Recurring concern

Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the inter-agency care information-sharing system, including inadequate arrangements, communication channels, shared records or contact mechanisms when these prevent timely access to relevant care, needs or risk information between agencies.

Not included

  • Excludes information-sharing failures unrelated to coordination between agencies supporting a person.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's records, assessment, documentation or communication process unless the report directly links them to inter-agency information sharing.
  • Excludes generic staffing, confidentiality, policy or technology deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the unsafe inter-agency information-sharing condition.
  • Excludes hazards involving public access to harmful information or physical communication and rescue equipment.
Reports
212

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
235

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
492

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care57
NHS England39
Ministry of Justice14
Home Office11
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership9
HM Prison and Probation Service8
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board8
Care Quality Commission7
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust7
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Metropolitan Police Service6
College of Policing5
Greater Manchester Police5
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Jamie Neil Elliott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jamie Neil Elliott died by hanging at his home on 18 November 2016, with an inquest conclusion of suicide. Before his death, he had expressed clear, detailed and escalating suicidal ideation and had declined offered voluntary inpatient admission. Concerns included failures to contact his private therapist and to provide a face-to-face psychiatric assessment after his condition deteriorated.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to verify treatment information with external mental health service providers

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Mental health clinicians from the Trust should be required to contact external providers of mental health services, if possible, when a patient is receiving treatment elsewhere, particularly when consideration is being given to compulsorily detain that individual. They should not simply take the patient’s account at face value. ”

    Source location

    Jamie Neil Elliott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Distribute guidance to City and Hackney clinical staff on contacting external mental health providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to contact with external providers I can confirm that a memo has been distributed to all clinical staff in City and Hackney highlighting the issue.”

    Source location

    2017-0135-Response-by-East-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 July 2017

    Open published response
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Christiana Pelle · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christiana Pelle developed a grade 4 sacral pressure ulcer while living at home under the care of community nursing and a planned care package. The ulcer became infected, and she later died in hospital after contracting pneumonia while receiving inpatient treatment. The principal concerns were unclear guidance about when nurses should involve a GP and inadequate systems for sharing information and escalating concerns between community nursing, other agencies, and the care provider.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a clearly understood system for sharing relevant community patient information and escalating care-quality concerns between the Community District Nursing Team and partner agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) An ongoing absence of any / any clearly understood system for sharing relevant information relating to a community patient and/or escalating concerns about the quality of the care they were receiving, between Homerton’s Community District Nursing Team and other partner agencies involved - in this instance the Community Mental Health Team from the East London NHS Foundation Trust’s City and Hackney Mental Health Care for Older People and the London Borough of Hackney’s Integrated Independence Team; ”

    Source location

    Christiana Pelle · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Leah Abby Ratheram · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Leah Abby Ratheram, who had autism, foetal alcohol syndrome and a history of self-harm, died after being found hanging from a tree on 7 October 2016. The report raised concerns about the lack of coordinated care and unclear responsibility between mental health organisations, ineffective sharing of records and risk information, and uncertainty about the Mental Health Act assessment process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share and access mental health records effectively between organisations

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Both organisations use different record keeping systems. There is a real risk that information will not be shared effectively and key risk factors will be missed in the handover process. It was unclear how staff from each organisation would access each other’s records when patients present to one or other of the services. ”

    Source location

    Leah Abby Ratheram · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Gloucestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Shane Dean Hardy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shane Dean Hardy, a 29-year-old man with a history of substance misuse and involvement with mental health services, died after placing a belt around his neck and being found hanging from a tree on 8 March 2017. The report raised concerns that people with addiction and mental health difficulties can fall between services, and that agencies supporting an individual may not share information or identify a lead agency for communication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of information sharing between agencies providing support services

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) When multiple agencies are involved in providing support services to an individual, there can be a lack of information sharing between those agencies. No agency is identified as the lead agency for communication purposes. ”

    Source location

    Shane Dean Hardy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Alfie Rose · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alfie Rose, aged 17, died on 09 June 2016 following deterioration from obstructive hydrocephalus, severe brain injury and brain stem death. The report identified poor communication between the two hospitals and inadequate guidance and education for clinicians in outlying hospitals as principal concerns. The inquest concluded that earlier detailed MRI scanning, admission and treatment at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital neurosurgical unit would, on balance, have avoided his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate relevant clinical information between hospitals

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was poor communication between both hospitals in relation to Alfie’s condition and care. Details of his neurosurgical review on 16/05/16 were not made available to Russell’s Hall Hospital. His clinical condition was not relayed to QE hospital on 27/05/16 or morning of 06/06/16. These were vital missed opportunities to transfer him back to QE for treatment. Both Trusts need to look at their communication systems and identify areas for improvement and to clarify if the NORSE system is effective. I heard evidence to suggest that all the NORSE system entries cannot always be seen. ”

    Source location

    Alfie Rose · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct meetings between QEHB and RHH clinical staff to identify communication and referral-system improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important to reflect on the effectiveness of any system when there has been a significant clinical incident. To that end the following meetings have been held to identify areas of concern that could be improved:”

    Source location

    2016-0382-Response-by-The-Dudley-Group-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and agree a detailed cross-Trust action plan addressing identified communication, referral and emergency-management concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Issues Identified:”

    Source location

    2016-0382-Response-by-The-Dudley-Group-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver the agreed cross-Trust action plan to address identified safety concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A detailed action plan has been developed (attached to this letter) and the actions have been agreed by both UHB and DGFT. We have commenced on the delivery of these actions and recorded our progress on the action plan for you information.”

