Recurring concern

Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the inter-agency care information-sharing system, including inadequate arrangements, communication channels, shared records or contact mechanisms when these prevent timely access to relevant care, needs or risk information between agencies.

Not included

  • Excludes information-sharing failures unrelated to coordination between agencies supporting a person.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's records, assessment, documentation or communication process unless the report directly links them to inter-agency information sharing.
  • Excludes generic staffing, confidentiality, policy or technology deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the unsafe inter-agency information-sharing condition.
  • Excludes hazards involving public access to harmful information or physical communication and rescue equipment.
Reports
212

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
235

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
492

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care57
NHS England39
Ministry of Justice14
Home Office11
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership9
HM Prison and Probation Service8
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board8
Care Quality Commission7
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust7
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Metropolitan Police Service6
College of Policing5
Greater Manchester Police5
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Hannah Louise Booth · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hannah Louise Booth, who had been diagnosed with post-natal depression after giving birth in July 2024, drowned in the Goyt River on 6 January 2025 after sending a message evidencing her intention to take her own life. The report identified concerns about information sharing between services, including different record systems, incomplete records, and relevant information about Hannah being recorded only in her baby’s records. Increasing contact about her baby’s development was not shared with perinatal mental health services or recognised as potentially indicating that Hannah was struggling.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of shared policies, guidance and understanding about information relevant for sharing between services

    Wider context from the report

    “This inquest has exposed important issues with information sharing between services and also within services. Those issues are: • Difficulties encountered because different IT systems were being used for record keeping in different services. Essentially a lack of a single patient record. • A lack of a shared understanding of what is relevant information and needs to be made available to other services. • Relevant notes being made in records of baby and not repeated in notes of the mum. Further detail: 1. Sett Valley, the health visitors and perinatal mental health services all had information about Hannah that was potentially relevant to her mental health, but none had the whole picture. It was evident that had those within the perinatal mental health services known about Hannah’s increasing frequency of contact with services about her baby’s development, it would have prompted further contact by them with Hannah and prompted a review of risk and support offered. They did not know and there was no further contact. 2. There was no single electronic patient record accessible to all services. Whilst the perinatal mental health and health visitors used SystmOne, Sett Valley did not. The health visitor had not informed Sett Valley about the contact Hannah had had with them on 27th December so that the GP seeing Hannah on 31st did not know that Hannah was beginning to make increased contact with services about her concerns and did not share any information about that consultation with other services. 3. There was increasing contact with health visitors that was not escalated to or shared with perinatal mental health. The significance of the increased contact, to Hannah’s mental health, did not appear to have been understood. The concerns raised at each contact around her baby’s development were dealt with at face value with exploration and examination of her baby’s development and reassurances given to Hannah regarding the particular concerns raised. The evidence revealed that it was not the individual concerns raised that were relevant to Hannah’s mental health but the fact that she was making more frequent contact which suggested she was struggling. There are no policies, guidance or any shared understanding between services of what might be relevant information to be shared and when. 4. Within both Sett Valley and health visitor records there was potentially important information relevant to Hannah’s mental health recorded only within her baby’s records. At any future appointments concerning Hannah the relevant medical history available on her record would have been incomplete. It also meant that whilst the perinatal mental health services had access to the health visitor notes in relation to Hannah (because they both used SystmOne), even had they had cause to look at Hannah’s notes they would still not have had all relevant information. There are no policies or guidance regarding when information potentially relevant to both mother and baby should be placed in both records or cross referenced. This appears to be particularly important in the perinatal period. ”

    Source location

    Hannah Louise Booth · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the Perinatal Mental Health Service advice line for consultation and proactively share relevant contextual information about patients already receiving its care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During this meeting, it was agreed that the Perinatal Mental Health Service should be utilised by the Health Visiting Service as an advice and consultation resource, in addition to the existing formal referral pathways. Health Visitors are able to contact the Perinatal Mental Health Service advice line to discuss concerns, seek professional advice, or share relevant information without the need to submit a formal referral.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Community Health Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and circulate an infographic explaining the advice line, appropriate use, and information to share, with practical examples for Health Visiting staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support clarity and consistency in practice, the Perinatal Mental Health Service has agreed to develop an infographic for Health Visiting staff. This will provide clear, accessible guidance on:”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Community Health Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update Health Visiting Service standard operating procedures to formalize information-sharing expectations and use of the Perinatal Mental Health Service advice line.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of this discussion, the Health Visiting Service is in the process of updating its Standard Operating Procedures to reflect the agreed approach to information sharing and the use of the Perinatal Mental Health Service advice line. This update will provide clear, consistent guidance to staff and reinforce expectations regarding early consultation and sharing of relevant information.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Community Health Service NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add contextual-information-sharing guidance to the electronic referral document for professionals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Information leaflet to GP’s on referral The Perinatal CMHT has drafted an information leaflet for GPs setting out that this Trust and the GP practice use different electronic patient record systems, highlighting the impact of this and detailing risk mitigation. This leaflet will be sent to GPs on receipt of a referral from them if they do not have the same electronic patient record. An additional page has been added to the e-referral document for professionals regarding the sharing of contextual information around the patient. A patient will also be informed that their GP is not on the same electronic patient record so that they too are aware that information sharing is not automatic at the time of their appointment.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss developing guidance with DCHS on when health visitors should cross-reference medical notes for babies and mothers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Working alongside DCHS Further, and in addition, the Trust is currently discussing with Derbyshire Community Health Services NHS FT (‘DCHS’) the development of Guidance regarding when DCHS’ health visitors will cross reference the medical notes for baby and mum.”

