Recurring concern

Unreliable safety investigation reports and disclosure

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First reported 18 Sep 2014•Latest report 6 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in formal safety-investigation report provision, disclosure, authorship, version control, correction or transparency where the report itself or its availability is unreliable, including failure to provide a completed report to families or coroners and failure to disclose or clearly attribute investigation findings.

Not included

  • Excludes the underlying conduct of the investigation, including evidence gathering or causal analysis, where the report is itself available and the concern is only that the investigation was inadequate.
  • Excludes failures to implement corrective actions or organisational learning after a complete and reliable investigation report has been produced.
  • Excludes general inquest disclosure, duty-of-candour or court-evidence failures unless they specifically concern the availability, completeness, attribution or transparency of a formal safety investigation report.
  • Excludes ordinary clinical-record or administrative-document deficiencies unrelated to a formal safety investigation report.
Reports
20

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
23

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
27

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB3
Department of Health and Social Care2
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
All Care In One Limited1
All Care In One Ltd1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Civil Aviation Authority1
County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust1
Department for Transport1
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
Essex County Council1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
European Union Aviation Safety Agency1
Hellesdon Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Tracy Dawn WOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tracy Wood was admitted to Hellesdon Hospital with a history of self-harm and suicidal ideation and died on 3 June 2021 after being found unresponsive in her room following an earlier incident involving a prohibited item. The principal concerns included insufficient staffing and one-to-one support, failures in clinical assessment and risk management, inadequate record keeping, delayed emergency response, and shortcomings in the investigation and incident report.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccuracies in patient safety incident investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “11. The PSII Report contains many inaccuracies including Tracy’s date of death, stating it to be 5 June 2021. The report refers to Tracy ████████ again at 21:00 on 3rd June 2021. The correct date is the 2 June 2021 ”

    Source location

    Tracy Dawn WOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in completing and providing patient safety incident investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “10. A draft Patient Safety Incident Investigation Report (PSII) has been prepared. Evidence was heard that this is now used rather than a Serious Incident Requiring Investigation Report and has the advantage of being “more timely” and providing more learning. The report was still in draft form at the date of the inquest (nine months following Tracy’s death) and the draft was only available to me on the morning of the first day of the inquest, despite assurances at Pre Inquest Review Hearings that it would be available prior to the inquest. ”

    Source location

    Tracy Dawn WOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Jude Daryl Lloyd · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jude Daryl Lloyd was found dead at home on 8 May 2019 and died from diabetic ketoacidosis. The report identified concerns about inadequate diabetes monitoring and management, capacity assessment, communication and care transfer between services, follow-up with primary care, clinical review, and record keeping.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Factual errors and misinterpretations in SUI investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “h. The GMMH SUI investigation report contained several factual errors and misinterpretations. The CMHT Responsible Clinician did not provide a statement or was interviewed despite him being a crucial witness. This meant the all the lessons for future care and planning were not learnt. There was inadequate overview of the report before it was signed off. ”

    Source location

    Jude Daryl Lloyd · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the serious-incident information-gathering process to obtain staff statements early and use them in investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust process for obtaining information from staff involved in an SI has been updated to ensure we gather statements from staff at an early stage following the SI and use these statements in the SI review.”

    Source location

    2021-0329-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 6 · response
    Published 13 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assign a Patient Safety Practitioner to support and advise serious-incident review teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “When a team of clinical staff are allocated to complete a review following a serious incident, they are allocated a Patient Safety Practitioner to support and advise the review team throughout the review process. The Patient Safety Practitioner is an experienced professionally qualified member of staff who has additional knowledge and skills in incident management.”

