Recurring concern

Ineffective communication during medical emergencies

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First reported 1 Oct 2013•Latest report 26 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes deficiencies in communication, information transfer, handover, communication strategy or role clarity that are directly dedicated to coordinating or escalating a medical emergency response, including communication between healthcare staff and prison, control-room, ambulance or other responding personnel.

Not included

  • Excludes communication deficiencies unrelated to a medical emergency response.
  • Excludes standalone training, staffing, equipment, documentation or clinical-assessment deficiencies unless the report directly identifies their effect on medical-emergency communication.
  • Excludes failures confined to a specific clinical guideline or treatment decision where emergency communication is not the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic information-sharing problems that are not tied to coordinating or escalating a medical emergency.
Reports
42

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
49

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
61

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care11
HM Prison and Probation Service5
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives3
Ministry of Justice3
NHS England3
Home Office2
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
South Central Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust2
Boldmere Court Care Home1
Bourne Leisure Limited1
Capita Business Services Ltd1
Capita PLC1
Cardiff Prison1
Care Quality Commission1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Somerset

    AI-generated summary

    Barbara Jean Rymell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barbara Jean Rymell, a frail elderly resident with dementia and mobility limitations, was left unattended on a mechanical stairlift at her care home on 8 August 2022. She left the stairlift, attempted to climb the stairs, fell, and became entrapped with her head under the stairlift chair; she was pronounced deceased when paramedics arrived. The report raises concerns about staff leaving vulnerable residents unattended and about care workers’ English proficiency affecting their ability to communicate the nature of an emergency and obtain appropriate medical assistance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient English proficiency among direct care staff to communicate urgent medical needs and summon emergency help

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that those working with vulnerable people who are in a position of trust and responsibility must be able to demonstrate a sufficient proficiency in English to enable them to summon appropriate emergency medical attention when needed. Vulnerable people, by very definition, are unable to often appreciate the need for help; take steps to keep themselves safe and/or summon help for themselves when they need it. By being unable to speak the native language of England with any proficiency I am concerned that deaths will continue to arise where those who are young, disabled, suffering from a mental impairment or who are elderly and in need of urgent medical help will not have this summoned for them if those who are engaging with emergency professionals are unable to communicate effectively. The Court looked at evidence of the B1 English test. Examples from the paper were as follows: “I ________ that book last year” (options are bought, have bought, had bought) “The town, ________ is very beautiful, has lots of parks” (options are which, where, what). This level of comprehension is comparable to a KS2 curriculum being studied by Year 6 students sitting their SATS exam and appears to be wholly insufficient for those working in the direct care and protection of vulnerable people, as demonstrated in this case by carers who were alone (i.e. no English speaking members of staff on duty) being unable to explain to medical professionals the presenting condition of the patient. ”

    Source location

    Barbara Jean Rymell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Tighten Health and Care visa sponsorship requirements so only CQC-regulated providers can sponsor care worker and senior care worker applications from Spring 2024.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, the Government has recently announced that it will tighten the requirements for care workers coming to the UK on the Health and Care visa. Most relevant is the fact that only care providers who are regulated by the CQC will be eligible to sponsor care worker and senior care worker applications from Spring 2024. We will keep immigration requirements, including those relating to English language, under review as part of this work.”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Keep immigration requirements, including English-language requirements, under review as part of the Health and Care visa changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, the Government has recently announced that it will tighten the requirements for care workers coming to the UK on the Health and Care visa. Most relevant is the fact that only care providers who are regulated by the CQC will be eligible to sponsor care worker and senior care worker applications from Spring 2024. We will keep immigration requirements, including those relating to English language, under review as part of this work.”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 December 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Different English language requirements for different sectors would be difficult to assess and manage.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I receive representations on a regular basis from sectors who argue that the English language requirements are too high for their sector. Unfortunately, it would prove very difficult, both to assess and also to manage, a system where we had different English language requirements for different occupations.”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Imposing English requirements on routes without them could defeat those routes' intended purposes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This creates a mix of immigration routes with different purposes, but where people could end up working in social care. Raising the English language level in those routes which have an English language requirement would be very difficult, and imposing such a requirement on routes which do not have such a requirement would in some cases defeat the purpose of the route as it was intended.”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raising Skilled Worker English requirements is considered inappropriate, impractical, and unlikely to address all concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Given the points which I have set out above, we do not believe that raising the level of the English language requirements for Skilled Workers would be appropriate, nor do we think it would be practical to set different levels for different sectors. In any event, it would not fully address the concerns you have raised for all the reasons set out earlier.”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Employers are primarily responsible for ensuring overseas care staff can fulfil their roles and may require higher English standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I absolutely recognise that ensuring the safety of those who require care is a very important issue, but the responsibility for ensuring that employees can fulfil the requirements of their role primarily rests with employers. An employer should ensure their overseas staff can speak English to an adequate standard. The employer should consider the merits of requiring higher levels of English language than necessitated by immigration requirements – on the basis that it may be required for the settings overseas staff will be working in. In some cases, a higher level of English than required for a visa may be”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 December 2023

