Recurring concern

Failure to take timely escalation action when safety thresholds are breached

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First reported 27 Jan 2014•Latest report 16 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to initiate, progress or complete escalation when a defined safety threshold, failed contact or time limit has been reached, including escalation after repeated failed visits, breached response times or comparable triggers requiring senior review, resource allocation or welfare intervention.

Not included

  • Excludes the underlying safety concern, staffing shortage or clinical deterioration when no failure to escalate after a defined trigger is identified.
  • Excludes failures of ordinary communication or notification where no safety threshold, failed contact or breached time limit required escalation.
  • Excludes deficiencies confined to the substantive content of an escalation policy when the policy's operation after a trigger is not the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes the existing broader concern about failure to escalate patient-safety concerns to senior oversight when the assertion does not specifically identify a breached threshold, failed contact or time-based escalation trigger.
Reports
62

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
65

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
84

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care6
NHS England5
Barts Health NHS Trust3
Care Quality Commission3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Essex County Council2
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust2
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust2
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust2
Adbolton Hall1
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Bedford Prison1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Plymouth, Torbay and South Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sebastian was a six-year-old boy who became ill on 10 October 2015 and deteriorated over the following weekend. He suffered a cardiac arrest and was confirmed deceased at Derriford Hospital on 12 October 2015. The concerns included limitations in NHS Pathways questions and support arrangements that may have hindered recognition and escalation of an acutely unwell child, as well as the absence of a failsafe mechanism for repeated enquiries about the same complaint.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a failsafe mechanism for rapid assessment and escalation after repeated enquiries about the same child health complaint

    Wider context from the report

    “Following the inquest I received submissions that without changes in the NHS Pathways the 111 call handlers will not be adequately assisted by the Pathways to recognise the acutely unwell child, in particular: i at the conclusion of the inquest there was no question within the NHS Pathways questionnaire concerning cold hands and feet for children aged over five ii at the time of the conclusion of the inquest the question regarding green vomit, asked in respect of children over five, had an inappropriately high threshold (that is required severe pain for more than four hours before the question was engaged) and would not have been activated in Sebastian’s case iii there has no indication NHS Pathways/NHS Digital have reviewed the support arrangements for non-clinically qualified call advisors to refer unusual cases to clinically qualified colleagues iv at the time of the conclusion of the inquest NHS Pathways’ questions did not allow a meaningful assessment of pain in a child; that is to say questions about severity of pain and ability of a child to communicate such pain should be reviewed at national governance level One expert at the Hearing expressed the view that three contacts with medical providers about one concern should instigate a face to face meeting between patient and clinician. Those providing health care are asked to review the need for a failsafe mechanism whereby, when there is a repeated enquiry regarding the same complaint over a child’s health within a period of time, there is a rapid assessment to determine whether or not that call requires urgent escalation to a review by an appropriate clinician and, where appropriate, a face to face meeting between the patient and an appropriate clinician. ”

    Source location

    Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Michael William Flynn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael William Flynn underwent elective hip replacement surgery and required a blood transfusion. He subsequently experienced inadequate Early Warning Score monitoring, failures to follow escalation procedures, incomplete fluid-balance monitoring, and a lack of timely clinical review before suffering cardiac arrest and dying on 17 July 2018.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate when requested clinical reviews do not occur

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The inquest was told that the nursing notes indicated that drs had been asked to review Mr Flynn but that this was not reflected in the clinical notes. When requested reviews documented in the nursing notes did not happen there was no evidence of further escalation. ”

    Source location

    Michael William Flynn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Addressed orthopaedic NEWS-policy noncompliance through staff discussions and circulated responsibilities for recording and escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Matron for the Orthopaedic Unit has provided assurances that formal discussions have taken place with the nursing staff identified through our investigation as failing to comply with Trust Policy in respect to the regularity, recording and appropriate escalation of NEWS observations, and consideration given to identified support or training needs. Additionally, I understand the ward manager has circulated a newsletter to all staff reiterating their responsibilities and accountability with regards to the appropriate recording and escalation of NEWS, including -”

