Recurring concern

Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care services

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First reported 27 Sep 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the cross-service clinical information communication process, including stale or unsupported guidance for emergency clinicians, omitted care decisions, inaccurate handovers and information not reaching involved services.

Not included

  • Excludes failures confined to a single clinician's knowledge or competence where no cross-service information communication issue is identified.
  • Excludes generic training, staffing, documentation or information-system deficiencies that are not specifically tied to communicating clinically important information between care services.
  • Excludes delays or failures in treatment, referral or emergency access where the material communication failure is not part of the concern.
Reports
144

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
157

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
271

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care25
NHS England24
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust5
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Care Quality Commission4
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust4
Aneurin Bevan University LHB3
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust3
Health Services Safety Investigations Body3
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Jacob Sulaiman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jacob Sulaiman died at home on 8 December 2017 after a fire started in his bedroom, causing carbon monoxide poisoning. The principal concerns were that response officers did not have complete or readily accessible information about his contacts with other services, including the outcome of a paramedic visit, which may have affected the assessment and management of his mental capacity.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record and share relevant information about contacts with other services and their outcomes

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Response officers from Careline visited Mr Sulaiman twice during the night of 7/8 December 2017. It is not usual practice to leave a written record of those visits in the property. (2) In addition, Mr Sulaiman made a number of calls to Wellbeing which were referred to response officers for guidance. (3) Response officers only know about calls made to Wellbeing if the information is placed on the shared database. Response officers did not know the outcome of the paramedics’ visit in the early hours of 8 December when they visited at 3.40 am. (4) Information regarding the nature and number of recent contacts with Wellbeing is not easily accessible to response officers dealing with an emergency call out. (5) From the evidence before me, it is evident that the services which visited Mr Sulaiman on the night of 7/8 December 2017 had an incomplete picture of the number of other services that Mr Sulaiman had contacted and his presentation at those times. In particular, had the London Ambulance Service had more information regarding the nature and number of calls that Mr Sulaiman had made to Careline, this may have had some bearing on the steps taken to assess his mental capacity and how Mr Sulaiman was managed. ”

    Source location

    Jacob Sulaiman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccessibility of information about recent contacts with other services during emergency call-outs

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Response officers from Careline visited Mr Sulaiman twice during the night of 7/8 December 2017. It is not usual practice to leave a written record of those visits in the property. (2) In addition, Mr Sulaiman made a number of calls to Wellbeing which were referred to response officers for guidance. (3) Response officers only know about calls made to Wellbeing if the information is placed on the shared database. Response officers did not know the outcome of the paramedics’ visit in the early hours of 8 December when they visited at 3.40 am. (4) Information regarding the nature and number of recent contacts with Wellbeing is not easily accessible to response officers dealing with an emergency call out. (5) From the evidence before me, it is evident that the services which visited Mr Sulaiman on the night of 7/8 December 2017 had an incomplete picture of the number of other services that Mr Sulaiman had contacted and his presentation at those times. In particular, had the London Ambulance Service had more information regarding the nature and number of calls that Mr Sulaiman had made to Careline, this may have had some bearing on the steps taken to assess his mental capacity and how Mr Sulaiman was managed. ”

    Source location

    Jacob Sulaiman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Migrate records to a new platform and train staff to support timely, complete recording and mobile working.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In preparation for this move, a new IT platform was required to support the”

    Source location

    2018-0252-Response-by-London-Borough-of-Camden
    Page 4 · response
    Published 25 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce an emergency-services referral checklist requiring Careline to provide London Ambulance Service with the caller’s full history.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This change is well underway, migrating records to the new IT system and training staff, so that it will be in place before the end of 2018. As part of working practices, there will be a checklist for referring to the emergency services, including ensuring that a full history is given to London Ambulance Service when a call is made. Caroline, which will now have a full history, will pass on all the information to LAS call centre, to be recorded as a part of the callout.”

