Recurring concern

Unreliable escalation policy for care concerns

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First reported 1 Aug 2013•Latest report 31 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the named or directly corresponding escalation-policy process, including policy clarity, dissemination, staff understanding, embedding, use when triggers arise and assurance that escalations are made through the required route.

Not included

  • Excludes generic escalation failures where no escalation policy or equivalent bounded policy process is identified.
  • Excludes generic staff training, communication or staffing deficiencies unless they directly impair understanding or use of the escalation policy.
  • Excludes failures in the substantive response after an escalation has been correctly made.
  • Excludes escalation processes belonging to a separately named system or pathway when that system provides the more specific supported boundary.
Reports
35

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
35

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
59

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission6
Department of Health and Social Care3
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust3
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board2
ADS (Addiction Dependency Solutions)1
Anson Court Residential Home1
Bamford Grange Care Home1
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Belong Limited1
Berkshire and Surrey Pathology Services1
Borough Care Ltd1
Calderdale Borough Council1
Cann House Care Home1
Caremark (Chiltern & Three Rivers)1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Calary Fern Davis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Calary Fern Davis was delivered by emergency Caesarean Section on 31st December 2017 after fetal bradycardia caused hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and very serious brain damage, and she later died from that condition. The report identified concerns about failures in the induction pathway, including a lack of planned obstetric review, delay in artificial rupture of membranes, insufficient staffing and leadership, poor communication and safety briefings, and a culture against performing artificial rupture of membranes at night.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use the escalation policy

    Wider context from the report

    “(8) There were insufficient staffing levels, despite which the escalation policy was not used. ”

    Source location

    Calary Fern Davis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and operate an escalation policy enabling midwives to contact the on-call Obstetric Consultant and Senior Midwife directly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. There was a reluctance from mid ranking midwife staff to challenge decisions made by the labour ward coordinators. The Health Board has developed an Organisational Development Plan addressing human factors and to work with all staff grades to develop a positive culture of challenge and openness. The Health Board also implemented a new Escalation Policy with work specifically focussed on midwives being able to jump call to the Obstetric Consultant and Senior Midwife on call. The Clinical Supervisor for Midwives is undertaking escalation work within group settings.”

    Source location

    2019-0043-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response
  2. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Simon Healey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Simon Healey underwent right hemi-colectomy on 1 August 2017 and died on 10 August 2017 after an anastomotic leak led to faecal peritonitis, E. coli septicaemia and organ failure. The principal concerns were missed opportunities to detect the leak and sepsis earlier, inadequate escalation of care under NEWS protocols, the suitability of private hospitals’ staffing and facilities for such procedures, and an inadequate hospital investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of escalation arrangements to provide emergency assessment by critical care-competent staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) I believe that the NEWS policies in place at private hospitals should be reviewed. This relates not only to awareness of the policy and sepsis training generally, but also consideration of the arrangements for escalating care where a patient becomes critically unwell. Most private hospitals do not have a full critical care capacity (in terms of facilities and staff) and rely instead on a consultant’s availability to attend and review the position. The Royal College of Physicians NEWS trigger thresholds have been adopted almost verbatim by this hospital, save for the category relating to the sickest patients. Whilst the trigger thresholds in the RCP documents do need to be tailored to the organisation in question, it would appear, based on the information I have been provided with, that something well below an “emergency response” can be provided in this hospital, and perhaps also the wider private sector. RCP guidelines clearly require “emergency assessment by a team with critical care competencies”. The escalation policy at Ramsay Healthcare hospitals currently (for a patient scoring 7 or above) is for the registered nurse “to immediately inform the RMO and named consultant. The named consultant to attend urgently and review the patient and agree action to be taken. Consider transfer of care to a level 2 or 3 clinical care facility i.e. HDU or ICU”. This policy clearly anticipates initial review by a consultant, outside the hospital, who may well not be available to attend on an emergency basis. ”

