Recurring concern

Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the inter-agency care information-sharing system, including inadequate arrangements, communication channels, shared records or contact mechanisms when these prevent timely access to relevant care, needs or risk information between agencies.

Not included

  • Excludes information-sharing failures unrelated to coordination between agencies supporting a person.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's records, assessment, documentation or communication process unless the report directly links them to inter-agency information sharing.
  • Excludes generic staffing, confidentiality, policy or technology deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the unsafe inter-agency information-sharing condition.
  • Excludes hazards involving public access to harmful information or physical communication and rescue equipment.
Reports
212

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
235

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
492

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care57
NHS England39
Ministry of Justice14
Home Office11
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership9
HM Prison and Probation Service8
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board8
Care Quality Commission7
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust7
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Metropolitan Police Service6
College of Policing5
Greater Manchester Police5
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Emma Day · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emma Day died in the street on 26 May 2017 from multiple stab wounds and was found to have been unlawfully killed. The report describes a history of domestic violence, coercive and controlling behaviour, threats to her life and protective orders that had expired shortly before her murder. Principal concerns included failures to share and record risk information, inadequate domestic-violence training and guidance, and a system failure in handling reports of domestic violence within the Child Maintenance Service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify all children when sharing risk information

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The Metropolitan Police Service did not mention the Non-Molestation Order in the Merlin Report, and when shared with Lambeth CSC only one of the children was mentioned. ”

    Source location

    Emma Day · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of case-record access and handover of key domestic-violence risk information

    Wider context from the report

    “The Coroner concluded that there was a system failure in Child Maintenance Service of Department of Work and Pensions in handling reports of domestic violence. a) There was no mutual access of case records or system of handing on key risk information between CMO and CMS and so the eliciting of domestic violence risks relies upon repeated self-reporting by a victim. ”

    Source location

    Emma Day · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Alan Howard Foster Griffin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan Howard Foster Griffin died by suicide at home on 8 November 2020 while under investigation by his former and current dioceses. The principal concerns were systemic and individual failings in the handling of unverified allegations, including inadequate verification, inaccurate and incomplete information-sharing, unclear responsibility, and failure to seek recommended legal advice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure accurate and complete cross-organisation safeguarding communications

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The safeguarding adviser who was tasked by the safeguarding manager with dealing with investigation, thought that an approach should be made to Father Griffin by a member of the clergy on a welfare basis. She told me she had thought that the church’s involvement should simply be about supporting a vulnerable man. She emailed the archdeacon asking him if the clergy could make an approach to Father Griffin, but such an approach did not take place, and so she herself spoke briefly to Father Griffin to make initial contact. During this brief conversation, Father Griffin explained that he was now a Roman Catholic priest, so the safeguarding adviser sent an email to her Roman Catholic safeguarding counterpart. The email disclosed Father Griffin’s HIV status; it was inaccurate as to detail; it did not properly represent her view of the allegations; and it did not include reference to the fact that Father Griffin had attempted suicide when diagnosed as HIV+ approximately nine years earlier. She told me that the errors she made within this email were the consequence of her concurrent very difficult personal circumstances, in the context of short staffing. The email was seen by the archdeacon and the safeguarding manager before it was sent, but neither made any substantive amendment. Insufficient regard was paid to ensuring scrupulous accuracy, and completeness of relevant information, in the communication with a different organisation. There seemed almost to be a lack of recognition that the Roman Catholic Church was a different organisation. ”

