Recurring concern

Failure to take timely escalation action when safety thresholds are breached

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First reported 27 Jan 2014•Latest report 16 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to initiate, progress or complete escalation when a defined safety threshold, failed contact or time limit has been reached, including escalation after repeated failed visits, breached response times or comparable triggers requiring senior review, resource allocation or welfare intervention.

Not included

  • Excludes the underlying safety concern, staffing shortage or clinical deterioration when no failure to escalate after a defined trigger is identified.
  • Excludes failures of ordinary communication or notification where no safety threshold, failed contact or breached time limit required escalation.
  • Excludes deficiencies confined to the substantive content of an escalation policy when the policy's operation after a trigger is not the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes the existing broader concern about failure to escalate patient-safety concerns to senior oversight when the assertion does not specifically identify a breached threshold, failed contact or time-based escalation trigger.
Reports
62

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
65

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
84

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care6
NHS England5
Barts Health NHS Trust3
Care Quality Commission3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Essex County Council2
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust2
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust2
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust2
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust2
Adbolton Hall1
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Bedford Prison1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Ivy Rebecca Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ivy Rebecca Morris was born with severe perinatal hypoxic ischaemic brain damage and died at home on 3 May 2016 after becoming unresponsive during a feed. The report identified concerns about foetal heart monitoring, failures to follow midwifery guidelines, and potential delays relating to episiotomy support. The inquest concluded that appropriate monitoring during the second stage of labour would have prevented her death, according to the supplied text.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to request obstetric review after 1 hour of active pushing

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Failure to follow midwifery guidelines. a. To confirm assessment of the CTG using the agreed assessment tool. b. The need to request an obstetric review after 1 hour of active pushing. c. The need to request an obstetric review for maternal tachycardia. ”

    Source location

    Ivy Rebecca Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to request obstetric review for maternal tachycardia

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Failure to follow midwifery guidelines. a. To confirm assessment of the CTG using the agreed assessment tool. b. The need to request an obstetric review after 1 hour of active pushing. c. The need to request an obstetric review for maternal tachycardia. ”

    Source location

    Ivy Rebecca Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Diana Maxine RITCHIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Diana Maxine Ritchie was recovering from major surgery when she deteriorated overnight on 5–6 March and suffered a cardiac arrest at around 12.20 hrs on 6 March. Concerns included missed opportunities to escalate care in response to raised NEWS scores, inaccurate or potentially delayed observations, and failures in the use of NEWS across the Trust.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report raised NEWS scores to doctors or critical care outreach

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That there were missed opportunities to escalate Mrs Ritchie's treatment arising from raised NEWS scores where there was no report of those raised scores either to the doctors on the ward or to the critical care outreach team. There were eight different NEWS scores taken between 06.30 on the 6th and 11.15 on the 6th. On two of them the scoring was inaccurate (one was scored 2 points too high and the other was scored 2 points too low). One of them scored at 4 but the remainder scored at 5 and above. As I say, none of them resulted in a call to critical care outreach or to the ward SHO. ”

    Source location

    Diana Maxine RITCHIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve ward staff familiarity with National Early Warning observations, scoring and escalation through reflection and additional training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I recognise, as does the Trust's Interim Chief Nurse, that accurate completion and scoring of observations on the National Early Warning charts, and appropriate escalation, is very important. In the light of these events, considerable action has been taken on the ward concerned (in conjunction with their matron) to ensure that the individuals directly caring for Mrs Ritchie, as well as the rest of the ward team, are fully familiar with what is expected of them. They have reflected carefully on this, as well as attending specific additional training since these sad events to improve their knowledge and skills. The ward action plan is being presented to the monthly adult meeting for women's services, as well as feedback being taken to the safety and quality meeting for wider learning.”

    Source location

    2016-0296-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 August 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate National Early Warning System safety guidance to all staff through the weekly Spotlight on Safety message and Patient Observation Policy link.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to extend this learning more widely, I used the Spotlight on Safety, in my weekly message to all staff, to focus on NEWS, saying - among other things - “it is vital that NEWS scores are calculated correctly and acted on appropriately if we are to provide safe care for our patients” and providing a direct link to the Trust's Patient Observation Policy.”

