Recurring concern

Failure to escalate significant clinical concerns to appropriately senior clinicians

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First reported 23 Aug 2013•Latest report 27 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical escalation for significant patient concerns, abnormal findings, changing clinical conditions or treatment problems where escalation to an appropriately senior clinician is required, including obstetric escalation and escalation by junior staff during busy shifts.

Not included

  • Excludes generic organisational governance failures where no clinical concern requiring senior clinical review is identified.
  • Excludes failures of escalation in non-clinical operational, safeguarding, complaints or emergency-control-room processes.
  • Excludes delays in senior review where the failure is solely lack of consultant availability and no escalation deficiency is identified.
  • Excludes failures limited to documentation, communication or training unless they directly constitute or undermine escalation of a significant clinical concern.
Reports
72

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
81

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
103

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care6
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust6
NHS England5
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust4
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust3
Royal Sussex County Hospital3
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust3
Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Milton Keynes University Hospital2
Nursing and Midwifery Council2
Recipient name withheld2
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists2
Tameside General Hospital2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Diana Maxine RITCHIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Diana Maxine Ritchie was recovering from major surgery when she deteriorated overnight on 5–6 March and suffered a cardiac arrest at around 12.20 hrs on 6 March. Concerns included missed opportunities to escalate care in response to raised NEWS scores, inaccurate or potentially delayed observations, and failures in the use of NEWS across the Trust.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report raised NEWS scores to doctors or critical care outreach

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That there were missed opportunities to escalate Mrs Ritchie's treatment arising from raised NEWS scores where there was no report of those raised scores either to the doctors on the ward or to the critical care outreach team. There were eight different NEWS scores taken between 06.30 on the 6th and 11.15 on the 6th. On two of them the scoring was inaccurate (one was scored 2 points too high and the other was scored 2 points too low). One of them scored at 4 but the remainder scored at 5 and above. As I say, none of them resulted in a call to critical care outreach or to the ward SHO. ”

    Source location

    Diana Maxine RITCHIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve ward staff familiarity with National Early Warning observations, scoring and escalation through reflection and additional training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I recognise, as does the Trust's Interim Chief Nurse, that accurate completion and scoring of observations on the National Early Warning charts, and appropriate escalation, is very important. In the light of these events, considerable action has been taken on the ward concerned (in conjunction with their matron) to ensure that the individuals directly caring for Mrs Ritchie, as well as the rest of the ward team, are fully familiar with what is expected of them. They have reflected carefully on this, as well as attending specific additional training since these sad events to improve their knowledge and skills. The ward action plan is being presented to the monthly adult meeting for women's services, as well as feedback being taken to the safety and quality meeting for wider learning.”

    Source location

    2016-0296-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 August 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate National Early Warning System safety guidance to all staff through the weekly Spotlight on Safety message and Patient Observation Policy link.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to extend this learning more widely, I used the Spotlight on Safety, in my weekly message to all staff, to focus on NEWS, saying - among other things - “it is vital that NEWS scores are calculated correctly and acted on appropriately if we are to provide safe care for our patients” and providing a direct link to the Trust's Patient Observation Policy.”

    Source location

    2016-0296-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 August 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate a monthly patient-safety bulletin highlighting recognition and escalation of care for deteriorating patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust's Patient Safety team sends a “Patients 1st” bulletin each month to all staff. This uses a fictionalized story to draw attention to things that may go wrong and sets out good practice. Since the death of Mrs Ritchie, such a bulletin has been circulated, which focused on the recognition and appropriate escalation of care for a deteriorating patient.”