    Source location

    Alan Howard Foster Griffin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct an independent external Lessons Learned Review of safeguarding and conduct handling, including information management, risk assessment, casework and inter-church sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We aim to agree the Terms of Reference by early September with the intention of the Lessons Learned Review ("the Review") beginning in September 2021. The purpose and objectives of the Review are currently as follows:”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Church-of-England_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Design and implement improved systems for capturing, triaging, recording, assessing and appropriately sharing safeguarding and conduct information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Our new Head of Safeguarding has already started working with the team to design and implement new systems of information capture, triage, recording, assessment and appropriate sharing of safeguarding and conduct matters. These issues will form part of our overarching improvement plan.”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Church-of-England_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver safeguarding-specific GDPR training and strengthen recording, auditing and lawful, proportionate information-sharing practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Delivering additional GDPR training specific to safeguarding to ensure staff in the Diocesan Safeguarding Team are competent and confident to ensure information that is shared is recorded and audited, and that the principles of information sharing are applied lawfully and proportionately. In due course this will be delivered to senior staff involved in handling personal and safeguarding related data to support their practice and decision making.”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Church-of-England_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement formal information-sharing protocols and agreements for safeguarding information with relevant statutory, faith and partner organisations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This project seeks to strengthen information sharing arrangements by putting in place an information sharing protocol and information sharing agreement in place for safeguarding information. The project was established as a result of a recommendation from the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) to focus on sharing information with the Church of Wales and statutory agencies. We will work with the Roman Catholic Church to implement a similar information sharing agreement.”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Church-of-England_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Collaborate with the Church of England to create and implement information-sharing and unresolved-concern escalation processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Inter-agency working The CSSA has consulted with the Church of England National Safeguarding Team and agreed that we will collaborate on creating and implementing an Information Sharing Agreement between the two denominations, and a process for escalation of concerns where matters cannot be resolved by the respective safeguarding teams.”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Catholic-Safeguarding-Standards-Agency_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Darrell Spear · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darrell Leonard Spear died in a fire at his home on 22 September 2020. The fire was probably accidental and accelerated by extensive hoarding and an open conservatory door. Concerns included poor communication and information sharing between agencies, and the absence of a clear strategy to address the fire risk associated with self-neglect and hoarding.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor inter-agency information sharing

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The evidence before the inquest suggested that communication between agencies was poor in relation to information sharing and that there was no clear strategy to address the risk presented to both Mr Spear and his wife. ”

    Source location

    Darrell Spear · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough

    AI-generated summary

    SAMANTHA JANE GOULD (Sam) · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sam took a very large quantity of prescribed medication at home in the early hours of 2 September 2018 and died within at most a couple of hours. The local pharmacy had not been told about a safety plan under which Sam’s parents were responsible for her medication. The report identified a concern that, without national action to ensure pharmacies are involved in medication safety plans for mental health patients aged 16–17, similar fatalities could occur.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of national guidance or standards for sharing medication risk information and care plans with local pharmacies

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There did not appear to be any national guidance or standards that directed or encouraged appropriate sharing of risk information and care plans with the local pharmacy. As a result, the pharmacy was unsighted on the fact that the treating psychiatric team had a safety plan involving Sam’s parents being responsible for handling and administering all medication. Had the pharmacy been aware of this plan, it is likely that they would have refused to provide the medication with which Sam overdosed or, at least, contacted Sam’s parents or General Practitioner. (2) A local protocol has now been introduced whereby the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Foundation Trust’s Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service ensures that any pharmacy used regularly by their patients aged 16-17 are (where appropriate) advised of relevant care plans, as well as the responsible GP being so informed. This is now to be part of mandatory training for CAMHS prescribing staff and is to be discussed in the local Joint Prescribing Group to ensure better communication between the local NHS Trusts, G.P.s and local pharmacies. Accordingly, action has already been taken in the local area to prevent similar fatalities. However, (3) I am concerned that there is a risk of future fatalities if action is not taken at a national level to ensure that pharmacies are appropriately involved in medication safety plans for mental health patients aged 16 – 17, given that such patients may otherwise be able to obtain prescribed medication with which to overdose. ”

    Source location

    SAMANTHA JANE GOULD (Sam) · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a working group to develop a national approach to sharing medication-safety information with community pharmacies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have set out in the annex some information that is relevant to this tragic incident and if used appropriately will help us ensure the risk of this tragic incident happening again is minimised. To assist in this I have asked Dr ████████, Deputy Chief Pharmaceutical Officer, to establish a working group to build on the work of the Joint Prescribing Group you mention, with the aim of rolling it out, or an improved approach, across the country within the next 6 months, and then subsequently to ensure that facilities like the Summary Care Record and other digital means are used to their full benefit.”