    Source location

    Simon Healey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue a CQC learning programme to understand outstanding safety practice and support its adoption across independent healthcare providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CQC’s State of care in independent acute hospitals published in April 2018 did cite examples of inconsistent monitoring of risks and examples where effective escalation did not occur within providers. In order to address this and other quality related findings, IHPN began a learning programme with the CQC to ensure that their view of what makes for outstanding care in the Safe domain is fully understood throughout the sector so that best practice can be adopted across the board.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss escalation policies in independent acute hospitals with the CQC.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “IHPN’s formal engagement with the CQC includes frequent catch-up meetings to discuss quality themes across the sector. It also comprises joint CQC-IHPN seminars where providers share best practice and learn from each other. Previous seminars have focused on safety and well-led. We will be discussing escalation policies in independent acute hospitals with the CQC in February.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a scoping exercise on providers’ assurance of staff awareness of NEWS and sepsis training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to support this agenda item, IHPN will undertake a scoping exercise on how providers assure themselves of levels of staff awareness of NEWS and on sepsis training. This will assist us to identify if these two elements of this unfortunate case are indeed reflected across the wider sector.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Encourage providers to establish formal service-level agreements with neighbouring providers for higher-acuity care transfers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is clear from the CQC’s end of programme report that more work needs to be done to formalise the arrangements some independent providers have in place to deal with deteriorating patients and we have strongly encouraged all providers to have formal Service Level Agreements in place with neighbouring healthcare providers able to provide higher acuity care in the event of a patient’s health deteriorating unexpectedly. However, we are confident that the overall picture for the sector is good. IHPN members already have clear processes in place to manage deterioration and, where necessary, to arrange the transfer of patients to higher acuity settings.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Patient transfer does not indicate inappropriate originating care or admission, and independent hospitals can safely manage unanticipated deterioration through planned transfer arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Inter-hospital transfers are a well embedded mechanism to ensure that patients are treated in the most appropriate place should unanticipated complications arise. These transfers take place between providers of all types – from NHS providers to other NHS providers, from independent providers to independent providers, and from independent providers to NHS providers and vice versa.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There is no evidence that patient transfers are particularly associated with hospitals lacking intensive-care facilities, and national guidance does not require on-site intensive care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are not aware of any evidence to suggest that transfers of patients are particularly associated with providers who do not have intensive care facilities, such as NHS community and district general hospitals, mental health inpatient units and some independent sector hospitals. The NICE guidelines on patient transfers do not suggest that patients should only be treated where there are”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Independent hospitals already have clear processes to manage deterioration and arrange transfers to higher-acuity settings when necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is clear from the CQC’s end of programme report that more work needs to be done to formalise the arrangements some independent providers have in place to deal with deteriorating patients and we have strongly encouraged all providers to have formal Service Level Agreements in place with neighbouring healthcare providers able to provide higher acuity care in the event of a patient’s health deteriorating unexpectedly. However, we are confident that the overall picture for the sector is good. IHPN members already have clear processes in place to manage deterioration and, where necessary, to arrange the transfer of patients to higher acuity settings.”

    Source location

    2018-0378-Response-by-IHPN
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Gerard Craven · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Gerard Craven was found dead at home on 19 April 2018 after consuming pregabalin in excess of his prescribed amount; toxicology showed a fatal dose of pregabalin. Concerns included repeated rejected referrals for psychiatric assessment, the absence of a challenge or escalation process, no agreed timescales for routine appointments, limited documentation of referral decisions, and inadequate sharing and review of mental health information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a challenge or escalation process for rejected psychiatric referrals

    Wider context from the report

    “He had long-term anxiety. Mental Health workers assessing him had repeatedly felt he needed to be seen by a psychiatrist. The referrals were rejected by the psychiatrist. There was no challenge or escalation process within the trust to deal with the situation. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Gerard Craven · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement a Stockport escalation process and protocol for rejected referrals and disagreements about psychiatric assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will develop a process and protocol for escalation to be used within the borough of Stockport by the end of February 2019.”

    Source location

    2018-0365-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evidence showed RAID planned and made a psychiatric referral, although the outpatient referral was not accepted.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. There had been a series of presentations at the emergency department and RAID referrals. The inquest heard that there was no documentation or rationale provided for why RAID did not refer him to a Psychiatrist.”