    Source location

    Response from Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Encourage specialist perinatal mental health teams to include record keeping in training for the wider perinatal pathway.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this case, NHS England via the regional Perinatal Mental Health networks will encourage specialist perinatal mental health teams to include record keeping as a component of their training to the wider pathway, to help support staff to understand their experiences for documenting assessments, risks, red flags, information sharing and consent.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide providers with guidance on recording information relevant to mother and baby and sharing information about frequent service access.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “DDICB is committed to ensuring that providers understand their obligations to share information between providers, where that information relates to the delivery of patient care. We note the coronial concern around the lack of policy or guidance relating to the recording of information potentially relevant to both mother and baby; and guidance relating to information sharing between healthcare providers in the case of a pattern of more frequent access to services.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham and Nottinghamshire Integrated Care Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Practice does not consider a policy or guidance on relevant information sharing capable of assisting with this concern.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “her baby’s development and reassurances given to Hannah regarding the particular concerns raised. The evidence revealed that it was not the individual concerns raised that were relevant to Hannah’s mental health but the fact that she was making more frequent contact which suggested she was struggling. There are no policies, guidance or any shared understanding between services of what might be relevant information to be shared and when.”

    Source location

    Response from Sett Valley Medical centre
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 December 2025

    Open published response
  2. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Herrin Dodds · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Herrin Dodds was assessed and detained under section 136 after expressing suicidal thoughts and threatening to harm himself, but was later released and allowed to board a train. He took his own life on the train and was pronounced deceased at Tamworth train station. The principal concerns were failures to pass on next-of-kin and recent section 136 information, and missing information that might have prompted further contact with mental health services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to include recent s136 detention information in force control communications

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was missing information on the PNC check which meant that Andrew was not flagged as recently being held under s136. The further email from force control also did not mention that he was recently detained under s136. I was told if this had been on the system BTP would have contacted mental health services for more information. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Herrin Dodds · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Robert CARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Robert CARD, known as Tony, died by suicide by suspension by ligature at 15 Duke Street, Ipswich, between about noon on 21 and 22 November 2023. The report identifies a concern that, outside Care Act safeguarding criteria, there was no mechanism for police to communicate medium-risk mental-health information to relevant medical or mental-health providers, potentially resulting in missed support or affecting later decision-making.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a mechanism for police to communicate consented mental-health risk information to medical or mental health care providers

