Recurring concern

Failure to provide effective senior clinical oversight of patient care

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First reported 23 Aug 2013•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of senior clinical oversight of patient care, including absent or delayed senior input at presentation, early or daily senior review, review of patients referred for advice, and ongoing senior clinical direction or challenge where senior involvement is required for safe care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic organisational, corporate or regulatory oversight where senior clinical oversight of patient care is not the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes senior review of incident investigations, documentation quality, policies or safety governance unless the assertion directly concerns oversight of a patient's clinical care.
  • Excludes failures of junior staff competence, staffing capacity or clinical treatment where senior clinical oversight is not itself deficient.
  • Excludes delays or failures in specialist review where the concern is access to a named specialty rather than the broader senior clinical oversight of patient care.
Reports
59

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
64

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
63

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust7
Department of Health and Social Care4
NHS England4
Royal Sussex County Hospital4
Care Quality Commission3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Medway NHS Foundation Trust2
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Recipient name withheld2
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Ashford and St Peter'S Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Ethan Robert Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ethan Johnson was born following an urgent Caesarean section, with no respiratory effort or heart rate, and died after intensive care treatment was withdrawn. The concerns included a lack of effective leadership, support and escalation when an abnormal CTG was identified. The inquest concluded that delayed delivery resulted in a lost opportunity to deliver him earlier and provide further medical treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of leadership authority to require timely doctor attendance and CTG review

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Two further members of staff reviewed the CTG trace and yet it appears that no one was in a position of leadership to require a doctor to attend and review the trace and ████████ ”

    Source location

    Ethan Robert Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Change the patient whiteboard to record the doctor-review time for suspicious CTG traces.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “management plan. The department is also in the process of changing the existing patient whiteboard, to include time of doctor review in cases where the CTG trace is deemed suspicious.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify staff responsibilities for patient reviews, senior-help escalation and upward-escalation timescales in writing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the ward the CTG did not require immediate intervention, so when the doctor had not attended within a reasonable timescale it was escalated appropriately. We have written to every member of staff clarifying their responsibilities if they are asked to review a patient, as well as what to do if senior help has been unable to attend. This includes timescales for upward escalation.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed a revised SBAR handover communication tool in practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new, specifically dedicated Matron for Labour Ward has ensured that a revised handover communication tool (SBAR) is embedded in practice, so that a succinct common language is in place to enable the medical staff to make an appropriate assessment of when to attend. There is now a Manager of the Day on the Maternity Unit.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recirculate the written escalation policy to all staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are existing clear instructions for all midwifery staff, from new Band 5 Midwife to Matron level and also for all levels of medical staff in respect of escalation to a Consultant.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns were identified and appropriately escalated; junior midwives are qualified and understand how to summon emergency assistance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In this particular case the concerns were identified and appropriately escalated within a few minutes. All our junior midwives are fully qualified and are conversant with the escalation process and how to summon help in an emergency. All staff have been reminded of this process.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The CTG did not require immediate intervention, and staff escalated appropriately when the doctor did not attend within a reasonable timescale.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the ward the CTG did not require immediate intervention, so when the doctor had not attended within a reasonable timescale it was escalated appropriately. We have written to every member of staff clarifying their responsibilities if they are asked to review a patient, as well as what to do if senior help has been unable to attend. This includes timescales for upward escalation.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clear escalation instructions already exist for all midwifery and medical staff, including escalation to a consultant.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are existing clear instructions for all midwifery staff, from new Band 5 Midwife to Matron level and also for all levels of medical staff in respect of escalation to a Consultant.”