    Source location

    2019-0008-Response-by-Tameside-and-Glossop-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 May 2019

    Open published response
  3. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Diana Faith Gudgeon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Diana Faith Gudgeon collapsed at home after being diagnosed with a water infection and remained on the floor for a prolonged period. Her call was assessed as requiring a category three response, and substantial delays followed before ambulance attendance, hospital admission and treatment; she died on 25 May 2018 despite treatment for infection and sepsis. The principal concerns were the triage and escalation of her call, shortages of ambulance resources, and the effectiveness of EMAS capacity management arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    High call-holding threshold for triggering CMP 4

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The effectiveness of the EMAS Capacity Management & Escalation Plan (CMP) including, inter alia, the fact that:- a) CMP status 1 – 3 does not trigger the deployment of additional vehicular resources. b) CMP 4 is only triggered when 200 calls are holding (this was previously 150) – this is a high threshold. c) A Technical Commander can overrule a CMP status e.g. even if 200 calls are holding (CMP 4), this can simply be downgraded to CMP 3 by the Technical Commander. ”

    Source location

    Diana Faith Gudgeon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Capacity Management and Escalation Plan’s existing triggers are considered safe for managing demand and are reviewed annually.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We do look to move resources from one Division to another and therefore we have to balance against how many jobs are holding in each Division. On this occasion, it was unfortunately not possible to move any resources.”

    Source location

    2019-0015-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2019

    Open published response
  4. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Gregory Rekowski · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Gregory Rekowski was detained under the Mental Health Act after being found trying to tie a ligature, discharged from hospital, and later posted “last goodbyes” on social media. He was found hanging at his home on 29 October 2017. The report identified concerns about delays, communication breakdowns, unclear responsibilities and procedures among Pennine Care NHS Trust, Greater Manchester Police and North West Ambulance Service, including the lack of a face-to-face assessment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate welfare incidents to the on-call senior manager

    Wider context from the report

    “No-one considered, at any stage the escalation of this incident to the on-call Senior manager when they were having difficulties contacting the emergency services or when GMP had provided the advice to contact NWAS. ”

    Source location

    Mr Gregory Rekowski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a pan-Greater Manchester response protocol defining roles, responsibilities, shared risk assessment, communication and escalation arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have now drawn together a pan-GM protocol for response, developed specifically in order to achieve a common understanding of roles and responsibilities; to ensure a shared view of risk; and to promote communication and escalation at the first point that a common understanding may falter.”

    Source location

    2018-0411-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish the Greater Manchester Responding to Crisis Board to oversee cascading, embedding and delivery of the response protocols.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Clearly, it is one thing to develop protocols, and quite another to embed them across the workforce. For this reason, we will now seek to embed these protocols within their respective agencies. I will ask them to agree to do so at a coming meeting of a new GM Responding to Crisis Board – a meeting I have convened in part in response to a common desire all partners have to enhance our broader offer around members of the community confronted with such risk. This Board will hold responsibility as part of its work programme for ensuring that these protocols are cascaded, rooted, and delivered upon.”

    Source location

    2018-0411-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed the response protocols within partner agencies and cascade them across their workforces through the Responding to Crisis Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Clearly, it is one thing to develop protocols, and quite another to embed them across the workforce. For this reason, we will now seek to embed these protocols within their respective agencies. I will ask them to agree to do so at a coming meeting of a new GM Responding to Crisis Board – a meeting I have convened in part in response to a common desire all partners have to enhance our broader offer around members of the community confronted with such risk. This Board will hold responsibility as part of its work programme for ensuring that these protocols are cascaded, rooted, and delivered upon.”

    Source location

    2018-0411-Response-by-GMCA
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a memo to all staff increasing awareness of the requirement to seek support from on-call managers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “PCFT have issued the memo (attached) to all staff to ensure that there is greater awareness of the requirement to seek support from the On-Call managers.”

