and no agreed written standards for communication and documentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share relevant clinical information between the Health Board and out-of-area psychiatric facilities

    Wider context from the report

    “a. The Health Board utilises facilities out of area for acute psychiatric care when there are no available beds in the NHS in North Wales. I was informed that the patients, however, remain the responsibility of the Health Board. During the deceased’s time at Ty Grosvenor it does not appear that any/all relevant information was shared between the two organisations e.g. deceased’s progress, medication, treatment etc, except for few telephone conversations. ”

    Source location

    Philip David Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of agreed minimum information-sharing standards between the Health Board and private psychiatric facilities

    Wider context from the report

    “e. There was no evidence at Inquest of any written agreement or standard operating procedure or similar between the Health Board and private facility as to minimum standard requirements or expectations between both organisations e.g. what documentation should be shared, how it is to be shared, when documentation should be shared, the timeliness of sharing documentation etc. f. It is concerning that such minimum standards are not set out and agreed between the Health Board and this private psychiatric unit in a situation where many patients are likely to be treated there. It is not known whether or not such minimum standards or Agreement exists with other out of area private units. g. In the event that patients are to be treated in private units out of the area then there will be a risk of future deaths if such minimum standards regarding sharing of information and communication are not set and agreed between the Health Board and private facility. There had been no consideration of this as part of the actions arising from the Health Board’s own investigation. ”

    Source location

    Philip David Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standard operating procedure governing information sharing, repatriation and discharge planning, and key documentation for out-of-area acute placements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The learning from the inquest of Mr Taylor has identified that a standard operating procedure is required (SoP) and must include the requirements for sharing information, joined up planning for repatriation and/or discharge and standards for the development and sharing of key documentation.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch and implement the fully ratified standard operating procedure for out-of-area acute placements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A multi-disciplinary task and finish group has been established, chaired by the Head of Integrated strategy and development, who is leading on the development of the SoP in collaboration with both operational and clinical teams. Progress will be overseen by the MHLD Policy and Procedure Group. Following ratification, the Task and Finish Group will oversee the launch and implementation of the SoP and compliance with the SoP will be monitored through established local and divisional Putting Things Right Meetings. I am advised that the SoP will be fully ratified by the end of August 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor compliance with the standard operating procedure through local and divisional Putting Things Right meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A multi-disciplinary task and finish group has been established, chaired by the Head of Integrated strategy and development, who is leading on the development of the SoP in collaboration with both operational and clinical teams. Progress will be overseen by the MHLD Policy and Procedure Group. Following ratification, the Task and Finish Group will oversee the launch and implementation of the SoP and compliance with the SoP will be monitored through established local and divisional Putting Things Right Meetings. I am advised that the SoP will be fully ratified by the end of August 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concern that Elysium failed to share discharge information is factually incorrect; Betsi was informed by telephone and emailed relevant records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Not sharing information except a few telephone calls That is not a fair reflection of the factual position. The reality is:-”

    Source location

    Response from Elysium Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The described processes did not create a future-death risk for Elysium because information was provided and Betsi had time to intervene.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. This is, therefore, as far as Elysium is concerned, not a case where the facts suggest a risk of future deaths in relation to the role of Elysium. Mr Taylor was an informal patient and was assessed as low risk. His details were already well known to Betsi who had summarised his position when referring him to Elysium in the first place. They had been informed by”

    Source location

    Response from Elysium Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The framework agreement and internal policy adequately govern information sharing; concurrent discharge letters are not contractually required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Elysium internal policy is to ensure the relevant information is given to home teams so that they can follow up within 72 hours (as was done here). In case it is of assistance to put the issue in context, the contract we have with Surrey requires that information only within 5 days of discharge.”

    Source location

    Response from Elysium Healthcare
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026