    Source location

    2015-0393-Response-by-Milton-Keynes-University-Hospitals-NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 September 2015

    Open published response
  2. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    MR. ANTHONY GEERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr. Anthony Geerts sustained a fractured neck of femur, underwent surgery and was transferred for rehabilitation before being moved to a nursing home. He later returned to hospital with hospital-acquired pneumonia and a possible urinary tract infection, and died on 21 November 2014. The concerns included inadequate rehabilitation, incomplete records and monitoring, poor communication and discharge planning, and failures in managing his continence, fluid restriction and possible chest infection; the inquest concluded that neglect at Princess Royal Hospital contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide senior review and follow up suspected infection

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr. GEERTS went to Princess Royal Hospital to Twineham Ward (the Ward which specialise in Rehabilitation patients coming from The Royal Sussex County Hospital in Brighton). Mr. GEERTS came with a fractured neck of femur which had been timeously operated. He was determined to return home to his wife who depended on him. He lived in Brighton and Hove and was disappointed to be going to Haywards Heath for rehabilitation as he knew how difficult it would be for his family to visit so regularly. In Brighton he had received physiotherapy and been regularly reviewed. In Haywards Heath he was effectively abandoned from the 6th. His notes give no clue as to how he was cared for. His physiotherapy notes end abruptly with no plan. I was told nurses on this rehabilitation ward had been asked to look after him as (a) There was insufficient physiotherapy staff to do so and (b) Without any or any effective consultation, the decision had been made that he was to be discharged to highgrove Nursing Home as soon as possible after the 6th. Neither Mr. GEERTS nor his family were involved in this decision. Mr. GEERTS had suffered long term mental health issues. These were ignored during his stay at Princess Royal Hospital. His anxieties were not addressed in any meaningful way. He was given no assistance after the 6th. Having been told he was to be transferred for further rehabilitation, Mr. GEERTS remained very anxious about the impending move and about the lack of communication and particularly the lack of physio. For reasons unexplained satisfactorily to this day, he was moved out of Twineham Ward late on the 10th, Bailey Ward was unaware of his needs. He was incontinent of urine. On the 11th he was transferred to the discharge ward from where he contacted his daughter 3 times. He arrived in a poorly state at Highgrove in the mid afternoon. This resulted in him being unable to participate fully in any of the Highgrove activities, nor could he settle in. He was back at The Royal Sussex County Hospital on the 16th with Hospital Acquired Pneumonia and ? urinary tract infection. No more physiotherapy was possible and in spite of ongoing treatment he deteriorated to his death on the 21st. Specifically at Princess Royal Hospital: • Notes not completed. • No nursing notes and no NEWS for 10th or 11th • Fluid chart not completed. Fluid restriction not properly documented. Fluid restriction effectively disregarded. • No plan for physiotherapy • No rehabilitation on Rehabilitation Ward from 6th -10th. Exercise on the 10th not properly documented. • No proper notes of Rationale for transfer to Bailey Ward on 10th/11th. Transfer procedure not followed. Transfer not documented. • No referral of lack of urinary continence. Therefore no plan regarding this. • Failed Trial without catheter on 3rd November 2014. • Bowel monitoring chart not complete • Discharge planning non-existent or inadequate • Communication with patient and family virtually non-existent • No senior review from 4th November 2014; possibility of chest infection not followed up. • Should have had a blood test as requested on 11th November 2014. Did not and therefore unnecessary extra 48 hours on fluid restriction. • Discharge lounge information incorrect. ”

    Source location

    MR. ANTHONY GEERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen senior medical review requirements, including consultant reviews, daily review of sick patients, junior attendance and documentation of discussions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “h) review of senior medical input on Twineham ward. The Clinical Director for the musculoskeletal service has emphasized that every patient on Twineham ward should normally be seen by a consultant orthopaedic surgeon or orthogeriatrician at least four times a week (including one day at the weekend), including a conversation with the patient and review of their progress with them. Any patient who is sick should be seen daily by a consultant. The junior medical staff have been reminded that they must attend with the consultant, and should record every such discussion in the notes, if the consultant does not do this themselves”

    Source location

    2015-0240-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 June 2015

    Open published response
  3. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs. Evelyn KENNEDY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs. Evelyn KENNEDY was an 89-year-old woman who died in hospital on 29 October 2014 after admission following recurrent falls. The inquest concluded that she died of hospital-acquired pneumonia and that her death was probably accelerated by a short time because of the effects of her five-day admission to the Acute Medical Unit. Concerns included incomplete handover and poor personal care, missing identification and risk bands, inadequate monitoring and documentation, missed medication and nutritional support, and failures to escalate clinical deterioration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide senior clinical review

