Recurring concern

Failure to provide effective senior clinical oversight of patient care

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First reported 23 Aug 2013•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of senior clinical oversight of patient care, including absent or delayed senior input at presentation, early or daily senior review, review of patients referred for advice, and ongoing senior clinical direction or challenge where senior involvement is required for safe care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic organisational, corporate or regulatory oversight where senior clinical oversight of patient care is not the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes senior review of incident investigations, documentation quality, policies or safety governance unless the assertion directly concerns oversight of a patient's clinical care.
  • Excludes failures of junior staff competence, staffing capacity or clinical treatment where senior clinical oversight is not itself deficient.
  • Excludes delays or failures in specialist review where the concern is access to a named specialty rather than the broader senior clinical oversight of patient care.
Reports
59

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
64

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
63

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust7
Department of Health and Social Care4
NHS England4
Royal Sussex County Hospital4
Care Quality Commission3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Medway NHS Foundation Trust2
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Recipient name withheld2
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Ashford and St Peter'S Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jane Elizabeth Wadsworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jane Elizabeth Wadsworth became seriously unwell after elective hip surgery, developing a deep vein thrombosis, cellulitis, sepsis, acute kidney injury and liver failure, and died on 31 December 2022 despite intensive care treatment. Concerns included missed antibiotic doses, limited consultant input, unclear escalation and doctor-to-doctor discussion about intensive care, unavailable Critical Care Outreach support, and no evidence that specialist liver advice was obtained.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of effective consultant input into inpatient care

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The evidence before the inquest was that on her admission over Christmas/New Year there was no effective consultant input into her care; ”

    Source location

    Jane Elizabeth Wadsworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a 24-hour, seven-day MERIT service staffed by senior anaesthetic clinicians to provide emergency critical-care support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has an established Critical Care Outreach Team which is comprised of a number of highly skilled and experienced critical care nursing colleagues. The service is available on a 24 hour, seven day a week basis. In addition to this the Trust also implemented a MERIT (Medical Emergency and Rapid Intubation Team) team as part of its response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the Trust, like other nations have stood down many of the supportive measures implemented in response to the pandemic, the organisation has continued with the MERIT Team. The MERIT Team is staffed by senior anaesthetic colleagues, including Consultant level from 08:30 to 18:00, and from 18:00 to 08:30 this is staffed by a middle grade anaesthetist.”

    Source location

    Response from Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care
    Page 5 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a critical-care referral policy defining consultant-to-consultant and urgent medical-registrar referral pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Admission and Discharge Policy for Critical Care clearly sets out referral pathways for those patients who may require a higher level of care leading critical care due to their current clinical condition. The referral pathway is in line with national guidance (National Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths- NCEPOD, The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence- NICE, National Patient Safety Agency-NPSA, and Royal College Physicians) that the optimal referral pathway is consultant to consultant. However the policy describes that in more critical instances where any delay may be detrimental to the patient then a referral may come from training grade doctors. It is expected that this be a medical registrar (i.e. medical middle grade either on-call or responsible for the patient).”

    Source location

    Response from Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care
    Page 5 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns fall under the Trust’s remit rather than NHS England’s functions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matters of concern raised in your Report come under the remit of Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust (hereafter “the Trust”), who are therefore the appropriate organisation to respond to the concerns raised. I am however grateful to you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention. The concerns have been shared with my relevant regional Quality colleagues in the North West, who are engaging with Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board (the responsible commissioning body for Greater Manchester) about the issues raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust is the appropriate organisation to respond, with the Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board responsible for commissioning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matters of concern raised in your Report come under the remit of Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust (hereafter “the Trust”), who are therefore the appropriate organisation to respond to the concerns raised. I am however grateful to you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention. The concerns have been shared with my relevant regional Quality colleagues in the North West, who are engaging with Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board (the responsible commissioning body for Greater Manchester) about the issues raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The consultant on-call rota had no staffing deficit during the admission, contrary to concerns about ineffective consultant input over Christmas and New Year.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust operates a Consultant on-call rota which includes all weekends and bank holidays throughout the year. The on-call Consultant’s remit is one of assisting their Urgent Care consultant colleagues in the review of new patients who have been admitted to the Acute Medical Unit and also to perform the review and care planning of any acutely unwell medical patients located in the medical wards across the Hospital if required.”

