Recurring concern

Failure to provide effective senior clinical oversight of patient care

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First reported 23 Aug 2013•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of senior clinical oversight of patient care, including absent or delayed senior input at presentation, early or daily senior review, review of patients referred for advice, and ongoing senior clinical direction or challenge where senior involvement is required for safe care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic organisational, corporate or regulatory oversight where senior clinical oversight of patient care is not the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes senior review of incident investigations, documentation quality, policies or safety governance unless the assertion directly concerns oversight of a patient's clinical care.
  • Excludes failures of junior staff competence, staffing capacity or clinical treatment where senior clinical oversight is not itself deficient.
  • Excludes delays or failures in specialist review where the concern is access to a named specialty rather than the broader senior clinical oversight of patient care.
Reports
59

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
64

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
63

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust7
Department of Health and Social Care4
NHS England4
Royal Sussex County Hospital4
Care Quality Commission3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Medway NHS Foundation Trust2
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Recipient name withheld2
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Ashford and St Peter'S Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Else Merete-Harvey Samuel · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Else Merete-Harvey Samuel was admitted to hospital after a fall, with continuing groin pain and a possible hip or pelvic fracture. Although initial radiographs did not show a fracture, some repeat views, including the pelvis, were not taken; a pelvic fracture was found at post mortem, alongside significant natural disease. The principal concerns were incomplete clinical information on imaging requests, insufficient senior discussion when investigations were challenged, and weaknesses in the subsequent incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct and document senior clinician–senior radiologist discussions for further out-of-hours investigation justification

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) In the event of further need for justification of an out hours investigation, discussion between senior clinician and senior radiologist should take place and be documented. ”

    Source location

    Else Merete-Harvey Samuel · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Frances Margaret Ann Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Frances Margaret Ann Bell presented at Southend Hospital with abdominal pain on 30 March 2012, was discharged shortly after midnight, readmitted the next day, underwent abdominal surgery on 1 April, and died on 13 April 2012. The report identified very serious failings in her care, including no senior clinical input at presentation and an unacceptable delay before surgery, and noted that no Root Causes Analysis Investigation was carried out.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of input from senior clinical staff at patient presentation

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was no input from senior clinical staff at the time of Mrs Bell’s presentation on 30 March ”

    Source location

    Frances Margaret Ann Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Herta Edith Maria WOODS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Herta Edith Maria WOODS, a 94-year-old woman living alone with carer support, was found after falls at home and admitted to hospital with injuries, dehydration, rhabdomyolysis and renal impairment. She was found deceased in her hospital bed early on 8 August 2013 after being overloaded with fluid. The principal concerns included apparent abandonment in the Acute Medical Unit, inadequate documentation and fluid monitoring, failure to act on the NEWS score, failure to obtain timely senior review, and failure to replace an inappropriate cannula.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek early senior review

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The failure to seek an early Senior Review for the failure to record the Fluid Chart correctly - this is important because it was fluid overload that was the immediate cause of Mrs. Wood's death. ”

    Source location

    Herta Edith Maria WOODS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Arthur Brockett-Deakins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Arthur Brockett-Deakins was born in poor condition on 16 December 2007 after complications during labour and suffered severe disabilities resulting from acute profound perinatal hypoxic-ischaemic encephalopathy. He died at home on 18 October 2011 from respiratory problems. The report identified concerns about failure to escalate an abnormal CTG, administration and monitoring of Syntocinon, CTG interpretation and display of the maternal heart rate, and the organisation and support of a private midwifery-led service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent thresholds for review and intervention between private and NHS maternity care

