Recurring concern

Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care services

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First reported 27 Sep 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the cross-service clinical information communication process, including stale or unsupported guidance for emergency clinicians, omitted care decisions, inaccurate handovers and information not reaching involved services.

Not included

  • Excludes failures confined to a single clinician's knowledge or competence where no cross-service information communication issue is identified.
  • Excludes generic training, staffing, documentation or information-system deficiencies that are not specifically tied to communicating clinically important information between care services.
  • Excludes delays or failures in treatment, referral or emergency access where the material communication failure is not part of the concern.
Reports
144

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
157

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
271

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care25
NHS England24
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust5
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Care Quality Commission4
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust4
Aneurin Bevan University LHB3
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust3
Health Services Safety Investigations Body3
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Adam RICE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam RICE was taken to hospital after being found asleep in a skateboard park, later self-discharged without a CT head scan, and was subsequently detained at a police station after being arrested. He exhibited signs of alcohol withdrawal, collapsed and died in his cell on 12 May 2014. The report identified concerns about communication between hospital staff and police, custody staffing and training, welfare checks, observation levels, handovers and monitoring practices.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate outstanding investigations or treatment to police after a patient self-discharges

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When a patient self-discharges against medical advice and it is known or it is highly likely that the Police will immediately thereafter become involved and it can be foreseen that the patient will be taken into Custody. 2. Then the Clinician(s) involved should inform the Police that the person has self-discharged against advice and should give brief details of any desired and outstanding investigations or treatment (eg. Reference to a possible head injury would suffice and the desire to carry out a CT head scan). This I suggest would not breach patient confidentiality. ”

    Source location

    Adam RICE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clinicians could not identify a lawful public-interest justification to disclose medical information to police without the patient’s consent.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “i) The General Medical Council set out in their 2009 guidance (“Confidentiality”) at Paragraph 36 the circumstances where a disclosure without patient consent can be made in the public interest. Essentially this is confined to a situation where there is a need to protect individuals from serious harm, such as serious communicable diseases or serious crime. As you know, the GMC takes the view that there is a clear public good from having a confidential medical service and quite rightly doctors who break patient confidentiality put themselves at risk of serious censure. After extensive multi-disciplinary discussion on this matter, we have been unable to identify either an indication for disclosing information about Mr Rice’s medical assessment or a justification in this case for such disclosure without the necessary permissions.”

    Source location

    Adam-Rice-Response_Redacted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 3 March 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Routine police contact after self-discharge is considered infeasible, unreasonable, time-consuming and likely to breach confidentiality unjustifiably.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “iv) The reality of a current day Emergency Department is that many patients take their own discharge every week. Many such patients will be known to the Police. We do not believe it feasible or reasonable to expect a healthcare practitioner to make a judgement as to whether that patient is likely to be arrested soon after discharge against medical advice. We believe that routinely contacting the Police in these circumstances would take a significant amount of”

    Source location

    Adam-Rice-Response_Redacted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 3 March 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing arrangements provide relevant medical-information handovers when patients transfer to recognised facilities with trained medical or nursing staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “iii) Our Emergency Department staff would like to reassure you that there are already arrangements in place for a handover of relevant medical information when patients are discharged from the Emergency Department. When a patient leaves the department for their own home, their GP will receive a discharge summary and the patient will normally be given advice in the presence of their next of kin as to features which warrant re-attendance. Similarly, when a patient is transferred to another hospital, relevant details will accompany the patient to the new healthcare provider and a formal handover of care will take place. The same principle applies where a patient is being transferred to a facility, such as a Police Custody Suite that is recognised to have trained medical or nursing staff.”

    Source location

    Adam-Rice-Response_Redacted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 3 March 2016

    Open published response
  2. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Amy Rose COOPER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amy was born at 40 weeks’ gestation by caesarean section on 8 July 2015 and required immediate resuscitation before being confirmed dead later that evening. Intrauterine growth restriction was not evident to the community midwives or hospital maternity unit until post-mortem investigations; the report also raised concerns about incompatible record-keeping systems and the sharing of maternity information between services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of compatible digital record-keeping and medical note systems enabling information sharing between maternity services

    Wider context from the report

    “It was clear at the inquest that maternity services which had been commissioned in this region had not been required to have a specification for record keeping, notes and scans which could be digitally available to other maternity services operating in the same area. Such that Arrowe Park Hospital needed to have the paper notes from One to One North West Ltd. to ensure continuity of care. This does not appear to be the most efficient system for continuity of patient care and could have been remedied by the commissioners of the services requiring compatible record keeping and medical note systems to ensure the easy sharing of information. This would also enable community based midwives to refer a patient to a consultant without the patient necessarily having to attend the maternity unit in the first place. Further access to notes would make the admission to the maternity unit safer and seamless, delivering what should be a better patient experience and outcome. ”