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles was found unresponsive on 10 April 2021, suspended on a mental health ward, after being admitted under the Mental Health Act following an attempt to take his own life. The principal concerns included failures in risk assessment, observation practices, emergency response, record keeping, and governance processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in calling duty doctors during emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Failures to respond to an emergency adequately – The Trust described the emergency response as chaotic . Staff agreed that they “panicked” and did not follow policy, specific issues include; a. A ward emergency bell was not sounded, b. An anti-barricade key was not used to open Mr Charles’ door, instead the door was forced open causing a risk of harm to Mr Charles. c. A ligature cutter could not be used promptly as it was secured in a box with a combination lock – staff did not know the combination, d. Duty doctors were not called promptly, e. Oxygen administration was delayed, f. An on-site defibrillator was not used by staff g. Staff could or would not provide a clear and relevant history to paramedics. ”

    Source location

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct monthly resuscitation drills covering emergency alarms, equipment, oxygen, defibrillation, clinical handover and cardiac-checklist use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Risk management (shortcomings in responding to the emergency) – the Coroner found that the Trust did not respond to the | 5. | Resus drills which include all of these elements are taking place monthly. | 1. Resus drills to take place monthly”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind medical staff to respond to ERT alarms and alert the duty doctor promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9. Duty Dr should be alerted as a result of the ERT alarm”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about care provision and coordination are mainly for the NHS Trust to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises concerns over the provision and coordination of care that Winbourne received at North East London NHS Foundation Trust, which are mainly for the Trust to address. I understand that the Trust has already carefully considered the matters of concern in your report and has provided you with a comprehensive response as well as a copy of its action plan setting out the actions to be taken to improve care quality and patient safety.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Sharon Elizabeth Langley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sharon Elizabeth Langley, an inpatient with Severe Depressive Disorder and Psychosis, died by immersion in water while unsupervised in an assisted bathroom at Princess Alexandra Hospital on 10 August 2019. The principal concerns included failures in the immediate emergency response, inadequate communication and coordination, shortcomings in bathroom and high-risk-area safety measures, confusion about bath-plug controls, unreliable investigation and learning processes, and inadequate record keeping and risk documentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to promptly inform and coordinate with the site co-ordinator during emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust staff immediate emergency response was not followed: a. pinpoint alarms were not activated immediately on finding Sharon Langley unresponsive b. there was a delay calling the ambulance and basic key information about the type of the emergency was not relayed: i. by qualified nurses who made the 999 calls, or ii. to paramedics on attendance c. there was a delay informing the site co-ordinator of the emergency even though she was based on the ward and there was a lack of co-ordination of the emergency resulting in the ambulance being called a second time by the site co-ordinator d. staff trained in basic life support did not assist the two nurses who were attempting to resuscitate Sharon Langley ”

    Source location

    Sharon Elizabeth Langley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share emergency-response learning through basic-life-support and grab-bag training, including prompt notification of the Site Coordinator and Doctor.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- The importance of informing the Site Coordinator and Doctor, at the time of the medical emergency, will be shared and highlighted by our colleagues who currently deliver the basic life support and grab bag training. In addition, any learning (examples of good practice or areas for improvement) which derives from a medical emergency, can be shared as part of the training (1c).”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2023