    Wider context from the report

    “Outside of situations where section 42 of the Care Act 2014 applies, there appears to be no mechanism available to enable front-line police officers who wish, of their own volition and with the subject's consent, to communicate risk information, arising out of an interaction with an adult at Medium risk to self from mental ill-health, to medical or mental health care providers, whom may be the right person or agencies to provide support in the medium term. The information that an individual has, for example, been reported as presenting in such a way that police have had to consider detaining them under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 could be important risk information that would assist medical or mental health care providers. Not having this risk information available in future assessments may adversely affect decision-making - e.g. not having this information available could contribute to a decision not to admit compulsorily the patient for mental health care if they were to present again in, say, one week from the police interaction. If such risk information is not received by treating medical or mental health care providers, there may be omission to offer vital further mental health support. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Robert CARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the Contact and Control Room to confirm NHS 111 Option 2 was signposted or contacted before closing a CAD incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Suffolk Constabulary commit to:”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue consulting partner agencies to evaluate NHS 111 Option 2’s operability, reliability, staff knowledge, and training needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Suffolk Constabulary is committed to continuing to consult with partner agencies to encourage a multi-agency approach to evaluating the operability and reliability of NHS 111 Option 2 and whether improvements can be made to strengthen staff knowledge and training. It is respectfully submitted that the existing clinical pathways provide an adequate mechanism for raising mental health concerns in circumstances where statutory thresholds are not met. It is important to consider alongside this the limitations of police powers, the role of Adult Social Care and the statutory role of NSFT in dealing with adult mental health concerns across Suffolk as addressed above.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue cooperating with partner agencies and sharing relevant information under applicable arrangements to support timely clinically led crisis assessment when suicide risk is identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “SCC will continue to co-operate with other partner agencies and share relevant information in accordance with applicable information-sharing arrangements, to support timely access to clinically led crisis assessment where suicide risk is identified”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk County Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing NHS 111 Option 2 clinical pathways provide an adequate mechanism for raising adult mental health concerns below statutory thresholds.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Suffolk Constabulary is committed to continuing to consult with partner agencies to encourage a multi-agency approach to evaluating the operability and reliability of NHS 111 Option 2 and whether improvements can be made to strengthen staff knowledge and training. It is respectfully submitted that the existing clinical pathways provide an adequate mechanism for raising mental health concerns in circumstances where statutory thresholds are not met. It is important to consider alongside this the limitations of police powers, the role of Adult Social Care and the statutory role of NSFT in dealing with adult mental health concerns across Suffolk as addressed above.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NSFT holds statutory and operational responsibility for adult mental health care across Suffolk, rather than MASH or the police.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Regulation 28 Report is addressed to both Suffolk Constabulary and Suffolk County Council (Adult Social Care), however is not addressed to Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust (“NSFT”). It is important to note that NSFT hold both the statutory and operational responsibility for adult mental health care across Suffolk.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A new MASH pathway is not viable because projected referrals would impose substantial operational impact and require structural redesign.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new MASH referral pathway for adult mental health concerns is not, in our respectful submission, viable. Creating a pathway for Medium-risk adult mental health referrals falling short of section 42 of the Mental Health Act would generate an estimated 500 additional referrals per month, creating substantial operational impact across the police and Adult Social Care. This would require a structural redesign of MASH which, in our view, would not lead to improved outcomes due to adult mental health sitting wholly within the remit of NSFT as opposed to within MASH. As addressed below, NHS 111 Option 2 already exists as the appropriate clinical route for sharing concerns falling outside of the statutory framework.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk Constabulary
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adult mental health provision and clinical pathways are the responsibility of NHS commissioners and mental health providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The responsibility for adult mental health provision and clinical pathways as identified by the report rests predominantly with NHS commissioners and NHS mental health providers (this is without prejudice to SCC’s distinct statutory responsibilities in respect of mental health social care, including Care Act functions and, where applicable, joint aftercare duties under the Mental Health Act).”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk County Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    SCC will not create a new MASH pathway for adult mental health-only referrals outside safeguarding or adult social care functions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where information relates solely to adult mental health concerns and does not meet statutory adult safeguarding criteria and/or does not otherwise engage adult social care functions, SCC is not the appropriate recipient for clinical triage or onward clinical referral into adult mental health pathways. Where a contact nonetheless indicates an appearance of care and support needs, SCC will consider whether Care Act assessment duties are engaged.”

    Source location

    Response from Suffolk County Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  4. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Ms. Amy Jo Cross · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ms. Amy Jo Cross was arrested on 9 June 2023, experienced reported drug and alcohol withdrawal symptoms, and died in a prison cell on 10 June 2023 after being found unresponsive before prescribed medication was administered. The report identified concerns about the transfer of healthcare information, including recent medication administration and physical observations, between police, court and prison healthcare providers, and the absence of a shared medical records system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system for passing important healthcare information between criminal justice healthcare providers during conveyance

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There is no system to ensure that important healthcare information including recent administration of medicines and the results of physical observations is passed between separate providers of healthcare in the criminal justice system at the time a person is conveyed between the police, the court and the prison. ”

    Source location

    Ms. Amy Jo Cross · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue discussions with PECS to commence pilots enabling Liaison and Diversion services to access and update the Digital Person Escort Record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England does commission Liaison & Diversion services, which also operate with police custody suites, addressing mental health and wider vulnerabilities. There is no indication that a referral was made in this case to Liaison & Diversion services at either Torquay or Exeter police custody suites. Liaison & Diversion services do not currently have access to enter information directly onto the DPER, but with an individual’s consent, they will share relevant health information with the police and the police will be responsible for updating the DPER. NHS England is in discussion with PECS to commence pilot schemes in London and West Yorkshire, whereby PECS will issue licences to Liaison & Diversion Services, to enable them to directly access the DPER and enter health information. The pilots are expected to commence in 2026 at the following sites:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 October 2025

