Recurring concern

Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care services

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 27 Sep 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the cross-service clinical information communication process, including stale or unsupported guidance for emergency clinicians, omitted care decisions, inaccurate handovers and information not reaching involved services.

Not included

  • Excludes failures confined to a single clinician's knowledge or competence where no cross-service information communication issue is identified.
  • Excludes generic training, staffing, documentation or information-system deficiencies that are not specifically tied to communicating clinically important information between care services.
  • Excludes delays or failures in treatment, referral or emergency access where the material communication failure is not part of the concern.
Reports
144

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
157

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
271

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care25
NHS England24
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust5
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Care Quality Commission4
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust4
Aneurin Bevan University LHB3
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust3
Health Services Safety Investigations Body3
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Keith HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith Hill was admitted with biliary sepsis and underwent a liver biopsy, after which he developed bleeding requiring surgery and later suffered bowel haemorrhage. The report identified concerns about communication between specialists, inadequate medical records, and insufficient support and scrutiny around the prescription and dispensing of micafungin.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure communication between interventional radiology and hepatology specialists

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When the plan changed and the transjugular liver biopsy became a percutaneous one, there was no communication between the interventional radiologist and the hepatologists. Even if it had not changed the plan, Mr Hill’s management would have benefited from a robust discussion between the specialists in these two fields, and a more accurate record of the decision making. ”

    Source location

    Keith HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct regular documented MDT discussions between medical teams and interventional radiologists, including discussions for non-elective patients outside formal MDT meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This case has led to a review of how decisions are discussed and documented between the treating team and the interventional radiology team. There are regular and documented discussions in the MDT meeting between the medical teams and the interventional radiologists; in addition there are conversations between referring teams and the interventional radiologists if non-elective patients are being treated without having been through a formal MDT discussion. In this context it is agreed between all clinical teams that at the time of the procedure the interventional radiologists will decide as to how to proceed based on their clinical knowledge, experience and the clinical situation at that point. Further conversations with the referring team at this point and in this case would not have changed the procedure performed.”

    Source location

    2019-0446-Response-from-Barts-NHS-Trust-R
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further discussions with the referring team at the procedure stage would not have changed the procedure performed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This case has led to a review of how decisions are discussed and documented between the treating team and the interventional radiology team. There are regular and documented discussions in the MDT meeting between the medical teams and the interventional radiologists; in addition there are conversations between referring teams and the interventional radiologists if non-elective patients are being treated without having been through a formal MDT discussion. In this context it is agreed between all clinical teams that at the time of the procedure the interventional radiologists will decide as to how to proceed based on their clinical knowledge, experience and the clinical situation at that point. Further conversations with the referring team at this point and in this case would not have changed the procedure performed.”

    Source location

    2019-0446-Response-from-Barts-NHS-Trust-R
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 January 2020

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Joyce Marchant · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joyce Marchant died at Tameside General Hospital on 1 June 2019 from complications of a liver abscess, including biliary sepsis and multi-organ failure. The report identified concerns about delays in arranging drainage because of limited interventional radiology capacity, delayed communication of abnormal results to her GP through the postal system, and the lack of a clear communication strategy between the district general hospital and tertiary centre.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear communication strategy and treatment plan between DGHs and tertiary centres

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The MRI was the treating centre for Mrs Marchant’s underlying medical problems which led to her deterioration. However there was no evidence of a clear communication strategy or treatment plan involving the DGH and Tertiary Centre. This was attributed in part to the sheer volume of demand on tertiary centres and the extent of support they can provide to DGHs. ”

    Source location

    Joyce Marchant · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    John Michael WELLS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Michael Wells died at the scene after lacerating a varicose vein and suffering severe blood loss while prescribed anticoagulant medication. The report identified concerns about incomplete medical information, the accessibility and handling of responder contact details, the absence of automatic risk flagging, and the triage of third-party emergency calls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transfer important and accurate medical information to telecare and emergency services