    Source location

    2021-0186-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue campaigning for community-pharmacy access to and sharing of patient health records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This is an active area in which the RPS continues to campaign. We believe access and sharing of patient health records for community pharmacies is really important and recognising pharmacists have a legitimate need to access patient health records to improve patient outcomes for patients.”

    Source location

    2021-0186-Response-from-RPS_Published-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish a policy and position statement on patient health records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This is an active area in which the RPS continues to campaign. We believe access and sharing of patient health records for community pharmacies is really important and recognising pharmacists have a legitimate need to access patient health records to improve patient outcomes for patients.”

    Source location

    2021-0186-Response-from-RPS_Published-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish guidance on keeping patients safe when they transfer between care providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also published guidance around keeping patients safe when they transfer between care providers. This is available on our website. https://www.rpharms.com/resources/quick-reference-guides/keeping-patients-safe”

    Source location

    2021-0186-Response-from-RPS_Published-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS and CAMHS organisations are responsible for making changes to prevent deaths involving pharmacy communication and medication safety plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We believe that there is a need for more system leadership in this area noting that pharmacies are often the recipients of information. This Regulation 28 report has been addressed to pharmacy organisations, and there is parallel need for organisations representing the NHS and CAMMHS services to make changes to prevent deaths.”

    Source location

    2021-0186-Response-from-RPS_Published-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Direct action is outside the remit because the organisation does not operate pharmacies or set standards and guidance for pharmacy operators.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CCA represents the interests of its members and provides a forum to bring together their knowledge, skills, resources, and experience for the benefit of patients and the NHS. The CCA does not operate any community pharmacies, nor do we set standards or provide guidance for our members or other pharmacy operators. As such we are, unfortunately, not in a position to undertake direct action in this regard.”

    Source location

    2021-0186-Response-from-CCA_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changing information-sharing and care-planning processes cannot be undertaken because the relevant organisations lack legislative authority.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This regulation 28 notice raises an important question about sharing of information and the inclusion of community pharmacy in care planning processes. Whilst neither the CCA nor the Patient Safety Group has legislative authority to change processes, we do share your concerns. We will work with the other organisations identified in your report (the GPhC, RPS and NHS England) to further consider how practice can be improved.”

    Source location

    2021-0186-Response-from-CCA_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2021

    Open published response
  5. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Alex Louise Shaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alex Louise Shaw, who had methylmalonic aciduria and chronic kidney failure, died on 22 October 2018 after developing fluid overload, pulmonary oedema and respiratory failure during hospital treatment. The principal concerns were poor communication and documentation of her clinical observations and telephone advice between clinicians at Royal Stoke University Hospital and Birmingham Children’s Hospital, including failure to communicate her rising heart rate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate patients’ clinical condition and observations between clinicians when telephone advice is sought

    Wider context from the report

    “[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] (1) There was poor communication of the patient’s clinical condition/observations between the Registrar at the Royal Stoke University Hospital and the Consultant at the Birmingham Children’s Hospital when advice was sought by telephone. There was also poor documentation of the contents of the information that had been provided during that conversation and the timing of when the call was made. The evidence of the Consultant at the Birmingham Children’s Hospital was that her advice would have been different if she had been made aware of the patient’s rising heart rate. (2) The evidence also revealed it was a “judgment call” when the clinician felt that a dialogue between clinician’s at a different hospital needed to be documented. (3) Consideration should be given as to how a patient’s observations are communicated to the clinician’s between the University Hospital and the Birmingham Children’s Hospital, the time, content, advice and documentation of the conversations. ”

    Source location

    Alex Louise Shaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a structured electronic Paediatric Advice Proforma with mandatory fields and prompts for documenting inter-hospital clinical advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1) The paediatric team are in the process of developing a facility on the Trust electronic Iportal System which will provide a structured note ‘Paediatric Advice Proforma’ to aid electronic documentation of conversations between hospitals when seeking advice on patient care; this will include prompts for important discussion points and will have mandatory fields for vital signs (such as heart rate, BP etc.) which will ensure that the clinician includes such information in conversation. Matters are currently being developed with the IT team and we hope to have a solution by September 2021.”