    Source location

    2018-0365-Response-by-Pennine-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 May 2019

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jane Olive Parker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jane Olive Parker, who had dementia and a history of choking episodes, was found unresponsive approximately 40 minutes after eating an inappropriate meal unobserved in her room on 24 August 2016. Post-mortem examination found un-chewed food in her airway, and the recorded conclusion was death from aspiration of food, contributed to by neglect. Concerns included poor understanding and preparation of modified diets, and failures to escalate choking episodes to the Speech and Language Team for reassessment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of care assistant understanding and systems for escalating choking episodes to SALT

    Wider context from the report

    “3. In Mrs Parker’s case the Inquest heard that there were opportunities to escalate her case back to SALT after choking episodes. However there was limited understanding within the care home assistants of the need to report and escalate choking episodes to ensure that the SALT team provided expert input and reduced risk. Following Mrs Parker’s death both the Local Authority in question and the Care Home provider had taken steps to improve systems within their care homes but it was unclear if there was national work in place to ensure that there were appropriate systems in place to ensure that there were appropriate escalations to SALT. ”

    Source location

    Jane Olive Parker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Stuart Michael Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stuart Michael Campbell was found suspended by a ligature on 5 March 2017 after reporting escalating drug and alcohol use and emotional distress. The inquest identified concerns about the absence of escalation from the drug and alcohol service to Pennine Care, unclear guidance and lack of clinical support for workers, and uncertainty about how shared care with the GP could be facilitated and documented.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate individuals’ unmet needs

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest was told that ADS were the lead contractor for the provision of services. The protocol between ADS and Pennine Care had an escalation policy to be followed where an ADS worker felt the needs of an individual felt the needs could not be met via ADS. An escalation had not taken place in this case. It was unclear what guidance was available to ADS workers. There was no provision for clinical support for ADS workers. ”

    Source location

    Stuart Michael Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Retrain all shared-care staff on the standard operating protocol, escalation procedures, and multidisciplinary shared-care discussions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “19. As part of our detailed response to your concerns ADS will ensure that all our shared care staff receive additional training and re-training with regard to the standard operating protocol. We will re-train all staff in managing shared care and in the escalation procedure. This will also include specific guidance on multi-disciplinary shared care discussions. ADS will ensure that this re-training is completed by 20th December 2017.”

    Source location

    2017-0390-Response-by-Addiction-Dependency-Solutions
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 February 2018

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Glenys Pollitt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Glenys Pollitt was admitted to Stepping Hill Hospital with community acquired pneumonia, but surgical emphysema and an oesophageal rupture were not identified on an initial x-ray and subsequent reviews. She underwent emergency surgery after the rupture was identified, deteriorated, and died from multi-organ failure on 16 February 2017. Concerns included inconsistent use of high-resolution x-ray screens, unclear reinforcement of clinical learning, and unclear escalation processes to consultant and critical care levels.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear process for escalation to consultant level and critical care

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The process for escalation to consultant level and critical care was unclear. ”

    Source location

    Glenys Pollitt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop an implementation plan for rolling out the National Early Warning System independently of the delayed electronic patient record launch.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the inquest the patient’s daughter asked why the Trust used the EWS pathway not the National Early Warning System (NEWS) as she believed the patient would have been escalated to the critical care team sooner based on the NEWS pathway. The evidence given in response was that though we were not using NEWS we had intended to change to it from 30/09/2017 when our new electronic patient record (ePR) was launched. Unfortunately this launch has been delayed and we do not have a definitive new launch date. Therefore our Assistant Director of Nursing, who has been tasked with rolling out NEWS across the Trust, is currently working up an implementation plan that is not reliant on the launch of our ePR.”

    Source location

    2017-0228-Response-by-Stockport-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 October 2017

    Open published response
  7. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Jean Stockley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jean Stockley was admitted after an unwitnessed fall down 13 stairs that caused spinal fractures. Her respiratory condition later deteriorated, leading to respiratory failure, intensive care treatment and her death on 20 April 2015. Concerns included failure to review her after a significant NEWS score increase, uncertainty about which doctor should be contacted, reluctance to escalate concerns to senior doctors, and possible benefits of automated NEWS monitoring.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent policies governing NEWS observation escalation

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Further, although the nurse quite rightly telephoned a doctor it was far from clear whether the right doctor had been contacted. The national NEWS forms were in use at the time of Mrs Stockley's death to record observations but the policy that governed their use was the 2012 MEWS Escalation Policy and the two policies were different. From evidence heard from both doctors and nurses, it suggests the need to revisit how the NEWS policy is applied locally especially around which doctor should be contacted when there is an acute change. ”

    Source location

    Jean Stockley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a revised NEWS policy allowing contact with the staff member best placed to provide timely assistance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Since April 2015, there have been several changes at the Princess Royal Hospital. The Critical Care Outreach Team, to whom you refer, implemented a 24 hour service on the site from June 2015, so are readily available to support and advise on the care of any patient whose condition is deteriorating. A revised NEWS policy has been introduced but it is recognised that some flexibility is required to ensure that contact is made with the member of staff who is most likely to be able to offer timely assistance to the patient. At night, there is no orthopaedic registrar present on the Princess Royal Hospital site, and the critical care and medical registrars who are on site are often better placed to assess the immediate needs of a patient whose condition has unexpectedly changed.”