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The information regarding Mr Wells’ medical conditions and medication held by RedAssure/Worthing Homes was not complete. RedAssure were the providers of the telecare service to Mr Wells and were part of Worthing Homes. RedAssure had contracted Apello to answer out of hours calls. During the inquest I heard evidence that when a resident moves into Worthing Homes sheltered housing they are asked to provide medical information; as are any persons who happen to accompany them. I heard that updates are requested from the residents by sending out a form. Neither Worthing Homes nor RedAssure seek permission from the residents to obtain medical information from their GP or other third parties. I heard evidence that the staff at Worthing Homes had been aware of Mr Wells’ special needs and vulnerability but this did not appear on the resident information sheet; which provides the information accessed by Appello. Whilst I heard evidence that Worthing Homes are no longer providing telecare support they still provide the medical information recorded on their residents to telecare providers. Subsequent to the inquest Worthing Homes provided further information to assist with the preparation of this report. This confirmed that RedAssure no longer existed and that Worthing Homes, as a social housing provider, were not involved in providing care or medical assistance. They state that medical information gathered at the application stage is solely for the purpose of ascertaining the prospective resident’s suitability for a property. Worthing Homes provided a full version of a review record from 2015 clearly stating that Mr Wells had learning difficulties. In addition a GP letter provided to Worthing Homes in 2008 states that Mr Wells had a low IQ. Neither of these pieces of information were transferred on the front sheet of the record, which appears to have been the source of the information entered onto Carenet. As a result of the incomplete records and summary Appello & SECAMB were not provided with important and accurate information regarding Mr Wells. ”

    Source location

    John Michael WELLS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Gareth Wycliffe WARBURTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gareth Wycliffe Warburton had undergone a double lung transplant and was taking anti-rejection medication when he arrived at HMP Hewell. A prescription error resulted in him receiving half his usual dose, and he died after chronic rejection of his transplanted lungs. The report raised concerns about prescription systems, staffing and the handling of important health-related correspondence at the prison.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to pass important prisoner health and welfare letters to the prison healthcare team

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Letters dated 16.10.17 and 27.11.17 from ████████ Mr. Warburton's treating clinician at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham to then Governor of HMP Hewell Gareth Sands, highlighting concern about the prescription error, asking for more information about the error, and seeking assurances that Mr. Warburton would continue to receive all required medication, were neither acknowledged nor answered by the Governor; (2) Furthermore, although such letters ought to have been passed on to the prison healthcare team, the evidence suggested that this was not done. Investigations carried out by current Governor Anthony Morrow failed to establish what had happened to these letters; (3) As to the suggestion that perhaps these letters were never received by the prison, it was apparent that the same letters had been sent to, and received by, members of Mr. Warburton's family; (4) Accordingly, I am satisfied that it is probable that these letters did reach the prison, but were not dealt with satisfactorily; (5) I am concerned that, as long as there is a risk that letters which seek or contain important information about a prisoner's health and welfare are not dealt with and go unanswered, there remains a risk to prisoners' lives at HMP Hewell. ”

    Source location

    Gareth Wycliffe WARBURTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Muhammed Saif Abdul Haleem · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Muhammed Saif Abdul Haleem was 13 years old and had a severe, life-limiting neurological condition. He became unresponsive at home on 8 December 2018, was found in asystole, and died after resuscitation efforts were terminated; the principal concern was that an outdated DNA-CPR document had remained on the emergency service system for seven years without the knowledge or support of the clinicians involved in his care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of communication of existing DNA-CPRs or Advance Care Plans between community paediatric teams and emergency services

    Wider context from the report

    “That information held on the NWAS system for the purpose of providing immediate guidance to paramedics was 7 years out-of-date and was not known to or supported by the clinicians involved in this child’s care at the time of his death. Whilst I accept the evidence that paramedics will make a clinical decision based on the patient’s presentation at the time, the fact that they sought advice around the existence of a DNA-CPR indicates that it is a relevant factor in their decision-making The evidence was that the number of children living in the community with DNA-CPRs in place is small and there should be communication between the community paediatric teams and emergency services of any DNA-CPRs or Advance Care Plans that are in existence and are ”

    Source location

    Muhammed Saif Abdul Haleem · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Place alerts on the NWAS system for children with current advance care plans and review them when changed or at least annually.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that alerts have now been placed on the NWAS system for all children who have current advance care plans (ACP) - these alerts will be reviewed if any changes are made or as a minimum once per year when the ACP is reviewed. In addition, we will review archived patient notes/records for any children with palliative care needs known to the Children’s Community Nursing Team (CCNT) on 15/11/19 to ensure that any ACP’s that may have commenced before the electronic system was set up are included.”

    Source location

    2019-0316-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review archived records for children with palliative care needs to identify advance care plans predating the electronic system and include them in alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that alerts have now been placed on the NWAS system for all children who have current advance care plans (ACP) - these alerts will be reviewed if any changes are made or as a minimum once per year when the ACP is reviewed. In addition, we will review archived patient notes/records for any children with palliative care needs known to the Children’s Community Nursing Team (CCNT) on 15/11/19 to ensure that any ACP’s that may have commenced before the electronic system was set up are included.”