    Source location

    2016-0296-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 August 2016

    Open published response
  2. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Jean Stockley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jean Stockley was admitted after an unwitnessed fall down 13 stairs that caused spinal fractures. Her respiratory condition later deteriorated, leading to respiratory failure, intensive care treatment and her death on 20 April 2015. Concerns included failure to review her after a significant NEWS score increase, uncertainty about which doctor should be contacted, reluctance to escalate concerns to senior doctors, and possible benefits of automated NEWS monitoring.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reluctance among nursing staff to escalate to senior doctors

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The nurse who had monitored Mrs Stockley throughout the night and contacted the junior doctor when the NEWS score spiked handed over to the day nurse shortly after her conversation with the doctor. From evidence heard at inquest, there may still be reluctance for nursing staff to contact doctors at a more senior level if a junior doctor does not take appropriate action such as a patient review. ”

    Source location

    Jean Stockley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a revised NEWS policy allowing contact with the staff member best placed to provide timely assistance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Since April 2015, there have been several changes at the Princess Royal Hospital. The Critical Care Outreach Team, to whom you refer, implemented a 24 hour service on the site from June 2015, so are readily available to support and advise on the care of any patient whose condition is deteriorating. A revised NEWS policy has been introduced but it is recognised that some flexibility is required to ensure that contact is made with the member of staff who is most likely to be able to offer timely assistance to the patient. At night, there is no orthopaedic registrar present on the Princess Royal Hospital site, and the critical care and medical registrars who are on site are often better placed to assess the immediate needs of a patient whose condition has unexpectedly changed.”

    Source location

    2016-0286-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 August 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind Twineham ward nursing staff to escalate patient concerns to the nurse in charge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Nursing staff on Twineham ward have been reminded that rather than simply handing over to the nurse who will be taking over direct care of a patient on the next shift, any concern about a patient should be drawn to the attention of the nurse in charge. Since June 2016, a senior nurse (band 6) has been rostered to be on duty on the ward throughout the 24 hour period. This person is trained to provide advice, support and clinical guidance to other nurses, including ensuring that appropriate assistance is obtained in the event of a patient deteriorating. It is also the responsibility of the Band 6 nurse to contact a more senior member of the medical team if there is cause for concern arising from advice received from the junior doctor first contacted.”

    Source location

    2016-0286-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 August 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roster a trained senior Band 6 nurse on Twineham ward throughout the 24-hour period to provide guidance and support escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Nursing staff on Twineham ward have been reminded that rather than simply handing over to the nurse who will be taking over direct care of a patient on the next shift, any concern about a patient should be drawn to the attention of the nurse in charge. Since June 2016, a senior nurse (band 6) has been rostered to be on duty on the ward throughout the 24 hour period. This person is trained to provide advice, support and clinical guidance to other nurses, including ensuring that appropriate assistance is obtained in the event of a patient deteriorating. It is also the responsibility of the Band 6 nurse to contact a more senior member of the medical team if there is cause for concern arising from advice received from the junior doctor first contacted.”

    Source location

    2016-0286-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 August 2016

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Emily TUCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Emily Tuck, who had multiple myeloma, fell at home on 13 October 2015 and again in hospital on 15 October 2015. The report identified concerns about the absence of a falls prevention care plan, unclear nursing responsibility, incomplete post-fall documentation, missing neurological observations, delays in recognising possible bleeding and informing the consultant, and shortcomings in incident reporting and the hospital investigation. The inquest jury determined that her death was caused by a combination of accident and illness.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delay in escalating falls to the responsible consultant

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The consultant in charge of Mrs Tuck’s care did not learn of the 15 October fall until 17 October. It seems that the junior doctors on her ward did not bring this to her attention. Mrs Tuck’s nephew, however, was gravely concerned to find his auntie unable to communicate, and brought this to the attention of the consultant. The consultant asked him “What do you want me to do, scan her brain?” and he replied “I think that would be a very good idea”. Hence a CT scan was conducted on the afternoon of 17 October. ”

    Source location

    Margaret Emily TUCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver multidisciplinary training on falls prevention and post-falls care, with regular assessment of planned and delivered care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Our Nurse Educator has been instrumental in setting up and delivering a new multi-disciplinary training programme around important issues, that includes falls prevention awareness and post falls care. As part of the Band 7 role regular assessment during the shift of care planned and delivered, is undertaken. All of our medical staff, including FY1’s, are invited to participate. Falls prevention and awareness is also included in the FY1 mandatory education programme. With the increased presence of Band 6 and 7 nurses on each shift all the clinical staff now have a first contact who they can handover important issues to, even when the named nurse is not on the ward. There are now four multidisciplinary board / handover meetings per 24-hours and these are focussed around patient safety and handover.”