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Models of private midwifery led services for low risk pregnancy: The private midwifery caseload for low risk pregnancies was managed by a pair of midwives who set up the service to provide continuity of care. The midwife service that was operating when ████████ was pregnant was not adequately documented. No job description was seen by the court and the referral and operational arrangements were discussed, but no documentation was brought to the court. There was no evidence of risk assessment. Although NHS employees were required to be self sufficient in terms of annual leave and sickness cover, on call arrangements and use of NHS personnel except in emergencies. They did not at the outset have a link obstetrician. This led to fear of burn out, a sense of isolation and lack of support and collegiality. When they transferred babies to the Hospital Birthing Centre, they were expected to refer to a duty obstetric consultant, access to whom was described as variable. The midwife in charge of the NHS unit agreed that she provided a different threshold of care to private and NHS mothers and was reluctant to intervene or review the care plan for augmentation of labour, which she would have done in an NHS patient. The midwives expected her to be involved but did not ask her. In the event no peer senior midwife or obstetrician saw ████████ which was necessary. The reasons for non referral were complex and were not because the midwives thought they could not refer. Misjudgements were made which in part were caused by a 15 hour shift with only a 40 minute break. This would not occur in contexts where there was normal NHS management of staff, but this arrangement continued apparently unknown to the NHS Trust management. The service is no longer operational, the Trust reporting that it was discontinued for economic reasons. Expert advice considered that the model of service created a risk of deaths, although it was not found to have directly done so in this case. Dr ████████ reported that there were similar units operating elsewhere in the country and that the lessons from the difficulties in operating this one should be disseminated to other such units. The expert midwife, Ms ████████ was particularly concerned about adequate support and Dr. ████████ was particularly concerned about the isolation and professional culture and lack of interdisciplinary peer discussion, in the context of increasingly risks in obstetric and midwifery practice. The Trust head midwife reported that she expected that the matter would now be dealt with robustly by the statutory supervision system. No evidence was heard about whether this was now effective in this regard, nor how influence and information could be brought to bear on those setting up or managing such midwife led services. It was further reported that not all midwives are members of the College that runs that supervision and that midwives are not necessarily practising within the NHS. Thus is it was not clear how the risks are best identified and managed across a complex mixed health economy, which is why the Secretary of State is an addressee of my report. ”

    Source location

    Arthur Brockett-Deakins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Intrapartum Care clinical guideline, including fetal assessment and monitoring recommendations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We review all of our guidance at regular intervals and also consider feedback and requests for updates where this is appropriate. Our clinical guideline on Intrapartum Care (CG55) is currently being updated. The progress of the update can be monitored via our website (http://guidance.nice.org.uk/CGWaveR/109).”

    Source location

    2014-0077-Response-by-N.I.C.E
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consult stakeholders on the draft Intrapartum Care guideline recommendations between 13 May and 24 June 2014.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will consult on the draft recommendations with stakeholders between 13th May – 24th June 2014 and the final guideline will be published in October 2014.”

    Source location

    2014-0077-Response-by-N.I.C.E
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish the final updated Intrapartum Care clinical guideline in October 2014.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will consult on the draft recommendations with stakeholders between 13th May – 24th June 2014 and the final guideline will be published in October 2014.”

    Source location

    2014-0077-Response-by-N.I.C.E
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The regulator cannot offer a view on models of private and NHS midwifery care because this falls outside its regulatory role.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the regulatory body for nurse and midwives, the NMC is not in a position to offer a view on the models of midwifery care offered in private and NHS settings and I think that references to this particular area of your report would be more appropriately addressed by colleagues at the Department of Health.”

    Source location

    2014-0077-Response-by-Nursing-Midwifery-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    References concerning private and NHS midwifery care should be addressed to the Department of Health.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the regulatory body for nurse and midwives, the NMC is not in a position to offer a view on the models of midwifery care offered in private and NHS settings and I think that references to this particular area of your report would be more appropriately addressed by colleagues at the Department of Health.”

    Source location

    2014-0077-Response-by-Nursing-Midwifery-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clinicians retain responsibility for treatment decisions and may depart from NICE guidelines for appropriate, documented clinical reasons.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have confidence that our guidance, correctly implemented, will provide the best outcomes for patients but clinicians retain the responsibility for their decisions. NICE Clinical Guidelines are not mandated and clinical staff can depart from them if there are appropriate and documented clinical reasons for doing so.”

    Source location

    2014-0077-Response-by-N.I.C.E
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The private midwifery-led service model was discontinued and no longer operates, so further action on that model is not indicated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the NMC has already suggested, this is more appropriately addressed by my department. The model of midwifery provision described in this case was and is unacceptable and, for the reasons cited in the Regulation 28 Report, unsustainable. When this incident occurred in 2007 the Trust had a system of two midwives providing care to private patients who requested midwifery-led care. This system was discontinued in July 2010 and no longer operates. The model is not known to exist elsewhere in England.”