    Source location

    2018-0252-Response-by-London-Borough-of-Camden
    Page 5 · response
    Published 25 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop information-sharing arrangements with London Ambulance Service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The London Ambulance Service is represented on the Adults Safeguarding Board and we would expect them to participate in any SAR. In addition, the senior manager responsible for the Caroline service has already made contact with LAS to begin discussions about how information could be better shared in future.”

    Source location

    2018-0252-Response-by-London-Borough-of-Camden
    Page 5 · response
    Published 25 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Calls not resulting in a Careline visit are not routinely passed to response officers because no action from them is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Wellbeing pass on information to response officers when there is likely to be a need for a visit. A call that does not result in a visit is not routinely passed on to Careline, as no action from them is required.”

    Source location

    2018-0252-Response-by-London-Borough-of-Camden
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Wellbeing coordinated the responses, and there was no evidence that the individual lacked capacity or required mental-health intervention.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is correct to say that none of the individuals attending Mr Sulaiman’s property on the night of his death had a full picture of all the calls that day, however, Wellbeing were aware of, and coordinated the responses, whether they were remotely or in person.”

    Source location

    2018-0252-Response-by-London-Borough-of-Camden
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 September 2018

    Open published response
  2. Southampton and New Forest

    AI-generated summary

    Nigel Malloy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nigel Malloy fell from a second-floor window on 29 October 2017 while intoxicated with alcohol, suffered severe head injuries, and died in hospital two days later. He was alcohol dependent and had depressive symptoms, with previous similar falls and multiple hospital admissions, but concerns were raised that there was no information sharing or coordinated treatment plan between the relevant alcohol-support services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share information between alcohol liaison and inclusion services

    Wider context from the report

    “The Deceased was alcohol dependant and suffered depressive symptoms. On 22 May 2017 he fell from a window in circumstances very similar to those on 29 October 2017 and on that occasion suffered head injuries and was taken to Southampton General Hospital. After this fall he was regularly drinking excess alcohol leading to multiple admissions to the Emergency Department at Royal Hampshire County Hospital Winchester operated by Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (HHFT), but was then discharged once sober without any follow up. On 22 September 2017 he referred himself to the Inclusion Service provided by South Staffordshire & Shropshire NHS Foundation Trust (SSSFT) and started to receive some assistance. On 16 October 2017 the deceased sustained a fall in the street and was taken to Winchester hospital for treatment of his head wound but discharged the same day. There was no sharing of information between the Alcohol Liaison service provided by HHFT and the Inclusion Service provided by SSSFT or coordinated plan to treat his alcohol dependence. ”

    Source location

    Nigel Malloy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a 24-hour referral service and dedicated pathway with the Inclusion Service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A 24 hour referral service and dedicated pathway with Inclusion”

    Source location

    2018-0232-Response-by-Hampshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain telephone and onsite liaison with Inclusion regarding referrals and referred patients receiving inpatient care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Regular telephone liaison between Inclusion and the Trust when one of their users is an inpatient or in relation to referrals”

    Source location

    2018-0232-Response-by-Hampshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing referral, liaison, follow-up and high-intensity-user arrangements are considered sufficient to address the reported concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As per our response to point 2 above, the Trust made the initial referral to Inclusion on 21.09.17 and subsequently liaised with them to arrange Mr Malloy’s first attendance and ensure that Mr Malloy had attended as planned.”

