Recurring concern

Unreliable interagency sharing of safeguarding risk information

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First reported 18 Dec 2013•Latest report 3 Sep 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the interagency safeguarding-information-sharing process, including obtaining relevant information, securing or recording appropriate consent for disclosure, communicating risk information across agencies, and ensuring that receiving agencies obtain complete and accurate information.

Not included

  • Excludes generic communication or information-management failures not materially connected to safeguarding risk information or interagency care.
  • Excludes failures confined to disclosure to a court, coroner or other legal inquiry rather than safeguarding or care coordination.
  • Excludes failures in making safeguarding referrals where the concern is the referral decision itself rather than the sharing of information between agencies.
  • Excludes clinical assessment, care ownership or discharge failures unless the unsafe condition is specifically the failure to share relevant safeguarding risk information between agencies.
Reports
23

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
26

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
45

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care7
Home Office4
Department for Education3
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board3
Crown Prosecution Service2
Greater Manchester Police2
Ministry of Justice2
NHS England2
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust2
Surrey County Council2
Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Bury Borough Council1
Catholic Safeguarding Standards Agency1
Church of England1
College of Policing1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East Riding and Hull

    AI-generated summary

    Jessica Louise LAVERACK “Jessie” · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jessica Louise LAVERACK “Jessie” had a history of domestic abuse, anxiety and alcohol dependence, and reported suicidal ideation and self-harm before her death. She was found on 2 February 2018, and the medical cause of death was recorded as hanging. The report identified concerns about the lack of a coordinated approach and information sharing between agencies, including for vulnerable people who did not meet the MARAC high-risk threshold.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of information sharing between agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) There was a lack of information sharing between all agencies, even those tasked with domestic abuse. a. There is no one database which is accessible for all agencies to input their common concerns. b. There is lack of robust policy of information sharing regarding both suicidal ideation, self harm as well as identification of the vulnerable. It is noted that the Health and Care Act is due to commence on 1st July 2022, which outlines need for interagency working. This may be an ideal opportunity to address these issues. ”

    Source location

    Jessica Louise LAVERACK “Jessie” · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Confidential patient information cannot be shared without satisfying data protection law, public interest requirements and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality case by case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to your concerns around the general lack of information sharing between agencies, healthcare professionals must believe there is a significant public interest and satisfy data protection law, and the ‘Common Law Duty of Confidentiality’ when sharing any confidential patient information. This requires requestors to meet specific purposes on a case-by-case basis to ensure the confidentiality of this data is maintained.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Home Office and Department of Health and Social Care hold responsibility for the majority of concerns and lead related recommendations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Responsibility for the majority of the concerns raised in your report sits with the Home Office and Department of Health and Social Care and we have seen and support the response that the Home Office sent you on 23rd August. However, we have separately considered the third concern in your Report where you refer to a lack of information sharing between agencies, including no singular database for all agencies to input common concerns and a lack of robust policy of information sharing regarding both suicidal ideation, self-harm as well as identification of the vulnerable.”

    Source location

    Response from Ministry of Justice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 November 2022

    Open published response
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Alan Howard Foster Griffin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan Howard Foster Griffin died by suicide at home on 8 November 2020 while under investigation by his former and current dioceses. The principal concerns were systemic and individual failings in the handling of unverified allegations, including inadequate verification, inaccurate and incomplete information-sharing, unclear responsibility, and failure to seek recommended legal advice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure accurate and complete cross-organisation safeguarding communications

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The safeguarding adviser who was tasked by the safeguarding manager with dealing with investigation, thought that an approach should be made to Father Griffin by a member of the clergy on a welfare basis. She told me she had thought that the church’s involvement should simply be about supporting a vulnerable man. She emailed the archdeacon asking him if the clergy could make an approach to Father Griffin, but such an approach did not take place, and so she herself spoke briefly to Father Griffin to make initial contact. During this brief conversation, Father Griffin explained that he was now a Roman Catholic priest, so the safeguarding adviser sent an email to her Roman Catholic safeguarding counterpart. The email disclosed Father Griffin’s HIV status; it was inaccurate as to detail; it did not properly represent her view of the allegations; and it did not include reference to the fact that Father Griffin had attempted suicide when diagnosed as HIV+ approximately nine years earlier. She told me that the errors she made within this email were the consequence of her concurrent very difficult personal circumstances, in the context of short staffing. The email was seen by the archdeacon and the safeguarding manager before it was sent, but neither made any substantive amendment. Insufficient regard was paid to ensuring scrupulous accuracy, and completeness of relevant information, in the communication with a different organisation. There seemed almost to be a lack of recognition that the Roman Catholic Church was a different organisation. ”

