Recurring concern

Failure to take timely escalation action when safety thresholds are breached

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First reported 27 Jan 2014•Latest report 16 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to initiate, progress or complete escalation when a defined safety threshold, failed contact or time limit has been reached, including escalation after repeated failed visits, breached response times or comparable triggers requiring senior review, resource allocation or welfare intervention.

Not included

  • Excludes the underlying safety concern, staffing shortage or clinical deterioration when no failure to escalate after a defined trigger is identified.
  • Excludes failures of ordinary communication or notification where no safety threshold, failed contact or breached time limit required escalation.
  • Excludes deficiencies confined to the substantive content of an escalation policy when the policy's operation after a trigger is not the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes the existing broader concern about failure to escalate patient-safety concerns to senior oversight when the assertion does not specifically identify a breached threshold, failed contact or time-based escalation trigger.
Reports
62

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
65

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
84

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care6
NHS England5
Barts Health NHS Trust3
Care Quality Commission3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Essex County Council2
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust2
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust2
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust2
Adbolton Hall1
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Bedford Prison1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    MORGAN-ROSE HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Morgan-Rose Hart, who was detained on a female mental health ward, died on 12 July 2022 after being found unresponsive with a ligature around her neck. The report identified concerns about missed and falsified observations, failures to complete physical welfare checks after bathroom alerts, inadequate escalation of risk, shortcomings in investigation and record keeping, and insufficient suitable placements for people with autism and mental health and self-harm risks in Essex.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate changes in leave risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Escalation of risk – Morgan-Rose attempted to secure unescorted leave on the morning of her death, her Responsible Clinician had only authorised escorted leave. This was not escalated to the nurse in charge and the Responsible Clinician was not informed. ”

    Source location

    MORGAN-ROSE HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an inpatient care framework with named-nurse responsibilities and personalised leave plans reviewed by clinical teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “EPUT are adopting and implementing an evidence based framework within inpatient services to support engagement, care planning and therapeutic intervention. This is an internationally recognised framework which will support a positive cultural change across all our ward environments around therapeutic engagement, holistic care planning (including leave plans), whilst considering the context of care. This will include re-establishing the ‘named nurse’ function and responsibilities.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review multidisciplinary safety huddles and improve handovers through a nurse-in-charge checklist and task allocation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Communication will be improved within the multi - disciplinary team by reviewing the impact of the multi-disciplinary team safety huddles through a Qi methodology. As well as implementing improvements in the handover process with the introduction of the nurse in charge checklist and task allocation.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response
  2. Sefton, St Helens and Knowsley

    AI-generated summary

    Julia MURPHY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julia Murphy, known as Sheila, died in hospital on 9 April 2023 after a fall in her care home caused a hip fracture and her condition deteriorated. The report raises concerns about repeated falls, incomplete or inaccurate referrals to the falls prevention team, inadequate escalation, and failure to formally seek one-to-one supervision funding where appropriate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate a significant number of falls sustained by a frail older person

    Wider context from the report

    “Julia had 21 falls, the final fall led to her death. The 3 referral forms sent to falls prevention were incomplete, misleading and/or inaccurate. An action plan in respect of preventing future deaths from falls/falls prevention/the learning following these events was not presented at Inquest nor did there appear to be a clear plan to address inter alia; 1. Accurate/timely reporting of falls/accurate timely, completion of referral forms to the falls prevention team . 2. Escalation when such a significant number of falls were sustained by 1 frail, elderly person. 3. Meeting the needs of the resident with evolving dementia, particularly in respect of mobility, supervision, falls prevention and risk assessment. 4. Formally requesting 1-1 supervision funding when necessary/as appropriate on a case by case basis. 5. Training/development/organisational learning following these events re falls prevention and accurate reporting/escalation. The above list is not exhaustive and the care home management/owners will be best placed to develop their own action plan following the death of Julia. ”