    Open published response
  5. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Louise Healey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Louise Healey was admitted to hospital on 4 May 2024 with severe malnutrition and complex infections after longstanding mental health difficulties and a highly restricted diet. She deteriorated and died on 1 August 2024 from respiratory failure secondary to pleural effusions, hypoalbuminaemia and malnutrition. The principal concerns were inadequate, inconsistent and insufficiently joined-up mental health care, information sharing and collaboration, particularly for patients with physical health issues, neurodiversity or difficulty attending in-person appointments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure comprehensive cross-service information sharing and coordinated assessment and care

    Wider context from the report

    “Whilst I heard evidence that local Mental Health (MH) Services (the Sussex Partnership Foundation Trust) had aimed to ensure the recognised ‘triangle of care’ (MH Services, Individual and Family) was in place, this did not (and I understand that national policy and approach may not extend to other services such as the GP, private counselling, or e.g. social services being formally involved and engaged in a comprehensive assessment and hence effective package of treatment and care. I fully appreciate that there are ethical, legal and patient confidentiality issues in patient care. Without, first, better information sharing and a wider, collaborative and joined-up approach – ideally with one individual [whether MH clinician, GP or even carer/family member] able, empowered and with the right legal authority to ensure they have a comprehensive and detailed knowledge of the individual’s various issues – and, second, the development of policy, protocols and guidance to better safeguard mental health patients with accompanying physical health issues, especially those who may have capacity and are neuro-diverse, there is a risk of patients like Sarah not receiving the right, consistent and individually tailored care and treatment which may prevent self-neglect or other serious self-harm. I also heard evidence that there is, nationally, a move away from traditional in-person or face to face appointments as standard and regular practice, to the increased use of online platforms and tools enabling remote attendance. I completely recognise that there are huge benefits in the use of such systems, which bring savings, efficiency and immediacy of access for a huge number of patients. My concern is that they work for some but not all. I was encouraged by evidence I heard from SPFT that in their development of a Care Plan Approach and the inception of Community Mental Health Teams there will be a local policy requirement for MH Practitioners to see patients in person at least six monthly. Sarah’s case graphically demonstrated that there is no substitute for physically seeing a patient, especially when there are other conditions and lifestyle issues so clearly impacting on or resulting from her mental health, such that it seems that an agreed national approach and similar policy requirement may also further help to prevent future deaths of patients like Sarah. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Louise Healey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch the National Neighbourhood Health Implementation Programme to integrate health and social care teams and improve comprehensive community care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As your report has highlighted, better integration is needed between physical and mental health care provision. Through our 10-Year Health Plan, we are delivering a shift from hospital to community. As part of this, we have launched the National Neighbourhood Health Implementation Programme. Neighbourhood Health Services will bring together teams of professionals closer to people’s home - nurses, doctors, social care workers, mental health professionals and more – to work together to provide comprehensive care in the community. This will support systems across the country by driving innovation and integration at a local level, to accelerate improvements in patient outcomes and satisfaction and ensuring care is more joined-up, accessible, and responsive to community needs.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 October 2025

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Honoria Culshaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Honoria Culshaw died at home on 25 October 2024 after developing fatal pneumonia following treatment for sepsis from an infected pacemaker site. Her underlying cardiac and immunological conditions contributed to her deterioration after pacemaker extraction surgery. The report identified concern that inadequate communication about the need for pacemaker extraction delayed referral between treating hospitals and specialist services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate pacemaker extraction referral requirements between specialist and local cardiology services

    Wider context from the report

    “Mrs. Culshaw attended Wythenshawe Hospital on the 10th July 2024 an presented with an opening of her pacemaker scar. I heard evidence at the inquest from ████████, a Consultant Cardiologist at Wythenshawe that International clinical guidance indicates that any opening of an implantation scar should be interpreted as a sign of systemic infection of the wound and that extraction and replacement of the pacemaker should follow in order to remove the infection. This was the advice of the on-call Cardiologist at Wythenshawe on the 10th July 2024 to the Emergency Department medical team. I heard evidence that Wythenshawe is one a limited number of specialist surgical centres for the extraction of pacemakers. Mrs. Culshaw was not admitted to Wythenshawe Hospital, but discharged to the care of Royal Preston Hospital, where her pacemaker had been fitted. Royal Preston Hospital is not a specialist surgical centre for pacemaker extraction. The expectation of Wythenshawe Hospital at the time of her discharge appears to be that Royal Preston would refer her back to Wythenshawe for extraction. However, the need for extraction and therefore a referral was not communicated by Wythenshawe to either Royal Preston or to Mrs. Culshaw’s GP. It is not clear that it was adequately explained to Mrs. Culshaw’s family. Mrs. Culshaw re-presented at Wythenshawe on the 9th September, again with signs of infection and underwent an extraction procedure as an inpatient on the 16th September 2024. However, I found that her experienced persistent and prolonged infection depleting her physiological reserve and contributed to her succumbing to a fatal pneumonia on the 25th October 2024. I am concerned that this lack of information sharing along a communication pathway between the Cardiology department and specialist surgical extraction team at Wythenshawe and the Cardiology departments at local treating hospitals risks such referrals being delayed or not being made at all, as happened in the present case. ”