    Source location

    Amy Rose COOPER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Marion Rose HOWES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marion Rose HOWES died before the inquest concluded on 3 February 2016; the circumstances are referred to in the Record of Inquest. The concerns included failures in discharge communication, coordination and continuity of care, two failed discharges, inadequate communication of a cancer diagnosis, and failure to recognise that she was dying, which was said to have resulted in an undignified and uncomfortable death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to send hospital discharge summaries electronically to GPs on the day of discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Discharge summaries from the hospital These need to be sent electronically to the GP on the day of discharge for continuity of care and full handover to the community from the acute hospital. In addition, the patient must understand the significance and be given his or her copy so that if by any chance there is a delay or a sudden readmission the patient understands the significance of keeping his copy with him for a few days after discharge. ”

    Source location

    Marion Rose HOWES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jake Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jake Robinson died at home on 23 August 2015 after taking his own life; the recorded cause of death was hanging and illicit drug use. Concerns included failures to share information about prescribing diazepam, the failure to identify this issue in the review of his death, fragmented substance-misuse services, and the unexplained rearrangement of a Community Mental Health Team appointment shortly before his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure relevant prescribing information is received and communicated to drug services

    Wider context from the report

    “1) The Court heard evidence that his GP had written to Greater Manchester West on the 23rd June 2015 (exactly to whom this letter was addressed is not known as it was not provided in the evidence from the GP practice) indicating that Jake could be prescribed diazepam following the investigation for his seizure. There was no indication in the review by GM West as to whether this letter had been received and if not why not. However neither of the Drug Services who were involved with Jake were aware of this information and therefore he was not commenced on any benzodiazepine reduction. This issue is being brought to the attention of all the recipients of this Regulation 28 report including the Medical Director for the Greater Manchester NHS Area who will be aware of the same concern raised in a separate recent case. ”

    Source location

    Jake Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Streamline receipt procedures for letters and faxes to reduce opportunities for them to be lost.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Trafford Aim however have taken the opportunity to review their administration process regarding receipt of letters and faxes sent to the service. A more streamlined process has been put in place which has reduced the points at which a letter or fax may get lost.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-West-NHS-Mental-Heath-Foundation-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send all GPs guidance on verifying receipt of urgent correspondence, documenting confirmation, and recording persistent suicide risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to reduce the risks of recurrence of a similar incident at these and other organisations across Greater Manchester so that referrals are managed and monitored by the responsible commissioning and provider organisations I intend to undertake the following actions by 29 April 2016.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send all mental health service commissioners NHS England expectations for commissioned arrangements covering urgent correspondence, clinical risk assessment, shared care, incident learning, and vulnerable patients who miss appointments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to reduce the risks of recurrence of a similar incident at these and other organisations across Greater Manchester so that referrals are managed and monitored by the responsible commissioning and provider organisations I intend to undertake the following actions by 29 April 2016.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The service was unaware of the fax because the GP did not alert the recipient or confirm that it had been received.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that the Serious Incident Review Team and Trafford Aim were unaware that a letter had been sent to Trafford Aim until the issue was highlighted in a meeting with the review lead and ████████ after the conclusion of the review. Trafford Aim have carried out a robust search of both its office base and the electronic database and have found no evidence to indicate the faxed letter from the GP had been received.”

    Source location

    2015-0474-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-West-NHS-Mental-Heath-Foundation-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 December 2015

    Open published response
  5. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Tamara Mills · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tamara Mills, who had longstanding asthma and repeated acute exacerbations, developed breathing difficulties during the night of 10th/11th April 2015 and died after paramedics were called. The principal concerns were fragmented care, inadequate coordination and communication, insufficient recognition of her deteriorating chronic respiratory condition, and the absence of a long-term management plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of effective communication between primary and secondary care services

    Wider context from the report

    “8. Two further areas of concern presented, inter related but independently significant and critical in this matter : A) Tamara’s mother readily presented her child for care in an out of hours to primary care and secondary care, but there was a lack of effective communication between these services, either at the time of referral or after consultation and treatment. B) Evidence was also received of the development of a Tertiary service designed to improve medical care in the area of paediatrics. i) There was a singular lack of understanding by practitioners of how referrals to the service were to be made and once made an anxiety that the receiving trust not be seen to be acquiring a patient at the expense of the referring trust. The net result of this inhibition a further fragmentation in the care and management of the patient. ii) Within this service there were and indeed are specialist Respiratory Physicians who because of their level of expertise could and did demonstrate their ability to make a difference if they had been permitted in one instance to assume long term management of the child’s care and iii) More tragically in another because she was referred to the hospital but not to the service and therefore not to the Tertiary Specialists, managed only as an acute presentation 9. Tamara was never formally referred to this level of service. ”