    Source location

    2016-0296-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 August 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate a monthly patient-safety bulletin highlighting recognition and escalation of care for deteriorating patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust's Patient Safety team sends a “Patients 1st” bulletin each month to all staff. This uses a fictionalized story to draw attention to things that may go wrong and sets out good practice. Since the death of Mrs Ritchie, such a bulletin has been circulated, which focused on the recognition and appropriate escalation of care for a deteriorating patient.”

    Source location

    2016-0296-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 August 2016

    Open published response
  3. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Patricia Mercieca · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patricia Mercieca, who had severe COPD and asthma and lived in assisted accommodation, pulled her emergency cord on 14 July 2015 and said that she could not breathe. She arrested shortly afterwards and was found deceased when the ambulance service arrived. Concerns included failures to provide correct information and follow up when she did not respond, to contact the resident manager, and to pass on relevant medical history and information requested by emergency services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to raise immediate concerns with appropriate agencies after no response from an emergency call system user

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) That call handlers be trained such that if they get no response when contacting a person who has contacted them and that person is a user of the emergency call system, then immediate concerns should be raised with the appropriate agencies for example the LAS and resident scheme manager. ”

    Source location

    Patricia Mercieca · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Marc GROOM · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Marc Groom stood in front of a lorry after spending seven hours in the emergency unit of Whittington Hospital, where he was seen by emergency medicine and mental health staff. Concerns included delays in his mental health assessment, prescribed diazepam not being administered, inadequate planning for his possible departure, failure to seek urgent hospital security assistance, and incomplete communication with police.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek urgent hospital security assistance when detention under the Mental Health Act is considered necessary

    Wider context from the report

    “4. When Matt did leave the department, the assessing doctor asked the nurse to call the police, but neither doctor nor nurse considered seeking urgent assistance from hospital security, given that they were by now both of the view that he would probably now have to be detained under section of the Mental Health Act. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Marc GROOM · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare a joint emergency-department framework and reference document covering risk assessment, capacity, security, observation, documentation and inter-service communication when patients leave.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improvement in response to Concern To improve the reliability of assessments made by the Whittington and Camden and Islington frontline staff to consider and plan what action to take should a patient suddenly decide to leave, both organisations are jointly preparing a joint framework and reference document that will be used in the ED to outline and further reinforce clear steps with regard to:”

    Source location

    Matthew-Groom-Response
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare a joint emergency-department framework and reference document covering risk, capacity, security, observation, documentation and inter-service communication when patients may leave.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both Trusts have committed to improving staff awareness of their legal duties, what the options are associated with the various circumstances and clinical contingency planning in line with legal options. These are detailed under point 4.”

    Source location

    2015-0503-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Informal patients cannot lawfully be prevented from leaving without sufficient grounds for detention or proportionate physical intervention.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Individuals who have attended the ED voluntarily are informal patients and are not subject to any form of legal detention such as the Mental Health Act. For informal patients staff may try and persuade patients not to leave, but cannot in any manner prevent them leaving. A general duty of care can be applied in circumstances where someone is actively violent or is actively trying to hurt themselves or others, and then a physical intervention can be applied by NHS staff. This was not the case for Mr Groom.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Groom-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The patient did not display behaviour indicating immediate risk, requiring detention, restraint, or an active police search.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Mental Health Act enables appropriately trained staff to deprive someone of their liberty and enforce treatment; rightly this assessment requires a high threshold to be met. Alongside this the assessors have to consider the persons capacity to make this decision. Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust is satisfied that Mr Groom did not display behaviour that was sufficiently concerning that it required Mr Groom to be immediately detained under the Mental Health Act or any other Act.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Groom-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The patient was not considered an immediate risk requiring detention, restraint, or an active police search.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Mental Health Act enables appropriately trained staff to deprive someone of their liberty and enforce treatment; rightly this assessment requires a high threshold to be met. Alongside this assessment, staff have to consider the person’s capacity to make this decision. Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust is satisfied that Mr Groom did not display behaviour that was sufficiently concerning that it required Mr Groom to be immediately detained under the Mental Health Act or any other Act.”

