Recurring concern

Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the inter-agency care information-sharing system, including inadequate arrangements, communication channels, shared records or contact mechanisms when these prevent timely access to relevant care, needs or risk information between agencies.

Not included

  • Excludes information-sharing failures unrelated to coordination between agencies supporting a person.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's records, assessment, documentation or communication process unless the report directly links them to inter-agency information sharing.
  • Excludes generic staffing, confidentiality, policy or technology deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the unsafe inter-agency information-sharing condition.
  • Excludes hazards involving public access to harmful information or physical communication and rescue equipment.
Reports
212

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
235

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
492

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care57
NHS England39
Ministry of Justice14
Home Office11
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership9
HM Prison and Probation Service8
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board8
Care Quality Commission7
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust7
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Metropolitan Police Service6
College of Policing5
Greater Manchester Police5
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    David Ball · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Ball was found deceased at home on 30 June 2019 after taking methadone and venlafaxine with the intention of taking his own life following delusions and paranoia. His discharge care plan was not fully implemented, including the planned community support. Concerns included poor communication between healthcare departments with separate patient records, and no process to ensure that emails were received or acted upon.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of health care departments to communicate crucial patient information

    Wider context from the report

    “Different health care departments have different patient care records and the departments did not communicate with one another. Evidence was heard that healthcare professionals would have to rely on professional curiosity to ascertain crucial information regarding their patients. The examples used within the Inquest of David Ball were that the Hospital, Social Care and Derbyshire Healthcare all had different patient care records. ”

    Source location

    David Ball · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a shared care record for Derby and Derbyshire to address information-sharing problems across multiple healthcare providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Shared Care Record: A clear plan is in place to bring together a shared care record for Derby and Derbyshire plans to address the problems where there are multiple healthcare providers involved in a person’s care. This work is unlikely to be completed until 2024. In the meantime, there are systems in place to facilitate shared care conversations which include a Mental Health Liaison Team who will share relevant details on request and where appropriate in line with data protection regulations and a Mental Health Risk Triage Assessment Form, in use at Chesterfield Royal Hospital (CRH). This triage assessment form is designed to prompt the professional completing it to contact the Mental Health Liaison Team where a risk is identified.”

    Source location

    2020-0251-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use interim shared-care communication systems, including Mental Health Liaison Team information-sharing and a mental health risk triage assessment form.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Shared Care Record: A clear plan is in place to bring together a shared care record for Derby and Derbyshire plans to address the problems where there are multiple healthcare providers involved in a person’s care. This work is unlikely to be completed until 2024. In the meantime, there are systems in place to facilitate shared care conversations which include a Mental Health Liaison Team who will share relevant details on request and where appropriate in line with data protection regulations and a Mental Health Risk Triage Assessment Form, in use at Chesterfield Royal Hospital (CRH). This triage assessment form is designed to prompt the professional completing it to contact the Mental Health Liaison Team where a risk is identified.”

    Source location

    2020-0251-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Task the Learning from Deaths Forum with considering system improvements alongside the move to a shared care record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Forum will be tasked with considering system improvements complimentary to the move to a Shared Care Record and any recommendations will be escalated nationally through NHS E/I’s Executive Quality Group and associated sub-group which considers learning and improvement from these matters.”

    Source location

    2020-0251-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Coordination and management of discharge care plans fall outside NHS Digital’s area of responsibility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We understand from the request that the discharge care plan was not followed, and this was not recognised. This is an issue of health and social care coordination and management.”

    Source location

    2020-0251-Response-from-NHS-Digital-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A system is unlikely to replace professional curiosity and clinical judgement, which are supported by existing medical and nursing training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Learning from Deaths: in the Midlands a Learning from Deaths Forum has been established which brings together Acute, Community and Mental Health Trusts as well as the Regional Medical Examiner. A suitably anonymised case study of Mr Ball’s experience has been taken to this forum for consideration, shared awareness and learning. It is accepted that “professional curiosity” or clinical judgement plays a major part in determining health risks and it is unlikely that a system can replace such decision-making which is supported by the significant training medical and nursing staff undertake to carry out their roles.”