    Source location

    Honoria Culshaw · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop structured Emergency Department discharge communications and built-in referral reminders, while reviewing amendments to the current Emergency Department notes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Onward communication and referral to external providers have been a key area of focus and improvement for the Trust. Following this case, further work is being done with discharge communications from Emergency Departments to provide structured discharge information and also built in reminders to staff that if a referral is required, the correct process is following at the point of discharge. This includes working with digital colleagues to review the practicalities of amending the current Emergency Department notes that are generated by the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve Emergency Department HIVE discharge workflows so staff can send discharge letters to relevant healthcare providers, including external cardiology departments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of the rolling programme of improvements of the use of HIVE, the Trust is committed to improve the discharge process in our Emergency Departments to ensure that the workflow is seamless and our clinical teams are aware of the functionality to send copies of Emergency Department discharge letters to a full range of healthcare providers. This would include cardiology departments at providers such as the Royal Preston Hospital.”

    Source location

    Response from Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop HIVE tip sheets and video guides on using the Emergency Department discharge navigator’s correspondence function and share them with relevant staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust will also develop additional HIVE tip sheets and video guides to increase knowledge and awareness of the ‘correspondence’ tab in the Emergency Department’s discharge navigator within HIVE. The tip sheets and video guides will be available by 15 December 2025 and shared with all relevant staff members by this date by the Emergency Department’s Clinical Head of Division.”

    Source location

    Response from Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Build the HIVE discharge navigator so the correspondence workflow appears in the Emergency Department’s Dispo section.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The intention is that the ‘correspondence’ workflow will appear in the ‘Dispo’ section (the discharge navigator for the Emergency Department). This will require a fundamental HIVE build and therefore will not be completed until June 2026.”

    Source location

    Response from Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce with Cardiology the importance of communicating with other secondary and tertiary care providers to maximise continuity of care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reinforced with the Cardiology Department that communication with other secondary and tertiary care providers is of paramount importance to ensure continuity of care is maximised for patients. From 15 December 2025 onwards when the tip sheets and video guides are available, Cardiology Residents’ training will include focused education regarding the processes available to copy inpatient discharge letters that are sent to general practitioners to other relevant healthcare providers. This uses the same process within the electronic patient record as medical staff use to send letters following outpatient clinic appointments. This training will be”

    Source location

    Response from Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide Cardiology Residents with focused training on copying inpatient discharge letters to relevant healthcare providers and referring patients to available pacemaker extraction services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reinforced with the Cardiology Department that communication with other secondary and tertiary care providers is of paramount importance to ensure continuity of care is maximised for patients. From 15 December 2025 onwards when the tip sheets and video guides are available, Cardiology Residents’ training will include focused education regarding the processes available to copy inpatient discharge letters that are sent to general practitioners to other relevant healthcare providers. This uses the same process within the electronic patient record as medical staff use to send letters following outpatient clinic appointments. This training will be”

    Source location

    Response from Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response
  7. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher John Bird (“Chris”) · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher John Bird died by suicide on 19 September 2024 after placing his head on a railway line near South Marston and being struck by a freight train. The report found that a mental-health response sent to primary care was not received, and that this communication failure meant he was not updated about his referral and more likely than not exacerbated his mixed anxiety and depression. It also raised concern about the reliability of nhs.net email for transmitting important information between mental-health and primary-care services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Systemic failure in communication between mental health and primary care