    Source location

    Response from Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response
  2. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Howard SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Howard Smith was a serving prisoner at HMP Lowdham Grange who died at Queen’s Medical Centre on 19 May 2019 from cardiac arrest due to a massive pulmonary embolism, predisposed by deep vein thrombosis. The report describes progressive deterioration, inadequate monitoring and clinical assessment, delayed escalation and ambulance transfer, and failures in communication and care. It also identifies concerns about unsafe clinical-care practices, inadequate record keeping and disclosure, and a lack of candour in post-death investigations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of senior healthcare leadership oversight of care planning and deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. An inability to provide prisoners at HMP Lowdham Grange with safe clinical care I heard evidence, and the jury reached findings, that there was an unsafe practice of staff conducting important healthcare and wellbeing observations via the cell door observation hatch. Observing an unwell prisoner through a hatch slightly larger than a letterbox undermines the safety of the clinical assessment. Healthcare staff did not utilise the NEWS2 system of monitoring the condition of an acutely unwell prisoner, despite the Trust having adopted this recognised healthcare tool many years prior. The Forensic Directorate has continued to lag behind other areas of the Trust where NEWS2 is fully embedded and this has previously been identified as an issue linked to other deaths. There was a lack of robust GP visits, despite such being mandated by the Prison Rules. When visits did take place, they were often via the cell door observation hatch and conducted as “fleeting glances” rather than robust clinical assessments. Again, this is unsafe. There was a lack of effective leadership of the healthcare department to ensure that staff had created a safe plan of care for Christopher. Senior personnel were not aware of Christopher’s week-long deterioration in the segregation unit until very late in the chronology of events, nor were they aware of a dispute between the mental health and physical health teams as to the differential diagnoses that might be causing his concerning symptoms and deterioration. Despite daily lunch time meetings, there was a stark lack of professional curiosity from senior staff as to the plan of care for Christopher and what safety netting, if any, was in place. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Howard SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide dedicated Resus Lead support, onsite training, scenario coaching, code-call shadowing and feedback for deteriorating-patient care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of identifying a need to develop a training programme and approach that would ensure our staff have a greater understanding of NEWS 2 and the application of NEWS2 in a patient setting, a number of actions have been undertaken in order to address this:”

    Source location

    Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response
  3. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Carol Ann Hatch · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Carol Ann Hatch underwent repeat hiatus hernia surgery at a private hospital on 31 August 2022 and became unwell overnight. She was transferred to an NHS hospital, treated for septic shock and organ failure for six weeks, and died on 18 October 2022. The report identifies concerns about overnight monitoring, escalation, staffing competence, record-keeping, and delays in investigations and treatment; evidence at the Inquest indicated that the failings contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to alert senior clinicians to unexpected patient deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Mrs Hatch’s condition deteriorated markedly during the night of 31 August/1 September 2022 (some hours after surgery). Neither the surgeon nor the anaesthetist were alerted to this unexpected deterioration. The Surgeon only became aware of the position when he contacted the hospital and came in around 7 am. ”