    Source location

    2021-0141-Response-from-Royal-Stoke-University-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Scope improvements to recording patient information for patients needing specialist advice while off site.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is acknowledged that this will result in inconsistencies in practice and as a result, the Trust’s Chief Clinical Information Officer (CCIO) as Associate Chief Medical Officer for IT and Information, together with the Trust’s Chief Technology Officer and Data Protection Officer for the Trust are scoping how the recording of information pertaining to patients who are not on our premises but who need specialist clinical advice can be improved.”

    Source location

    2021-0141-Response-from-Birmingham-Womens-and-Childrens-NHSFT-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with the Norse supplier to transition to the system’s latest version and additional features.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have a limited deployment of an electronic product called Norse. This facilitates a typed ongoing conversation between a clinician’s at this Trust and at another centre. This system includes some features including an ability for our staff to request baseline information at the start of the conversation and include other clinicians as appropriate in the conversation. At conclusion of the discussion, it is then possible to retain the detail of the dialogue.”

    Source location

    2021-0141-Response-from-Birmingham-Womens-and-Childrens-NHSFT-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out Norse across a number of clinical services to strengthen required documentation of inter-centre clinical advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have a limited deployment of an electronic product called Norse. This facilitates a typed ongoing conversation between a clinician’s at this Trust and at another centre. This system includes some features including an ability for our staff to request baseline information at the start of the conversation and include other clinicians as appropriate in the conversation. At conclusion of the discussion, it is then possible to retain the detail of the dialogue.”

    Source location

    2021-0141-Response-from-Birmingham-Womens-and-Childrens-NHSFT-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 May 2021

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jade Rayner · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jade Nicole Rayner was a vulnerable adult with complex mental and physical health needs, including seizures, alcohol use and fluctuating capacity. She was found unresponsive at home on 30 March 2020 and had a fatal level of prescribed antidepressants and alcohol in her system. Concerns included the absence of an effective multi-agency strategy, failures in recording and investigating a reported sexual offence, and alcohol misuse support that could not meet the needs of a complex case involving underlying trauma.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear multi-agency strategy for supporting complex cases

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest was told that her capacity fluctuated and she was vulnerable. Her social worker reported to Greater Manchester Police and to NWAS that it was believed she had been the victim of a sexual offence involving an employee of NWAS who had initially been to her address in a professional capacity. The inquest heard that NWAS dealt with this robustly through their internal disciplinary process. The inquest was told that GMP did not record it as a crime. The officer giving evidence to the inquest initially gave evidence that GMP had 72 hours to decide if GMP should record a sexual allegation as a crime. It was then indicated that it should have been recorded as a crime. The inquest was told it was not investigated and was written off following a strategy meeting. Jade Rayner was not as a consequence offered by GMP the support set out within the Victims Code. 2. Her case was complex, and the evidence was that there was not a clear multi agency strategy to support her particularly to share information and understand the relationship between earlier Domestic abuse and the subsequent use of alcohol. 3. The evidence was that the existing available alcohol misuse support programmes whilst useful could not meet the needs of a complex case such as this where underlying trauma was a key driver. ”

    Source location

    Jade Rayner · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish two externally facilitated task-and-finish groups to review Section 42 and MAARS/TAA processes within the multi-agency safeguarding rewrite.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CCG confirmed that following a multi-agency workshop it was agreed that two task and finish groups would be set up with an external facilitator to review Section 42 and Multi Agency Adults at Risk System (MAARS)/TAA processes as part of the wider multi agency safeguarding re-write. The task and finish groups are scheduled to meet in May and June 2021.”