    Source location

    Tamara Mills · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Barry Thraves · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barry Thraves, who had schizoaffective disorder and lived alone, took his own life after a relapse in May 2015; the time of death was unknown and his body was discovered on 29 May 2015. The report identified concerns about delayed psychiatric follow-up, lack of community mental-health support, inadequate risk consideration, and poor communication between services and Barry’s family and GP.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share clinically important information across mental health and primary care services

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Communication between the community mental health team and other stakeholders was poor, with important information that had been identified (that Barry was depressed and not compliant with his medication) not being shared with the GP, nor were the GP or psychiatric team aware that Barry was not receiving any community support. ”

    Source location

    Barry Thraves · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement next-working-day telephone and two-day written feedback from AMHP assessments to relevant GPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is noted that the AMHP’s report to the Coroner identifies that the psychiatrists and AMHP assessing Mr Thraves were aware that he was not compliant with his medication. It is acknowledged that it should be standard practice for information to be shared with relevant professionals, such as the GP. In order to ensure this takes place in practice the Head of Service has e-mailed all AMHPs on 15 December 2015 to remind them of the importance of feeding back to GPs following an assessment under the Mental Health Act, where the GP was not part of that assessment.”

    Source location

    2015-0443-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind Adult Mental Health social workers to share relevant information with the full multidisciplinary team and carers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Social workers across Adult Mental Health have been reminded of the importance of feeding back to the whole multi-disciplinary team and to carers, not solely the Registered Medical Officer.”

    Source location

    2015-0443-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require staff to include referrals to other agencies in discharge letters and communicate them clearly to patients and carers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Actions taken/planned:”

    Source location

    2015-0443-Response2
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and approve a revised Discharge Policy with detailed electronic discharge-letter requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The LPT Discharge Policy is currently under review and the new policy is due to be approved in February 2016.”

    Source location

    2015-0443-Response2
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require medical and nursing staff to notify GPs when patients miss outpatient appointments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We agree with the inquest findings that communication between the Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) and wider stakeholders was poor. We agree that LPT did fail to communicate the fact that Barry did not attend his outpatient appointment to his GP and the steps regarding open contacts taken to prevent this happening in the future have been detailed are outlined above.”

    Source location

    2015-0443-Response2
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 October 2015

    Open published response
  7. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Lee Mark Anthony Bates · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee Mark Anthony Bates died at 01.18 on 24 February 2014 in Cambian Churchill London Clinic after ingesting a potentially fatal overdose of Zopiclone in conjunction with benzodiazepines while under one-to-one eyesight observation. The principal concerns were inadequate staff training in one-to-one observation and insufficient coordination between psychiatric and sleep-apnoea specialists about CPAP use, sedative medication risks, and monitoring of patients with severe obstructive sleep apnoea.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish dialogue between specialist physicians and psychiatrists about managing OSA risks

    Wider context from the report

    “The court heard that neither the psychiatrists sought advice from the sleep apnoea clinic nor did the clinic inform the psychiatrists of the importance of using CPAP, the risks of not doing so and the risks of sedative medication especially if not using it and the desirability of oximetry. ████████ director of the hospital, said that there was no guidance from GSTT about the use of the CPAP machine, of which psychiatric staff would not be familiar. He presumed that none of the psychiatrists sought guidance about medication, observation or use of the machine in a patient with severe sleep apnoea, as they did not see the need. He expected that the sleep clinic would provide any advice that psychiatrists needed in managing the OSA in a psychiatric unit. ████████ consultant psychiatrist at Cambian, acknowledged that there were risks of death to people with severe OSA given drugs and then not taking CPAP. Physical health care needs were advised by GPs. He said that psychiatric staff did not know about the importance of CPAP, nor whether introduction of a drug required monitoring. There is the facility to use pulse oximetry in the hospital, but the implications, if it were to be used in all OSA patients, would need to be considered. There are many OSA patients in Cambian. It is clear that there is an on going risk of avoidable death in patients with OSA in Cambian Churchill hospital (especially if severe and associated with morbid obesity), Although this risk is reduced by use of CPAP machine and increased by use of sedative drugs, and may be mitigated by use of oximetry, such measures require dialogue between specialist physicians and psychiatrists and might require special provision for monitoring of patients that are high risk and require sedation. Neither hospital has addressed how this dialogue is to be instigated when required, nor how these risks should be addressed; reliance on GP advice seeming to be insufficient. ”

    Source location

    Lee Mark Anthony Bates · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Agree a protocol with St Thomas’ to improve communication and care coordination for patients referred to physical health clinics.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With that in mind, and following the inquest into the death of Mr Bates when you indicated your proposal to make this report, my hospital manager at Cambian Churchill Hospital has met with ████████ at St Thomas’ and agreed a protocol going forward to cover the matter set out in the attached document, in order to reduce the possibility of inadequate communication or care in the future.”