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the Inquest, I heard evidence from ████████ the joint Senior Partner at The White Horse Medical Practice. Having asked colleagues to carry out a forensic search for evidence of the e-mail having been received and finding none he did allude to a view that was not shared by him alone, but by colleagues both within the Surgery and it appears colleagues in other surgeries that there were concerns that when using the nhs.net e-mail e-mails had gone missing and were not received through the system suggesting its 100% reliability. I personally have not come across another case where this issue has been raised but there is no evidence that I saw that pointed to the e-mail having been incorrectly sent by mental health to the GP practice and I have to accept ████████ evidence that there is no evidence to support it was in fact received. The systemic failure in my view more than minimally contributed to the deterioration in Chris’ mental health that led to his death late afternoon on the 19 September 2024. When Chris spoke with another GP on the 16 September 2024, she was unaware of the response from mental health because the e-mail indicating in detail the nature of that response was never received by the GP practice. She in turn contacted the embedded mental health social worker the next day via e-mail although however he was not available that day hence the assumption that that was the reason if not a combined reason for Chris’ case being discussed at the hub meeting on the 19 September 2024. If there is a reliability issue with the use of nhs.net for whatever reason such as old infrastructure, in that clearly is a concern and one which I am of the view could impact on future deaths if important information having been sent through the system is not guaranteed to be received and is lost; During the course of the Inquest it became clear that there had been a systemic failure in relation to the communication from mental health to primary care on the 28 August 2024 and I asked and indicated that I would like both organisations to work together to reflect on the finding in relation to ways of working relative to the interaction between secondary and primary care levels to see if there are any measures that could be undertaken to minimise and ideally exclude the repetition of such an incident occurring again. It is not the job of a Coroner to make recommendations. You are aware of my concern here and I am sure that Chris' brother, ████████ would equally welcome your joint input in respect of the matter. ”

    Source location

    Christopher John Bird (“Chris”) · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use DocMan instead of email for DWF Hub referral-outcome communication with GPs, except when the referrer explicitly requests email.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Primary Care Mental Health Hubs The manager of the Didcot, Wantage and Faringdon Hub (”DWF Hub”) attended the inquest and provided you with some evidence on the day. They have introduced an immediate change to the practice at the DWF Hub. The change is that the DWF Hub has changed its practice, and now also uses the DocMan system as the means of communication with GPs with regard to the outcome of a referral. The team no longer uses email, save where there is an explicit request for email to be used by the referrer.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate the DWF Hub’s DocMan process and use Trust governance processes to decide whether to adopt it across the other Hub teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are seven other Hub teams in Oxfordshire (eight in total with the DWF Hub being one). The plan is for the Trust to evaluate the use of DocMan by the DWF Hub and we will then utilise Trust governance processes to make a decision on whether the new process is adopted in each of the hubs.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review AMHT communication practice, identify available changes and assess which options could strengthen controls against GPs missing important communications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Service Managers agreed to talk to their teams about how communication with GPs is happening and whether anything can/should be done to make an”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss AMHT communication practices with teams to identify whether improvements are needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Service Managers agreed to talk to their teams about how communication with GPs is happening and whether anything can/should be done to make an”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    DocMan is considered effective, timely and secure for communication between Oxfordshire Talking Therapies and GPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Oxfordshire Talking Therapies The Oxfordshire talking therapies service was commissioned by the CCG/general practitioners for Oxfordshire, with an established practice by which the service communicates with GPs. This is a system called DocMan. That system has been the agreed process for many years and the Trust’s position is that it provides effective, timely and secure communication between Oxfordshire Talking Therapies and GPs.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust will not change AMHT communication practices until it understands available options, utility and potential consequences.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “improvement. Email communication with GPs is commonplace across AMHTs and the Trust must apply diligence to any decision to direct staff to change their practice. That is particularly so because managers are not aware of any similar incidents between AMHTs and GPs and the Trust is reticent to make what could be a significant change without being confident that it will have utility for service users of AMHT services.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 September 2025

    Open published response
  8. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Brian Ingram · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Brian Ingram, an 85-year-old man with dementia and vascular Parkinsonism, fell and was taken to a minor injuries unit after a delay. His hip fracture was not identified there, and he was discharged before later admission to hospital, where he underwent surgery and died. Concerns included the lack of a physical assessment, failure to identify groin pain and obtain a hip x-ray, assumptions about the ambulance staff’s clinical role, exclusion of his family member, and information-sharing between organisations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure reliable sharing of ambulance clinical information between organisations

    Wider context from the report

    “3) The inquest was told that it will ordinarily be a SWAST ambulance that attends the MIU and there is a process whereby an ACRF can be sent electronically with the relevant past medical history. On this occasion, an LML ambulance attended whose staff work from written Patient Clinical Records. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether a PCR was provided to MIU staff. One had to be subsequently requested by CPFT to review what had happened on the day. It may be appropriate to review how information is shared between different organisations. ”

    Source location

    Brian Ingram · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require CFT MIU teams to assess ambulance arrivals and obtain handover, history and records before accepting or booking patients into the unit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.6 There has been a team-wide communication to all MIU staff, reiterating the requirement for all patients arriving by ambulance (SWAST or otherwise), to be physically assessed and have a handover and history taken in the back of the ambulance, before the patient is accepted into the MIU. It has been clarified that the patient should only be booked in to the MIU, once the clinician has confirmed their acceptance with the admin team. Patients arriving by ambulance are not to be booked in until they have been assessed as suitable for treatment at the MIU.”