    Open published response
  4. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Nathan Forrester · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Nathan Forrester died in a shared prison cell after consuming illicit drugs, and the jury concluded that he died of a drug-related death. Concerns included delays and insufficient training in removing an unresponsive prisoner from a top bunk for CPR, and gaps in nurses’ CPR, airway-management and handover training in detention settings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate handover during resuscitation emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Training of nurses in CPR (NHS England) Nurses attending the Code Blue had no training insertion of an IGel or oropharyngeal tube, nor was an airway available in the emergency bags. Paramedics reported that resuscitation being provided by nurses was ineffective (too low and too fast) and that they had an inadequate handover. These deficiencies have been addressed locally and all nurses in Oxleas NHS Trust are trained annually to ILS level and airways are available. The concern is that this standard of training of nurses working in detention settings nationally may not be universal. ”

    Source location

    Mr Nathan Forrester · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Lewis Steven Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lewis Steven Johnson was found unresponsive with a neck ligature at HMP Wealstun on 12 December 2019 and later died in hospital following a further cardiac arrest. The report raised concerns about the absence of overnight healthcare staff and the prison officers’ delayed and inadequate response, including lack of CPR, defibrillator use and consideration of the recovery position.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of prison officers to initiate or coordinate CPR in an emergency

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) The four prison officers present in the cell did not discuss the need for CPR. The possibility of using a defibrillator was not mentioned. Mr Johnson was left in the cell in a seated position without the wisdom of placing him in the recovery position being considered. ”

    Source location

    Lewis Steven Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the emergency-response training video and distribute it to training centres and prisons for staff training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In respect of the EFAW training all prison officers receive during their entry level training, all first aid training certificates are valid for three years and although not mandatory, staff are encouraged to undertake refresher training to maintain their basic skills and keep up to date with any changes to first-aid procedures. The initial training for staff includes an HMPPS video which shows how to respond to an emergency situation where a prisoner has attempted suicide. This is currently being updated to reflect changes to policy and equipment available since the original video was produced. This video covers the use of prison issue ligature tools, emergency response codes, placing someone in the recovery position and considerations such as when to initiate first aid and the use of defibrillators.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2022

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review first-aid policy and collaborate on updated guidance covering CPR commencement and signposting safer-custody guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Looking ahead, HMPPS is currently reviewing the first aid policy with the view to replacing this with updated guidance. As the new guidance develops, collaboration will take place amongst teams to ensure there is reference to the commencement of CPR and to ensure we signpost the current safer custody guidance available on the HMPPS intranet which sets out the circumstances in which CPR should be commenced. This is designed to be read in conjunction with the current the Prison Service Instruction which makes clear that all staff must be aware of their responsibilities and of the local procedures that are in place to enable an effective response to medical emergencies.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2022

    Open published response
  6. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma collapsed during separate military selection runs at Whittington Barracks and later died after being taken to hospital. Both were found to have metabolic acidosis, acute kidney injury, rhabdomyolysis and sickle cell trait; the final causes of death remained under investigation, with the most likely cause of collapse described as sickle cell trait combined with military exercise. The principal concern was the risk of death or harm to non-UK selection candidates, including the need to consider screening for sickle cell trait.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a mechanism to broadcast a medical emergency by tannoy at the base