    Source location

    2015-0381-Response-by-Cambian-Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for physical-health care after referral is transferred to St Thomas’ specialists, over whom the hospital has no control.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report raises an issue in relation to communication between our hospital and the sleep apnoea clinic at St Thomas’. As you will appreciate, the clinic is operated by Guys and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust which is separate from our hospital. We therefore clearly have no control over them, and vice versa.”

    Source location

    2015-0381-Response-by-Cambian-Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 September 2015

    Open published response
  8. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Colin Moulton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Colin Moulton was discovered deceased on 14 February 2013 near the perimeter wall of the Irwell Unit at Fairfield General Hospital, after leaving the Accident and Emergency Department the previous day. Concerns included ineffective communication during handover, incorrect triage, failure to recognise confusion, and the absence of a formal capacity assessment or other documented measures when he attempted to leave. The inquest narrative stated that his death was contributed to by neglect.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide the receiving triage nurse with access to and sight of the paramedic pro-forma

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When Mr Moulton was admitted to A & E on the 13th February 2013, critical information was conveyed by means of an audible handover from the paramedic to the receiving triage nurse. Following this incident, the Pennine Acute Trust now requires the receiving triage nurse to have access to and have sight of the paramedic pro-forma with the additional requirement that those actions be documented. It would be helpful if an additional copy of the paramedic pro-forma could be given to and remain with the receiving triage nurse. ”

    Source location

    Colin Moulton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Department considers the concerns matters for local comment and resolution rather than national action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I consider that both of your concerns are for local comment and resolution and I note that you have sent a copy of your report to the NWAS. I am aware that NWAS has already responded, addressing the issues you raise and asking that you redirect your specific concerns to FGH for its consideration also.”

    Source location

    2015-0267-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Specific concerns should be redirected to Fairfield General Hospital for consideration after North West Ambulance Service’s response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I consider that both of your concerns are for local comment and resolution and I note that you have sent a copy of your report to the NWAS. I am aware that NWAS has already responded, addressing the issues you raise and asking that you redirect your specific concerns to FGH for its consideration also.”

    Source location

    2015-0267-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 July 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing handover procedures should ensure triage staff access important patient information, so retaining paramedic notes is not required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NWAS has advised that its staff always leave a patient report form (PRF) at every hospital following a patient transfer. A copy of this form also remains with the patient following admission.”

    Source location

    2015-0267-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 July 2015

    Open published response
  9. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Alec James MATHIAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alec James Mathias developed drug-induced jaundice after receiving Flucloxacillin in 2008, but this reaction was not communicated to his GP or highlighted in the hospital records. He was prescribed Flucloxacillin again in 2014 for an infected finger and died after developing Flucloxacillin-induced cholestatic liver injury and liver failure. The principal concerns were failures to send discharge information to the GP and to record the drug sensitivity in the hospital notes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to send discharge letters to GPs documenting dangerous treatment side effects

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Discharge letters have not been sent to the patients GP in a case where a dangerous side effect to treatment has been noted ”

    Source location

    Alec James MATHIAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Nancy Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nancy Hughes, who had Alzheimer’s disease and was receiving Risperidone, fell at a care home and later suffered a further unwitnessed fall in hospital before dying on 3 January 2014. The concerns were that her medication was not reviewed as required and that there was insufficient cohesion between mental health and medical treatment, potentially affecting care for vulnerable patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide access to mental health information during medical treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “2. That the evidence given by ████████ Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon suggested that there was no cohesion between mental health treatment and medical treatment such that whilst receiving medical treatment he would not have access to mental health information relating to a patient and as a result there may be no consideration given to the care given to vulnerable patients requiring additional support. ”

    Source location

    Nancy Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate a named care coordinator or nurse within 24 hours and require medication review and continuity of contact during transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This is a requirement under the Mental Health (Wales) Measure; there is a requirement for patients to have a named individual who coordinates their care, ie their Care Coordinator.”

    Source location

    2015-0221-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve communication between transferring mental health wards and receiving acute hospitals, including transfer of mental health medical records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The role of the Care coordinator or named nurse incorporates key responsibilities for ensuring effective communication between the transferring ward and receiving ward. When patients are transferred from mental health facilities to an acute secondary care setting, mental health medical records should follow the patient. The Mental Health Improvement Group is also working to improve this.”

    Source location

    2015-0221-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 June 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026