    Source location

    Carol Ann Hatch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide NEWS refresher training to relevant colleagues and conduct regular audits of NEWS compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to addressing NEWS training with agency staff, the hospital have ensured a NEWS update refresher has been provided to all relevant colleagues and have conducted regular audits to provide assurance in relation to compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 4 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver training to RMOs on recognising deteriorating patients and signs of gastric perforation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This matter was recognised in the RCA, has been discussed with the RMO and there is a plan in place for training to be delivered to RMOs on recognising signs of a deteriorating patient and recognising signs of gastric perforation. In addition, Spire has received confirmation that the RMO has undertaken a recent appraisal. We refer the Coroner to evidence file relating to the RMO which includes evidence of action taken in relation to this concern.”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 5 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce deteriorating-patient stickers for clinical use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ADDITIONAL ACTIONS EVIDENCE”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 11 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response
  4. Herefordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Keith Hodson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith Hodson had a complex medical history, with delays before an ambulance was called, in ambulance attendance, on hospital admission and in receiving appropriate treatment. Concerns included failure to consistently use an appropriate triage system in Accident and Emergency, inadequate escalation and monitoring, insufficient senior oversight, delays in signing off serious incident reports, and untimely communication with the next of kin.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide appropriate senior oversight of patient assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) I am advised that on occasion appropriate senior oversight does not occur, this is required to identify when a patient has not been appropriately assessed. ”

    Source location

    Keith Hodson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the senior doctor rota to increase substantive Emergency Department staffing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has a departmental electronic patient record, which is a visual tool that can be reviewed by senior staff both on site and remotely. This highlights the patients NEWS (National Early Warning Score), triage, streaming status amongst other information and can be seen by all staff with access to the tool. During the day there is consultant cover in the ED from 08:00 until 19:00. After the hours of 19:00, there is an on-call function and there are clear instructions for staff to follow if they require the on-call consultant. Band 7 senior sisters/charge nurses provide ED support from the hours of 08:00 until 20:30. Overnight the department is overseen by a Band 6 Nurse in Charge and middle grade doctor cover. Since this case, the senior doctor rota has been amended leading to an increase in substantive staff on duty.”

    Source location

    Response from Wye Valley NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide specialty doctors with enhanced departmental oversight and leadership training through the rolling training programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Specialty doctors have received enhanced training on departmental oversight and leadership and this is repeated in their rolling training programme. Furthermore, we have increased the establishment of Band 6 nurses who are employed substantively to provide more consistent senior leadership and support to the department.”

    Source location

    Response from Wye Valley NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase the substantive establishment of Band 6 nurses to strengthen Emergency Department leadership and support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Specialty doctors have received enhanced training on departmental oversight and leadership and this is repeated in their rolling training programme. Furthermore, we have increased the establishment of Band 6 nurses who are employed substantively to provide more consistent senior leadership and support to the department.”

    Source location

    Response from Wye Valley NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 April 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing electronic monitoring, consultant cover, on-call arrangements and senior nursing and medical oversight are relied on to address senior supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have addressed this in (1) above but please find below a more detailed explanation.”

    Source location

    Response from Wye Valley NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 April 2023

    Open published response
  5. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Michael ALLEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Allen, an otherwise healthy man, was admitted to Milton Keynes University Hospital with gallstone pancreatitis and died there on 11 April 2021 from acute pancreatitis and liver necrosis resulting from gallstone disease. The report identified concerns about ineffective monitoring, inadequate senior surgical supervision, failure to initiate the sepsis protocol effectively, and delay in calling the ITU team after his deterioration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide effective senior review of deteriorating patients

    Wider context from the report

    “An FY1 doctor was effectively left to her own devices to manage Mr Allen, despite her being only 8 months or so in a post qualification position. In my mind this was a wholly unacceptable lapse on the part of her senior clinicians. She was, despite her efforts, out of her depth. This is not a criticism of the FY1 doctor, simply a reflection that she had only a few months junior surgical experience at that time. All clinicians, ████████ gave evidence that they were aware of the MKUH Sepsis protocol. However, none of them was able to describe it fully – the nearest being the most junior of the team, ████████. As a result there was a failure to initiate the sepsis protocol effectively. There was no effective senior involvement in the care of Mr Allen from the end of the 0800 am ward round to his deterioration at around 1800 or so. There was a failure to effectively or consistently monitor Mr Allen between 1059 am and his deterioration around 1800. Even at that point despite, in my mind, a critical emergency, there was a further delay of one hour before the ITU team were called. Overall, I find that the surgical team in charge of Mr Allen had no effective knowledge of the Sepsis protocol, they failed to monitor him effectively or consistently despite clear signs of deterioration, they failed to provide adequate support and supervision to ████████ and they failed to institute an effective senior review at any point on the 9th April 2021 until critical deterioration by which time his chances of death due to his rapid deterioration and multi-organ failure were 80 to 100%. ”