    Wider context from the report

    “Sickle cell trait (SCT) screening process and identifying SCT in candidates: 1. The Inquest heard evidence that since these tragedies there had be 12 (13 as one incident includes 2 people) near misses where the process that had been put in place following these tragedies had not be followed. This resulted in 3 candidates at High Risk for SCT according to their family origins questionnaire undertaking the 2km run. 1 of these had self-identified to a Group Leader prior to the exercise but was directed to complete the RFT(E) run element in any case. This raises a concern about the screening process may be safe and effective. 2. The inquest was told that the Air force and Navy are not screening any candidates for SCT. The Army are. Both services are recruiting from the Commonwealth. Medical evidence at the inquest confirmed screening was the only way to safely identify candidates at risk. This raises a concern that the recruitment process is not safe and effective. Training and Education 1. The near miss incidents lead to a concern that staff involved in the selection process and RFT assessments are still not aware of the risk associated with SCT given that in one case the person was directed to undertake the run despite knowing he was at high risk of developing exertional rhabdomyolysis associated with SCT. 2. The lack of screening in the Navy and Air Force leads to a further concern about the level of understanding regarding the risks associated with SCT – the evidence at the inquest said this risk was unpredictable . 3. The inquest heard evidence that there is no standardised way to identify SCT candidates who are going through the selection process as the different services were considering using different colours wrist bands in different services. The raises a concern about the ability to identify those candidates who have SCT. 4. There should be a review of the wording used and rationale for including questions for candidates regarding ‘cola coloured urine’ in the PMSA. Dr Gupta, an expert haematologist at the inquest, informed the court that this is not always a sign of SCT as an individual can get cola urine from hepatitis. This raises a concern about the level of understanding of the significant of "cola coloured urine" and what it might indicate. Reporting and investigation 1. The inquest heard how Capita have set up a clinical oversight board to review any incidents. First this board did not appear to have reviewed or audited any of the near misses referred to above and second it does not include a representative from the Army. This raises concerns about the lack of joined up thinking for an incident between Capita and the army and the safety of the new process. 2. Reporting of incidents: the majority of the 12 near misses were not investigated at the time they occurred which indicates the present process is not safe and effective. 3. There is no system to audit whether incidents are being correctly processed and investigated. 4. The reporting system continues to use two parallel reporting forms for Capita (Casper) and the Army (Durals). These are on separate IT systems. This raises a concern that there is no "one version of the truth". The inquest heard evidence that Capita were unclear if they had resolved the issue in their Casper system associated with the drop down menu options and the fact that non work related incidents close investigations automatically. 5. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group has a clear identifiable person to take responsibility for the review health and safety incidents and to ensure adequate investigation is undertaken. Specifically it was still not clear that any oversight of the medical incidents fell within the remit of the Capita Head of Health and Safety. 6. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group act as one entity regarding health and safety issues with a clear lines of responsibility for global risk assessment (and promoting information gathering & investigation) of incidents of any nature. The Inquest heard evidence that ‘H&S at work’ is considered differently to any medical risk, which is supported by the lack of investigation of the near misses. Medical response: 1. Inquest heard how Lichfield had specialist medical staff on site in the medical training unit but there was no system for getting urgent medical attention on the base if needed. There was no mechanism to put a tannoy out for a medical emergency but the Inquest heard evidence that this could be done for a cake sale. 2. All the services should consider whether there should be a generic policy for the treatment of exertional collapse (of any cause) as per US Army where during training there is a clear medical plan with availability of essential medical treatment (eg oxygen and fluids) before hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    James Joseph MANNING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Joseph Manning, aged two, choked on a piece of sausage at Butlins, Bognor Regis, on 6 June 2018, suffered a cardiac arrest and hypoxic ischaemic brain injury, and died in hospital on 20 June 2018. The concerns included delays and weaknesses in healthcare referral, follow-up and information-sharing systems, and shortcomings in the management of health and safety, incident reporting, first-aid provision and emergency procedures at Bourne Leisure sites.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of an external phone line for emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “d) I was concerned to hear evidence that many months after this tragic incident during Tots Week, installation of an external phone line and sufficient AEDs in key areas such as restaurants and swimming pool areas had not been completed. ”

    Source location

    James Joseph MANNING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Ian McDonald Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Ian McDonald Taylor suffered a cardiac arrest after a physical altercation while in police detention and died in hospital. Concerns included the police officer’s assessment and communication of Mr Taylor’s breathing difficulties, access to his inhaler while awaiting an ambulance, and the exceptionally delayed ambulance response.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate detainee medical distress with appropriate urgency