    Source location

    2019-0316-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate current advance care plan information and provide child lists to relevant hospital children’s services to support replication of alert systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also communicated with the Lead Nurse at the Royal Oldham Hospital Children’s A&E department and forwarded a list of the children known to CCNT who have ACP’s to enable them to set up their own alert system. We have also communicated with the Oldham Children’s unit and O&A to replicate the same system.”

    Source location

    2019-0316-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reviewing and communicating changes to DNA-CPR decisions remains the responsibility of the patient’s referring clinician or GP practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The responsibility of review of a DNA-CPR remains with the patient’s referring clinician. If a DNACPR is revoked, in the same way as the agreement is communicated, NWAS would expect the GP practice to communicate the change. If this does not happen, the DNA-CPR marker on the Trust system that remains in place is a warning of the potential existence of a DNA-CPR, which directs the clinician to look for a paper copy of the DNA-CPR when on scene. NWAS policy stipulates the commencement of resuscitation until information can be confirmed. NWAS should also receive requests from GP practices to remove a DNA-CPR marker when a patient has passed away.”

    Source location

    2019-0316-Response-by-North-West-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 November 2019

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Caspian Thorn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Caspian Thorn was born with significant brain damage after chronic placental insufficiency and died in hospital on 29 September 2018 after developing a gram-negative hospital-acquired infection and sepsis. The concerns included failure to offer induction or follow up a missed growth scan, poor communication and support for a vulnerable family, undocumented triage calls, inadequate documentation of decision-making, delayed recognition of a pathological CTG, and delayed recognition of signs of sepsis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of communication between midwifery and social work teams

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A feature of the evidence was a lack of communication between the teams of midwives and social worker. This meant that it was not picked up that his mother had missed a key fetal growth scan and that a small baby was not monitored for the period between 10th September until his birth on 24th September. The inquest heard that contributing to this was a shortage of midwives in the enhanced midwifery team and a shortage of experienced social workers in the Local Authority at the time; ”

    Source location

    Caspian Thorn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    David John Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David John Smith underwent a dual renal transplant involving kidneys from a CMV-positive donor, but the donor’s CMV status was not communicated to him and was incorrectly recorded as negative. He did not receive CMV prophylaxis, later developed CMV infection and ganciclovir resistance, deteriorated, and died on 5 July 2017. The principal concerns were the consent process and failures to communicate and accurately record the donor’s CMV status.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transmit donor kidney CMV status to the renal transplant team

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The consent process – I found that the CMV status of the donor’s kidneys (listed as positive on the Electronic Offering System form) was never communicated to the Deceased for him to consider the risks of proceeding with the transplantation, and for him to provide informed consent. 2 Recording of the CMV status – When the plan for the deceased’s surgery was communicated to the Renal transplant team in an email, this did not include reference to the donor’s CMV status, nor did it attach the relevant EOS form. Consideration should be given to introducing a process in which the EOS form itself is sent onwards to the Renal transplant team to ensure important information such as the CMV status is not missed by the treating clinicians. ”

    Source location

    David John Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Fern-Marie CHOYA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Fern-Marie Choya died from hypovolaemic shock caused by massive intra-abdominal bleeding following rupture of the abdominal gravid uterus during a monochorionic diamniotic pregnancy. Concerns included failure to communicate her pregnancy during the pre-hospital alert and on hospital arrival, a 16-minute delay in recognising the pregnancy and calling the obstetric team, and treatment focused on possible pulmonary embolism before free fluid was identified.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate pregnancy information effectively on hospital arrival

    Wider context from the report

    “2. On arrival at the Whittington Hospital, the detail of the pregnancy was not communicated effectively. It is unclear whether the LAS crew did not mention the fact, or whether the emergency staff simply did not hear it. In any event, it took 16 minutes post arrival for the pregnancy to be recognised and the obstetric team to be called. ”