    Source location

    Julia MURPHY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Marion May Luckraft · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marion May Luckraft was admitted to hospital with jaundice and died on 17 April 2023 after developing a duodenal perforation following ERCP and pancreatic stent placement, biliary sepsis and shock. The principal concerns were cumulative delays in diagnostic and treatment processes, delayed escalation to high dependency care, fragmented treatment across two hospital sites, and the absence of a clear treatment pathway for biliary sepsis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to promptly escalate care to a high dependency unit despite a NEWS score of 8

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Following the duodenal perforation suffered by the patient there was a failure to promptly escalate her care to a high dependency unit despite her NEWS score of 8. ”

    Source location

    Marion May Luckraft · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Hilary THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hilary THOMAS attended hospital with abdominal pain on 28 and 29 October 2022, then reattended on 30 October in a shocked and profoundly unwell state. She underwent emergency surgery for ischaemic bowel caused by adhesions but died on 31 October 2022. The principal concerns were delayed review of blood test results, failure to escalate her case for consultant review, and delay in arranging a CT scan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate eligible emergency department patients for consultant review

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Mrs Thomas reattended hospital with severe pain, was over age 70 and an unscheduled return within 72 hours. The Doctor should have considered and followed national guidance from the Royal College of Emergency medicine published in June 2016 (consultant sign off) which confirmed Mrs Thomas should have been reviewed by a consultant. Mrs Thomas was not escalated for consultant review. There was no evidence at the inquest that this guidance has been adopted by the Trust nor that staff are aware of it and have been trained on it. ”

    Source location

    Hilary THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a policy empowering any multiprofessional team member to escalate delayed assessment or transfer to the consultant on call.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has therefore implemented a new policy developed by the Clinical Service Leads for EGS and ED, alongside a programme of education (from August 2023) in which any member of the multi-professional team are invited to escalate concerns regarding delayed assessment, or delayed transfer of patients to SAU, to the consultant on call. This will be enhanced by a communication strategy that will include direct teaching and laminated posters displayed in acute surgical areas at all acute sites (by 31 October 2023). This communication will emphasise the importance of this action for patient safety and will not be a punitive action.”

    Source location

    Response University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver an education programme on escalation for delayed assessment or transfer from August 2023.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has therefore implemented a new policy developed by the Clinical Service Leads for EGS and ED, alongside a programme of education (from August 2023) in which any member of the multi-professional team are invited to escalate concerns regarding delayed assessment, or delayed transfer of patients to SAU, to the consultant on call. This will be enhanced by a communication strategy that will include direct teaching and laminated posters displayed in acute surgical areas at all acute sites (by 31 October 2023). This communication will emphasise the importance of this action for patient safety and will not be a punitive action.”

    Source location

    Response University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver direct teaching and display laminated posters in acute surgical areas at all acute sites by 31 October 2023.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has therefore implemented a new policy developed by the Clinical Service Leads for EGS and ED, alongside a programme of education (from August 2023) in which any member of the multi-professional team are invited to escalate concerns regarding delayed assessment, or delayed transfer of patients to SAU, to the consultant on call. This will be enhanced by a communication strategy that will include direct teaching and laminated posters displayed in acute surgical areas at all acute sites (by 31 October 2023). This communication will emphasise the importance of this action for patient safety and will not be a punitive action.”

    Source location

    Response University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for addressing emergency department patient volume rests with the Department of Health and Social Care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This area of concern is for the Department of Health and Social Care however we acknowledge that there has been a significant increase in demand for assessment by the Emergency General Surgery (EGS) Service at UHB. This was the service to which Mrs Thomas was appropriately referred by the Emergency Department. In this case failure of assessment and escalation occurred after this referral. She was seen by the EGS service at 11:30am by an experienced Specialist Registrar (SpR) who was in the 7th Year of specialist training (ST7). When that SpR returned at 20:00 Mrs Thomas, after waiting for so long, had taken her own discharge. We acknowledge that Mrs Thomas had to wait far too long and that this was a failure of the EGS service.”