    Source location

    2021-0128-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Health-and-Social-Care-Partnership-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 May 2021

    Open published response
  7. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Alan Massam · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan Massam, a resident with dementia, had repeated falls after moving to a dementia residential home and was twice admitted to hospital. After a traumatic brain bleed and rib fractures were identified, he deteriorated and died in hospital on 24 October 2019. Concerns included inadequate information-sharing between agencies, discharge without effective communication or confirmation that the care home could meet his needs, and the absence of a clear escalation process when he refused medication and fluids.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear inter-agency information-sharing arrangements for complex care

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard that the care of Mr Massam was complex due to his needs but there was no clear agreement or arrangement between agencies as to how to effectively share information in complex cases.in his case mental health services were involved as was the acute trust, GP and the care home but there was limited evidence of a joint approach to ensure his care was optimised. This included a limited understanding by those involved of when and how to use of s.9 assessments to reduce the risk to a vulnerable adult such as Mr Massam. ”

    Source location

    Alan Massam · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue driving health and social care integration by removing data-sharing barriers and enabling joint decision-making.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I wish to reassure you that promoting integrated care is a priority for this Government. We are continuing to drive increased integration between health and social care by removing barriers to data sharing and enabling joint decision-making.”

    Source location

    2021-0120-Response-from-Dept-of-Health-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake an unannounced targeted inspection of Lisburne Court covering the concerns raised in the prevention of future death report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Upon receipt of the concerns raised within the Regulation 28 report issued to CQC by the Coroner on 26 April 2021 a decision was made to undertake an unannounced targeted inspection of Lisburne Court. The findings of this inspection will be shared with the Coroner. This will be completed to ensure that the circumstances of Mr Massam’s death do not reflect any ongoing risk to people currently living at the home.”

    Source location

    2021-0120-Response-from-CQC-Redacted
    Page 5 · response
    Published 29 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing shared-system arrangements are considered effective for communicating current information between organisations involved in complex patient discharges.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Point 1 – communication between organisations involved in discharge of complex and vulnerable patients. Stockport CCG has confirmed that communication between the hospital, GP and wider Community Services has improved by the use of a common system allowing the various organisations to see each other’s work. This is reliant on patient consent but works well in practice as it allows information regarding changes in a patient’s circumstances to be updated and immediately accessible to other health and care colleagues. The expectation is that care needs are assessed in a timely manner and information shared to ensure that all involved are acting in the best interest of the”

    Source location

    2021-0120-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Health-and-Social-Care-Partnership-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The relevant Safeguarding Adults Board may undertake a review to identify learning and improvement actions across local agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Act requires each local authority to establish a Safeguarding Adults Board (SAB) to provide assurance that local safeguarding arrangements and partners are acting to support and protect adults who may be at risk of abuse or neglect. These Boards have the authority to carry out a Safeguarding Adult Review (SAR) in instances when serious harm or a fatality has occurred and there is concern that providers could have worked more effectively to have better protected the vulnerable adult.”

    Source location

    2021-0120-Response-from-Dept-of-Health-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Developing policy and procedures for integrated care and communication is outside the regulator’s direct remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst the CQC have no direct remit in developing policy and procedures to support integrated care and optimal communication, during inspection of a service the CQC will look at joint arrangements and how systems work to facilitate the transfer of care from one setting to another. This is considered against Regulation 12 (1) (2) (i) (j) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) regulations 2014 which states;”

    Source location

    2021-0120-Response-from-CQC-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2021

    Open published response
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Ailsa Stewart · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ailsa Stewart, who was bed-bound, lived alone and relied on domiciliary carers, was left without domiciliary care after her care package was suspended following a hospital assessment. She was found gravely ill at home on 29 April 2019 and subsequently died in hospital; the inquest recorded that her death was from natural causes, contributed to by neglect. The report identified concern that there was no cohesive national framework or guidance governing suspension of domiciliary care packages and the communication of responsibilities between agencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of specific rules allocating agency responsibilities for conveying information when vulnerable patients are sent home from urgent care without admission