    Source location

    Fern-Marie CHOYA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the crew’s learning from the EOC observation and confirm use of a structured information-sharing and handover approach.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Prior to the Inquest, a meeting was held with the crew regarding this incident and feedback provided during this de-brief meeting. In addition, the crew are also to attend an observation session in the EOC for learning purposes (to be completed by 14 October 2019). Furthermore, the relevant Clinical Team Leader will be reviewing, with the crew, what they have learnt from that session and seeking confirmation that they will be following a structured approach every time they share information with the EOC about patients or hand them over to an emergency department in the future.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a comprehensive cardiac-arrest handover procedure with tertiary centres to ensure key clinical information reaches receiving teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS has liaised with tertiary centres to develop a comprehensive handover procedure in relation to cardiac arrests, ensuring that relevant and key important clinical information is shared with the receiving team.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out the cardiac-arrest handover procedure and ATMIST AMBO tool to all receiving centres.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of this handover procedure, receiving teams are expected to observe a 30 second “hands off eyes on time” period to ensure quiet whilst vital information is conveyed using the ATMIST AMBO (age, time, mechanism/medical complaint, injuries/information related to complaint, signs, treatment – allergies, medication, background/history, other information) mnemonics. The LAS will be rolling out the extension of this handover tool/procedure to all receiving centres, as per the attached handover documents. Work will also be done to ascertain the feasibility of establishing a handover audit mechanism in the specification of the Electronic Patient Care Record (EPCR) that is being developed by the LAS alongside the introduction of its replacement Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assess the feasibility of adding a handover audit mechanism to the developing electronic patient care record specification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of this handover procedure, receiving teams are expected to observe a 30 second “hands off eyes on time” period to ensure quiet whilst vital information is conveyed using the ATMIST AMBO (age, time, mechanism/medical complaint, injuries/information related to complaint, signs, treatment – allergies, medication, background/history, other information) mnemonics. The LAS will be rolling out the extension of this handover tool/procedure to all receiving centres, as per the attached handover documents. Work will also be done to ascertain the feasibility of establishing a handover audit mechanism in the specification of the Electronic Patient Care Record (EPCR) that is being developed by the LAS alongside the introduction of its replacement Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include SBAR handover training in the Emergency Department junior doctors' induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Further work is being undertaken across the Trust in order to standardise handover between clinicians by using the “SBAR” format (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation). This has already been included in the new junior doctor’s induction to the Emergency Department and is being designed into the electronic clinical notes that are used to hand over a patient at any point from presentation to discharge.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-Whittington-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Design SBAR handover into electronic clinical notes used from patient presentation through discharge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Further work is being undertaken across the Trust in order to standardise handover between clinicians by using the “SBAR” format (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation). This has already been included in the new junior doctor’s induction to the Emergency Department and is being designed into the electronic clinical notes that are used to hand over a patient at any point from presentation to discharge.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-Whittington-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing SBAR handover tool is considered sufficient to help crews convey relevant information to emergency departments, including in stressful circumstances.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LAS currently utilises the SBAR tool for all patient handovers (Situation, Background, Assessment, and Recommendation). This enables crews to be confident that they have passed relevant information onto emergency departments when handing over patients, even in the most stressful scenarios. However, the importance of relaying the important medical information at handover has been stressed to the crew who provided care to Ms Choya, as a part of the feedback and de-brief meetings referred to above.”

    Source location

    2019-0281-Resposne-by-London-Ambulance-Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Hannah Dolly Kaur Bharaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hannah Dolly Kaur Bharaj had anorexia, depression and fluctuating suicidal ideation, and died at Salford Royal Hospital on 13 July 2018 from injuries sustained after jumping from a first-floor café. Concerns included inadequate communication and discharge planning, unsuitable placement and care coordination, incomplete sharing of clinical information, and the safety of the café balustrade and adjacent table.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of private providers to obtain relevant clinical information from referring services

    Wider context from the report

    “5.The expectations around information sharing with private providers and the expectation on private providers contracted by the NHS to seek information. The Priory did not request any notes from the EDU about Hannah. As a result they were unaware of detailed information held by the Trust regarding previously expressed suicidal ideation; ”

    Source location

    Hannah Dolly Kaur Bharaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    David Jonathon Jukes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Jonathon Jukes was declared deceased on 9 October 2018 after being found hanging from a ligature fixed to a garden gate. The report identified concerns about inadequate information sharing, mental-health assessment and follow-up, attempts to locate and engage him, risk assessment, and clinical record keeping, with associated risks to life.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to pass reliable information between mental health services