    Source location

    2020-0251-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 December 2020

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Alfie Gildea · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alfie Gildea sustained catastrophic injuries consistent with being shaken with force while in his father's care on 12 September 2018 and died from his injuries on 14 September 2018. The report identifies concerns about failures by police, children's services, health visiting services and the CPS to recognise, assess, share and act on domestic abuse risks, including coercive and controlling behaviour.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor information sharing and joint risk recognition across statutory agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “12. Information sharing between all of the statutory agencies in particular health; Local Authority and Police was poor. As a result there was no holistic overview of the situation or shared recognition of the risk posed by the perpetrator. Opportunities to use the MARAC framework were not taken. ”

    Source location

    Alfie Gildea · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct district safeguarding-team deep-dive reviews and circulate domestic abuse, child-protection and adults-at-risk triage expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMP's Public Protection Governance Unit has conducted a deep-dive review into the standards used in the triage process of six district safeguarding teams, including information sharing between agencies. The purpose of the review was to understand the methodology and information considered as part of the triage decision making process and how this was recorded. This review identified good practice and areas for development moving forward. Triage expectations for domestic abuse, child protection, and adults at risk have been circulated to districts to set out the standards expected during triage. Moving forward, the Public Protection Governance Unit is working with the People and Development Branch to establish a specific triage training course which will include guidance on information sharing.”

    Source location

    2020-0242-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police-Redacted.pdf
    Page 7 · response
    Published 24 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a specific safeguarding-team triage training course incorporating information-sharing guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMP's Public Protection Governance Unit has conducted a deep-dive review into the standards used in the triage process of six district safeguarding teams, including information sharing between agencies. The purpose of the review was to understand the methodology and information considered as part of the triage decision making process and how this was recorded. This review identified good practice and areas for development moving forward. Triage expectations for domestic abuse, child protection, and adults at risk have been circulated to districts to set out the standards expected during triage. Moving forward, the Public Protection Governance Unit is working with the People and Development Branch to establish a specific triage training course which will include guidance on information sharing.”

    Source location

    2020-0242-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police-Redacted.pdf
    Page 7 · response
    Published 24 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Other named respondents are responsible for addressing the coroner’s concerns; this response covers only broader learning-sharing issues within its remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have noted that your Regulation 28 letter has also been sent to Greater Manchester Police, Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council, Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust, Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust, The Crown Prosecution Service, the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care and I will leave it to the named respondents to address the concerns which you have expressed. My letter therefore addresses the issues that fall within the remit of GMHSCP more widely around how we can share the learning from this case.”

    Source location

    2020-0242-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Health-and-Social-Care-Partnership-Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 December 2020

    Open published response
  3. Newcastle upon Tyne and North Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Ewan Nathanial Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ewan Nathanial Brown was found dead on 30 April 2019 after absconding while awaiting mental health assessment, following concerns about his behaviour and mental health. The inquest concluded that he died by accidental drowning while experiencing an unassessed and untreated psychotic illness. Concerns included gaps in police and health-service information sharing, multiagency coordination, mental health training, and family contact during the missing-person search.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a joint police-health policy for sharing information about vulnerable missing persons with mental health difficulties

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There is no joint policy in place to give guidance to Northumbria Police officers and health professionals in order to enable them to work together and share information about an individual when reported missing, who is classed as vulnerable and is potentially a risk to themselves or others, as a consequence of a mental health difficulty or mental illness. I heard evidence that 30% of missing persons suffer from some form of mental health difficulty. The mental health of a missing person is a crucial aspect of any risk assessment, both in assessing the level of risk they pose to themselves and to others. ”

    Source location

    Ewan Nathanial Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    May Adalaid Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    May Adalaid Miller, aged 95, was attacked by another resident while asleep at Beech House Residential Care Home on 9 February 2020 and died from natural causes precipitated by the assault. The report raised concerns about the lack of safeguarding information sharing between agencies and care facilities, including the absence of a system to share information about the other resident’s risk factors.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain consent for disclosure of safeguarding information to other agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “In light of the data sharing and confidentiality requirements under GDPR, the GP was unable to disclose full information to the Limes or to Beech House about any previous conduct or assessments of ████████. At no time was the family of Mr ████████ asked to sign a letter giving consent to disclosure to other agencies before or after the residency. It was not known whether the GP could have been the central point of contact for all investigative agencies and the Care Homes. It was established during the evidence that multiple investigative agencies may have been aware of Mr ████████’s risk factors but that due to his not having been admitted to Beech House from a registered facility, that information sharing was not possible. Had there been in place a system for sharing safeguarding information with the Limes and Beech House, there may have been an opportunity to safeguard May Miller. ”

