Recurring concern

Unreliable clinical task management and follow-through

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First reported 16 Oct 2015•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the bounded clinical task-management process for identifying, assigning, prioritising, monitoring and confirming completion of safety-critical clinical tasks, including acting on important test results, making referrals, arranging specialist consultations and ensuring urgent tasks are followed through.

Not included

  • Excludes generic workforce shortages, workload or communication-volume concerns unless they directly cause failure of the clinical task-management and follow-through process.
  • Excludes failures in the clinical judgement or quality of treatment after a task has been reliably assigned and completed.
  • Excludes generic documentation or record-keeping deficiencies unless they prevent clinical tasks from being assigned, tracked or confirmed as completed.
  • Excludes non-clinical operational task systems and administrative actions that are not safety-critical clinical tasks.
  • Excludes isolated delays in risk assessment, referral or review where no broader failure of clinical task management or follow-through is asserted.
Reports
9

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
9

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
23

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England2
Ashton Medical Centre1
Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust1
East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
G4S1
G4S Forensic & Medical Services (UK) Ltd1
Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
NHS Birmingham and Solihull Integrated Care Board1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
Premier Physical Healthcare1
Richmond Medical Centre (Solihull)1
Spectrum Community Health C.I.C.1
SSP Health1
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. City of London

    AI-generated summary

    KERRY TERESA SINGH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kerry Teresa Singh died on 14 July 2025 after urgent extraction of a failing pacemaker lead caused a tear to the superior vena cava, severe bleeding and unsuccessful resuscitation. The report identified delays in involving a tertiary centre, failures to review a critical test result and complete a referral, inadequate systems for patient involvement and task monitoring, and a lack of internal investigation or review.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system for checking completion of important clinical tasks and referrals

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The Deceased’s critical test result, which was available from the 31st December 2024, was not accessed by the responsible consultant until March 2025. Further, the decision made subsequently, on the 3rd April 2025, to refer for lead extraction was not acted upon and no referral was made. It is not appropriate for concerns about the clinician to be addressed by means of this PFD Report. However, the failures raise concern also for the systems in place in the William Harvey Hospital. First, in evidence, the clinician suggested that she had not been provided by the Trust with sufficient time in which to perform these tasks and that she was overwhelmed by receiving an unnecessary number of communications. Secondly, I was told that there was no system in place to check that test results have been accessed and read or to alert clinicians to test results which had not been accessed and read, whether through IT alerts or otherwise. Thirdly, it seems that there is no system in place to check that important tasks (such as making a patient referral) have been performed and/or to identify when they have not been performed within a reasonable period. ”

    Source location

    KERRY TERESA SINGH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the revised Devices MDT governance documents, including referral criteria, clinical reasoning, patient involvement, escalation and action-accountability requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the inquest into Mrs Singh’s death, the Terms of Reference for the Devices MDT were formally reviewed and ratified. A Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”) has also been developed and implemented.”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apply the strengthened MDT governance model, where appropriate, to other Cardiology Service MDTs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The revised governance documents define the purpose and scope of the MDT, responsibilities of attendees, referral criteria, arrangements for recording clinical reasoning and communicating outcomes, circumstances in which tertiary advice should be sought, and the process for allocating, monitoring and escalating MDT actions.”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a centralised Devices MDT action log with named responsibility, completion dates, status tracking and escalation of outstanding actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Although actions arising from MDT discussions were historically recorded on individual referral documentation, the Cardiology Service has now introduced a centralised MDT action log.”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare a business case and assess internal resources for funding a dedicated Cardiology MDT Coordinator role.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The service has developed a job description for a dedicated Cardiology MDT Coordinator. The proposed role would support the administration of Cardiology MDTs, maintain action logs, monitor completion of agreed actions, ensure that outcomes are uploaded to the electronic patient record and support audit of compliance with MDT processes.”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review implementation of the revised abnormal-results escalation process and compliance with completion of Devices MDT actions through governance arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Actions agreed through the Devices MDT are now recorded on a central action log, with a named responsible individual and target completion date. Outstanding or overdue actions are reviewed through the MDT process and escalated where necessary. This includes tertiary-centre referrals, investigations, consultant review, changes to follow-up and communication with patients. Where tertiary referral is agreed, completion is confirmed by evidence that the referral has been submitted and recorded.”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 21 August 2026