    Source location

    Michael ALLEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Carl Wright · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Carl Wright underwent complex cardiac surgery and was later transferred to a rehabilitation unit that was not suited to his condition. An infection and abdominal abscess were not identified promptly, with concerns including reliance on inexperienced junior doctors without easy access to senior input and delays in reviewing blood test results. He developed sepsis and died on 29 October 2021.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of easy access to input from more experienced doctors

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The majority of medical care, including the identification and assessment of deteriorating patients, was done by inexperienced junior doctors with no easy access to input from more experienced doctors; ”

    Source location

    Carl Wright · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require consultant assessment and review before transferring inpatients to Linden Lodge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All patients who are planned to be transferred from an NUH in patient bed into Linden Lodge are now required to be physically assessed and reviewed by a Consultant from Linden Lodge, prior to transfer. This is to ensure that the patient is medically stable and suitable for transfer and for care within the Neuro-Rehabilitation Unit. The team are developing induction guidelines for junior doctors working in Linden Lodge, supported by an escalation process where a patient may be at risk of clinical deterioration [completion date 31/12/2022].”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham University Hospital Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop induction guidelines and an escalation process for junior doctors managing patients at risk of deterioration in Linden Lodge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All patients who are planned to be transferred from an NUH in patient bed into Linden Lodge are now required to be physically assessed and reviewed by a Consultant from Linden Lodge, prior to transfer. This is to ensure that the patient is medically stable and suitable for transfer and for care within the Neuro-Rehabilitation Unit. The team are developing induction guidelines for junior doctors working in Linden Lodge, supported by an escalation process where a patient may be at risk of clinical deterioration [completion date 31/12/2022].”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham University Hospital Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a specialty referral and escalation procedure for City Campus patients based on their presenting condition.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Standard Operating Procedure [SOP] has previously been developed which outlines which medical speciality should be referred/escalated to at the City campus based on the presenting condition. For example, if postoperatively a City-based patient has signs of post-operative pneumonia the guidance means the responsible surgical team contacts the Specialty Registrar [SPR] for advice which in this scenario would be from the respiratory team, with the patient remaining under the care of the surgical team unless the respiratory team formally transfer the patient under their care. There are a small group of patients who do not clearly “fit” into this process, for example, presentations such as sepsis of unknown origin.”

    Source location

    Response from Nottingham University Hospital Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 20 October 2022

    Open published response
  7. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Gordon Bernard Hendley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gordon Bernard Hendley, who had lymphoma and recent lung infection and pulmonary embolism, developed a severe rash most likely caused by Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and died in hospital on 23 January 2022 after maximal treatment. The report identified concerns about delays in medical assessment and treatment, failure to escalate significant blood-test results, lack of specialist dermatology input and prognostic scoring, and the robustness of systems for monitoring and supporting severely ill patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate critical A&E blood-test abnormalities to the senior clinician

    Wider context from the report

    “2) When Gordon returned to A&E late on 20th January there was an excessive delay in his assessment. His blood test revealed a significant lactic acidosis with marked anaemia and very low white blood counts. The A&E consultant who gave evidence said she would have expected this to be escalated to her -she was on call at home, but it was not. I have inputted the data in medical records to the scoring tools referred to above and mortality predictions have now risen to around 50%. ”