    Source location

    May Adalaid Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear central point of contact for investigative agencies and care homes

    Wider context from the report

    “In light of the data sharing and confidentiality requirements under GDPR, the GP was unable to disclose full information to the Limes or to Beech House about any previous conduct or assessments of ████████. At no time was the family of Mr ████████ asked to sign a letter giving consent to disclosure to other agencies before or after the residency. It was not known whether the GP could have been the central point of contact for all investigative agencies and the Care Homes. It was established during the evidence that multiple investigative agencies may have been aware of Mr ████████’s risk factors but that due to his not having been admitted to Beech House from a registered facility, that information sharing was not possible. Had there been in place a system for sharing safeguarding information with the Limes and Beech House, there may have been an opportunity to safeguard May Miller. ”

    Source location

    May Adalaid Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system for sharing safeguarding information with care homes

    Wider context from the report

    “In light of the data sharing and confidentiality requirements under GDPR, the GP was unable to disclose full information to the Limes or to Beech House about any previous conduct or assessments of ████████. At no time was the family of Mr ████████ asked to sign a letter giving consent to disclosure to other agencies before or after the residency. It was not known whether the GP could have been the central point of contact for all investigative agencies and the Care Homes. It was established during the evidence that multiple investigative agencies may have been aware of Mr ████████’s risk factors but that due to his not having been admitted to Beech House from a registered facility, that information sharing was not possible. Had there been in place a system for sharing safeguarding information with the Limes and Beech House, there may have been an opportunity to safeguard May Miller. ”

    Source location

    May Adalaid Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Information-sharing arrangements failing when a person is not admitted from a registered facility

    Wider context from the report

    “In light of the data sharing and confidentiality requirements under GDPR, the GP was unable to disclose full information to the Limes or to Beech House about any previous conduct or assessments of ████████. At no time was the family of Mr ████████ asked to sign a letter giving consent to disclosure to other agencies before or after the residency. It was not known whether the GP could have been the central point of contact for all investigative agencies and the Care Homes. It was established during the evidence that multiple investigative agencies may have been aware of Mr ████████’s risk factors but that due to his not having been admitted to Beech House from a registered facility, that information sharing was not possible. Had there been in place a system for sharing safeguarding information with the Limes and Beech House, there may have been an opportunity to safeguard May Miller. ”

    Source location

    May Adalaid Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact receiving care homes immediately when residents consider residential care and share all available information by telephone and follow-up letter.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On hearing that a resident is considering a move into residential care, contact will be made immediately with the receiving care home and all information will be shared. This would initially be by phone (warden) and would always be followed up in writing (manager)”

    Source location

    2020-0201-Response-from-the-Limes-Residence-Association_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    GP confidentiality means the suitability information received about prospective residents is very limited.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Prospective residents are interviewed by the warden and the manager. A letter of suitability is always obtained from the G.P. but they seemed to be bound by confidentiality and the information is received is very limited.”

    Source location

    2020-0201-Response-from-the-Limes-Residence-Association_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 December 2020

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Gordon Fenton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gordon Fenton, a 70-year-old man detained under the Mental Health Act, developed a urinary tract infection and related complications during periods of care between psychiatric and medical services, and died in hospital on 29 June 2019 after a seizure and cardiac arrest. The principal concerns were inadequate information sharing and the lack of a formal joint decision-making process between the two NHS Trusts, with the inquest finding that this prolonged and contributed to ineffective management of his infection.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reliably and consistently share medical records and information between Trusts

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There does not appear to be a reliable and consistent method of sharing medical records and information between the two Trusts. ”

    Source location

    Gordon Fenton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate joint mental health inpatient transfer and return-transfer pathways covering physical deterioration, chronic conditions and required clinical information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A number of joint pathways have also been created with regards to Mental Health Inpatient Transfers of Care and Return Inpatient Transfers of Care. In terms of transfers of care, the process will be split into three categories;”

    Source location

    2020-0102-Response-from-Tameside-and-Glossop-Integrated-Care_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the joint Standard Operating Procedure for shared physical and mental healthcare of older inpatients requiring medical input.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of our investigation into your concerns, extensive discussions have taken place between Tameside’s Associate Director and Mental Health Quality Lead at PCFT and the Head of Assurance and Governance and Lead Nurse for Mental Health and Learning Disabilities at TGICFT in relation to ongoing improvements in shared service, specifically in relation to creating a formal standard operating ████████ and enhancing services offered by TGICFT.”