    Source location

    2014-0077-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 February 2014

    Open published response
  5. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen John PALMER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen John Palmer’s death was the subject of an inquest, but the supplied text does not describe the circumstances of the death. Principal concerns included delays in assessment and review, inappropriate transfer to an Acute Medical Unit, failure to recognise deterioration, suboptimal clinical management, inadequate preparation and arrangements for urgent surgery, and failure of the CT scanning service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of early senior review

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) No early senior review. ”

    Source location

    Stephen John PALMER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Keith Ronald Martin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith Ronald Martin attended A&E with chest pain and left-arm tingling, but there were delays in triage, investigations, treatment and senior review. He later deteriorated with a myocardial infarction, was transferred for emergency treatment, and died after the infarction was described as incompatible with life. The concerns included failure to appreciate and act promptly on his symptoms and raised troponin, unclear chest-pain management protocols, and inadequate documentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in senior clinical review

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The length of time taken for Mr Martin to be reviewed by a senior member of staff ”

    Source location

    Keith Ronald Martin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Bernard McCormick · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Bernard McCormick was admitted to hospital with gastrointestinal symptoms, vomiting, lethargy, fever and rigors, and was later found to have liver abscesses and gallstones. He underwent surgery but developed pneumonia and sepsis and died on 31 May 2011; the post-mortem found extensive empyema and sepsis. Concerns included delays in urgent admission, diagnosis, specialist referral and surgery, failures in communication and clinical review, and gaps in appropriate antibiotic treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of senior clinical review to recognise seriousness and plan urgent treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When the results of the blood tests taken at Macclesfield Hospital on 27 January 2011 were received this should have resulted in an urgent admission to hospital and further investigations undertaken to establish the source of the symptoms. This did not happen and suggests failures in communication and senior clinical review and appreciation of the significance of the presenting symptoms. 2. There was a significant failure to appreciate the seriousness of the condition, the need for urgent treatment and associated raised mortality risks upon the receipt of the results of the CT scan on 28 February 2011 showing the presence of multiple liver abscesses and gallstones. These are all factors which it would be reasonable to expect senior clinicians to appreciate and plan accordingly. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Bernard McCormick · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Jude Augustus Gordon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jude Augustus Gordon underwent surgery and anaesthesia on 23 November 2011, deteriorated with signs of respiratory failure on 27 November, and died shortly after suffering a cardiac arrest. The concerns included failure to escalate his treatment or refer him to critical care, miscalculation of the Early Warning Score, variation in how scores were calculated between Trusts, and the absence of an automatic alert system for senior clinicians.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to contact a consultant when Early Warning Scores indicate clinical deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Evidence was given at the inquest, by a consultant, that if he had been called to see Mr Gordon at the time his condition deteriorated, as was indicated by the Early Warning Score system should have happened, then he would have referred to critical care. He was not contacted. I was informed at the inquest that a Trust in Birmingham has a computerised system, that leads to an automatic alert to the relevant senior doctor on each occasion that a Early Warning Score exceeds the relevant level, for contact to be required. Such a system would on the 27th November 2011, to the consultant attending on Mr Gordon. ”

    Source location

    Jude Augustus Gordon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to refer patients to consultant level when Early Warning Scores indicate escalation

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) As stated the Early Warning Score in Sheffield is referred to as SHEWS. It was clear from the evidence that for a period of almost four and a half hours, prior to his final collapse, Mr Gordon’s score had shown a marked increase. This in itself should have led to referral to consultant level which did not happen. It was also apparent that there had been a miscalculation of the Early Warning Score, by more than one individual. The court was informed, by expert evidence, that there are differences in the method of calculating an Early Warning Score, between different Trusts. Nursing staff, but in particular junior doctors, who are often the person to make the decision to increase the level of treatment, have either trained or worked in different Trusts. This may lead to confusion. It was not clear to me why there is not a single, National, Early Warning Score system. ”

    Source location

    Jude Augustus Gordon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. West Yorkshire (East)

    AI-generated summary

    JILL FELICITY SINSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jill Felicity Sinson had schizophrenia, an anxiety-related disorder, non-epileptic seizures, and a history of self-harm and suicidal tendencies. She was last seen alive on 3 September 2012 and was found lifeless at her home on 10 September 2012; life was pronounced extinct by paramedics. The concerns included inadequate GP monitoring, failure to review or refer her after a GP surgery consultation, insufficient consideration of her medical history when prescribing medication unsupervised, and failure to act appropriately on correspondence from her Consultant Psychiatrist.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to arrange necessary General Practitioner review or Consultant Psychiatrist referral

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) When the Deceased was seen at the GP surgery by a Staff Nurse on the 3rd July 2012 – (a) the Deceased’s presentation on that occasion was such as to necessitate a review by a GP and/or referral to the Deceased’s Consultant Psychiatrist, but no such review and/or referral was considered, and (b) due regard was not paid to the Deceased’s computerised medical records prior to and/or in the course of consulting with the Deceased on that occasion, as information provided by the Deceased to the said Staff Nurse was fundamentally incorrect which was apparent from earlier entries in the Deceased’s said records ”

    Source location

    JILL FELICITY SINSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026