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The above psychiatric liaison and diversion practitioner gave evidence that she contacted either the duty bed manager for BSMHT or the BSMHT liaison and diversion team based at Perry Barr custody suite and was informed that Mr. Jukes was not known to the service. She stated that if she had been aware that he was open to the HTT she would have sought information about his involvement and would have made the team aware that he was in custody and the events of his previous evening. It was not established during the inquest and has not been established in BSMHT RCA investigation how this breakdown in communication occurred. Evidence was heard that the introduction of the Merit Vanguard system would not give a BCPFT employee in a custody suite access to some information and would mitigate against such circumstances arising again but it doesn’t explain why the nurse was left with the impression that he was not known to services. It is not unusual that clinicians from different mental health trusts will need to discuss patients and as full records are not available through the Merit Vanguard this will continue to arise. If reliable information is not being passed there is a risk to life from ill-informed decision making. ”

    Source location

    David Jonathon Jukes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out Liaison and Diversion staff access to the Spine for wider pan-mental-health information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Before acting on any referral, L&D staff will do full background checks. This is part of the triage process to establish previous history, risk, current care plans, treatment, compliance and medication for example so staff can make an informed judgement on who needs to be seen and the level of urgency. Local mental health databases are reviewed however when staff don’t have immediate access, neighbouring services will be telephoned to attain all relevant information. Across the L&D services we are also rolling out staff access to the Spine to give staff wider access to pan-mental health information.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Black-Country-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Meet BSMHT Trust leads to consider jointly strengthening communication pathways between services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately we have yet to ascertain why on this occasion the L&D staff member was advised by BSMHT that the patient was not known to services however meetings with Trust leads from BSMHT are being planned to consider how we can jointly strengthen communication pathways to prevent reoccurrence. Implementation of the MERIT system will further enable staff access to information from mental health Trusts in Birmingham and Coventry. Likewise Birmingham and Coventry staff will be authorised for access to MERIT, for mental health information about those records held on both Oasis systems covering the whole of the Black Country.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Black-Country-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement MERIT access arrangements to enable cross-trust access to relevant mental-health records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately we have yet to ascertain why on this occasion the L&D staff member was advised by BSMHT that the patient was not known to services however meetings with Trust leads from BSMHT are being planned to consider how we can jointly strengthen communication pathways to prevent reoccurrence. Implementation of the MERIT system will further enable staff access to information from mental health Trusts in Birmingham and Coventry. Likewise Birmingham and Coventry staff will be authorised for access to MERIT, for mental health information about those records held on both Oasis systems covering the whole of the Black Country.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Black-Country-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a joint operating protocol with the Sandwell Liaison and Diversion Service for custody-based patient assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are grateful to you for raising this matter with us as it has identified the need for a joint operating protocol to be developed between BSMHT and the Liaison and Diversion Service in Sandwell. We have been in liaison with this team and are scheduled to meet and develop this protocol in late September 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Advance the Local Integrated Health and Care Records programme to enable safe, secure sharing of comprehensive digital care records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NHS Long Term Plan is committed to ensuring that by 2024, secondary care providers in England, including acute, community and mental health care settings, will be fully digitised, including clinical and operational processes across all settings, locations and departments. Data will be captured, stored and transmitted electronically, supported by robust IT infrastructure and cyber security, and Local Health and Care Records will cover the whole country.”

    Source location

    2019-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce and operationalise an information-sharing protocol for co-commissioned Armed Forces mental health services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England and Improvement will produce an information sharing protocol for the NHS and Independent sector Mental Health Trusts that are co-commissioned with the local NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) to deliver services to the Armed Forces. This will ensure that patient information can be shared thereby providing a comprehensive and simultaneous patient record. This protocol will be in place and operational by 1 April 2020. Where NHS England and NHS Improvement Armed Forces co-commission mental health services with CCGs we will strengthen the commissioning relationships already in place and work through an integrated approach to ensure that the appropriate Quality and Safety systems are in place to identify risk and have mechanisms to respond. NHS England and NHS Improvement Quality and Safety meetings are currently held with the providers only.”

    Source location

    2019-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Other concerns concerned NHS bodies and services not provided by the respondent, so the respondent did not comment on those outcomes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please note that all other concerns raised within the Regulation 28 report affected other NHS bodies and services not provided by BCPFT and therefore we have not commented on these outcomes. We have however approached both BSMHT and CWPT to consider”

    Source location

    2019-0329-Response-by-Black-Country-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local NHS agencies are expected to address the report’s local concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please note this response will address the matters of concern from a national level and we would expect the local NHS agencies, which I note are copied in to the letter, to address the local concerns raised.”

    Source location

    2019-0220-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 July 2019

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026