    Source location

    2021-0329-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 6 · response
    Published 13 October 2021

    Open published response
  3. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Antony Declan Schofield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Antony Declan Schofield, who had recurrent depressive disorder and a history of suicidal thoughts and behaviour, was found dead at home on 27 August 2019 after taking an overdose. The report identified concerns about incomplete risk assessment before discharge, inadequate transfer and communication to the community team, insufficient review of escalating suicide risk, missed opportunities to assess changes in presentation, and deficiencies in records, auditing and the subsequent investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccurate and misinterpreted serious untoward incident investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “1. a. No thorough comprehensive risk review was undertaken by a member of staff who had detailed knowledge of the deceased prior to his discharge from the inpatient unit. This was not identified before he left the ward and it was not discovered by the HBTT when they took over his care. b. The transfer and communication process from inpatient care to the HBTT appeared inadequate. b. There was no clear plan to deal with the risk of his condition deteriorating and him experiencing significantly more suicidal thoughts as well as obtaining the means by which to kill himself. It is well known that a history of suicidal thoughts and actions increases the risk when they are repeated. c. When he disclosed that he bought ████████ there was no risk review planning involving a senior HBTT clinician which was then monitored even when he indicated that he had received it. d. On several occasions before he died the deceased saw members of the HBTT but they failed to demonstrate professional curiosity and enquire about his suicidal thoughts and plans. There were either adequate or no records about this. e. There were a number of missed opportunities for the HBTT to assess changes in his presentation and risk profile. f. There was no robust audit system for checking compliance with the trust own policies and protocols in particular with regard to medical record keeping, risk assessments and reviews. g. The GMMH SUI investigation report contained several factual errors and misinterpretations. It was only discovered at the inquest hearing that one of the last members of HBTT staff to see the deceased had given an account that was not the same as given to their line manager. This meant the all the lessons for future care and planning were not learnt. There was inadequate overview of the report before it was signed off. ”

    Source location

    Antony Declan Schofield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update serious-incident information-gathering procedures to obtain staff statements early and use them in investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We apologise if there were factual errors within the Trust Serious Incident (SI) investigation report. The Trust process for obtaining information from staff involved in an SI has been updated to ensure we gather statements from staff at an early stage following the SI and use these statements in the SI review. When a team of clinical staff are allocated to complete a review following a serious incident, they are allocated a Patient Safety Practitioner to support and advise the review team throughout the review process. The Patient Safety Practitioner is an experienced professionally qualified member of staff who has additional knowledge and skills in incident management. Following completion of the review the final draft is shared with Senior Managers and Clinical Leads in the area of the Trust where the SI occurred to check for factual accuracy and approve content and recommendations.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assign a Patient Safety Practitioner to support and advise serious-incident investigation teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We apologise if there were factual errors within the Trust Serious Incident (SI) investigation report. The Trust process for obtaining information from staff involved in an SI has been updated to ensure we gather statements from staff at an early stage following the SI and use these statements in the SI review. When a team of clinical staff are allocated to complete a review following a serious incident, they are allocated a Patient Safety Practitioner to support and advise the review team throughout the review process. The Patient Safety Practitioner is an experienced professionally qualified member of staff who has additional knowledge and skills in incident management. Following completion of the review the final draft is shared with Senior Managers and Clinical Leads in the area of the Trust where the SI occurred to check for factual accuracy and approve content and recommendations.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share final serious-incident investigation drafts with senior managers and clinical leads for factual checking and approval.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We apologise if there were factual errors within the Trust Serious Incident (SI) investigation report. The Trust process for obtaining information from staff involved in an SI has been updated to ensure we gather statements from staff at an early stage following the SI and use these statements in the SI review. When a team of clinical staff are allocated to complete a review following a serious incident, they are allocated a Patient Safety Practitioner to support and advise the review team throughout the review process. The Patient Safety Practitioner is an experienced professionally qualified member of staff who has additional knowledge and skills in incident management. Following completion of the review the final draft is shared with Senior Managers and Clinical Leads in the area of the Trust where the SI occurred to check for factual accuracy and approve content and recommendations.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require post-incident executive review and approval of serious-incident reports before release to families and other stakeholders.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The report is then taken to a Post-Incident Executive Review Panel who can raise questions of the Review Authors and the Service Managers. Following any amendments, the Executive Panel approve the report and it’s content for release to the family and other concerned stakeholders, i.e. commissioners, coroners. It is expected that any factual inaccuracies are addressed during the review, the Trust have addressed this concern with the Author of the Trust’s RCA investigation in this case.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Grazyna WALCZAK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Grazyna Walczak died after jumping three storeys from her flat on 25 or 26 September 2020 while suffering an acute depressive illness. Before her death, she was assessed as being at low to moderate risk, but was not asked whether her family could be notified. The report also raised concern that a required 72-hour investigation report was completed about five months after her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete investigation reports within 72 hours of death