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Once again my concerns involve the Acute Medical Unit (AMU). (2) Mrs. KENNEDY was transferred from AMU in a chair, not a trolley. (3) Handover was incomplete and unhelpful. (4) She arrived unkempt. (5) She had porridge leaking from her mouth; it took 20 mouth sponges to give her adequate mouth care. (6) She felt cold and said she was cold. (7) She had been incontinent of faeces and had not been cleaned for some time. (8) She had no name wrist band. (9) In spite of known allergies she had no allergy wrist band. (10) In spite of falling regularly she had no falls risk wrist band. (11) She still had an IV cannula in place; this should have been removed after 72 hours. (12) Her daily catheter care bundle had not been completed for 3 days. (13) She had no fluid charts for 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th or 20th. (14) Care plans were not completed for 17th, 18th, 19th or 20th. (15) Repositioning charts were incomplete or poor for 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th. (16) The handling assessment was not completed for 16th, 18th, 19th or 20th. (17) No food chart was completed for her entire time in AMU. (18) She had pressure damage to her hips and bottom. (19) No daily oral assessment was completed for her entire time on AMU. (20) She was not weighed. (21) The malnutrition tool was not completed. (22) Her bowel movements were not recorded. (24) NEWS scores of 4 to 9 had not been escalated to doctors nor filled in on her drug chart. PLUS (25) No personal care over the weekend of 18th and 19th. (26) No senior review over that weekend. (27) Not written up for her Sertraline, therefore not given (28) Not written up for any food supplements until 21st October. (29) She should have been specialled, but wasn’t. Once again AMU has been found to be chaotic and not fit for purpose. ”

    Source location

    Mrs. Evelyn KENNEDY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase permanent Acute Medical Unit staffing, including matron input, an additional senior nurse and a support assistant role.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Changes, introduced mainly before the inquest into Mrs Kennedy’s sad death as part of the ongoing programme of improvements, include:”

    Source location

    2015-0178-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 May 2015

    Open published response
  4. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Robert Watt · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert Watt had suspected bladder cancer symptoms, including haematuria, weight loss and rectal bleeding, but investigations and specialist review did not identify the cancer until it was advanced and incurable. The report identified concerns about communication of a cancelled haematuria clinic appointment, incomplete medical records, reliance on junior doctors for specialist advice, and the lack of urological review when malignancy was suspected.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct renal or urological consultations through appropriately senior clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “iv. On each occasion that he medical team consulted with renal or urological physicians in seeking advice how to manage their patient, the consultation was conducted through the most junior doctor on the ward (FY1) ”

    Source location

    Robert Watt · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Philip Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip Robinson developed vomiting, breathlessness, coughing up blood and pain before being assessed at Bassetlaw Hospital, discharged, and later readmitted in cardiac arrest. The inquest concluded that he died from an acute myocardial infarction with severe coronary artery disease, after the significance of his clinical condition was not appreciated by the treating team. Concerns included inadequate escalation and recording of Early Warning Scores, unclear guidance on ECG use, an extreme risk arising from the absence of senior medical review, and incomplete implementation of systems intended to improve monitoring.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of senior medical review when a registrar is absent

    Wider context from the report

    “The risk of there being no one available to provide senior medical review when a registrar is absent remains an ‘extreme risk’ ”

    Source location

    Philip Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue recruiting senior medical staff to reduce out-of-hours registrar-cover gaps.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The risk of there being no one available to provide senior medical review when a registrar is absent remains an ‘extreme risk’ This is now no longer seen as an acceptable option to leave a SHO without registrar cover out of hours. In 2015 to date there has been three occasions where no cover could be obtained. On these occasions the consultant on-call was informed and provided extra support to the SHO. The issue around senior medical staffing remains a concern within the Trust. We currently have an ongoing recruitment programme and are considering alternative ways to utilise senior staff within the trust to support this. The hospital 24/7 program is aimed at providing senior nurse practitioner cover to support the hospital out of hours. Similar hospital sites have implemented this system with good outcomes with regards patient safety.”