    Source location

    Alan Howard Foster Griffin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct an independent external Lessons Learned Review of safeguarding and conduct handling, including information management, risk assessment, casework and inter-church sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We aim to agree the Terms of Reference by early September with the intention of the Lessons Learned Review ("the Review") beginning in September 2021. The purpose and objectives of the Review are currently as follows:”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Church-of-England_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Design and implement improved systems for capturing, triaging, recording, assessing and appropriately sharing safeguarding and conduct information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Our new Head of Safeguarding has already started working with the team to design and implement new systems of information capture, triage, recording, assessment and appropriate sharing of safeguarding and conduct matters. These issues will form part of our overarching improvement plan.”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Church-of-England_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver safeguarding-specific GDPR training and strengthen recording, auditing and lawful, proportionate information-sharing practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Delivering additional GDPR training specific to safeguarding to ensure staff in the Diocesan Safeguarding Team are competent and confident to ensure information that is shared is recorded and audited, and that the principles of information sharing are applied lawfully and proportionately. In due course this will be delivered to senior staff involved in handling personal and safeguarding related data to support their practice and decision making.”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Church-of-England_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement formal information-sharing protocols and agreements for safeguarding information with relevant statutory, faith and partner organisations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This project seeks to strengthen information sharing arrangements by putting in place an information sharing protocol and information sharing agreement in place for safeguarding information. The project was established as a result of a recommendation from the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) to focus on sharing information with the Church of Wales and statutory agencies. We will work with the Roman Catholic Church to implement a similar information sharing agreement.”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Church-of-England_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Collaborate with the Church of England to create and implement information-sharing and unresolved-concern escalation processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Inter-agency working The CSSA has consulted with the Church of England National Safeguarding Team and agreed that we will collaborate on creating and implementing an Information Sharing Agreement between the two denominations, and a process for escalation of concerns where matters cannot be resolved by the respective safeguarding teams.”

    Source location

    2021-0243-Response-from-Catholic-Safeguarding-Standards-Agency_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Alfie Gildea · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alfie Gildea sustained catastrophic injuries consistent with being shaken with force while in his father's care on 12 September 2018 and died from his injuries on 14 September 2018. The report identifies concerns about failures by police, children's services, health visiting services and the CPS to recognise, assess, share and act on domestic abuse risks, including coercive and controlling behaviour.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor information sharing and joint risk recognition across statutory agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “12. Information sharing between all of the statutory agencies in particular health; Local Authority and Police was poor. As a result there was no holistic overview of the situation or shared recognition of the risk posed by the perpetrator. Opportunities to use the MARAC framework were not taken. ”

    Source location

    Alfie Gildea · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct district safeguarding-team deep-dive reviews and circulate domestic abuse, child-protection and adults-at-risk triage expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMP's Public Protection Governance Unit has conducted a deep-dive review into the standards used in the triage process of six district safeguarding teams, including information sharing between agencies. The purpose of the review was to understand the methodology and information considered as part of the triage decision making process and how this was recorded. This review identified good practice and areas for development moving forward. Triage expectations for domestic abuse, child protection, and adults at risk have been circulated to districts to set out the standards expected during triage. Moving forward, the Public Protection Governance Unit is working with the People and Development Branch to establish a specific triage training course which will include guidance on information sharing.”

    Source location

    2020-0242-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police-Redacted.pdf
    Page 7 · response
    Published 24 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a specific safeguarding-team triage training course incorporating information-sharing guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMP's Public Protection Governance Unit has conducted a deep-dive review into the standards used in the triage process of six district safeguarding teams, including information sharing between agencies. The purpose of the review was to understand the methodology and information considered as part of the triage decision making process and how this was recorded. This review identified good practice and areas for development moving forward. Triage expectations for domestic abuse, child protection, and adults at risk have been circulated to districts to set out the standards expected during triage. Moving forward, the Public Protection Governance Unit is working with the People and Development Branch to establish a specific triage training course which will include guidance on information sharing.”