    Source location

    Gordon Bernard Hendley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    The deceased had chronic mental health problems, serious self-neglect and infected wounds, and was detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act. After readmission, a VTE risk assessment, monitoring, records, management plan and further capacity assessments were not undertaken; she suffered a pulmonary thromboembolism and died following a cardio-respiratory arrest on 23 February 2020. The principal concerns included inadequate safeguarding and clinical oversight, failures to implement and audit the VTE policy, and insufficient staff training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of senior clinical oversight

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a lack of appropriate safeguarding review, Senior clinical oversight as well as necessary MDT meetings and actions to be completed. ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Antony Declan Schofield · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Antony Declan Schofield, who had recurrent depressive disorder and a history of suicidal thoughts and behaviour, was found dead at home on 27 August 2019 after taking an overdose. The report identified concerns about incomplete risk assessment before discharge, inadequate transfer and communication to the community team, insufficient review of escalating suicide risk, missed opportunities to assess changes in presentation, and deficiencies in records, auditing and the subsequent investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of senior HBTT clinician risk-review planning and monitoring after disclosure of access to lethal means

    Wider context from the report

    “1. a. No thorough comprehensive risk review was undertaken by a member of staff who had detailed knowledge of the deceased prior to his discharge from the inpatient unit. This was not identified before he left the ward and it was not discovered by the HBTT when they took over his care. b. The transfer and communication process from inpatient care to the HBTT appeared inadequate. b. There was no clear plan to deal with the risk of his condition deteriorating and him experiencing significantly more suicidal thoughts as well as obtaining the means by which to kill himself. It is well known that a history of suicidal thoughts and actions increases the risk when they are repeated. c. When he disclosed that he bought ████████ there was no risk review planning involving a senior HBTT clinician which was then monitored even when he indicated that he had received it. d. On several occasions before he died the deceased saw members of the HBTT but they failed to demonstrate professional curiosity and enquire about his suicidal thoughts and plans. There were either adequate or no records about this. e. There were a number of missed opportunities for the HBTT to assess changes in his presentation and risk profile. f. There was no robust audit system for checking compliance with the trust own policies and protocols in particular with regard to medical record keeping, risk assessments and reviews. g. The GMMH SUI investigation report contained several factual errors and misinterpretations. It was only discovered at the inquest hearing that one of the last members of HBTT staff to see the deceased had given an account that was not the same as given to their line manager. This meant the all the lessons for future care and planning were not learnt. There was inadequate overview of the report before it was signed off. ”

    Source location

    Antony Declan Schofield · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update inpatient and HBTT procedures to require risk assessments at entry, discharge, identified intervals, and when risks change.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the period under review the Manchester services had recently changed to a new patient clinical record system, Paris, and were in the process of implementing the associated documents such as the Star V2 Risk Assessment which meant that there were some gaps in the services adhering to the Trust Policy. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for both the Inpatient wards and the HBTT have been updated to reflect the Trust Clinical Risk Policy and when staff should be completing a risk assessment. This includes on entry and discharge from a service as well as identified periods in between and in response to any changes to a person’s risks. The Safire SOP clearly outlines that a patient’s risk assessment should be reviewed and updated prior to discharge from the ward and that a crisis plan should be in place.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold daily HBTT multidisciplinary meetings to share new information and risks and assign responsibility for the next 24 hours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mr Schofield participated in a detailed review of his psychological health with a senior clinician from HBTT, clinical psychologist, during which he said that he did not wish to ████████ rather he wanted to ‘escape the emotional turmoil’. There was no indication at this point that Mr Schofield posed an imminent risk to himself and the HBTT staff considered that he could continue to work with HBTT and be supported in the community rather than being readmitted to hospital. To support the communication within HBTT there are daily MDT meetings where all patients are discussed, any new information, risks, and the plan for the next 24 hours and”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a structured HBTT note format prompting documentation of visit purpose, presentation, and risk to self and others.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the Trust’s review into Mr Schofield’s death it was acknowledged that the documentation was not always in keeping with Trust Record Keeping Policy in respect of the notes being recorded in the clinical record and that they did not always reflect the discussions that were occurring with the patient and so had the potential to impact on communication and decision making within the team. The HBTT SOP has been updated and states that clinical risk and management are reviewed at each contact with the service user and changes responded to where necessary and escalated to the MDT if necessary. Since the review, in addition to the daily MDT meetings, HBTT have introduced a structured note format to prompt staff to review and record the purpose of the HBTT visit, how the patient was presenting and specific prompts in respect of assessing risk to self and others.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The patient's disclosure about obtaining medication was reviewed, incorporated into a management plan and followed up by HBTT staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the review with the ST5 doctor and HBTT Practitioner on 22 August 2019 and as part of the assessment of risk to self, Mr Schofield disclosed he had ordered the ████████ ██████████████████████████████████████ but had now realised that this wouldn’t be an option and indicated plans to hand it over to the team when it arrived. This concern was then reflected in the management plan with the increase in visits and the sharing of information indicating that Mr Schofield intended to hand over the ████████ when he received it. The notes record this being followed up by HBTT staff in a visit later that day and again on 26 August 2019 during a visit when Mr Schofield disclosed that he had received the medication and disposed of it in a bin in the community which he believed had now been emptied.”