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The 72 hour investigation report that should be produced within 72 hours of death, to enable fast learning that may be of immediate benefit to other patients, was not completed until last week, some five months after Ms Walczak’s death. That is obviously not acceptable and could put others at risk by a potential failure to learn. ”

    Source location

    Grazyna WALCZAK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Trust-wide 72-hour reporting process and analyse report timeliness to identify improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This Trust has undertaken a review of the timeliness of 72-hour reporting to ensure adherence to meeting the requirements of the National SI Framework and to implement improvements in light of the prevention of future deaths report. This will ensure more timely reporting and organisational learning takes place.”

    Source location

    2021-0063-Response-from-St-Pancras-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve the 72-hour report submission process using quality-improvement methods, with progress monitored through existing executive and quality-safety governance arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following key recommendations were made and are being implemented”

    Source location

    2021-0063-Response-from-St-Pancras-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop 72-hour reporting process maps for users to improve compliance and reporting quality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following key recommendations were made and are being implemented”

    Source location

    2021-0063-Response-from-St-Pancras-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement 72-hour reporting through the Datix patient-safety incident reporting system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following key recommendations were made and are being implemented”

    Source location

    2021-0063-Response-from-St-Pancras-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare and deliver training for divisional staff on the Datix 72-hour reporting process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following key recommendations were made and are being implemented”

    Source location

    2021-0063-Response-from-St-Pancras-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate the new 72-hour reporting process and the effectiveness of its training, reporting progress to the Quality and Safety Programme Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. To evaluate the training package with the divisions after 3 months.”

    Source location

    2021-0063-Response-from-St-Pancras-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Martin Edward ELLIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Martin Edward Ellis was electrocuted at the Sir John Compton Dam in Saint Lucia while holidaying there with his family. The concerns included inadequate access restriction and warning signage, exposed live wiring in a galvanised metal conduit, and the lack of an explanation or investigation report about the exposed wire six months after his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide the Chief Electrical Officer’s investigation report

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The electrocution was caused by exposed live wiring in a galvanised metal conduit. I understand that the Chief Electrical Officer visited the site in the days after Mr Ellis’s death and that the Ministry of Infrastructure, Ports, Energy and Labour is responsible for the Saint Lucia investigation. However, six months after Mr Ellis’s death, no explanation has been provided to his family or to HM Senior Coroner for Inner North London, as to why there was an exposed live wire. Despite repeated requests, neither Mr Ellis’s family nor I have been provided with a copy of the Chief Electrical Officer’s report. 5. The dam was built in 1996. I do not know whether the unsafe wiring is a result of a lack of appropriate building regulations enforcement. I do not know whether other constructions built at around the same time are unsafe. ”

    Source location

    Martin Edward ELLIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Emily TUCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Emily Tuck, who had multiple myeloma, fell at home on 13 October 2015 and again in hospital on 15 October 2015. The report identified concerns about the absence of a falls prevention care plan, unclear nursing responsibility, incomplete post-fall documentation, missing neurological observations, delays in recognising possible bleeding and informing the consultant, and shortcomings in incident reporting and the hospital investigation. The inquest jury determined that her death was caused by a combination of accident and illness.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record and identify the authorship of investigation findings

    Wider context from the report

    “7. The hospital investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death was conducted by a ward manager. The thinking behind having a senior nurse explore questions of nursing care is obvious. However, the report also commented on aspects of medical care that the report author freely admitted in court were outside her area of expertise. In terms of learning lessons for the future, this seems sub optimal. Clinicians giving evidence disagreed with some of the report’s conclusions, but I was not able to explore those areas with the true originator, because the views had come from a consultant who the author had consulted informally. The report was not recorded as being co-authored, and the doctor who had been asked for his view was not an oncologist. The author thought on reflection that an oncologist would have been better placed to comment on the medical management. ”

    Source location

    Margaret Emily TUCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt round-table serious-incident investigations to obtain relevant expertise and name the expert in the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The hospital is adopting a process of round table discussions to investigate serious incidents. This will ensure that relevant expertise is obtained and the expert is named in the report. We regret that such expertise was not available to you first hand at the inquest and will in future ensure better representation from our clinical staff.”