    Source location

    2020-0242-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Police-Redacted.pdf
    Page 7 · response
    Published 24 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Other named respondents are responsible for addressing the coroner’s concerns; this response covers only broader learning-sharing issues within its remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have noted that your Regulation 28 letter has also been sent to Greater Manchester Police, Trafford Metropolitan Borough Council, Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust, Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust, The Crown Prosecution Service, the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care and I will leave it to the named respondents to address the concerns which you have expressed. My letter therefore addresses the issues that fall within the remit of GMHSCP more widely around how we can share the learning from this case.”

    Source location

    2020-0242-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Health-and-Social-Care-Partnership-Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 December 2020

    Open published response
  4. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Darrell Sharples · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darrell Sharples died on 21 July 2018, aged 49. The inquest recorded the medical cause of death as asphyxia due to hanging and concluded that he died by suicide. Concerns included whether information about vulnerable individuals from ViST forms could be appropriately shared with partner agencies, and whether custody staff should access relevant CJLDT assessments before imposing bail conditions and releasing vulnerable individuals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to appropriately share targeted ViST data about vulnerable individuals with partner agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “ViST forms. These generate a lot of data about potentially vulnerable individuals. I consider deaths may be prevented in the future where that data could be appropriately shared with partner agencies. I have in mind, in particular, Cornwall Partnership Foundation Trust and Kernow Clinical Commissioning Group (on behalf of GPs.) I recognise there is a need to limit or prioritise the data shared so that it is manageable and targeted to the most vulnerable and/or those at greatest risk of harm or self-harm. I further recognise that there may well be legitimate concerns about data protection. I was told this may be of concern where a particular individual consents to the sharing of data. Where someone refuses to consent, however, I accept sharing may be more problematic and legal advice may be required. ”

    Source location

    Darrell Sharples · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Central Safeguarding Team’s adult GP-referral process and feedback loop with NHS Kernow.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. A meeting was arranged between Devon and Cornwall Police and NHS Kernow to discuss the process for adult GP referrals from the police Central Safeguarding Team (“CST”) and closing the feedback loop with consideration for education of all GP’s including working with GP lead for suicide prevention and dissemination via other forums.”

    Source location

    2020-0219-Joint-Response-from-Devon-and-Cornwall-Police-and-Kernow-NHS-Clinical-Commissioning-Group-Redacted..pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a Central Safeguarding Team trigger process identifying escalating adult risk and prompting focused GP letters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At this meeting it was discussed and agreed that the sending of all ViSTs to GPs would overwhelm GPs, and create the risk of the higher risk referrals being overlooked as a result of the volume. We recognised that more work could be done in the CST to improve organisational recognition of risk over time; in particular, where risk in relation to a particular individual is escalating. This work has been progressing since 2020 and in November 2020, Detective Inspector (“DI”) ████████ from the CST launched a trigger process to identify escalating risk in adults (including following the submission of a certain number of ViSTs). Part of this process is to include a more focused letter to GPs to advise them of and alert them to the potential escalating risk. The CST already shares information from ViSTs with GPs via GP letters.”

    Source location

    2020-0219-Joint-Response-from-Devon-and-Cornwall-Police-and-Kernow-NHS-Clinical-Commissioning-Group-Redacted..pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consult local GPs on the draft focused letter used after the escalating-risk trigger process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A draft letter has been prepared and will now be subject to a process of consultation led by ████████ including local GPs. DI ████████ is also to produce guidance notes to accompany the letter, in addition to drafting an article for publication in the GP Bulletin to increase awareness. The GP Bulletin will also be shared with safeguarding leads within GP practices. The learning points will be further raised at the Safeguarding Adult conference.”

    Source location

    2020-0219-Joint-Response-from-Devon-and-Cornwall-Police-and-Kernow-NHS-Clinical-Commissioning-Group-Redacted..pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce guidance notes accompanying the focused GP letter.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A draft letter has been prepared and will now be subject to a process of consultation led by ████████ including local GPs. DI ████████ is also to produce guidance notes to accompany the letter, in addition to drafting an article for publication in the GP Bulletin to increase awareness. The GP Bulletin will also be shared with safeguarding leads within GP practices. The learning points will be further raised at the Safeguarding Adult conference.”