    Source location

    2020-0102-Response-from-Pennine-Care-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create and apply structured pathways for acute deterioration, chronic-condition advice, information gathering, and transfers of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A number of pathways have also been created with regards to mental health in-patient transfers of care and return in-patient transfers of care. In terms of transfers of care, the process will be split into three categories;”

    Source location

    2020-0102-Response-from-Pennine-Care-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver and document self-directed training for staff covered by the approved joint SOP.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please note that this SOP remains in its implementation stages as both Trusts are working to align their own pathways with the new arrangement. It is planned that his will go live at the end of August 2020. Once the new SOP is approved by both Trusts, self-directed training will be carried out by all staff to which the SOP is relevant and this training will be documented in their training record.”

    Source location

    2020-0102-Response-from-Pennine-Care-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 May 2020

    Open published response
  6. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Mr. Thomas REILLY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Thomas REILLY visited Beachy Head on 1 October 2019 intending to jump, but changed his mind after receiving support. A safeguarding alert was delayed and then sent to an individual mailbox rather than the appropriate generic mailbox; it was actioned after Mr Reilly had been found dead early on 3 October. The report identified a missed opportunity to prevent his suicide and stated that the safeguarding system was fundamentally flawed and needed urgent review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to route safeguarding alerts to the appropriate generic mental health service mailbox

    Wider context from the report

    “When the police officer arrived back at Eastbourne police station he raised a safeguarding alert. This alert was sent to the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH). When received there it should have triggered fast onward transmission to the appropriate agency to support Mr Reilly. It was received at MASH at 15.33hrs on the 1st October but, although it had been sent as soon as possible after the incident, it was clear from the evidence that it stood no chance of being dealt with on the 1st. (2) The alerts are graded low, medium and high risk. The high risk alerts stand a chance of being dealt with timeously. This was graded medium which was a reasonable assessment. Everything else will be delayed. Indeed the alert for Mr Reilly was not dealt with until 12:40 hours on Friday, the 4th of October. That is after lunch on a Friday. (3) This alert was not dealt with again until Monday, the 7th of October when it was sent to the mailbox of a named mental health social worker ████████ rather than to the Sussex Partnership Foundation Trust generic mailbox where it would have been actioned on the 7th. As it was, it was received by ████████ on the morning of the 8th. She actioned it at once. Too late, Mr Reilly had been found dead early on the 3rd of October. ”

    Source location

    Mr. Thomas REILLY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Shneur Zalman Kaye · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shneur Zalman Kaye died at home on 24 August 2018, aged 14, from suffocation caused by inhalation of helium. The report raises concerns that a safeguarding referral was closed without contacting Shneur or his parents and that the referral and reasons for it were not shared with relevant third parties or agencies, potentially limiting assessment and protective action.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share safeguarding referral information and reasons with relevant third parties, services or agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “2...The evidence received by the Court indicates that the closure of the safeguarding referral marks an end to social services involvement. Despite this no attempt is made to share the fact of the referral or the reasons for it with any third party, service or agency. This may have the unintended result of depriving third parties (including parents) and agencies already participating in the care and welfare of a child from being alerted to the concern and taking appropriate action (including accessing other services) in response to it. The submissions made on behalf of the council indicate these practices are driven by considerations of data protection compliance The practice imperils the precedence to be given to the paramountcy principle and has the potential to undermine the protection of children who are the subject of referral. ”

    Source location

    Shneur Zalman Kaye · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Maureen Waterfall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maureen Waterfall fell at home on 12 July 2019 while taking the anticoagulant Edoxaban and sustained a head injury that led to a subdural haematoma. She died at Willow Wood Hospice on 26 July 2019. Concerns included the lack of a licensed specific antidote for Edoxaban, uncertainty about treatment effectiveness and timing, the absence of national guidance, and the storage of antidote supplies away from the resuscitation unit.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share anticoagulant reversal risks with non-tertiary centres