    Open published response
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    ████████ was detained under the Mental Health Act and admitted to psychiatric wards at the Tower Hamlets Centre for Mental Health before being found unresponsive in a patient room on 7 June 2022; her death was verified later that day. The jury identified several contributing factors, including a non-functioning door-locking system and shortcomings in patient observations. Further concerns included risk assessment, staff understanding and attitudes towards risk, auditing, and clinical oversight.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete allocated clinical tasks within the responsible shift

    Wider context from the report

    “7) Attitudinal concerns There was a recurrent theme in the evidence provided by nursing and support staff that certain clinical tasks (including, but not limited to, the completion of risk assessment documentation) could simply be left for the next shift to complete. The net result of this was that such tasks were not completed, allowing the risks associated with non-completion to be perpetuated. The court was told that all shifts (on Rosebank Ward in particular) were busy and staff often did not have time to complete the tasks allocated to them. However, CCTV footage showed, for example, a member of staff (allocated to complete observations and not on a designated break at the material times) checking their mobile telephone and sitting in the lounge reading the newspaper instead of undertaking their clinical role. ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train qualified nursing staff in nurse-in-charge responsibilities, including allocation and monitoring of outstanding tasks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All qualified nursing staff are undergoing brief initial training around the role of the nurse in charge which includes allocation of outstanding tasks (assessments, care plans etc) and monitoring the completion of these. A longer electronic training package is being developed. This has already been completed in Tower Hamlets.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a longer electronic training package for the nurse-in-charge role.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All qualified nursing staff are undergoing brief initial training around the role of the nurse in charge which includes allocation of outstanding tasks (assessments, care plans etc) and monitoring the completion of these. A longer electronic training package is being developed. This has already been completed in Tower Hamlets.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a standardised handover template to identify and allocate outstanding nursing and medical tasks, with senior nursing oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A standardised handover template has been introduced which facilitates the identification of outstanding nursing and medical tasks to be allocated. The lead nurse and matrons are attending nursing handovers to monitor and embed this practice.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response
  3. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Hailey Anne Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hailey Anne Thompson was found unresponsive at home on 19 December 2022 and died after unsuccessful resuscitation. Her death was attributed to sepsis and pneumonia arising from a Streptococcus A infection. The principal concerns were unclear pathways and guidance for care navigators handling reports of allergic reactions to medication, including referral to an appropriately competent clinician and recording an auditable trail.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record clinical task communications on the medical records system

    Wider context from the report

    “2. During a call to the GP surgery, Hailey’s mother spoke with an administrative member of staff (who at the inquest was referred to as a care navigator at a call centre). The staff member referred an appointment to a pharmacist working with the practice to call her. 3. The pharmacist to whom this was assigned was not competent to deal with a paediatric medication enquiry and sent a message back advising of this, albeit not on the medical records system where an auditable trail would exist. On the evidence, the pharmacist was not provided with feedback directly on the need to use the medical records system or involved in the lessons learned process as they were not directly employed by the practice. 4. A further concern arose during the course of evidence from the primary care practice manager that a care navigator may not have a clear pathway on whom to refer a task or action to, or triage tool to recognise that a reported allergic reaction to a medication may require urgent consideration by a doctor to assess any risk of anaphylactic shock. 5. No evidence was provided to: a. explain how a patient telephoning the practice and being answered by the call centre would be referred to the urgent triage doctor on duty at the practice, b. whether a list of clinician competencies and whom to refer tasks to was held c. Care Navigator training d. Algorithms or policies that apply to assist care navigator / call handlers at a centre which is not located within the doctor surgery. 6. These issues are important as I had no reassurance that an administrative member of staff who spoke with a patient contacting the practice, had a clear pathway or guidance on whom the required task should be referred to. 7. Instead, the task could be allocated using judgement (although as above, guidance to apply this was not clear) to a clinician who could not in fact assist, which occurred in this case. The jury who heard the inquest found that there was a missed opportunity to review the antibiotics, which was not causative in this case. In my opinion, there is a risk that an urgent need for appropriate clinical referral may not occur in the above circumstances. ”

    Source location

    Hailey Anne Thompson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce use of auditable systems for all clinical communication and prohibit screen messages for clinical referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We have reinforced the requirement for auditable documentation across all communication channels.”