    Source location

    2020-0219-Joint-Response-from-Devon-and-Cornwall-Police-and-Kernow-NHS-Clinical-Commissioning-Group-Redacted..pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    All ViSTs cannot be sent to GPs because the resulting volume could overwhelm practices and cause higher-risk referrals to be overlooked.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At this meeting it was discussed and agreed that the sending of all ViSTs to GPs would overwhelm GPs, and create the risk of the higher risk referrals being overlooked as a result of the volume. We recognised that more work could be done in the CST to improve organisational recognition of risk over time; in particular, where risk in relation to a particular individual is escalating. This work has been progressing since 2020 and in November 2020, Detective Inspector (“DI”) ████████ from the CST launched a trigger process to identify escalating risk in adults (including following the submission of a certain number of ViSTs). Part of this process is to include a more focused letter to GPs to advise them of and alert them to the potential escalating risk. The CST already shares information from ViSTs with GPs via GP letters.”

    Source location

    2020-0219-Joint-Response-from-Devon-and-Cornwall-Police-and-Kernow-NHS-Clinical-Commissioning-Group-Redacted..pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 December 2020

    Open published response
  5. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    May Adalaid Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    May Adalaid Miller, aged 95, was attacked by another resident while asleep at Beech House Residential Care Home on 9 February 2020 and died from natural causes precipitated by the assault. The report raised concerns about the lack of safeguarding information sharing between agencies and care facilities, including the absence of a system to share information about the other resident’s risk factors.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain consent for disclosure of safeguarding information to other agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “In light of the data sharing and confidentiality requirements under GDPR, the GP was unable to disclose full information to the Limes or to Beech House about any previous conduct or assessments of ████████. At no time was the family of Mr ████████ asked to sign a letter giving consent to disclosure to other agencies before or after the residency. It was not known whether the GP could have been the central point of contact for all investigative agencies and the Care Homes. It was established during the evidence that multiple investigative agencies may have been aware of Mr ████████’s risk factors but that due to his not having been admitted to Beech House from a registered facility, that information sharing was not possible. Had there been in place a system for sharing safeguarding information with the Limes and Beech House, there may have been an opportunity to safeguard May Miller. ”

    Source location

    May Adalaid Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system for sharing safeguarding information with care homes

    Wider context from the report

    “In light of the data sharing and confidentiality requirements under GDPR, the GP was unable to disclose full information to the Limes or to Beech House about any previous conduct or assessments of ████████. At no time was the family of Mr ████████ asked to sign a letter giving consent to disclosure to other agencies before or after the residency. It was not known whether the GP could have been the central point of contact for all investigative agencies and the Care Homes. It was established during the evidence that multiple investigative agencies may have been aware of Mr ████████’s risk factors but that due to his not having been admitted to Beech House from a registered facility, that information sharing was not possible. Had there been in place a system for sharing safeguarding information with the Limes and Beech House, there may have been an opportunity to safeguard May Miller. ”

    Source location

    May Adalaid Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Information-sharing arrangements failing when a person is not admitted from a registered facility

    Wider context from the report

    “In light of the data sharing and confidentiality requirements under GDPR, the GP was unable to disclose full information to the Limes or to Beech House about any previous conduct or assessments of ████████. At no time was the family of Mr ████████ asked to sign a letter giving consent to disclosure to other agencies before or after the residency. It was not known whether the GP could have been the central point of contact for all investigative agencies and the Care Homes. It was established during the evidence that multiple investigative agencies may have been aware of Mr ████████’s risk factors but that due to his not having been admitted to Beech House from a registered facility, that information sharing was not possible. Had there been in place a system for sharing safeguarding information with the Limes and Beech House, there may have been an opportunity to safeguard May Miller. ”

    Source location

    May Adalaid Miller · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact receiving care homes immediately when residents consider residential care and share all available information by telephone and follow-up letter.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On hearing that a resident is considering a move into residential care, contact will be made immediately with the receiving care home and all information will be shared. This would initially be by phone (warden) and would always be followed up in writing (manager)”

    Source location

    2020-0201-Response-from-the-Limes-Residence-Association_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    GP confidentiality means the suitability information received about prospective residents is very limited.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Prospective residents are interviewed by the warden and the manager. A letter of suitability is always obtained from the G.P. but they seemed to be bound by confidentiality and the information is received is very limited.”