    Source location

    2016-0273-Response-by-Barths-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response
  4. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    baby Dominic Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Baby Dominic Smith was born on 2 June 2015 after a prolonged labour and died at approximately 18 hours of life following a collapse. The report describes pneumonia as the cause of death and identifies concerns including failure to recognise possible rupture of membranes and infection risk, inadequate maternal and neonatal observations, failure to escalate deterioration, delayed antibiotic treatment, and communication and record-keeping problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of midwives to escalate to or consult with relevant specialist clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust: 1. During the course of the inquest into Baby Smith’s death, the following concerns arose: - Inadequate communication, handover and record keeping; - Staff did not follow the Trust’s protocols/guidance and did not document their rationale where they exercised clinical discretion; - Midwives did not carry out a speculum examination, on two separate occasions, in order to establish whether there had been a rupture of membranes. The time between rupture and delivery was, more likely than not, miscalculated as a result of this; - Early warning scores were i) miscalculated, ii) not acted upon; - Neonatal observations were not carried out when it became apparent that there had been a material change in baby’s condition. Signs and symptoms relating to the deterioration were also missed; - Maternal observations were not carried out after delivery, despite a spike in temperature; - Midwives did not escalate to or consult with the Obstetrician/Paediatrician/Neonatologist & - Inadequate preceptorship for newly qualified (and particularly part-time) Midwives. ”

    Source location

    baby Dominic Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver training on recognising abnormal maternal observations and escalating to medical practitioners with clear clinical management plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Division have developed a programme of training to emphasise recognition of signs and symptoms or deviations from normal physiological observations.”

    Source location

    2016-0240-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide Critical Care outreach support and follow-up when elevated early warning scores are identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Critical Care outreach team are also supporting the Division where elevated early warning scores are identified. This involves direct care by the outreach team and subsequent follow up to ensure stabilisation of the patient.”

    Source location

    2016-0240-Response-by-The-Pennine-Acute-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 June 2016

    Open published response
  5. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Valerie Margaret Ellis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Valerie Margaret Ellis, an 83-year-old woman, died at home on 6 September 2015 after a massive gastrointestinal bleed associated with Apixaban. The report identified concerns about inadequate counselling on the medication, communication and call-handling problems in NHS 111, premature closure of an IC24 case, and aspects of ambulance triage.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consult clinical advisors in complex KMSS 111 cases

    Wider context from the report

    “2) KMSS 111 provides a valuable lifeline for many patients and although health advisors are trained to follow algorithms they only have 4 weeks training followed by 2 weeks of sitting in with an experienced advisor. I am concerned about the training schedule, particularly for those with little or no background medical knowledge. Whilst reliant on algorithms, advisors must be able to recognise potentially fatal illnesses and deteriorating conditions as thousands of patients rely on this service for medical help. Clinical advisors on duty were not consulted in this complex case. The senior manager for Quality and Clinical Governance at KMSS 111 expressed concern at the algorithm used in the case of Mrs Ellis. The clinical algorithm called NHS Pathways is owned by the Department of Health and was felt to be imprecise but despite representations to the Department of Health by KMSS 111 for changes and improvement there has been no positive communication since February. ”

    Source location

    Valerie Margaret Ellis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing NHS Pathways training and call-handling arrangements are considered sufficient to provide a safe service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly and with regards to the NHS Pathways training KMSS 111 deliver, this is in line with requirements set out by the Department of Health who own the system. As commented during proceedings if three answers of ‘unknown’ are provided by the caller this would flag to pass the call to a clinician in the room. This is considered the mechanism to provide a safe service, with call takers operating within the scope of the algorithm.”