    Source location

    2016-0382-Response-by-The-Dudley-Group-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 October 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct cross-hospital meetings to identify communication and patient-management improvements following the clinical incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important to reflect on the effectiveness of any system when there has been a significant clinical incident. To that end the following meetings have been held to identify areas of concern that could be improved:”

    Source location

    2016-0382-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 October 2016

    Open published response
  6. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Richard Walsh · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Walsh was detained after being charged with attempted murder and, while experiencing delusions, refused food and drink with the stated intention of dying. He was transferred between HMP Highdown and HMP Belmarsh, where he was isolated in a single cell for 23½ hours a day and later died by hanging. The principal concerns were failures in communication and information-sharing between police, mental health, court and prison services, inadequate mental health assessment, and inadequate assessment of his fitness for segregation and suicide risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of detained organisations to pass risk information consistently between one another

    Wider context from the report

    “There was no agreed system for transfer of health care information from police station or court, or from either to prison. There was no functioning and consistent system of passing risk information from one detained organization to another. There was not agreement whether there just was a duty to pass the information or if it was not in possession, whether there was also one to ask for it and if so which individual bore that responsibility. ”

    Source location

    Richard Walsh · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear responsibility for passing or seeking relevant information

    Wider context from the report

    “There was no agreed system for transfer of health care information from police station or court, or from either to prison. There was no functioning and consistent system of passing risk information from one detained organization to another. There was not agreement whether there just was a duty to pass the information or if it was not in possession, whether there was also one to ask for it and if so which individual bore that responsibility. ”

    Source location

    Richard Walsh · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide AMHP guidance on confidential information sharing with GP practices and prison healthcare.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Coroner report has highlighted the need for a national process for information sharing in view of the role, in this case, of general practice and/ or prison healthcare.”

    Source location

    2016-0377-Response-by-Hampshire-County-Council_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with NHS providers and Hampshire Constabulary to review information sharing after joint police-custody assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.2 Sharing AMHP reports with Police”

    Source location

    2016-0377-Response-by-Hampshire-County-Council_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a governance framework monitoring police-custody assessment outcomes, information sharing, relative communication and AMHP training records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The standard of mental health act assessments is brought into question by the Coroner in light of the findings from this inquest. Certainly the conduct of each of the practitioners involved in this case is referred to separately.”

    Source location

    2016-0377-Response-by-Hampshire-County-Council_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Robert Arthur Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert Arthur Davidson, who had dementia, Alzheimer’s disease and PICA, died after choking on a plastic glove at a care home on 27 January 2016. The report identified concerns about inadequate transfer of information about his PICA, insufficient staff training and failures in emergency procedures, including calling emergency services and initiating CPR.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to highlight essential patient information during transfers between care homes

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The deceased PICA behaviour was not highlighted or identified on his transfer between care homes. Some process or direction from the governing body needs to be provided to care homes to ensure essential information is provided and highlighted when patients are transferred. ”

    Source location

    Robert Arthur Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an additional action plan and timetable responding to the inquest findings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, whilst under the Restful Homes Group tenure, Aran Court had very few of these processes in place and where systems or processes were in situ they were often substandard. It remains an ongoing process to fully embed all of Avery’s policies and procedures and in light of the inquests findings an additional action plan and timetable for action has been implemented.”

    Source location

    2016-0363-Response-by-Avery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue embedding all organisational policies and procedures at Aran Court.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, whilst under the Restful Homes Group tenure, Aran Court had very few of these processes in place and where systems or processes were in situ they were often substandard. It remains an ongoing process to fully embed all of Avery’s policies and procedures and in light of the inquests findings an additional action plan and timetable for action has been implemented.”

    Source location

    2016-0363-Response-by-Avery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inspect care homes’ emergency response, staff training, induction, and transfer-risk arrangements, including follow-up checks against the reported concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the course of the CQC focused inspection of Aran Court Care Centre on 09 March 2016, we found systems in place to ensure that nurses had training in emergency first aid. Emergency First Aid at work training provides delegates with an extensive first aid skill set so that they can identify incidents and manage them appropriately, whether the patient is conscious or unconscious. The course is designed to include first aid priorities, managing incidents, basic life support (CPR), unconsciousness, control of bleeding, burns and scolds, recording and reporting First Aid Priorities.”