    Source location

    Response University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response
  5. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Molly Ann Sergeant · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Molly Ann Sergeant, aged 17, was found deceased on 16 October 2020 after hanging, having left a note. The report identifies concerns about delayed autism diagnosis, insufficient assessment and discharge planning, failures in social-care assessments and coordination, and a lack of understanding of her aftercare rights and chronic suicide risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of escalation when assessment and discharge planning requests are not answered

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Lack of escalation to Essex County Council when there was a failure to respond to requests for assessment and attendance at discharge planning meetings and the key worker/care co-ordinator carrying too heavy a workload as a consequence. ”

    Source location

    Molly Ann Sergeant · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a monthly Mental Health Resolution Forum to resolve liaison issues between Children and Families, EWMHS and Tier 4 specialist commissioning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a Mental Health Resolution Forum which meets monthly – this focuses on liaison and resolution issues between Children and Families, EWMHS and Tier 4 Specialist Commissioning. Core agencies are represented at Director / Head of Service level. This was established in 2018”

    Source location

    Response from Essex County Council
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 March 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The acknowledged shortcomings were not causation or contributory factors in Molly’s death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not our view that these shortcomings, which we have fully acknowledged and have taken significant steps to ensure do not happen again, were causation factors or contributory factors which led to Molly’s very sad death.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex County Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 March 2023

    Open published response
  6. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Michael ALLEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Allen, an otherwise healthy man, was admitted to Milton Keynes University Hospital with gallstone pancreatitis and died there on 11 April 2021 from acute pancreatitis and liver necrosis resulting from gallstone disease. The report identified concerns about ineffective monitoring, inadequate senior surgical supervision, failure to initiate the sepsis protocol effectively, and delay in calling the ITU team after his deterioration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delay in calling the ITU team during critical emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “An FY1 doctor was effectively left to her own devices to manage Mr Allen, despite her being only 8 months or so in a post qualification position. In my mind this was a wholly unacceptable lapse on the part of her senior clinicians. She was, despite her efforts, out of her depth. This is not a criticism of the FY1 doctor, simply a reflection that she had only a few months junior surgical experience at that time. All clinicians, ████████ gave evidence that they were aware of the MKUH Sepsis protocol. However, none of them was able to describe it fully – the nearest being the most junior of the team, ████████. As a result there was a failure to initiate the sepsis protocol effectively. There was no effective senior involvement in the care of Mr Allen from the end of the 0800 am ward round to his deterioration at around 1800 or so. There was a failure to effectively or consistently monitor Mr Allen between 1059 am and his deterioration around 1800. Even at that point despite, in my mind, a critical emergency, there was a further delay of one hour before the ITU team were called. Overall, I find that the surgical team in charge of Mr Allen had no effective knowledge of the Sepsis protocol, they failed to monitor him effectively or consistently despite clear signs of deterioration, they failed to provide adequate support and supervision to ████████ and they failed to institute an effective senior review at any point on the 9th April 2021 until critical deterioration by which time his chances of death due to his rapid deterioration and multi-organ failure were 80 to 100%. ”

    Source location

    Michael ALLEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel John O’Sullivan was found deceased on 27 March 2019 while a voluntary psychiatric patient at St Charles Hospital, after leaving the hospital unescorted and failing to return. The principal concerns were failures to update his self-harm risk assessment, formulate a care and treatment plan, document unescorted leave, and promptly notify police when he did not return. The report also raised concerns that the hospital’s serious incident investigation did not identify or investigate these issues adequately.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in alerting police when psychiatric patients fail to return from leave