    Wider context from the report

    “Whilst PC ████████ was away from Mr ████████ he accepts that he is heard shortly after 18.14 stating to his sergeant on the radio “He’s currently on the floor playing the whole poor me poor me; he’s going to have to go to hospital though as a matter of course.” And at 18.24: “He’s saying he has chest pains he cant breathe blah blah; it’s a load of nonsense but there we go” He said in court that he formed these views as Mr Taylor seemed iller than he would expect from the nature of the previous altercation. He denied he thought Mr Taylor was faking. He claims to have made a continual risk assessment, but there is no record or evidence of that. He said that his views were influenced by a previous incident in which a man sprang to violence from previous calmness. They were not his final conclusion. There was no evidence as to his forming a different conclusion in the following 8 minutes before the cardiac arrest. ”

    Source location

    Mr Ian McDonald Taylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The officer’s comments had no bearing on the circumstances of the incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is the position of the AA that whilst the officer’s comments had no bearing on the circumstances of the incident, the flippant nature of the words demonstrate a lack of professionalism and are in breach of the standards of professional behaviour outlined in the code of ethics issued by the college of policing.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The conduct did not meet the threshold for disciplinary proceedings, so no disciplinary action was pursued.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The AA has determined that the conduct does not meet the threshold for justifying disciplinary proceedings. The AA has identified practice requiring improvement and determined that the officer will be referred the reflective practice review process, as set out in Part 6 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. In particular the AA has determined that the reflective practice review process will include an opportunity for the officer to reflect on the missed opportunity to offer an apology to Mr Taylor’s family.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The officer’s behaviour did not meet the statutory threshold for disciplinary proceedings and therefore did not require treatment as a conduct matter.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The distress that ████████ comments to his Sergeant, and the lack of insight and reflection shown in his evidence to the inquest, will have caused to Mr Taylor’s family, is a harm resulting from his behaviour which will also be capable of harming public confidence in the police service more widely. I agree that this behaviour does need appropriate intervention. Balanced against this, this appears to be a one off incident rather than a pattern of behaviour and while the inquest jury concluded that the dynamic risk assessment of the officers present was not adequate, the evidence did not suggest that ████████ comments to his Sergeant delayed or otherwise affected the treatment of Mr Taylor.”

    Source location

    Response from IOPC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A further investigation was unnecessary because existing body-worn video and inquest evidence established the officer’s behaviour, while reflective practice provided appropriate intervention.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I agree that this is an appropriate intervention. ████████ behaviour is evidenced in the BWV capturing his comments at the time, and the record of his evidence to the inquest. A further investigation therefore does not appear to be necessary in order to establish the extent of his behaviour or test the evidence. Under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, the appropriate authority has the power to refer an officer to the reflective practice review process without an investigation. The Home Office Guidance on Conduct, Efficiency and Effectiveness 2020 states that the reflective practice review process is intended to:”

    Source location

    Response from IOPC
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 September 2022

    Open published response
  9. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Mark Anthony Moffett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Mark Anthony Moffett had probably suffered from diarrhoea and vomiting for up to three weeks before dying from natural causes following a cardiac arrest due to metabolic acidosis. Failures included an unlabelled blood sample, omission of an ECG, and inadequate communication of the patient’s condition and emergency level to ambulance control. The report raised concerns about communication arrangements between healthcare staff, prison control rooms and ambulance control, including the possibility of a wider national problem.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of effective communication between healthcare personnel at medical emergencies and prison or ambulance control

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence disclosed the need for healthcare and the prison to devise a better means of communication between healthcare personnel at the scene of a medical emergency and the prison control room / ambulance control (2) Similar communication difficulties have already been reported in relation to the inquest into the death of Martin Brown who died at HMIP Lancaster Farms and the Prison and Probation Ombudsman has highlighted a delay in the provision of essential information to Ambulance Control in the case of ████████ who died on 9th December 2020 at HMP Garth (3) The fact that communication difficulties have arisen between healthcare and the ambulance service in three recent cases involving prisons in Lancashire may indicate a potentially national problem ”

    Source location

    Thomas Mark Anthony Moffett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the revised emergency response process, including a second healthcare responder, scene SBAR completion and direct ambulance communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It was therefore decided that Healthcare at HMP Preston would revise the Emergency Response Standard Operating Procedure to allow a second healthcare staff member to also attend any emergency codes or Hotel 2 calls. The second healthcare member of staff would carry Hotel 3 radio and would be responsible to immediately completing an SBAR at the scene and then use the wing phone to ring communications to speak directly with the ambulance to provide accurate updates.”