    Source location

    2020-0201-Response-from-the-Limes-Residence-Association_Redacted.pdf
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 December 2020

    Open published response
  6. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Shneur Zalman Kaye · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shneur Zalman Kaye died at home on 24 August 2018, aged 14, from suffocation caused by inhalation of helium. The report raises concerns that a safeguarding referral was closed without contacting Shneur or his parents and that the referral and reasons for it were not shared with relevant third parties or agencies, potentially limiting assessment and protective action.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share safeguarding referral information and reasons with relevant third parties, services or agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “2...The evidence received by the Court indicates that the closure of the safeguarding referral marks an end to social services involvement. Despite this no attempt is made to share the fact of the referral or the reasons for it with any third party, service or agency. This may have the unintended result of depriving third parties (including parents) and agencies already participating in the care and welfare of a child from being alerted to the concern and taking appropriate action (including accessing other services) in response to it. The submissions made on behalf of the council indicate these practices are driven by considerations of data protection compliance The practice imperils the precedence to be given to the paramountcy principle and has the potential to undermine the protection of children who are the subject of referral. ”

    Source location

    Shneur Zalman Kaye · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Katie Croft · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Katie Croft was a vulnerable child who had reported abuse and later disclosed thoughts of self-harm. She was found suspended from a ligature at home, sustained catastrophic brain damage, and died in hospital on 15 January 2019. Concerns included shortcomings in the police and social-care responses, failures to fully hear Katie’s voice and share relevant information, and uncertainty about guidance for schools teaching material involving suicide to vulnerable pupils.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share Child and Family Assessments in accordance with best practice

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The Local Authority at the time were using a substantial number of agency social workers. As a result the Child and Family Assessment was not completed in accordance with best practice and not shared in accordance with expectations around best practice. The Local Authority has since made significant progress in moving away from a reliance on agency staff to fill gaps in social work cover. The inquest was told that agency social workers are still used extensively in other Local Authorities creating a risk that a similar situation could arise; ”

    Source location

    Katie Croft · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Aram Ali Mustafa · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Aram Ali Mustafa, an asylum seeker living in initial accommodation, was found hanging by a scarf in his room on 4 February 2019 and was declared deceased at 23.10. The report identified concerns that earlier suicide and safeguarding information was not sufficiently detailed or logged across the organisations involved.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide sufficient details about safeguarding concerns and health care matters

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When he had first illegally entered the UK Mr Mustafa was deported to Italy on 29/10/18. Just before he was deported he confirmed he would kill himself if he was deported. He was provided with 1:1 constant watch and was successfully deported. When he re-entered the UK on 30/01/19 he was seen by a member of the immigration compliance and enforcement team who completed paperwork for the national asylum accommodation unit who in turn completed a service commission form requesting initial accommodation. The service commission form recorded that he had urgent medical needs and was a safeguarding concern however no detail was provided. Neither G4S nor Urban housing services requested any further details. A system needs to be put in place to ensure organisations provide sufficient details for providers to understand the nature of safeguarding concerns and health care matters. If there are GDPR concerns these could easily be addressed by a consent form at the time the person is first seen. ”

    Source location

    Aram Ali Mustafa · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Participate in a monthly Senior Safeguarding Working Group reviewing safeguarding cases and information gaps.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matter of consent forms when service users are first assessed for accommodation is a matter for UKVI. G4S has however taken the following steps in order to seek improvements to the process and level of information exchange:”

    Source location

    2019-0508-Response-from-G4S-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require fuller vulnerability details, record them on CID and referral forms, and check CID more thoroughly before onward referral.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Home Office have confirmed that the first responders are being challenged for further detail when referring a case into NAAU (National Asylum Allocation Unit) in relation to any indication of vulnerabilities. This information is being recorded on the CID database and on the SCF 4386 referral form prior to being forwarded to the Routing Team. CID is being checked more thoroughly by the Intake Team to reduce the risk of missing information that wasn’t forthcoming from the referring officers.”