    Source location

    2016-0286-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 August 2016

    Open published response
  8. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Walker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Walker, who had dementia and had been admitted to hospital after a stroke before being discharged to a care setting, was found dead on 10 October after overnight checks. She had died of bronchopneumonia. Concerns were raised about the lack of detail recorded during night-time checks and unclear procedures for Care Assistants escalating health concerns.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear procedures for Care Assistants escalating health concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) During the inquest there was a lack of clarity in relation to the procedures to be followed by Care Assistants when they wanted to escalate health concerns. This system requires review. ”

    Source location

    Mary Walker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake a comprehensive ratings inspection of Belong Wigan Care Village, including review of the provider’s response to the report findings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following receipt of this Report we held a management review meeting to look at the information we held in relation to this case. At this meeting we took the decision to:”

    Source location

    2016-0150-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind Support Workers how to escalate health concerns and seek external professional advice through staff training, induction, supervision, reviews and audits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• All Support Workers have been reminded of the correct procedures to follow and how to seek advice from outside professionals for non-nursing customers in their care, when they need to escalate health concerns. This is incorporated into the care practice training for all staff, to include staff induction, supervision, life plan review and audit.”

    Source location

    2016-0150-Response-by-Belong
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The provider’s response and inspection consideration were sufficient, so no written confirmation or further action evidence was requested.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We noted the response provided to you by the registered provider, CLS Care Services Limited known as Belong on 27 April 2016. In light of this response it was not felt necessary for CQC to contact the registered provider to request written confirmation and”

    Source location

    2016-0150-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Following inspection and document review, no further investigation into the death or regulated activities was considered necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Thank you for providing us with disclosure during the Coronial investigation. We can confirm that following our inspection and a review of these documents we do not intend to undertake further investigations in relation to the death of Mary Walker or the provision of regulated activities by CLS Care Services Limited.”

    Source location

    2016-0150-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 April 2016

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Adele Blakeman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adele Blakeman, who had a history of mental health difficulties and self-harming behaviour, died after taking her own life at Gateley Railway Station on 28 September 2015. The substantive concerns included failures in police information recording and access, classification and escalation of the call, timely allocation of resources, and understanding of the role of the Missing Persons Unit.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate calls for divisional Inspector review

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was a failure to escalate this call as per the escalation procedure to a divisional Inspector for a review ”

    Source location

    Adele Blakeman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and implement the FWIN Escalation Policy using threat, risk and harm assessments and the National Decision Model.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In March 2016 Chief Inspector 05718 ████████ from the Operational Communications Branch (OCB) revised the FWIN Escalation Policy the revised version is currently at the end of the consultation phase.”

    Source location

    2016-0145-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2016

    Open published response
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Freda Weston · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Freda Weston was treated for septic arthritis in a replacement knee and died in hospital on 29 April 2015. The report states that Septrin led to disseminated intravascular coagulation and identifies concerns including delays in antibiotics, insufficient time to assess whether the new drug suited her, inadequate staffing, and failures in communication and escalation procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure staff knowledge and adherence to IBleep escalation guidelines

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The “Escalation guidelines for the IBleep system were either unknown to the staff or were not adhered to. ”

    Source location

    Freda Weston · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update and approve the iBleep escalation procedure to specify escalation by staff placing calls and reinforce registered-nurse judgement and frequent escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please see enclosed the current standard operating procedure for the Escalation of iBleep jobs which is to be used by the iBleep Co-ordinator. This guides the staff monitoring the iBleep system to escalate to senior staff as and when required.”

    Source location

    Weston-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Out-of-hours staffing arrangements, including prioritisation and access to senior clinicians, were considered adequate for urgent reviews and emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is no on-call national guidance with regards to staffing numbers and broadly the total number of on-call doctors in Stepping Hill Hospital is the same for most district general hospitals of a similar size. Out of hours on-call work is primarily for urgent reviews and emergencies.”

    Source location

    Weston-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2016

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026