    Wider context from the report

    “The court heard evidence as to an extensive range of actions which local agencies have taken in response to Ms Stewart’s death to try and reduce the risk of a similar set of circumstances occurring again. That said, it was clear from the evidence that in England, family members play an essential part in ensuring continuity of care is maintained by sharing information between different agencies, and facilitating the co-ordination of care provided to vulnerable patients, particularly in circumstances where unplanned hospital attendances are required. It is a matter of concern that no cohesive national framework or guidance exists across health and social care, to prescribe the circumstances in which a domiciliary care package can be suspended, or sets out specific rules as to the roles and responsibilities of particular agencies to convey information when a vulnerable patient is sent home from an urgent care setting without having formally been admitted. ”

    Source location

    Ailsa Stewart · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Because the patient was technically not admitted, the Trust did not need to invoke its hospital discharge process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHSE and NHSI have informed my officials that technically Ms Stewart had not been admitted to hospital and it was therefore not necessary for the Trust to invoke their discharge process.”

    Source location

    2021-0110-Response-from-Department-of-Health-Social-Care-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2021

    Open published response
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Agnès Blandine Marthe MARCHESSOU · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Agnès Marchessou had experienced fragile mental health for four or five years before her death. After her arrest on 4 July 2020, she was knocked over by a bus on 8 July and taken to hospital. The principal concerns were that police did not pass key information about the incident and her stated reasons for stepping into the road to ambulance or hospital staff, did not promptly make relevant enquiries or record her potential vulnerability, and showed confusion about the required process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to pass relevant incident and vulnerability information to ambulance and hospital staff

    Wider context from the report

    “The police officer did not pass on this crucial account to the emergency ambulance crew who transported Ms Marchessou to hospital, nor to any of the doctors or nurses at the hospital. 2. Ms Marchessou told the police officers that she had blacked out and could not remember what had happened, then that she thought she had stepped into the road as the result of a panic attack. She also said that she had stepped in front of the bus because she was upset about being denied contact with her children. The police officers did not pass on the crucial information that Ms Marchessou said she had stepped in front of the bus because she was upset about being denied contact with her children, either to the emergency ambulance crew or to the treating doctors or nurses. ”

    Source location

    Agnès Blandine Marthe MARCHESSOU · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve officers’ sharing of vital incident information with colleagues, ambulance crews and medical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Officer 1 interviewed the bus driver at the scene of the collision whilst Officer 2 dealt with Ms Marchessou in the ambulance. This would be normal practice where two parties were involved, with each officer initially dealing with their casualty, witness or other party involved. The senior officer has discussed this incident in detail with Officer 1, providing him with the opportunity to reflect on the decisions he made. It was evident from their discussion that the officer was reflective as he recognised that he would deal with a similar incident differently next time. He would now relay the bus driver’s account to his colleague who was dealing with Ms Marchessou at the scene and subsequently provide this information to the medical staff at the scene and at the hospital.”

    Source location

    2020-0255-Letter-from-Metropolitan-Police-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 December 2020

    Open published response
  10. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Ann Patricia Ellen Schuetz · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Ann Patricia Ellen Schuetz died at Northampton General Hospital on 26 June 2018 following an allergic reaction to Ramipril. The report identifies concerns that her known allergy was not recorded across relevant electronic systems, which allowed Ramipril to be restarted and continued to be prescribed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of primary and secondary care electronic patient systems to share allergy information

    Wider context from the report

    “In the present case, the allergy was not recorded in the appropriate places in the relevant electronic systems. A contributing factor was that that primary and secondary care have a number of different electronic systems in place to manage patient medical information including:- 1. Symphony – Emergency Department system 2. EDN – Electronic Discharge Notification system 3. ePMA – Electronic prescribing system 4. SystemOne – Electronic GP documentation system 5. CAMIS – Overview system which holds such details as ID and all attendances including outpatient One of the root causes according to the Trust’s Investigation report was “the fact that the electronic patient systems used in primary and secondary care did not have the ability to share information and therefore the updated allergy information was required to be inputted manually into each system….” The Trust is continuing to explore the feasibility of having regional central medical records but it is not known if any other Trusts are doing the same. The Investigation report also states that “The CAMIS system currently does not have anywhere to record a patient’s allergies. If a change is to be made to the CAMIS system, this would need to be changed nationally”. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Ann Patricia Ellen Schuetz · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026