    Source location

    2015-0225-Response-by-Doncaster-Bassetlaw-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider alternative ways to deploy senior Trust staff to provide out-of-hours support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The risk of there being no one available to provide senior medical review when a registrar is absent remains an ‘extreme risk’ This is now no longer seen as an acceptable option to leave a SHO without registrar cover out of hours. In 2015 to date there has been three occasions where no cover could be obtained. On these occasions the consultant on-call was informed and provided extra support to the SHO. The issue around senior medical staffing remains a concern within the Trust. We currently have an ongoing recruitment programme and are considering alternative ways to utilise senior staff within the trust to support this. The hospital 24/7 program is aimed at providing senior nurse practitioner cover to support the hospital out of hours. Similar hospital sites have implemented this system with good outcomes with regards patient safety.”

    Source location

    2015-0225-Response-by-Doncaster-Bassetlaw-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 March 2015

    Open published response
  6. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Craig Douglas Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Craig Douglas Bell was found dead in his cell at HMP Manchester on 13 December 2012 after taking his own life by hanging using a self-constructed ligature. He had a history of self-harm and suicidal ideation and was subject to ACCT procedures. The principal concerns included inadequate sharing of risk information, insufficient senior psychiatric involvement in discharge planning, the lack of a graduated risk-management plan, and limited availability of safer or CCTV-monitored cells for prisoners at risk of suicide.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of suitably senior psychiatric clinician attendance at discharge case reviews

    Wider context from the report

    “3. I am concerned at the lack of attendance of the Consultant Psychiatrist or a suitably qualified and experienced junior colleague at the discharge case review/meeting. In a case of patient still on an ACCT and being discharged to an ordinary wing location without as senior clinician being able to attend and participate in the discharge case review , risk assessment at that stage and risk planning. In this case there was no attendance on the 6 December 2012 and no clinician had seen him since 27 November 2012. This would allow a more sophisticated and timely assessment of risk at that time. Measures to try and reduce or mitigate the risks could then be discussed and put in place in a graduated manner. It is appreciated that such case reviews may have to be rearranged so as to facilitate full attendance. The court has previously identified the concern arising from that fact that no senior clinician took the opportunity at the appropriate time to stand back and take an overall view of the entire circumstances and the risks presented. ”

    Source location

    Craig Douglas Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Phillip Roy Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Phillip Roy Smith was diagnosed with a likely pancreatic carcinoma and underwent a percutaneous transhepatic cholangiogram with external drain insertion. He deteriorated overnight with severe pain, vomiting and a subsequent cardiac arrest, and died in intensive care on 15 March 2014 after treatment was withdrawn. The concerns included missing nursing and doctors’ records, undocumented observations, medication, blood gas results and fall details, and the junior doctor’s decision not to seek additional senior support despite concerns about Mr. Smith’s deterioration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain appropriate senior medical review or support when deterioration is identified

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Junior Doctor’s Involvement i) The senior nurse on duty was concerned of Mr. Smith’s deterioration in the early hours of the 15th March. At the time of the junior doctor’s attendance she suggested that a more senior medical review should take place, however the junior doctor indicated that he did not require any further support in the circumstances notwithstanding Mr. Smith’s presentation. ”

    Source location

    Phillip Roy Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Maureen Annette ELLETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    The report concerns the death of Maureen Annette ELLETT; the circumstances are referred to the Record of Inquest. Concerns included incomplete emergency department documentation and observations, inadequate clinical planning and review, staffing and fatigue issues, and shortcomings in ECG and observation procedures. The report states that the cumulative effect of these issues was considered catastrophic by the inquest.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to formulate a detailed and complete senior clinical plan

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Discussion by the Junior Doctor with the Senior Doctor as to the plan for Mrs. Ellett was brief to the point of transient. No proper detailed plan was formulated. Clues to the patient's condition were missed, probably because the discussion was so brief and the paperwork required for transfer to the short-stay ward, also known as the Clinical Decisions Unit, was signed by the A&E Consultant but neither dated nor timed by him. The plan was incomplete and the counter-signatory of the Senior Nurse with date and time was completely missing. Therefore the transfer should not have taken place. ”

    Source location

    Maureen Annette ELLETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Senior Nurse verification and completion of N.E.W.S. scores