    Source location

    2015-0503-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response
  5. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Casey Paul GARRETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Casey Paul Garrett was born at Bedford Hospital on 10 September 2014 and died on 11 September 2014 at 07:10 from perinatal asphyxia. The inquest identified failures to recognise his deteriorating condition and escalate care to expedite delivery, while the stated concerns included insufficient fetal monitoring, misinterpretation of a CTG trace, failure to escalate care, and the suitability of the hospital as a clinical learning environment for student midwives.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate the level of care when there is a deviation from the norm

    Wider context from the report

    “My concern was regarding the clinical learning environment, in that a Student Midwife was working with a Midwife and witnessed/carried out entirely inappropriate midwifery care which led to this infant’s death, including insufficient fetal monitoring, mis-interpretation of a CTG trace and the failure to escalate the level of care when there was a “deviation from the norm”. 1. The incident raises questions about the suitability of Bedford Hospital NHS Trust being used as a clinical learning environment for Student Midwives – this needs an urgent review in the interests of safety of mothers and babies to avoid similar deaths in the future. ”

    Source location

    Casey Paul GARRETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Laurence Boyens · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Laurence Boyens died in prison on 15 November 2012 from Methadone, Tramadol and Diazepam intoxication. The jury identified concerns about the combination and interaction of prescribed drugs, failures to monitor intoxication symptoms and blood pressure, and failures to suspend or withhold Methadone and Tramadol when signs of toxicity were present.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to suspend controlled drugs and escalate low blood pressure

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appeared to be a general misunderstanding how health care professionals should comply with DH Clinical Management of Drug Dependence in Adult Prison Settings Guidelines 12.3 and 12.4. In particular this relates to the requirement to ensure that patients who are undergoing Methadone or Buprenorphine stabilization have not experienced a lowering of blood pressure or drowsiness before administration of the controlled drug. • Health care assistants routinely took the blood pressure before administration but did not inform the nurse of the reading and may not have had instruction when to report the reading • The evidence of six nurses and a health care assistant showed that previous blood pressure recordings were not sought or examined to determine if there had been a lowering of BP • The record of blood pressure was often written on paper and not usually entered in the medical records at the time and sometimes not at all • A health care assistant who did record a BP of 93/68 was asked by a nurse to repeat it and reported back to the medication hatch that it was still low. No apparent action was taken by nurses to suspend the medication or escalate the concern to a doctor on 11th. • One nurse, who did not see the BP of 93/58 recorded in the records and administered Methadone, did not know what she would do if he had discovered a previous higher BP. • One nurse was surprised that a BP of 105/60 having a reading of 128/68 and 93/68 the previous day and 121/81 the day before that, should trigger withholding Methadone and escalating to the doctor. • The expert GP, who had been clinical director in the health care team provided to the prison, identified a sequence of seven BP recordings over 4 days, six of which (the second was considered rogue) should have triggered suspension of administration of drugs and escalation to the doctor, but in no case did this occur. • The head of health care at the time, who was an inexperienced nurse, did not accept that advice and asserted it would be impractical to implement it, as it would lead to significant delays. • In a local policy on Buprenorphine a threshold triggering suspension of drug and escalation was defined as 90/60 without reference to the trend. None was found in a section on Methadone and no definition of lowering of blood pressure or how to record it was found in any local policies. • No nurse saw the entry in the medical records by a doctor at 18.56 on 13th November which read: “Unusually drowsy. Eyelids close when not engaged. communicative alert. no sadness or dsh. Plan stop Citalopram and monitor for signs of overdose.. may req further urine test before further Methadone testing...”. • At 17.57 on 13th, one hour from the doctor’s assessment, when he must have been unusually drowsy, no nurse found him drowsy when he presented at the hatch for medication, and he was given Methadone and Tramadol. • On the morning of 14th he was given further Methadone and Tramadol, without measuring the blood pressure, or testing, as the previous day was last day of his Methadone titration regime and his 5 day review. ”