    Source location

    Response from SSP Health and Ashton Medical Practice
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share a GDPR record-keeping reminder through the NHS Greater Manchester Primary Care Newsletter.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have reviewed the response from SSP Health to this part of your report and think there is some learning for primary care providers around ensuring efficient and effective access to the right clinician to treat them and the requirement to ensure accurate, detailed and timely record keeping. To this aim, I will ensure that:”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure the practice carries out a Significant Event Analysis concerning the identified safety issues.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS GM recognises the importance of staff training in all our primary care practices to ensure that patients are navigated correctly and in a timely way as appropriate for the symptoms they are presenting with, including providing appropriate and timely treatment. NHS GM will”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure key learning from the Significant Event Analysis is implemented within the provider and SSP Health.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS GM recognises the importance of staff training in all our primary care practices to ensure that patients are navigated correctly and in a timely way as appropriate for the symptoms they are presenting with, including providing appropriate and timely treatment. NHS GM will”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns did not contribute to the death, and delayed anaphylaxis was extremely unlikely more than two days after the final dose.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge the concerns raised regarding care navigation, governance, and communication processes, and would like to take this opportunity to provide assurances of the processes that are embedded into the practice. We note that you state that you concluded that the concerns you raised did not contribute to the death and would also point out that the structures and operating procedures which are used at the surgery are consistent with those used in the vast majority of doctors surgeries in the UK. As a result, we would ask you to consider if a Regulation 28 Report is appropriate in these circumstances.”

    Source location

    Response from SSP Health and Ashton Medical Practice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 April 2025

    Open published response
  4. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Clement · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Clement, aged 92, died at Royal Blackburn Hospital on 15 June 2022 after developing significant rectal bleeding, vomiting blood and an upper gastrointestinal bleed following hospital admission after a fall. Concerns included inadequate nursing records and handovers, ineffective prioritisation of urgent tasks, failure to seek urgent clinical assistance for significant rectal bleeding, and inadequate assessment of compliance with procedural changes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of doctors to prioritise work by reviewing the task book for urgent tasks

    Wider context from the report

    “(3)Evidence was heard that doctors on the ward did not effectively prioritise work by reviewing the task book in order to identify more urgent tasks ”

    Source location

    Margaret Clement · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove doctors’ task books and route non-urgent requests through Cerner, with urgent concerns verbally escalated to medical staff or the Acute Care Team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly, since 21 June 2024, the doctors’ tasks book on Reedyford has been removed. I can confirm that now all doctors’ tasks (non-urgent) are requested via the Whiteboard on Cerner (the Trust’s Clinical Electronic Record system) during core hours. Urgent actions are communicated verbally and escalated directly to medical staff during core hours and to the Acute Care Team out of hours.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Standardise clinical-risk handovers by using Cerner tasks and embedding Patient e-Obs trend review during nursing handover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the conclusion of the inquest work has been undertaken to ensure that there is a standardised approach for the measurement and management, and communication, of clinical risks between shifts.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide daily multidisciplinary meetings and twice-daily medical-team handovers to the Acute Care Team to identify concerned patients and support timely deterioration management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is now a daily MDT (multidisciplinary team meeting) and a twice daily planned handover from the medical team to the Acute Care Team (ACT) to ensure seamless handovers to ensure that any patients who are of concern are identified. The ACT are highly experienced with the skills needed to provide timely interventions to stabilise patients whose clinical condition deteriorates unexpectedly. This level of advanced clinical decision making and problem solving enables a more comprehensive and encompassing package of care and increases support for the workload of the medical teams, particularly if needed in the out of hours period. All doctors’ tasks (non-urgent) are requested via the Whiteboard on Cerner during core hours. Urgent actions are now communicated verbally and escalated directly to medical staff during core hours and to the Acute Care Team out of hours.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update SOP046 to require medical and nursing staff to verify completion of doctors’ tasks before leaving the ward.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SOP046 MDT will be updated to reflect the requirement that both medical and nursing staff check that the doctor’s tasks have been completed before they leave the ward. An audit of this SOP has been undertaken and was presented at the Clinical Effectiveness Group in July 2024, which identified recommendations. These have been transferred to a SMART action plan which will be monitored by the Clinical Audit team within the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from East Lancashire Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 May 2024