    Source location

    2022-0018-Response-from-Spectrum-1.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide supporting training on the new emergency response process to relevant staff and incorporate it into responses to all emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Healthcare team will receive training in ambulance categorisation to be able to effectively challenge if they feel it has been incorrectly categorised by the ambulance call handler. The Head of Healthcare at HMP Preston has contacted the Head of Healthcare at HMP Lancaster farms who has spoken directly to North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) to discuss training needs and scope training provision for clinicians within Spectrum prisons. NWAS have provided Spectrum with information (embedded in the action plan) which we can use to develop a staff training package. This information has been incorporated into the new Emergency Response Standard Operating Procedure at HMP Preston.”

    Source location

    2022-0018-Response-from-Spectrum-1.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and deliver clinician training on ambulance categorisation and challenging incorrect categorisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Healthcare team will receive training in ambulance categorisation to be able to effectively challenge if they feel it has been incorrectly categorised by the ambulance call handler. The Head of Healthcare at HMP Preston has contacted the Head of Healthcare at HMP Lancaster farms who has spoken directly to North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) to discuss training needs and scope training provision for clinicians within Spectrum prisons. NWAS have provided Spectrum with information (embedded in the action plan) which we can use to develop a staff training package. This information has been incorporated into the new Emergency Response Standard Operating Procedure at HMP Preston.”

    Source location

    2022-0018-Response-from-Spectrum-1.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Access to mobile phones or alternative communication methods is the responsibility of HMPPS partners.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly, based on the number of occurrences of communication issues identified above, the issue of communication between prison healthcare teams, the communication room and the ambulance service, is clearly a national problem. The accessibility to mobile phones or alternative methods to improve communication remain in the gift of our HMPPS partners. The same issues arise for the use of Code Blue and Code Red with Spectrum Healthcare have no influence to change and may continue to be a wider concern”

    Source location

    2022-0018-Response-from-Spectrum-1.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Spectrum Healthcare has no influence to change the Code Blue and Code Red communication arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly, based on the number of occurrences of communication issues identified above, the issue of communication between prison healthcare teams, the communication room and the ambulance service, is clearly a national problem. The accessibility to mobile phones or alternative methods to improve communication remain in the gift of our HMPPS partners. The same issues arise for the use of Code Blue and Code Red with Spectrum Healthcare have no influence to change and may continue to be a wider concern”

    Source location

    2022-0018-Response-from-Spectrum-1.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2022

    Open published response
  10. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Martin Thomas Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Martin Thomas Brown collapsed in his cell at HMP Lancaster Farms on 10 December 2018, suffered a cardiac arrest and died despite resuscitation attempts. A post-mortem examination did not establish a cause of death. Concerns related to prison staff training and familiarity with the ERIC system, healthcare liaison with the ambulance service, and communication during medical emergencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate communication between healthcare personnel at medical emergency scenes and prison or ambulance control

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) For the attention of the Governor, the evidence disclosed a need for the training of prison staff in relation to responses to medical emergencies and familiarisation with the ERIC (Emergency Response in Custody) system (2) For the attention of the Head of Healthcare, the evidence disclosed a need for healthcare to liaise with North West Ambulance Service over the handling of medical emergencies involving the ambulance service (3) For the attention of the Governor in partnership with the Head of Healthcare, the evidence disclosed a need to devise a better means of communication between healthcare personnel at the scene of a medical emergency and the prison control room / ambulance control. ”

    Source location

    Martin Thomas Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of healthcare to liaise with the ambulance service over medical emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) For the attention of the Governor, the evidence disclosed a need for the training of prison staff in relation to responses to medical emergencies and familiarisation with the ERIC (Emergency Response in Custody) system (2) For the attention of the Head of Healthcare, the evidence disclosed a need for healthcare to liaise with North West Ambulance Service over the handling of medical emergencies involving the ambulance service (3) For the attention of the Governor in partnership with the Head of Healthcare, the evidence disclosed a need to devise a better means of communication between healthcare personnel at the scene of a medical emergency and the prison control room / ambulance control. ”