    Source location

    2018-0411-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response
  5. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Diane Greenslade · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Diane Greenslade was found moaning on her bedroom floor with a chest of drawers on top of her after ambulance responses were delayed. She suffered a cardiac arrest and died, with the inquest concluding that she died from natural causes following a fifteen-and-a-half-hour delay in ambulance intervention. The substantive concerns included the initial call categorisation without clinical assessment, failure to consider escalation or a police welfare check, high ambulance demand and hospital delays, and a nearby rapid response vehicle being unavailable because it was reserved for higher-priority calls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate calls appropriately after unsuccessful contact

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) After failing to make contact, no consideration was given to either upgrading the call category or to contacting the Police to ask them to carry out a welfare check. ”

    Source location

    Diane Greenslade · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review policies and procedures for establishing contact with patients or callers at scene.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. After failing to make contact, no consideration was given to either upgrading the call category or to contacting Police to ask them to carry out a welfare check. Whilst we have set out in this correspondence that we are reviewing our policies and procedures around establishing contact with a patient or caller at scene, we are of the view that it would not be appropriate to request police attendance to undertake welfare checks for 999 calls to the ambulance service, as police officers are not suitably trained to make a clinical assessment. However, we are working collaboratively with our Police Force colleagues to develop a Memorandum of Understanding regarding this issue.”

    Source location

    2018-0401-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Services
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a Memorandum of Understanding with police regarding the issue.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. After failing to make contact, no consideration was given to either upgrading the call category or to contacting Police to ask them to carry out a welfare check. Whilst we have set out in this correspondence that we are reviewing our policies and procedures around establishing contact with a patient or caller at scene, we are of the view that it would not be appropriate to request police attendance to undertake welfare checks for 999 calls to the ambulance service, as police officers are not suitably trained to make a clinical assessment. However, we are working collaboratively with our Police Force colleagues to develop a Memorandum of Understanding regarding this issue.”

    Source location

    2018-0401-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Services
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Police attendance for ambulance 999 welfare checks is considered inappropriate because police officers lack training for clinical assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. After failing to make contact, no consideration was given to either upgrading the call category or to contacting Police to ask them to carry out a welfare check. Whilst we have set out in this correspondence that we are reviewing our policies and procedures around establishing contact with a patient or caller at scene, we are of the view that it would not be appropriate to request police attendance to undertake welfare checks for 999 calls to the ambulance service, as police officers are not suitably trained to make a clinical assessment. However, we are working collaboratively with our Police Force colleagues to develop a Memorandum of Understanding regarding this issue.”

    Source location

    2018-0401-Response-by-Welsh-Ambulance-Services
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 December 2018

    Open published response
  6. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Simon Healey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Simon Healey underwent right hemi-colectomy on 1 August 2017 and died on 10 August 2017 after an anastomotic leak led to faecal peritonitis, E. coli septicaemia and organ failure. The principal concerns were missed opportunities to detect the leak and sepsis earlier, inadequate escalation of care under NEWS protocols, the suitability of private hospitals’ staffing and facilities for such procedures, and an inadequate hospital investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of escalation arrangements to provide emergency assessment by critical care-competent staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) I believe that the NEWS policies in place at private hospitals should be reviewed. This relates not only to awareness of the policy and sepsis training generally, but also consideration of the arrangements for escalating care where a patient becomes critically unwell. Most private hospitals do not have a full critical care capacity (in terms of facilities and staff) and rely instead on a consultant’s availability to attend and review the position. The Royal College of Physicians NEWS trigger thresholds have been adopted almost verbatim by this hospital, save for the category relating to the sickest patients. Whilst the trigger thresholds in the RCP documents do need to be tailored to the organisation in question, it would appear, based on the information I have been provided with, that something well below an “emergency response” can be provided in this hospital, and perhaps also the wider private sector. RCP guidelines clearly require “emergency assessment by a team with critical care competencies”. The escalation policy at Ramsay Healthcare hospitals currently (for a patient scoring 7 or above) is for the registered nurse “to immediately inform the RMO and named consultant. The named consultant to attend urgently and review the patient and agree action to be taken. Consider transfer of care to a level 2 or 3 clinical care facility i.e. HDU or ICU”. This policy clearly anticipates initial review by a consultant, outside the hospital, who may well not be available to attend on an emergency basis. ”