    Source location

    2016-0273-Response-by-Barths-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response
  7. Buckinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen John Bird · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen John Bird underwent surgery for an Achilles tendon injury on 6 May 2016 and died at home on 11 May 2016. The recorded cause of death was pulmonary embolism due to deep vein thrombosis following recent surgery. Concerns included incomplete, inconsistent or conflicting records and an investigation report containing assumptions that conflicted with documentary records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure Significant Clinical Incident Investigation reports are based on documentary records rather than conflicting assumptions

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Evidence given regarding the investigation by the hospital into Mr Bird’s death and the preparation of a draft Significant Clinical Incident Investigation (SCII) Report (disclosed as part of the Inquest process) identified an assumption of facts within that draft report which conflicted with documentary records and this was acknowledged during the Inquest hearing. It was indicated during the hearing that the hospital places reliance upon SCII reports as part of a learning process. ”

    Source location

    Stephen John Bird · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a BMI Root Cause Analysis of the incident and provide the finalised report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to these concerns the initial investigation report has been reviewed and a RCA has been completed. We enclose a copy of the finalised RCA.”

    Source location

    2016-0265-Response-by-South-Buckinghamshire-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigation reports remain in draft format until the Inquest concludes, preventing finalisation while further issues may be identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please be advised that reports concerning the investigation of the death of an unexpected patient remain in draft format pending conclusion of the Inquest to ensure all issues identified at the Inquest can be addressed in the report.”

    Source location

    2016-0265-Response-by-South-Buckinghamshire-Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 July 2016

    Open published response
  8. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Sheila Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheila Johnson died on 15 May 2013 from catastrophic haemorrhage from a femoral graft wound, less than 24 hours after discharge from hospital with an open left groin wound. The report identified failures in responding to recognised bleeding before discharge and concerns about the inadequacy of the Trust’s investigation, including the omission of key witnesses, limited review of clinical documentation, factual inaccuracies, and the lack of an urgent recall system for patients discharged with potentially life-threatening conditions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccuracies in internal investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The court was provided with a copy of the Trust’s Internal Report of the circumstances of Mrs Johnson’s death and heard evidence regarding the findings from the author of the report. (2) The court was of the opinion that any such investigation and report must be sufficiently robust if it is to have any meaning and lessons learnt to prevent future deaths. (3) The court was of the opinion that on this occasion there was insufficiency of inquiry and the investigation was perfunctory and slipshod. (4) Statements of 6 members of staff were taken. Two of those members were interviewed, the court was of the opinion that other key witnesses including the nurse who discharged Mrs Johnson should have been interviewed. (5) An audit of the nursing and medical documentation was undertaken, however this confined itself to establishing that the entries were accurately dated and timed with a legible signature. No consideration was given to the clinical content of those entries and as to whether or not they were appropriate. (6) The report contained serious factual inaccuracies and based on those errors of fact erroneous findings and recommendations were made. (7) The court believes that should future reports be conducted in this manner then patient’s clinical conditions may be compromised and such errors could lead to deaths in the future. (8) The Trust appeared to have no system in place for the urgent recall of patients who had been discharged with potentially life threatening conditions. ”

    Source location

    Sheila Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Rewrite and implement the serious incident investigation policy with guidance on reporting, investigation, best practice, system failures and record-keeping standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to your particular concerns regarding the quality of the internal investigation undertaken at this time, the Trust’s processes have been revised significantly and beyond all recognition. The current policy for the management of serious incidents including their investigation has been rewritten and implemented. The policy provides clear guidance to Trust staff in relation to incident reporting and the investigation process, with the aim of improving the quality of the Trust’s investigations. We have had this monitored by the CQC and CCG and reported to external oversight groups.”

    Source location

    2015-0238-Response-by-Tameside-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce an Executive-led Serious Incident Review Panel to scrutinise investigation reports and action plans and require clinical leads to report changes and learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also introduced improvements to the process for internal review of serious incident reports. There is now an Executive led Serious Incident Review Panel which reviews all serious incident investigation reports and action plans and scrutinises and challenges them, providing feedback to the investigation teams when further clarity is required. The panel also require that responsible nursing and medical leads attend the meeting to feed back what changes have been made and what lessons have been learnt from investigations.”