    Source location

    2019-0508-Response-from-Government-Legal-Department-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Check that referring officers identify and record relevant safeguarding and vulnerability concerns on referral forms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Specific safeguarding and vulnerable concerns are included in the referral form – a list of possible concerns are listed and the referring officer is asked whether they have any relevance to the customer. Checks are put in place to ensure this happens.”

    Source location

    2019-0508-Response-from-Government-Legal-Department-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise safeguarding concerns with G4S when SCF forms lack adequate detail.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ii. G4S now flag SCF forms where a safeguarding issue is raised without adequate detail being provided with UKVI. UHSL also raise these issues with G4S; and”

    Source location

    2019-0508-Response-from-Urban-Housing-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Draft and distribute incident reports and support notifications when resident concerns, including mental-health issues, are identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “If a concern (such as mental health issues) about a resident is noted, an incident report is drafted and sent to G4S. This includes as much information as we have available and actions we have taken. This information can then be passed on to UKVI by G4S and ensures that these concerns can be notified to any future residence, or those with responsibilities for the resident. An email is also sent to the charity Migrant Help and Attwood Health Centre to enable the resident to obtain the appropriate level of support.”

    Source location

    2019-0508-Response-from-Urban-Housing-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Information shared with external contractors is limited by GDPR to data shown to be required, relevant, secure and in the applicant’s best interests.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We set out below the factors provided by the Home Office to take into account while sharing information with external contractors in line with GDPR.”

    Source location

    2019-0508-Response-from-Government-Legal-Department-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Joan Wright · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joan Wright, who had poor mobility and was unable to communicate verbally, died at Belmont Residential Home on 16 September 2017; the post-mortem found extensive coronary artery atheroma. The report raised concerns about the incorrect administration and handling of Oramorph, medication management at a care home rated inadequate, and failures to recognise and address safeguarding risks after the medication incident.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the CDLO to liaise with the local police unit and discuss safeguarding implications

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Following the maladministration of medication to Mrs Wright, the inquest heard that the matter was reported to GMP .The CDLO investigated but did not liaise with the local police unit or discuss the safeguarding implications; ”

    Source location

    Joan Wright · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Controlled Drugs Regulations establishing tighter controls and mandatory governance arrangements for prescribing, records, custody, monitoring and accountable officers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You mention the Shipman Inquiry in your report. In response to the Shipman Inquiry's Fourth Report¹, there have been significant changes in the governance arrangements for the use and management of controlled drugs.”

    Source location

    2018-0408-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about police responses and national learning should be raised with the Home Secretary because Controlled Drug Liaison Officers are police employees.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises concerns about the actions of Greater Manchester Police in responding to the potential safeguarding risks following the incident report of maladministration of Oramorph to Mrs Wright, and questions if learning from this incident has been shared at a national level.”

    Source location

    2018-0408-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 5 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Russell Charles ROBB · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Russell Charles ROBB died at Manchester Royal Infirmary on 9 April 2016 after taking a fatal combination of prescribed and non-prescribed drugs with alcohol. The report identified inadequate monitoring and lack of regular medication reviews, no apparent guidelines to limit the quantity of drugs available, and limited information sharing between agencies involved in adult safeguarding.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited information sharing between adult safeguarding board members

    Wider context from the report

    “which ultimately led to his death. There was no evidence of regular reviews of his medication. There appeared to be no guidelines in place to reduce the quantity of drugs available to Mr Robb at any one time. (CCG; Secretary of State for Health) 2. There was limited evidence of information sharing between the members of the Trafford Adult Safeguarding Board. This meant that the Local Authority were unaware of volume of interaction between the Police and Mr Robb.(Adult Safeguarding Board).As a result only 1 strategic meeting took place over a 6 year period ”

    Source location

    Russell Charles ROBB · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update TARGet meeting terms of reference to strengthen safeguarding-partner information sharing and multi-agency risk assessment and management planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have updated the Terms of Reference of our TARGet (Trafford Adults at Risk Group) meeting to facilitate better information sharing between safeguarding partners and improve multi-agency risk assessment and risk management planning with regard to supporting”

    Source location

    2017-0385-Response-by-Trafford-Safeguarding-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026