    Source location

    Response from Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require LML staff to complete and hand over patient clinical records for every journey, including separate records for outbound and return transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.1.1 Crews will usually ring ahead prior to arriving at the door of a MIU or UTC.”

    Source location

    Response from Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require LML crews to provide records promptly alongside structured verbal handover, disseminate the policy to staff, and audit a sample of records monthly against national standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.5 LML crews have also been reminded to ensure that PCRs are shared with the receiving destination in a timely manner and used alongside a structured verbal handover at every transfer of care. Documentation should never replace verbal communication; both are essential for continuity, safety, and clarity. This has been codified in a new policy, which has communicated to staff and reinforced by:”

    Source location

    Response from Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 14 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopting an electronic patient-record system was not financially viable for a medium-sized ambulance provider.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3.2 In Mr Ingram’s case, the ambulance which attended the call was a private ambulance provided by LML, whose staff work from written Patient Clinical Records (PCR). The possibility of LML adopting a similar electronic system of recording PCRs was discussed, however the associated set-up and maintenance costs were not considered financially viable for a medium sized ambulance provider. There was a conflict in the evidence at the inquest as to whether a PCR was provided to MIU staff. During discussions between the parties following the inquest, it was considered that the ECAs who brought Mr Ingram into the MIU may have retained his PCR, rather than left it with the MIU, because they were intending to wait for him to be x-rayed and then take him back home.”

    Source location

    Response from Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 October 2025

    Open published response
  9. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Tracey Ostler · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tracey Ostler, who had severe Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder and a history of self-harm and overdoses, took an overdose and cut her wrists on 12 June 2023. After paramedics attended her home on 16 June following a further overdose, they left her there after deciding she had capacity to refuse hospital treatment; she was later found unconscious and died in hospital on 18 June 2023. The principal concerns were inadequate capacity assessment and clinical consultation, failures to share information and coordinate mental-health and ambulance care, the absence of multi-agency safety planning, and insufficient psychiatric hospital beds.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide frontline paramedics with vital mental health risk and capacity information

    Wider context from the report

    “Multi Agency Safeguarding Plans Addressed to the Surrey and Borders Partnership Trust and South East Coast Ambulance Service 8. Ms Ostler suffered from a severe Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder, this was a longstanding diagnosis, and the effects were well known to her mental health team. She was placed in the community on a Positive Risk Taking Plan. She presented a continuous and serious risk to herself in the community and was prone to impulsive acts of self harm. Ambulances were frequently required to attend her home after such acts. The disorder impacted her ability to make capacious decisions about her own care. 9. The independent expert consultant psychiatrist called at the inquest regarded it as good practice in these circumstances to have a joint plan in place, including liaison between the ambulance service and mental health teams, for dealing with emergencies. 10. No system currently exists in Surrey to create such plans. 11. The paramedics who attended Ms Ostler on the 16th June 2023 did not know she had a diagnosis of Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder, nor that this such a diagnosis would be likely to affect her decision-making capacity because it made her more prone to be volatile and impulsive. 12. The psychiatric evidence was that she would be likely to lack capacity. 13. Paramedics assessing her lacked this vital information. In consequence, she was left at home to die. 14. I have not been provided with any Protocol between the services to ensure safety planning in these circumstances that would ensure that front line paramedics are made aware that they are dealing with a seriously unwell mental health patients who is at high risk living in the community. 15. I therefore remain concerned that such a death could occur again. ”

    Source location

    Tracey Ostler · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch an investigation into ambulance responses to mental health crisis calls via NHS 111 and 999, covering triage, training, capacity assessment, and conveyance decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mental Health Crisis: Ambulance service response via NHS 111 and 999”

    Source location

    Response from Health Service Safety Investigations Body
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review emergency mental health care pathways across Surrey, Sussex and Kent to establish a partnership framework for ambulance responses to suicidality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• To work with partners in Surrey, Kent and Sussex to further inform and develop shared decision-making pathway”

    Source location

    Response from NHS South East Coast Ambulance Service
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with partners to expand access to shared care records through the electronic Patient Care Record system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the pathway outlined above, the Trust is working closely with key partners to expand access to existing and new shared care records system platforms via our electronic Patient Care Record (ePCR) system. The expected functionality includes GP records, hospital data, community and mental health notes, with the potential for including care coordination notes, vaccination history and long-term condition (LTC) management. This will support frontline clinicians to make more informed decisions, including complex mental capacity assessments, and improve patient outcomes. Currently, only clinicians based in the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) and Clinical Hubs have access to the Summary Care Records (SCR) and two other regional local Shared Care Records (SCRs): Kent and Medway Care Record (KMCR), Thames Valley and Surrey Care Record (TVS).”