    Source location

    Simon Healey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue a CQC learning programme to understand outstanding safety practice and support its adoption across independent healthcare providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CQC’s State of care in independent acute hospitals published in April 2018 did cite examples of inconsistent monitoring of risks and examples where effective escalation did not occur within providers. In order to address this and other quality related findings, IHPN began a learning programme with the CQC to ensure that their view of what makes for outstanding care in the Safe domain is fully understood throughout the sector so that best practice can be adopted across the board.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss escalation policies in independent acute hospitals with the CQC.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “IHPN’s formal engagement with the CQC includes frequent catch-up meetings to discuss quality themes across the sector. It also comprises joint CQC-IHPN seminars where providers share best practice and learn from each other. Previous seminars have focused on safety and well-led. We will be discussing escalation policies in independent acute hospitals with the CQC in February.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a scoping exercise on providers’ assurance of staff awareness of NEWS and sepsis training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to support this agenda item, IHPN will undertake a scoping exercise on how providers assure themselves of levels of staff awareness of NEWS and on sepsis training. This will assist us to identify if these two elements of this unfortunate case are indeed reflected across the wider sector.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Encourage providers to establish formal service-level agreements with neighbouring providers for higher-acuity care transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is clear from the CQC’s end of programme report that more work needs to be done to formalise the arrangements some independent providers have in place to deal with deteriorating patients and we have strongly encouraged all providers to have formal Service Level Agreements in place with neighbouring healthcare providers able to provide higher acuity care in the event of a patient’s health deteriorating unexpectedly. However, we are confident that the overall picture for the sector is good. IHPN members already have clear processes in place to manage deterioration and, where necessary, to arrange the transfer of patients to higher acuity settings.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Patient transfer does not indicate inappropriate originating care or admission, and independent hospitals can safely manage unanticipated deterioration through planned transfer arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Inter-hospital transfers are a well embedded mechanism to ensure that patients are treated in the most appropriate place should unanticipated complications arise. These transfers take place between providers of all types – from NHS providers to other NHS providers, from independent providers to independent providers, and from independent providers to NHS providers and vice versa.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There is no evidence that patient transfers are particularly associated with hospitals lacking intensive-care facilities, and national guidance does not require on-site intensive care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are not aware of any evidence to suggest that transfers of patients are particularly associated with providers who do not have intensive care facilities, such as NHS community and district general hospitals, mental health inpatient units and some independent sector hospitals. The NICE guidelines on patient transfers do not suggest that patients should only be treated where there are”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Independent hospitals already have clear processes to manage deterioration and arrange transfers to higher-acuity settings when necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is clear from the CQC’s end of programme report that more work needs to be done to formalise the arrangements some independent providers have in place to deal with deteriorating patients and we have strongly encouraged all providers to have formal Service Level Agreements in place with neighbouring healthcare providers able to provide higher acuity care in the event of a patient’s health deteriorating unexpectedly. However, we are confident that the overall picture for the sector is good. IHPN members already have clear processes in place to manage deterioration and, where necessary, to arrange the transfer of patients to higher acuity settings.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response
  7. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    John Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Lea was admitted to hospital for management of heart failure and was later found collapsed on the ward after the bay-tagging nurse temporarily left without arranging monitoring. Resuscitation was unsuccessful and his death was confirmed on 12 June 2017; the report considered a sudden cardiac-related event more likely than not. Concerns included incomplete risk assessments, poor communication, gaps in documentation, failure to escalate a change in oxygen saturations, incorrectly calculated NEWS scores, and failures to follow relevant policies and protocols.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate when an on-call doctor does not attend after a marked change in oxygen saturations