    Source location

    2016-0252-Response-by-South-East-Coast-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 June 2016

    Open published response
  6. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Laxmi Himatlall THAKKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Laxmi Himatlall Thakker fell at home and was admitted to Croydon University Hospital, where her deterioration after surgery was not recognised promptly. She collapsed and was not diagnosed or treated for bleeding and vascular injury until several hours later, was transferred to St George’s Hospital in critical condition, and died in intensive care on 29 September 2014. The principal concerns included the lack of bedside observation charts, failures to escalate concerns, communication and training problems, delays in administering blood, and inadequate escalation to senior staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of timely escalation of clinical concerns from junior to senior staff

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Lack of escalation of clinical concerns from junior to senior staff at CUH, and in particular that a patient could collapse, be seen by a junior from another treating team and the patient’s own senior team not be promptly informed, as well lack of escalation of clinical issues within the same team. ”

    Source location

    Laxmi Himatlall THAKKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin John Gilbert · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin John Gilbert suffered an aortic root dissection on 29 January 2015 and died after cardiac arrest during transfer from William Harvey Hospital to St Thomas’ Hospital. The concerns included confusion about transfer protocols, delay in accepting him for transfer, and refusal to escalate the decision to a consultant; the report stated that his chances of survival would have been greater had the delay been avoided.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate transfer acceptance decisions to a Consultant when requested

    Wider context from the report

    “• It was not reasonable to decline ████████ request for the decision to accept Mr Gilbert to be escalated to a Consultant on the basis that ████████ was in theatre and unable to talk to ████████ ”

    Source location

    Kevin John Gilbert · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify and reinforce to cardiothoracic registrars that aortic dissection referrals must be discussed immediately with the duty consultant, who decides transfer and any pre-transfer CT review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In January 2015, shortly after Mr Gilbert died, the referring consultant wrote to Mr Avlonitis, consultant cardiothoracic surgeon and raised concerns about the delay in transfer. Following receipt of the letter Mr Avlonitis wrote to all registrars in the Cardiothoracic Department to clarify the department’s process for accepting dissection referrals. He confirmed that all such referrals must be discussed immediately with the duty consultant and any decision to ask to review CT imagery before transfer could only be made by a consultant. The text of the email is shown below.”

    Source location

    Kevin-GILBERT-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Extend the open-door policy to ascending-aorta and arch dissections, enabling consultant-authorised immediate transfer with guaranteed theatre and critical-care capacity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would also like to make the Coroner aware of a more recent change to the management of dissection referrals at the Trust. It has always been the case that there is an ‘open door’ policy for leaking abdominal aortic aneurysms, meaning they are accepted by the vascular surgical team for immediate transfer if clinically appropriate, with a guarantee that theatre and critical care capacity will be made available. This approach has now been extended to include dissections of the ascending aorta and arch such as suffered by Mr Gilbert. Therefore, from May 2016, any such referral to this Trust will be discussed immediately with the duty consultant cardiac surgeon (as outlined above), who will then be able to authorise immediate transfer if clinically indicated, with that same guarantee that theatre and critical care capacity will be made available.”

    Source location

    Kevin-GILBERT-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarified consultant escalation and guaranteed immediate transfer arrangements are considered sufficient to prevent recurrence of confusion and delay.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is absolutely committed to learning from incidents and about how care can be improved and delivered more effectively. I am confident that following the email, and the reinforcement of the message by consultant staff, that all junior staff are completely clear that dissection referrals must be reviewed immediately by the duty consultant and they understand that the transfer decision must be made by a consultant.”