    Source location

    2018-0232-Response-by-Hampshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Jeroen ENSINK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dr Jeroen Ensink was stabbed to death in a wholly unprovoked attack on 29 December 2015. The report identified multiple concerns involving police recording and information-sharing failures, including failures to identify and communicate possible mental health problems and issues in the handling of evidence and custody records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to alert the forensic medical examiner to newly available mental health information

    Wider context from the report

    “13. Consequently, the FME was never alerted to this, and so did not return to re-examine ████████. ”

    Source location

    Jeroen ENSINK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Henry James Heselton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Henry James Heselton died by hanging in a field off Down Lane, Guildford, on 28 September 2016. The report identified concerns about unclear electronic mental health records and poor communication between mental health teams and his general practitioner, which meant relevant information was not available to inform clinical judgement.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share relevant recent mental health information between mental health teams and general practitioners

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There was a lack of communication between the mental health teams and the general practitioner. The fact that contact had been made by ████████ with both the acute and community mental health team was not shared with his General Practitioner. This left her without relevant recent history to inform her clinical judgement when she was contacted by ████████ on the 7th September 2016. ”

    Source location

    Henry James Heselton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop GP access to mental health records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Electronic communication has being developed to allow access to CHIE (formerly the Hampshire Health Record) and GP summary patient records and is being developed to allow access for GPs to the mental health record. But this does not mean that communication described above will be superseded.”

    Source location

    2018-0152-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed GP communication requirements in acute and community mental health team procedures, instruct managers, and monitor compliance after referral triage.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To address the shortcomings in the care provided to Mr Heselton, these principles have been included in the review of the Acute Mental Health Team and Community Mental Health Team Standard Operating Procedures, and the team managers instructed to ensure that staff are aware of the requirement to communicate with GPs after triaging referrals and to regularly monitor that it is occurring.”

    Source location

    2018-0152-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response
  5. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Doris Mary Ridgwell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Doris Mary Ridgwell was admitted to hospital with knee swelling and pain, with an INR of 8.1 that was not successfully communicated to the ward or acted upon before her discharge. She was later admitted with a large subdural haematoma and intraventricular bleed, and the inquest determined that she died as a consequence of over-anticoagulation. Concerns included unclear procedures for communicating abnormal coagulation results, delays in making results available to healthcare professionals, and discharge summaries that did not include blood test results.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Omission of blood test results from discharge summaries

    Wider context from the report

    “The Discharge summaries provided to GPs following discharge from Hospital do not include blood tests results, meaning a potential safeguard to check these results is missed; ”

    Source location

    Doris Mary Ridgwell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Including hospital blood results in discharge summaries is not considered necessary because GPs can access those results through Telepath.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The possibility of including blood results from hospitals within hospital discharge summaries was discussed with a GP representative from the local area at the Clinical Quality Review Group on 24 May 2018. They did not feel they would be able to review blood results within patient’s discharge summaries. Moreover, it is not felt that it would be appropriate to rely on GP’s to act as a potential safeguard for abnormal results. Blood results taken in hospital can be accessed by GP’s via a computerised patient management system, Telepath.”

    Source location

    2018-0151-Response-by-Epsom-St-Helier-University-Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response
  6. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kenneth William Horne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth William Horne suffered two falls at Royal Stoke University Hospital, including one on the morning of his transfer to Leek Moorlands Hospital. The falls were not included in the discharge letter, there was no nurse-to-nurse discharge call, and the Transfer of Care form was not up to date. He fell approximately six hours after admission to Leek Moorlands Hospital, sustaining a serious chest wall injury, and later died from sepsis, bronchopneumonia and chest wall injury.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct nurse-to-nurse discharge communication between hospitals

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The deceased had 2 falls whilst at the Royal Stoke University Hospital, one on the morning of his transfer to Leek Moorlands Hospital. The falls were not included in the discharge letter. (2) There was no nurse to nurse discharge call between the hospitals. (3) The Transfer of Care form was not up to date. If these matters had been properly dealt with Leek Moorlands Hospital might not have accepted the transfer. He had a fall with serious injury approximately 6 hours after admission to Leek Moorlands Hospital. As a side issue and a matter of concern, communication with the relatives appeared to be poor. No Datix form was completed for the second fall in the Royal Stoke University Hospital until December. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth William Horne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require verbal nurse handover alongside written handover when transferring patients between hospitals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Ward staff to ensure that alongside the paper version of handover between UHN M and other hospitals, a verbal handover happens as part of a trusted assessment.”