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The inquest was told that head injury patients who are prescribed Exodaban are at greater risk of continued bleeding to the brain than other patients as the absence of a specific antidote makes the reversal of the anticoagulant medication less certain. As with other newer anticoagulant drugs, there is little ability to monitor the effectiveness of the antidote. It was unclear if that understanding had been shared widely amongst non-tertiary centres to assist them in managing such patients. The inquest was told that, at SRFT which is a tertiary centre for neuro surgery/ neurology they have taken steps to set a target for the use of anticoagulant antidote drugs at 90 minutes from presentation. It was unclear if this target was feeding into development of a national protocol. It was unclear how in the absence of national guidance that information was being shared with DGHs which rely on tertiary centres for expertise. At TGH there was no clear target time for the administration of anti-coagulations. ”

    Source location

    Maureen Waterfall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Helen Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Helen Taylor, who had Down syndrome and significant learning disabilities, died at Stepping Hill Hospital on 23 September 2018 from pneumonitis following a chicken pox virus infection contracted while awaiting discharge. The concerns included inadequate reasonable-adjustment planning, lack of best-interests meetings and documented decision-making, poor communication between agencies, limited access to suitable learning-disability beds and support, information-sharing difficulties, and delayed recognition of chicken pox.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of digital information access between acute and community trusts

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The IT constraints meant that the acute trust could not access the community trusts records. The community trust itself had not fully digitised meaning not all professionals could see each other's notes. The community trust recognised the internal issue and was taking steps to fully roll out an integrated system however communication between trusts digitally was unlikely to improve despite a recognition that it would be beneficial. ”

    Source location

    Julie Helen Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The local NHS is expected to reflect on the LeDeR findings and address local failings in care for people with learning disabilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am advised by NHS England and NHS Improvement that Ms Taylor’s death is currently being reviewed under the LeDeR process and I expect the local NHS to reflect on the findings of the review and take action to address any failings in the care provided locally for people with a learning disability. I have also asked officials to bring your report to the attention of the National Director for Learning Disabilities, Ray James, who is leading work nationally to improve services for people with learning disabilities and/or autism.”

    Source location

    2019-0454-Response-from-the-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Community care matters in Derbyshire fall outside the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You have also identified a number of areas regarding community care in Derbyshire. As Derbyshire does not fall under the remit of the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership we are unable to provide a response to those issues.”

    Source location

    2019-0454-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Health-and-social-Care-Partnership-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 January 2020

    Open published response
  10. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Wedrychowski · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Wedrychowski had paranoid schizophrenia and had been prescribed antipsychotic medication for a number of years. Expert evidence indicated that the medication caused diabetes and contributed to morbid obesity; the medical cause of death was recorded as diabetic ketoacidosis and medication-induced diabetes mellitus. Concerns included whether higher-risk patients should receive more frequent diabetes monitoring and whether physical healthcare findings were adequately shared between primary and secondary care providers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share relevant physical healthcare check results between primary and secondary healthcare providers

    Wider context from the report

    “At both primary and secondary health levels it appeared to have been the view that following initial titration and a period of regular checks, annual monitoring for signs of the development of diabetes should be carried out annually as recommended in NICE guideline CG178. However, expert evidence at the inquest suggested that in cases of individuals with a higher risk of developing diabetes, more regular checks were called for. Further there was evidence to the effect that the results of relevant physical healthcare checks had not been shared between primary and secondary healthcare providers. Thus: (1) I draw to the attention of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence their guidance CG178 and specifically clause 1.3.6.4 thereof and ask them to consider whether to the directive for an annual test of inter alia HbA1c, there might be added the words: “or more frequently in those who have a higher baseline risk for the development of diabetes”. (2) I draw to the attention of Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust with reference to their planned review of their document entitled “Medicines Guideline: Monitoring psychotropic medication” my first paragraph addressed to the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence and ask them to consider adding similar wording to their recommendations with regard to annual review appearing at page 4 of the present document. Secondly, I ask the Trust to consider adding advice in the document to the effect that when a patient is prescribed anti-psychotic medication contact be made with the patient’s GP practice (a) informing them of this fact (b) requesting communication thereafter of any physical health findings that might indicate serious side-effects or potential side-effects of the drugs and (c) communicating any relevant physical health findings to the GP practice as well as mental health findings. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Wedrychowski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026