    Source location

    2016-0363-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise the transfer and discharge communication lessons from the incident in a forthcoming quarterly Safety 1st bulletin shared across Amore Care Homes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• This incident and the lessons learnt from it i.e. to ensure effective communication at the point of a resident’s transfer or discharge to another provider will be raised in a forthcoming issue of our quarterly Safety 1st bulletin which is shared across all of our Amore Care Homes.”

    Source location

    2016-0363-Response-by-Priory-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Highlight to home staff the requirement to complete Form AM32 Transfer Discharge records, including prompts for key information such as PCA behaviour.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We will also highlight the requirement for our home staff to complete Form AM32 Transfer Discharge record. This form is completed in accordance with Policy AM27 Admission, Transfer and Discharge (July 2016). The form contains prompts for staff to record key information such as PCA behaviour. The completed form is then provided to staff at the receiving organisation at the point of the resident’s transfer or discharge.”

    Source location

    2016-0363-Response-by-Priory-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Comprehensive pre-admission and transfer documentation is considered sufficient to identify relevant clinical risks when completed correctly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a provider Avery Healthcare does have appropriate systems and documentation in situ to address each of the above points.”

    Source location

    2016-0363-Response-by-Avery
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing admission and handover documents were considered sufficient to capture known risks during transfers when completed appropriately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC expects that providers should actively work with others, both internal and external, to make sure the care and treatment remains safe for people using the service. When people move between services or providers, Regulation 12(2) (The Regulations) requires providers to undertake appropriate risk assessments to make sure service users’ safety is not compromised. This includes when they move between or to other bodies who may not be registered with CQC. At the inspection on 14 November 2016 at Aran Court Care Centre, we looked at Avery Homes RH Limited’s admission assessment document. This is the provider’s transfer document. Whilst we did not look specifically at Mr Davidson’s transfer document, we saw that if this admission document was completed appropriately and with sufficient detail, the information needed to ensure that where people were known to be at risk would be captured.”

    Source location

    2016-0363-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    System-wide direction on identifying essential transfer information is directed to the governing body, such as the regulator or relevant health department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst we understand that you have directed this matter of concern to be dealt with by the governing body (which we take to understand either the regulator the Care Quality Commission or the Department of Health or NHS England) we hope that you will be reassured by the actions that we intend to take in respect of this matter.”

    Source location

    2016-0363-Response-by-Priory-Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The commissioning organisation should ensure receiving care homes can meet transferred patients’ needs; the Care Quality Commission may comment on this.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is essential that information is communicated between organisations when a patient is transferred. In this case between Jubilee Gardens and Aran Court Care Centre. Had Aran Court Care Centre been aware of Mr Davidson’s condition they would have been aware of the need for additional, possibly 1:1, care. The commissioning organisation should be satisfied that the organisation to which Mr Davidson was being admitted were able to meet his care needs. The care home will be registered with and regulated by the Care Quality Commission, to whom this Regulation 28 report has also been sent, and they may wish to comment in respect of this issue.”

    Source location

    2016-0363-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response
  8. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Rohid SHERGILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rohid Shergill, who had Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy and was fed through a nasogastric tube, died on 14 March 2016 after the tube was inserted into his lung and was used for feeding and medication. The principal concerns included inadequate checking of the tube position, uncertainty about parental understanding of pH testing, insufficient information-sharing between trusts, unclear care coordination, and possible contamination from repeated syringe use.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of information-sharing between trusts

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Information-sharing between the two trusts – by way of shared IT and / or the use of shared care folders kept in the family home – with clear training to staff on what information should be recorded there. ”

    Source location

    Rohid SHERGILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Patricia Mercieca · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patricia Mercieca, who had severe COPD and asthma and lived in assisted accommodation, pulled her emergency cord on 14 July 2015 and said that she could not breathe. She arrested shortly afterwards and was found deceased when the ambulance service arrived. Concerns included failures to provide correct information and follow up when she did not respond, to contact the resident manager, and to pass on relevant medical history and information requested by emergency services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to pass requested further information back to the requesting agency or professional

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) That if a call handler is directed by emergency services such as the LAS, or other relevant professionals such as a doctor to obtain further information or reassess then they should do so and pass any information so gained back to the agency or professional that requested it. ”

    Source location

    Patricia Mercieca · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Kirsty Childs · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kirsty Childs, aged 20, developed severe abdominal symptoms and repeatedly sought advice from NHS Direct and other services between 31 December 2012 and 2 January 2013. She was not admitted to hospital and was later found dead at home; the inquest recorded septic shock caused by an undiagnosed and untreated mesenteric venous thrombosis. The principal concerns included incorrect telephone triage, failure to review earlier calls, medically unqualified staff selecting questionnaires, the ability to override recommended outcomes, and poor information-sharing between agencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of agencies to obtain information from previously involved agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “7. All the different agencies operated in isolation, and despite computerised systems and phone facilities being available, there was no attempt to gain information from previous agencies which they had been involved ”

    Source location

    Kirsty Childs · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026