    Source location

    Response from NHS South East Coast Ambulance Service
    Page 5 · response
    Published 13 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Healthcare Professionals Line is considered sufficient for safe, situation-specific multi-agency decisions instead of relying on previously prepared joint plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The use of the Healthcare Professionals Line (HCPL) is crucial in ensuring appropriate and safe multi agency decision making. A joint plan, prepared at an earlier juncture, cannot be relied upon to enable the ambulance service, or other professionals, to make decisions in emergency or crisis situations.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Providing mental health care for patients without physical health needs is outside the Trust’s commissioned remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust is an acute trust, offering inpatient physical healthcare services at Epsom Hospital and St Helier Hospital. For patients within our locality, mental health services are provided by Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (‘SABP’). Whilst we are not commissioned to provide care for patients who do not have physical health needs, we acknowledge and are mindful of the situation that is faced across the country where the demand for mental health services far exceeds the availability. We work collaboratively with our partners in SABP to provide care for patients whilst they remain in the Trust. I welcome the opportunity to respond to your concerns on behalf of the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Epsom General Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Surrey and Borders Partnership provides local mental health services, while NHS Surrey Heartlands ICB commissions those services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS Surrey Heartlands ICB (‘the ICB’) is the responsible ICB for the geographical area in which the Trust sits. It is responsible for commissioning the mental health care provision for the population within its geographical area.”

    Source location

    Response from Epsom General Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Surrey Safeguarding Board will lead the Safeguarding Adults Review, with the organisation participating.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can assure you that we are committed to ensuring the learning and improvements are embedded moving forward. As Ms Ostler was a Surrey resident, rather than a South West London resident, we have engaged with Surrey Heartland ICB and have been made aware that a Safeguarding Adult Review (SAR) will be led by the Surrey Safeguarding Board, which we will fully engage with.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS South West London Integrated Care Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 August 2025

    Open published response
  10. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Alfie Lydon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alfie Lydon was admitted to hospital after being found profoundly unwell at home, transferred for intensive care, and died from the consequences of a viral infection. Before admission, his parents had raised concerns about his feeding and increasing lethargy, and discussions between midwives and the neonatal team were not consistently documented. The report raised concern that inadequate, contemporaneous documentation of discussions between community and hospital teams could affect continuity and escalation of care and result in future deaths in similar circumstances.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain contemporaneous, accurate and immediately available documentation of external calls between community and hospital teams

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I heard evidence that the vast majority of hospital Trusts do not have processes in place to document external calls from midwives to hospital teams. Concerns were raised that this can result in a lack of continuity and escalation of care, particularly with regards to parental concerns. The hospital Trust involved has taken steps to document such calls now but this is undertaken on paper, which is subsequently uploaded to the hospital records. They plan to implement an electronic solution but not for some time. There is a concern that a lack of contemporaneous, accurate and immediately available documentation of discussions between community and hospital teams could result in deaths in future similar circumstances. Given that this is not simply a local issue, this concern warrants raising at a national level. ”

    Source location

    Alfie Lydon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise Alfie’s case with Neonatal Operational Delivery Networks and Regional maternity teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Alfie’s case will be raised with the Neonatal Operational Delivery Networks and Regional maternity teams, with the expectation that they subsequently cascade to all maternity and neonatal units the importance of documenting such consultations.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Direct control over how healthcare staff record clinical communications lies outside the organisation’s authority as a membership body.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a membership organisation we have no direct control over the mechanism(s) by which healthcare staff record their clinical communications. Our sphere of influence lies in nudging change at national level. Currently, there is a lack of legislation and guidance on exactly what information, when and how it should be shared between agencies. In practice, our members (paediatricians) have reported difficulties in exchanging information, which may be a result of poor communication between professionals and/or a lack of interoperable information systems available to effectively share information. Use of the NHS number as a single unique identifier for children will overcome these barriers and enable information to be shared more easily between agencies and services.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Trusts are responsible for ensuring effective recording and access processes where digital infrastructure is unavailable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to documenting communication between community midwives and staff working on acute sites, this would be a standard expectation in the provision of care for both those making and those receiving the calls. Both staff groups will typically utilise the relevant Trust’s Electronic Patient Record (EPR) system for either community midwifery services or hospital maternity / neonatal services, depending on which staff groups on the acute site are involved. This should allow them to record information directly within the patient’s record, which should be accessible to all system users regardless of setting. This is on the provision that the maternity service has the necessary digital infrastructure, including capabilities for offline working when in the community.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 July 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026