    Source location

    Martin Thomas Brown · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaise with NWAS to define clinician training needs and incorporate ambulance-control communication guidance into the HMP Lancaster Farms emergency-response procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(2) For the attention of the Head of Healthcare, the evidence disclosed a need for healthcare to liaise with North West Ambulance Service over the handling of medical emergencies involving the ambulance service”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct joint prison-healthcare debriefs after incidents to identify communication lessons involving healthcare, the communications department and NWAS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following incidents, debriefs occur jointly with the Prison and healthcare. This is an opportunity to consider the communication taken place between healthcare, the communication department and NWAS. Any emerging lesson learnt will be captured at this early stage.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a dedicated radio net enabling clinicians and the prison communications room to communicate directly and relay information securely during medical emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An alternative solution was the provision of a mobile phone for healthcare to utilise to make the call, however, the phone signal in HMP Lancaster Farms is not reliable. Following the inquest, the Head of Healthcare met with the new Safer Custody Governor, and it was agreed that a spare radio net will be utilised so that the clinician can speak directly to the prison’s communications room (rather than via Oscar 1) to provide more information directly which can then be relayed to the clinician, who would also be able to answer any questions posed by the ambulance service. The clinician can also contact the communications room directly to ask for progress reports. As the net will only be accessible to the communications room and healthcare, this will mean confidential and sensitive information can be relayed.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor the new emergency-communication system through staff feedback, healthcare incident reviews and safety-huddle and organisational learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This new system was trialled in an exercise on the 18th January 2022. This approach proved to be successful. This went live on the 31st of January. Supportive training regarding the new process has been provided to relevant staff and will now form part of the response process for all emergencies. This new system will be monitored via staff feedback and review of healthcare incidents which are logged for each Code Red/ Blue. This will be shared at the safety huddles and within the wider organisation to share best practice.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a dedicated radio channel to connect clinicians directly with ambulance services through the communications room during medical emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new process has been implemented at HMP Lancaster Farms to ensure healthcare staff can communicate efficiently and effectively with the prison control room and the ambulance service during medical emergencies. By utilising a spare radio channel available on the prison radio network clinicians will now have the ability to speak directly to the ambulance service via the communication room when an emergency is underway. This will enable them to relay information and answer any questions posed by the ambulance service without disruption or delay, as well as receive progress reports on the ambulance’s arrival.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-HMPPS-response_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Restrict access to the emergency radio network to the communications room, healthcare staff and first responders on scene.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Also, the radio network will only be accessible to the communications room, healthcare and those first on scene to safeguard any confidential information.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-HMPPS-response_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Using the wing phone could delay emergency communication and leave the patient without a nurse while the clinician makes the call.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Potential solutions were discussed, and these included accessing the wing phone to make the call, however, it was noted that this would mean the clinician leaving the patient to ring an outside line. Prison telecommunication systems require a phone code to access an outside line which further increases the time taken to make a call. The patient may then be left without a nurse in attendance whilst this telephone call is taking place.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A mobile phone was not a reliable communication solution because phone signal at HMP Lancaster Farms was unreliable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An alternative solution was the provision of a mobile phone for healthcare to utilise to make the call, however, the phone signal in HMP Lancaster Farms is not reliable. Following the inquest, the Head of Healthcare met with the new Safer Custody Governor, and it was agreed that a spare radio net will be utilised so that the clinician can speak directly to the prison’s communications room (rather than via Oscar 1) to provide more information directly which can then be relayed to the clinician, who would also be able to answer any questions posed by the ambulance service. The clinician can also contact the communications room directly to ask for progress reports. As the net will only be accessible to the communications room and healthcare, this will mean confidential and sensitive information can be relayed.”

    Source location

    2021-0417-Response-from-Spectrum-at-HMP-Lancaster-Farms_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 December 2021

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026