    Wider context from the report

    “2) My second concern is the poor contemporaneous documentation of the grant of unescorted leave from the hospital and the time taken to alert the police when Daniel failed to return on 26/3/19 by 21:00 pm. A ward nurse eventually contacted the police after midnight. i) I am concerned that an earlier call to the police may have prevented the death, because Daniel was recorded on General Security Zone (GSZ) cameras at 22:21 leaving Vauxhall bridge, and returning, on foot at 23:48. An earlier call might have enabled police to intervene before he was able to commence the actions which ended his life. ii) The ward manager claimed in evidence that he had instructed others to call the police when Daniel failed to return at 21:00. However, this was not documented anywhere in the medical records and a leave book with handwritten entries went missing after the death. The missing leave book was not investigated by the SII. iii) A nurse who called the police, sometime before 00:30 according to the medical records, at 01:10 according to police records, was not interviewed by the SII. I found these investigative deficits troubling because the learning of lessons in patient care depends, in part, on an early SII by the hospital concerned so that risks to patient safety can be identified to enable recommendations and improvements long before an inquest conclusion. The delay in reporting the failure to return to the Ward was a factor that contributed to the dangerous situation already created by rescinding s.2. I am nonetheless concerned that, in general, psychiatric patients being tested on voluntary leave are a vulnerable group and as such failures to return should be reported with expedition not only because they may be a danger to themselves, but also due to a risk of being preyed upon by others. ”

    Source location

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Missing Informal Patient Policy with a risk-assessment checklist and flow chart for managing patients who fail to return from leave.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Missing Informal Patient Policy was updated in March 2020. It now requires a checklist to be completed which was not in the previous version. This is a risk assessment checklist that is now used by staff for managing informal leave from the wards. The checklist records the time that the patient leaves the ward and expected time of return (which is agreed in advance with the patient). There is also a risk assessment and an action plan for completion to mitigate against any risk identified. The Missing Informal Patient Policy also now provides a useful flow chart with the steps that are required to be taken in the event of someone not returning at the agreed time. The approach is balanced by the perceived risk.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish hourly ward accounting of patients during each shift, with responsibility allocated to the nurse in charge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Each patient is allocated a nurse for each shift. The nurse is responsible for completing the leave form for their identified patients and these forms are then uploaded by administration staff to the patient clinical record. The Nurse in Charge of each shift has the responsibility of ensuring that every patient is accounted for hourly. This task is allocated at the beginning of each shift and is recorded hourly, on a separate reporting sheet for every 24-hour period.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Datix recording of police contact during AWOL incidents to monitor reporting timeliness and escalate unnecessary delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to the audit the following further actions were agreed:”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Missing Informal Patient Policy to specify police-contact information required in SystmOne and Datix records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to the audit the following further actions were agreed:”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police reporting after voluntary-leave failures need not be immediate or automatic; individualized risk assessment and ward-team discussion determine the response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The timing of contact with the police if a patient fails to return is not standardised or mandated within the Missing Informal Patient Policy. This should be reviewed as part of planning for leave and incorporated into the plan for leave as agreed with the patient. Assessment of capacity and assessment of risk form part of the overall decision making and will be informed by the views of the multidisciplinary team and the aims and intended outcomes as provided for in the care plan. Although police involvement is sometimes necessary it is not always the default position when a patient fails to return the ward. Failure to return should prompt a discussion between the members of the ward team, involving the RC as necessary.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response
  8. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Volodymyr KOROL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Volodymyr Korol died from a fatal ventricular arrhythmia in his bedroom at Shrewsbury Court Independent Hospital on 1 August 2020, following cardiac and other physical health conditions. The inquest identified concerns including failures to assess his capacity regarding weight management, investigate and manage cardiac and other physical health conditions, share medical information, and escalate abnormal vital signs. The Coroner was concerned that similar practices might be present at another site operated by Whitepost Healthcare Group.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to appropriately escalate abnormal vital signs