    Source location

    Laurence Boyens · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    DARREN HAYES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darren Hayes had significant physical health problems, opiate dependence and alcohol abuse, and was losing weight, struggling with nutrition and personal care, living alone without a cooker. He died on 11 March 2014 before a planned community care assessment could take place; the inquest recorded poisoning by morphine and benzodiazepines, with empyema of the gallbladder. Concerns included delayed and inadequately documented attempts to contact him, insufficient consideration of the risks he presented, and failure to contact other relevant services when he did not respond.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate unanswered telephone contact attempts to a senior worker

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Attempts to contact Mr Hayes by telephone were not documented nor escalated to a senior worker – it is understood NCC have taken steps to ensure that staff are aware that all calls (even those where there is no response are documented) and a senior member of staff is made aware; ”

    Source location

    DARREN HAYES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a best-practice factsheet formalising contact attempts, escalation, identification of relevant contacts, and communication when referred people cannot be reached.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(1) Attempts to contact Mr Hayes by telephone were not documented nor escalated to a senior worker – it is understood NCC have taken steps to ensure that staff are aware that all calls (even where there is no response are documented) and a senior member of staff is made aware;”

    Source location

    2014-0538-Response-by-Norfolk-County-Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 December 2014

    Open published response
  8. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Peter John White · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter John White was involved in a road traffic collision on 2 April 2013 and was taken to Milton Keynes Hospital with serious chest injuries. He became unwell and collapsed while undergoing a CT scan, and died on 3 April 2013 from haemothorax. Concerns included incorrect completion and inadequate checking of the Early Warning Observation Chart, ignored triggers, failures to escalate care, and the absence of a regular audit system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to act on Early Warning Observation Chart trigger scores through appropriate escalation of care

    Wider context from the report

    “(1)Evidence was given to me that observation of patients are conducted throughout the Hospital using an Early Warning Observation Chart. The observations are often recorded by unqualified Health Care Assistants but the recordings should be checked and interpreted by a qualified nurse. A trigger score is given for each set of observations; one trigger should result in a review by a senior nurse and an increase in the frequency of observations, two triggers requires a review by a doctor and three triggers a review by a specialist registrar. The chart is a tool to ensure that there is an escalation of care to an appropriate level. (2) In the case of Mr. White the EWS chart was not completed correctly, triggers were ignored and none of the observations were checked by a qualified member of staff. The evidence of Dr. ████████ an independent expert was “This resulted in lost opportunities to reassess Mr. White and put in place the necessary resuscitative measures. (3) I was also told that there is no regular audit system in place to ensure that the charts are correctly completed, interpreted and acted upon. ”

    Source location

    Peter John White · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Charles TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Charles Taylor, a diabetic man aged 54, died in the Royal Free Hospital after a delay in administering insulin following the loss of his medical notes and drug chart. Concerns included unclear ward leadership, the absence of a protocol for lost notes and drug charts, inadequate escalation when blood sugar checks were refused, and delayed clinical monitoring after significant hyperglycaemia.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to alert medical staff after significant hyperglycaemia

    Wider context from the report

    “3. When Mr Taylor refused to have his blood sugar checked, there seemed no well understood protocol for re-checking or escalation. Immediate provision was not made for the administration of insulin, and a doctor was even told that he was not diabetic. When Mr Taylor became significantly hyperglycaemic on the 22nd, after the administration of the delayed dose of insulin his nurses did not immediately re-check his blood sugar, perform neurological observations or alert medical staff. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Charles TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Toni Elizabeth SKILLINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Toni Elizabeth Skillington took an excess of methadone and alcohol and contacted family members, who alerted the London Ambulance Service. Emergency paramedics arrived almost three hours later, after failures to follow procedures following unanswered welfare checks and other concerns about call handling and dispatch.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to take appropriate action after unanswered welfare-check callbacks

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Two welfare checks were made via ring backs without any reply gained, yet neither of these was followed by the appropriate action. Even accepting how busy and under staffed the service was that night, a call child at least have been made to the police asking for attendance. ”

    Source location

    Toni Elizabeth SKILLINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026