    Source location

    Kevin-GILBERT-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 December 2015

    Open published response
  8. Gloucestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Samantha Beach · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Samantha Beach developed severe chest pain and intermittent tachycardia shortly after giving birth to her third child, but her symptoms were not appropriately investigated or escalated. She later suffered cardiac arrests and died after surgery for bleeding from a ruptured splenic artery aneurysm. Concerns included inadequate escalation of care, poor sharing of information between community and hospital services, and failure to involve the obstetric department when she attended the Emergency Department.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate clinical care to more senior colleagues in the obstetric department

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The clinical care provided to Sam in the obstetric department was not escalated appropriately to more senior colleagues, ”

    Source location

    Samantha Beach · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Ethan Robert Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ethan Johnson was born following an urgent Caesarean section, with no respiratory effort or heart rate, and died after intensive care treatment was withdrawn. The concerns included a lack of effective leadership, support and escalation when an abnormal CTG was identified. The inquest concluded that delayed delivery resulted in a lost opportunity to deliver him earlier and provide further medical treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of leadership authority to require timely doctor attendance and CTG review

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Two further members of staff reviewed the CTG trace and yet it appears that no one was in a position of leadership to require a doctor to attend and review the trace and ████████ ”

    Source location

    Ethan Robert Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Change the patient whiteboard to record the doctor-review time for suspicious CTG traces.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “management plan. The department is also in the process of changing the existing patient whiteboard, to include time of doctor review in cases where the CTG trace is deemed suspicious.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify staff responsibilities for patient reviews, senior-help escalation and upward-escalation timescales in writing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the ward the CTG did not require immediate intervention, so when the doctor had not attended within a reasonable timescale it was escalated appropriately. We have written to every member of staff clarifying their responsibilities if they are asked to review a patient, as well as what to do if senior help has been unable to attend. This includes timescales for upward escalation.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed a revised SBAR handover communication tool in practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new, specifically dedicated Matron for Labour Ward has ensured that a revised handover communication tool (SBAR) is embedded in practice, so that a succinct common language is in place to enable the medical staff to make an appropriate assessment of when to attend. There is now a Manager of the Day on the Maternity Unit.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recirculate the written escalation policy to all staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are existing clear instructions for all midwifery staff, from new Band 5 Midwife to Matron level and also for all levels of medical staff in respect of escalation to a Consultant.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns were identified and appropriately escalated; junior midwives are qualified and understand how to summon emergency assistance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In this particular case the concerns were identified and appropriately escalated within a few minutes. All our junior midwives are fully qualified and are conversant with the escalation process and how to summon help in an emergency. All staff have been reminded of this process.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The CTG did not require immediate intervention, and staff escalated appropriately when the doctor did not attend within a reasonable timescale.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the ward the CTG did not require immediate intervention, so when the doctor had not attended within a reasonable timescale it was escalated appropriately. We have written to every member of staff clarifying their responsibilities if they are asked to review a patient, as well as what to do if senior help has been unable to attend. This includes timescales for upward escalation.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clear escalation instructions already exist for all midwifery and medical staff, including escalation to a consultant.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are existing clear instructions for all midwifery staff, from new Band 5 Midwife to Matron level and also for all levels of medical staff in respect of escalation to a Consultant.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response
  10. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Casey Paul GARRETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Casey Paul Garrett was born at Bedford Hospital on 10 September 2014 and died on 11 September 2014 at 07:10 from perinatal asphyxia. The inquest identified failures to recognise his deteriorating condition and escalate care to expedite delivery, while the stated concerns included insufficient fetal monitoring, misinterpretation of a CTG trace, failure to escalate care, and the suitability of the hospital as a clinical learning environment for student midwives.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate the level of care when there is a deviation from the norm

    Wider context from the report

    “My concern was regarding the clinical learning environment, in that a Student Midwife was working with a Midwife and witnessed/carried out entirely inappropriate midwifery care which led to this infant’s death, including insufficient fetal monitoring, mis-interpretation of a CTG trace and the failure to escalate the level of care when there was a “deviation from the norm”. 1. The incident raises questions about the suitability of Bedford Hospital NHS Trust being used as a clinical learning environment for Student Midwives – this needs an urgent review in the interests of safety of mothers and babies to avoid similar deaths in the future. ”

    Source location

    Casey Paul GARRETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026