    Source location

    2018-0131-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 July 2018

    Open published response
  7. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Peter STOJILJKOVIC · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter Stojiljkovic was discharged from hospital on 9 June 2017 after being prescribed melatonin and was later found suspended by a ligature at his home on 22 July 2017. The concerns included poor communication between the hospital, GP and Peter about community prescribing, differing prescribing policies, the complexity of prescribing guidance, and the possibility that he would need to obtain melatonin from unlicensed sources. There was also no evidence of communication with the GP before discharge to support a smooth transition into the community.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate with community GPs before discharge about ongoing melatonin prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The deceased had been prescribed melatonin whilst an in-patient. The inquest heard that post his discharge communication between the hospital; GP and Mr Stojiljkovic was such that he was unaware that his GP was prepared to prescribe melatonin in the community; 2. Whilst an in-patient the deceased was prescribed a drug melatonin that was on the Stockport CCG blacklist although not on all GM CCG blacklists. It was unclear why Stockport CCG took a different approach to other CCGs 3. The inquest heard that GPs are faced with a mixture of lists regarding prescribing. National and local. This results in GPs having to negotiate through a complex system when prescribing where there are grey areas that create uncertainty. 4. The deceased was told he would have to source melatonin for himself over the internet if his GP would not prescribe it. This created a risk that he would have to access the drug from unlicensed sources. 5. It was known whilst he was an in-patient that difficulties with prescribing melatonin in the community would arise. There was no evidence of any attempt to communicate with the GP prior to discharge to ensure a smooth discharge into the community. ”

    Source location

    Peter STOJILJKOVIC · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the case with the practice to identify further learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. We accept that from the information in the letter that there has been a breakdown in communication with the patient. You have written to the practice and we assume they will respond to that issue. However, our Medical Director will review the case with the practice to identify any further learning.”

    Source location

    2018-0077-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise how medication provision at discharge was handled with Pennine Care and identify required improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. We would not expect anybody to be told that they should access medication via the internet and we will discuss this with Pennine Care, and identify any further action that needs to be taken in respect of this finding. However, as you have written to Pennine Care I assume that they will respond to you directly on this issue. In addition, we will raise the issue of how the provision of medication at discharge was handled by Pennine Care, and again identify any improvements that they need to make.”

    Source location

    2018-0077-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    George French Russell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George French Russell was born prematurely at 35 weeks and 1 day following a footling breech birth on 11 January 2017, in poor condition and with severe brain damage. He died on 23 January 2017 after being transferred for neonatal care. Concerns included inadequate information-sharing between services and a lack of sustained expert input during the breech delivery.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of structured and direct information sharing between hospital and ambulance services

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The way in which information was exchanged between Stepping Hill Hospital and EMAS meant that all those involved in making decisions were not in possession of key facts. There was no structure to how information was shared and it was passed 3rd hand. ”