    Source location

    2015-0238-Response-by-Tameside-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 May 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing serious incident processes provide significant assurance that appropriate systems and processes are in place.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The auditors concluded in their report dated 10th March 2015 that the serious incident processes provided significant assurance to the Trust that systems and processes were in place.”

    Source location

    2015-0238-Response-by-Tameside-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 May 2015

    Open published response
  9. Central Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Thor Harrison Dalhaug · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thor Dalhaug was delivered by caesarean section on 23 September 2013 in poor condition after difficulties delivering his deeply engaged head, and died approximately one hour after birth. The report identified concerns including lack of supervision of the operating surgeon, use of an inappropriate forceps technique, inadequate contemporaneous records and shortcomings in the internal investigation and disclosure of the circumstances of his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of SUI reports to disclose the lack of support for forceps use to disimpact the fetal head

    Wider context from the report

    “(VI) The fact that the original SUI and the revised version completed after receipt of the post mortem failed to disclose that there was no support for the use of forceps to disimpact the fetal head. ”

    Source location

    Thor Harrison Dalhaug · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Janet Doreen Goodacre · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janet Doreen Goodacre, aged 88, was admitted to Leicester Royal Infirmary on 1 May 2013 and died there on 21 May 2013 after developing a gastrointestinal bleed while receiving warfarin, deltaparin and aspirin. The report raised concerns that the Trust’s investigation report was factually incorrect and flawed, that its identified root causes were wrong, and that the Trust did not communicate these shortcomings or revisit the report before the inquest.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate known investigation-report shortcomings in a timely manner

    Wider context from the report

    “I am therefore concerned that the Trust is providing inaccurate and misleading investigation reports, and Action Plans based on the erroneous findings that are not only of no assistance, but in fact divert attention away from the actual difficulties in service provision that should be identified. This not only fails to achieve the intention of the investigation, but also has the potential to miss opportunities to prevent future deaths. Furthermore, there was a failure to communicate the Trust knowledge of the Investigation Reports shortcomings until the day of the Inquest itself, and it was clear no attempts had been made to revisit the report to correct the recognized errors. ”

    Source location

    Janet Doreen Goodacre · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to produce accurate and reliable investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “I am therefore concerned that the Trust is providing inaccurate and misleading investigation reports, and Action Plans based on the erroneous findings that are not only of no assistance, but in fact divert attention away from the actual difficulties in service provision that should be identified. This not only fails to achieve the intention of the investigation, but also has the potential to miss opportunities to prevent future deaths. Furthermore, there was a failure to communicate the Trust knowledge of the Investigation Reports shortcomings until the day of the Inquest itself, and it was clear no attempts had been made to revisit the report to correct the recognized errors. ”

    Source location

    Janet Doreen Goodacre · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to revisit and correct recognized errors in investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “I am therefore concerned that the Trust is providing inaccurate and misleading investigation reports, and Action Plans based on the erroneous findings that are not only of no assistance, but in fact divert attention away from the actual difficulties in service provision that should be identified. This not only fails to achieve the intention of the investigation, but also has the potential to miss opportunities to prevent future deaths. Furthermore, there was a failure to communicate the Trust knowledge of the Investigation Reports shortcomings until the day of the Inquest itself, and it was clear no attempts had been made to revisit the report to correct the recognized errors. ”

    Source location

    Janet Doreen Goodacre · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish named RCA Chairs to oversee investigation scope, team composition, SMART action plans and report sign-off.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust continually works to improve the quality of the investigations of the RCA reports and we have recently introduced three further measures to assist with this.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Purchase and provide tiered external RCA training for investigation leads, senior safety investigators and RCA Chairs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust continually works to improve the quality of the investigations of the RCA reports and we have recently introduced three further measures to assist with this.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide senior scrutiny of events causing avoidable death or harm and identify root causes, themes and required safety workstreams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The Trust has established a new ‘Adverse Events Committee’, reporting to the Executive Quality Board, to review all serious untoward events (SUIs).”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reopening investigation reports is limited to commissioner feedback supported by compelling evidence, rather than a general reopening system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With respect to re-opening investigation reports, the Trust does consider any feedback received from Commissioners and may make amendments to such reports if there is compelling evidence to do so.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 September 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026