    Wider context from the report

    “4. No escalation when the on call doctor failed to attend following a marked change in the deceased’s oxygen saturations. ”

    Source location

    John Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Dawn Patricia GILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dawn Patricia Gill, a long-term drug user, died from a methadone overdose after taking illicit drugs while in the Royal London Hospital alongside prescribed medication. Concerns included the absence of a nursing care plan addressing her drug use, the loss of her drug chart, failures to detect her in her room during searches, and confusion about when to alert hospital security after she was thought to be missing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in alerting hospital security when an inpatient is missing

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Ms Gill was thought to have left the ward for a cigarette some time before 12.30am, though she was not actually seen leaving. She was wearing her night things. When her absence was discovered, hospital security personnel were not alerted. They could have viewed the CCTV. If they had done so, they would have realised that she had never left the ward. Hopefully, this would have prompted a redoubling of the search effort of the ward. There was confusion about the circumstances when the missing person policy should be followed. I was told that the policy is not clear. The responsible nurse said it was in the back of her mind to contact security and she did not know why she had not. The sister in charge said that she would not contact security for the first two hours. The director of nursing said the contact should be immediate. The clinical site manager and the responsible nurse disagreed about the nature of the conversation between them regarding contacting security. Neither of them had made a note. There seemed to be a lack of clarity. ”

    Source location

    Dawn Patricia GILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind nursing teams about the risks of assuming that an absent patient is not on Trust premises.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ms Gill had been judged by the clinical team to have capacity to decide for herself whether she should leave the hospital or not under her own volition. The Barts Health Missing Person / Absconding Patient Policy is clear that this would not classify her absence as a “missing patient” but as a “self-absenting patient”. By this definition she was thought to have been a patient who had capacity, was not subject to legal detention, and who had left the hospital through her own choice, without clinical approval, with the intention of returning. In such circumstances the Trust policy states the Security team should not be called. However the policy recommends that if there is concern that the person may be missing “on Trust premises” then the Security team should be called. The problem here was that the staff did not suspect Ms Gill was on Trust premises, and they should have considered this.”

    Source location

    2018-0354-Response-by-Barts-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 April 2019

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Novia Emilia Delima · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Novia Emilia Delima was brought to hospital on 25 July 2016 after blood was seen in her nappies, and she was not seen by a doctor until several hours after triage. She was subsequently diagnosed with sepsis, deteriorated despite treatment, and died later that day from neonatal herpes simplex and E. coli septicaemia. The concerns included delays in emergency assessment, the need for early paediatric input for very young babies, and consultant call-out arrangements that did not require attendance solely because of long waits.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of emergency department on-call arrangements to trigger consultant attendance after long waits

    Wider context from the report

    “3.on the night in question the inquest heard that a consultant was on call for ED but was not called in despite the significant delays in ED. The inquest heard that the ED on call consultant arrangements meant that long wait times would not in themselves trigger on call consultants being asked to attend the hospital. ”

    Source location

    Novia Emilia Delima · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Joan Osborne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joan Osborne, who had diabetes and advanced dementia, died on 25 August 2017 after repeated difficulties obtaining her blood glucose levels and administering her insulin. The concerns included failures by nursing home staff to seek medical assistance or escalate her missed insulin, inadequate records, failure to recognise her deteriorating condition, and inaccurate blood glucose measurement and treatment on 22 August 2017.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to alert management to prolonged insulin refusal

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) The nursing home staff did not alert anyone in the management team to the fact that Mrs Osborne had refused to have her insulin prescription for a period of 3 days prior to her hospitalisation on 22.08.2017. ”

    Source location

    Joan Osborne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026