    Source location

    George French Russell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the SBAR communication framework for clinical handovers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Point Two: EMAS recognises the importance of good communication and information sharing in relation to the delivery of high quality care and patient safety. As such EMAS will now implement a communication framework to ensure the provision of good quality clinical handovers, the SBAR model. The SBAR model (standing for: Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation) is a structured communication tool that is considered a best practice element in healthcare settings and has been”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and seek regional agreement for a maternity-specific SBAR handover model.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the specific concerns identified by HM Coroner’s inquest we are also working with our obstetric service partners to extend the SBAR to create a maternity specific model. This approach has been formally shared with our network partners through the East Midlands Maternity Clinical Advisory Group following a debate in early March 2018, in draft format for agreement as a standardised regional handover tool. This is planned for implementation across the EMAS footprint in May 2018 subject to governance approval.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the maternity-specific SBAR handover model across the EMAS footprint.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the specific concerns identified by HM Coroner’s inquest we are also working with our obstetric service partners to extend the SBAR to create a maternity specific model. This approach has been formally shared with our network partners through the East Midlands Maternity Clinical Advisory Group following a debate in early March 2018, in draft format for agreement as a standardised regional handover tool. This is planned for implementation across the EMAS footprint in May 2018 subject to governance approval.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The HSIB cannot investigate this case because it occurred before the organisation became operational and falls outside its investigation criteria.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you may be aware, the HSIB was set up to investigate systemic safety issues that cut across organisational boundaries. We conduct up to 30 investigations a year and focus on those with the most potential for new learning that have taken place after we became operational on 1st April, 2017. This case occurred before 1st April 2017 and therefore does not meet our criteria for investigation.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-HSIB
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational concerns are for the involved NHS trusts to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises several areas of concern which are operational and for the NHS Trusts involved to address.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    HSIB cannot investigate incidents occurring before its establishment because they do not meet its investigation criteria.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am aware that the HSIB has responded to you to advise that, as this incident occurred before its establishment on 1 April 2017, it does not meet the criteria for investigation. Nevertheless, the information provided will assist the HSIB develop a wider picture of safety issues in the NHS and help inform future investigations.”

    Source location

    2018-0062-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response
  9. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Ms Angela Caroline Byrne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ms Angela Caroline Byrne, who had a long history of drug misuse and was prescribed methadone alongside other medication, died at home on 29 July 2017 after taking an accidental overdose of prescribed and illicit drugs. The principal concerns related to risk assessment and planning, application of staff training, communication between inpatient and community services, separate clinical records, and shared rather than core-team care for patients with complex needs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate communication between inpatient and community services

    Wider context from the report

    “3. That communications between the inpatient and community services need to be improved. ”

    Source location

    Ms Angela Caroline Byrne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    William Myers · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Myers, aged 79, was unlawfully killed; the medical cause of death was multiple stab wounds. The principal concerns related to inconsistent and inappropriate community care of his attacker, including failures to coordinate treatment, recognise warning signs, share relevant information, act on recommendations for Mental Health Act assessment, and maintain adequate records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to circulate important clinical risk information to treating clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Valuable background information was not circulated to those involved in his treatment with the result that they were deprived of the crucially important medical history of the potential risks (particularly the attacker was no longer taking the medication which controlled his behaviour and was once again resorted to using illicit drugs). An example of this concerns a 20 page discharge report prepared by a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at the time the attacker was being prepared to leave Ashworth High Security Hospital. This report not seem to have been material to the Care Coordinator, the GP nor the Consultant Psychiatrist who undertook treatment on two different psychiatric wards and in the community. ”

    Source location

    William Myers · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require formal discharge care plans, risk assessments and consultant oversight for high-risk discharges.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The trust is reviewing all care-planning procedures in the light of the lessons learned from this case to ensure that there is continuity of care and a consistent management plan with particular emphasis on high-risk individuals. Discharge procedures have also been reviewed and high-risk patients should not be discharged without a completed formal discharge care plan and risk assessment with consultant oversight. The discharge care plans will include consideration of the risk of disengagement and non-compliance and the response to these.”

    Source location

    2018-0022-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Identify patients with significant forensic histories in AMIGOS special notes to inform care and discharge planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Patients with a significant forensic history are now being identified on the newly developed special notes system within AMIGOS the current Electronic Patient Record used in our Manchester services so that individuals presenting will have care plans and discharge plans, which are informed by these risks.”

    Source location

    2018-0022-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the approved PARIS electronic clinical record system across Manchester services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMMH has developed a business case to introduce the PARIS electronic clinical record system bring our Manchester services in line with the wider Trust. This has now been approved by the GMMH Trust Board and will be introduced over the next 12-15 months. This will further enhance accessibility of these assessments to the treating teams.”

    Source location

    2018-0022-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 March 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026