    Wider context from the report

    “(10) The Hospital's own Observation Policy states that if N.E.W.S observations are taken by a Health Care Assistant they should be checked within 30 minutes by the Senior Nurse (in this case the Agency Staff Nurse) who should complete the N.E.W.S scores. This did not happen in Mrs. Ellett's case and thus another opportunity to spend some time with her and review her in person was lost. ”

    Source location

    Maureen Annette ELLETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind consultants and shift leaders to require a detailed management plan and shift-leader confirmation before transferring patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We believe the A&E consultant’s failure to date and time his signature on the transfer documentation, while not best practice, is not relevant to the clinical care of Mrs Ellett. However, we agree that she should not have been transferred until an appropriately detailed plan for her management had been agreed and summarized in a series of bullet points in the documentation, and the clinical shift leader had confirmed his agreement by signing the proforma. All the consultants and the relevant shift leaders have been reminded of the importance of this aspect of their duties.”

    Source location

    2014-0473-Response-by-Brighton-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 October 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The consultant’s undated signature on transfer documentation was not relevant to the patient’s clinical care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We believe the A&E consultant’s failure to date and time his signature on the transfer documentation, while not best practice, is not relevant to the clinical care of Mrs Ellett. However, we agree that she should not have been transferred until an appropriately detailed plan for her management had been agreed and summarized in a series of bullet points in the documentation, and the clinical shift leader had confirmed his agreement by signing the proforma. All the consultants and the relevant shift leaders have been reminded of the importance of this aspect of their duties.”

    Source location

    2014-0473-Response-by-Brighton-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 October 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The failure to countersign the initial observations was considered a documentation oversight without adverse effect on clinical assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “10. The observations policy requires trained staff to review and countersign the findings, if taking the observations has been delegated to a health care assistant, however experienced that health care assistant may be. The agency staff nurse gave evidence to you that she had reviewed the first set of observations taken on the CDU and satisfied herself that the NEWS score was zero. What she failed to do, and acknowledged she should have done, was to countersign to indicate that she had carried out this check. We do not believe this documentation oversight at 21.55 had any adverse effect on Mrs Ellett’s clinical assessment, but we appreciate - as does the agency nurse herself - that detailed documentation of this kind is nevertheless important.”

    Source location

    2014-0473-Response-by-Brighton-Sussex-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 October 2014

    Open published response
  9. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Clive Harold Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Clive Harold Turner was taken to hospital after delays in the response to a call for medical assistance and was discharged after being incorrectly diagnosed as constipated. He was later found deceased at home from a gastrointestinal haemorrhage due to ischaemic bowel resulting from atherosclerosis. Concerns included uncertainty about pain relief provided by the ambulance service, lack of awareness of overnight discharge policies, and the absence of senior clinicians available for a second opinion.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of senior clinicians for overnight second opinions

    Wider context from the report

    “That ████████SHO in Emergency Medicine indicated in her evidence as follows :- 1. that she did not know what pain relief had been provided to Mr Turner by the Welsh Ambulance Service 2. that she was not aware of any policies within BCUHB relating to the discharge of patients overnight. 3. that there were no senior clinicians on duty from whom she could seek a second opinion due to the lateness of the hour when she was attending to Mr Turner. ”

    Source location

    Clive Harold Turner · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    MARTIN ARNOLD HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    MARTIN ARNOLD HILL arrived at A & E on 28 March 2014 after approximately three days of confusion, abdominal pain and vomiting, with raised inflammatory markers. The concerns included delayed antibiotics, failures to refer him to the Critical Care Outreach Team when his NEWS was elevated, inadequate withdrawal treatment, failures in managing constipation, poor handover and communication, and serious omissions in the Medical Administration Record.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of Senior Pharmacist review of Medical Administration Record charts

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) There are serious omissions on the Medical Administration Record. I was told that it was believed that no Senior Pharmacist reviewed the MAR charts over a weekend. Given the importance of medicating patients correctly, it would seem advisable that there should be a review, if indeed it is the practice that records are not reviewed. It seems that in this particular case the charts are particularly poorly written and perhaps those involved with this patient would benefit from a discussion with the Chief Pharmacist. ”

    Source location

    MARTIN ARNOLD HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026