    Source location

    2021-0324-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response
  10. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Sheldon Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheldon Marshall became seriously ill during a trek to Mount Everest Base Camp after sustaining a fractured left rib, later developing high-altitude pulmonary oedema, bronchopneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome and pneumothoraces. He died in intensive care on 17 December 2017 after cardiac arrests and a pleural injury associated with a right chest drain. The concerns identified were insufficient senior clinical input at Mayday Assistance Limited and unclear responsibility between Mayday Assistance Limited and air ambulance providers for patients’ overall medical management, presenting risks of future deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient senior clinical input into policy-holder medical management

    Wider context from the report

    “Senior clinical input at Mayday Assistance Limited At the conclusion of the inquest the court found that there was an omission on the part of Mayday Assistance Limited to ensure that their Medical Director was aware of, and providing clinical leadership in relation to, Mr Marshall, from at least 22 November 2017. Whilst the court was not persuaded that this omission caused or contributed to the particular facts of Mr Marshall’s death, the Coroner is concerned that the level of senior clinical input at Mayday Assistance Limited remains insufficient and may have a negative impact on the medical management of current and future policy holders and therefore presents a risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Sheldon Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand senior clinical capacity by employing two doctors, including a Medical Director and an additional doctor available on call.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mayday Assistance now employs two doctors rather than only one. The Medical Director is now Dr ████████, who took up the post when Dr ████████ stepped down in June 2018. A further doctor, Dr ████████, has also been appointed to provide senior clinical input. We attach the CVs of both Dr ████████ and Dr ████████. A doctor is always available to assist the Medical Team in decision making and discussion with third parties when required. There is no set weekly working pattern and both doctors are available on call. Dr ████████ currently has no other clinical commitments.”

    Source location

    2021-0276-Response-from-Mayday-Group-Ltd_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 August 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an internal escalation process for very sick and seriously ill patients to the senior clinical team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mayday now have in place an internal escalation process, which ensures escalation for VSIL and SIL (very sick and seriously ill patients) to the senior clinical team. We attach the Escalation Matrix for medical management now in place.”

    Source location

    2021-0276-Response-from-Mayday-Group-Ltd_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 August 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct virtual weekly ward rounds to review patients of concern and formally review complex cases presenting clinical or logistical challenges.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is now a virtual weekly ward round during which all patients presenting with any concerns are reviewed. This is attended by Dr ████████ (RGN this / Paramedic Practitioner) and ████████ (Operations Manager). During this weekly meeting there is a formal review of the management of any complex cases completed that provided clinical or logistical challenges.”

    Source location

    2021-0276-Response-from-Mayday-Group-Ltd_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 August 2021

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026