    Wider context from the report

    “Following Mr Korol’s death Shrewsbury Court Independent Hospital did not declare a Serious Incident. As such, whilst there was a 72 hour serious incident review into the events of 31 July and 1 August 2020, there was no investigation into the wider circumstances leading up to his death. Accordingly, none of the matters which form part of the jury’s narrative conclusion were identified by Shrewsbury Court Independent Hospital either at the time as part of their own internal investigation or thereafter as part of their preparation for the inquest. The court heard evidence that Shrewsbury Court Independent Hospital has now closed down but that Whitepost Healthcare Group continues to operate one other site, namely Iden Manor Nursing Home in Kent. The jury found that there were a number of causative failures in relation to the carrying out of mental capacity assessments, the sharing of medical information with other agencies and the appropriate escalation of vital signs which fall outside of normal parameters. All of these issues are equally as important in nursing homes as they are in psychiatric hospitals. Given that these issues were not identified and acted upon by Whitepost Healthcare Group at any point prior to the inquest, the Coroner is concerned that similar practices may be present at Iden Manor Nursing Home in Kent, which would present a risk of future deaths. In the circumstances the Coroner considers that practices should be audited at Iden Manor Nursing Home to ensure that the deficient practices identified by the jury in relation to Mr Korol’s care at Shrewsbury Court Independent are not present at Iden Manor Nursing Home. ”

    Source location

    Volodymyr KOROL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 7 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Natalie Melissa Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Natalie Melissa Turner had a long-standing eating disorder and abused laxatives, causing serious illness and repeated hospital admissions. She died at home on 27 October 2020 from the effects of laxative abuse. The concerns included insufficient guidance for GPs managing eating disorder patients who do not engage with treatment, and insufficient guidance for counsellors on when confidentiality should be breached to protect patients at risk of serious harm.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure by counsellors to disclose serious eating-disorder risks when breaching confidentiality is justified

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The second issue I raise with the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP): • The inquest heard from a BACP Accredited Counsellor, with whom Natalie shared some 63 counselling privately funded counselling sessions between January and October 2020. • BACP guidance includes a set of core principles which ought to guide counsellors, and the guidance makes clear that in exceptional circumstances the need to safeguard clients from serious harm “may require practitioners to override a commitment to make a client’s wishes and confidentiality the primary concern”. The guidance makes clear that a breach of confidentiality may be justified. • The Counsellor had developed a good therapeutic relationship with Natalie, but in my judgement she felt unduly constrained by the wishing to avoid breaching Natalie’s confidence, despite she herself having formed the view given what Natalie was disclosing to her about the extent of her ongoing laxative abuse she was at risk of self harm and of dying. These circumstances were exceptional, it is hard to think of a clearer example where to disclose her concerns to others would have been justified but she preferred not to because she did not feel she could betray her confidence. This was despite having regular discussions with her supervisor, and knowing that Natalie was not accessing the medical monitoring that she needed from her GP. • The Counsellor explained in court that she personally has not knowingly counselled an eating disorder patient before. The potential complexities of these conditions were not fully appreciated. • Patients with eating disorders will commonly prefer to avoid contact with mainstream medical care and treatment, and their families. It follows that such patients may be attracted to discussing their condition privately with a private counsellor. • Although the therapeutic relationship between counsellor and patient is fundamentally important, as the BCAP guidance makes clear there are occasions when a breach of confidentiality is justifiable. Counsellors who begin a course of therapy with an eating disorder patient need to appreciate that refraining from breaching confidentiality may well mean the patient goes without necessary and potentially life-saving care and treatment. Even if patients try to reassure counsellors that they are seeking medical help elsewhere, such claims may well not be credible because these patients may be claiming they are being treated as a distraction. • The Counsellor informed the court she did not have the benefit of guidance on eating disorders. More information may have highlighted the particular risks eating disorder patients may pose, particular as regards whether to breach confidentiality or not. In the absence of such guidance, I am concerned that there is a risk that vulnerable patients – who may in fact benefit from a disclosure by their counsellor – will miss out on necessary and potentially life – saving treatment. • Whilst acknowledging that on the BACP website [www.bacp.co.uk], within a section headed “Events & resources”, there is a series of articles which explore some of the issues eating disorders may pose for counsellors, the Counsellor who gave evidence at Natalie’s inquest did not appear to be familiar with these articles. This arguably reinforces the need for this subject to be raised with counsellors in a more targeted way. ”

    Source location

    Natalie Melissa Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review member resources on confidentiality, competence limits, safeguarding, duty of care and eating disorders.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to your report, we have conducted a thorough review of our member resources relating to confidentiality and when to breach it (including safeguarding and duty of care), working within own limits of competence and guidance on eating disorders specifically.”

    Source location

    Response from British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue reviewing guidance and resources on confidentiality, competence limits, safeguarding, duty of care and eating disorders.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to keep our guidance and resources under review and to take every opportunity to highlight the critical importance of the professional points and draw them to our members’ attention through our different channels of communication which include”

    Source location

    Response from British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue highlighting critical professional guidance through member bulletins, publications, the website and member events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to keep our guidance and resources under review and to take every opportunity to highlight the critical importance of the professional points and draw them to our members’ attention through our different channels of communication which include”

    Source location

    Response from British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    It is unclear whether breaching confidentiality would have saved the client’s life because her situation was already known to medical services and her partner.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where confidentiality may need to be broken the therapist is expected to go through an ethical decision-making process with support and guidance from their supervisor and involving the client where possible. What is not clear however, is whether breaking confidentiality would have saved Natalie’s life given that her situation was already known to her GP and specialist medical services and known to her partner.”

    Source location

    Response from British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 March 2022

    Open published response
  10. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Darren John Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darren John Lawrence had a history of suicidal thoughts, plans, previous attempts, mental ill health, disengagement from services and medication noncompliance. He was found dead at his home on 29 August 2020, and the inquest conclusion was suicide. Principal concerns included inadequate communication and follow-up between mental health services and the GP practice, failure to ensure that prescribed venlafaxine was issued and collected, insufficient escalation when direct contact with him was unsuccessful, and inadequate systems for managing correspondence and medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of escalation and contact process with secondary care when requested medication is not prescribed or contact fails

    Wider context from the report

    “f. The GP system for recording receipt of correspondence and ensuring that they were seen and reviewed by a GP was inadequate. As was communication with and from the Pharmacy team. Nor was there consideration of a system or process for contacting the secondary care provider GMMH in such circumstances when medication was not prescribed as requested and no contact could be made with the deceased. There was no escalation process/procedure. ”

    Source location

    Darren John Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of escalation following disengagement from community services

    Wider context from the report

    “b. There was lack of appropriate escalation following the deceased’s disengagement with community services in 2019 but also in 2020 when there was a repeated lack of direct contact with him as well as the recognition of its importance. From June 2020 no other methods were tried to have direct contact with the deceased apart from attempts from phone calls which were repeatedly unsuccessful. ”

    Source location

    Darren John Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use MaST across CMHT supervision and zoning meetings to identify gaps in contact and support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust now using Management and Supervision Tool (MaST) across all CMHT’s. MaST is a software platform which analyses data from the Trust’s existing clinical records system, Paris, to supplement decision making in CMHT’s regarding likely resources required to provide effective mental health care. MaST is being used in individual supervision and in team zoning meetings where it can be easily identified when someone was last seen by the service and any gaps can be picked up by the Team Manager and the clinical team.”

    Source location

    2021-0349-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and disseminate the Managing Did Not Attend and Cancellations policy across clinical services, with defined escalation requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In autumn 2020 the Trust implemented a policy for Managing Did Not Attend (DNA) and Cancellations. The policy provides information regarding the appropriate response to service user non-attendance at planned appointments as well as detailing different categories of non-attendance and non-engagement to support decision making across GMMH services and teams. This policy clearly outlines what staff should do and when/how to escalate that someone has not attended a planned appointment or staff have been unable to access them for a visit in the community. The escalation is based upon the person risk assessment and any concerns that the care team may have. As well as any risks being considered there are identified timeframes for escalation following no access visits across different services including HBTT and CMHT.”

    Source location

    2021-0349-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The GP practice is to provide the response concerning medication prescribing, correspondence handling, pharmacy communication and escalation processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GP to provide response”

    Source location

    2021-0349-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 October 2021

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026