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Jane Elizabeth Wadsworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jane Elizabeth Wadsworth became seriously unwell after elective hip surgery, developing a deep vein thrombosis, cellulitis, sepsis, acute kidney injury and liver failure, and died on 31 December 2022 despite intensive care treatment. Concerns included missed antibiotic doses, limited consultant input, unclear escalation and doctor-to-doctor discussion about intensive care, unavailable Critical Care Outreach support, and no evidence that specialist liver advice was obtained.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear clinical ownership of specialist consultation actions

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Following her first admission to ICU there was a note that Mrs Wadsworth’s case should be discussed with a specialist Liver team. There was no evidence available to the inquest that such a discussion had taken place. It was not entirely clear on the evidence precisely which clinician was to take ownership of the action. ”

    Source location

    Jane Elizabeth Wadsworth · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the Critical Care Unit daily review chart to document clearly who referred patients to the Liver Unit and when.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust acknowledge that the clinical documentation recorded within the Critical Unit was not clear with regards to who and when Mrs Wadsworth was referred to the Liver Unit. In response to this the Critical Care Unit have amended their daily review chart to provide additional clarity on this point and that this is documented in a more comprehensive way.”

    Source location

    Response from Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care
    Page 6 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns fall under the Trust’s remit rather than NHS England’s functions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matters of concern raised in your Report come under the remit of Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust (hereafter “the Trust”), who are therefore the appropriate organisation to respond to the concerns raised. I am however grateful to you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention. The concerns have been shared with my relevant regional Quality colleagues in the North West, who are engaging with Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board (the responsible commissioning body for Greater Manchester) about the issues raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust is the appropriate organisation to respond, with the Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board responsible for commissioning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matters of concern raised in your Report come under the remit of Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust (hereafter “the Trust”), who are therefore the appropriate organisation to respond to the concerns raised. I am however grateful to you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention. The concerns have been shared with my relevant regional Quality colleagues in the North West, who are engaging with Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board (the responsible commissioning body for Greater Manchester) about the issues raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response
  6. North Northumberland and South Northumberland

    AI-generated summary

    Odessa Carey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Odessa Carey was last seen alive at her home on 4 April 2019 and was found dead on 7 April 2019; the inquest recorded the conclusion “Unlawfully killed”. The report raised concerns about multi-agency risk assessment, substance-misuse referrals, discharge and care coordination, risk assessment, record keeping, and delays in referral to the Community Treatment Team.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of an audit system for timely referrals

    Wider context from the report

    “8. Contact with IRT and referral to Community Treatment Team The service user contacted the service on a number of occasions and sought self-referral to the Crisis team on 19 September 2018 who assessed her as requiring a re-referral to the community team. No referral was made. I am concerned that there was a delay in the referral to the Community Treatment Team and there is no audit system to ensure referrals are made and in a timely fashion. ”

    Source location

    Odessa Carey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Timothy Simon Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Timothy Simon Jones, who had Down syndrome, epilepsy and dementia and required PEG feeding, was admitted to hospital with breathing difficulties and aspiration pneumonia, was discharged and readmitted the same day, and died on 17 July 2016. Concerns included incomplete GP record keeping, unclear communication and documentation of requests for home visits, lack of GP clinical assessment despite deteriorating health and complex needs, a home-visit policy that did not address residents with complex chronic conditions, and antibiotic prescribing for aspiration pneumonia.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to distinguish clinical assessment tasks from true administration tasks

    Wider context from the report

    “2. I heard evidence at the inquest that the residential home had requested several home visits from the GP, on 5 July 2016, 12 July 2016 and 13 July 2016, but the GP disputed this. The mechanism of communication within the GP practice caused concern in that several aspects of care were classified as “admin tasks” when they required further clinical assessment. The process of requesting and documenting requests for home visits needs to be clearer. The role of “admin tasks” needs to be clarified so that these are only used for true administration tasks. ”

    Source location

    Timothy Simon Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a learning alert to all Solihull member practices covering home-visit requests, policies, care-home requests and administrative-task classifications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• In addition a ‘learning alert’ will be issued to all Solihull member practices to highlight concerns and learning in relation to: ○ Recording of requests for home visits ○ GP home visit policies ○ Nursing/residential home requests for GP home visits ○ Classifications of administrative tasks”

    Source location

    2016-0421-Response-by-Solihull-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response
  8. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    James Bewick Graham · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Bewick Graham, who had peripheral vascular disease and recurring problems with his left foot, was admitted to hospital after his condition deteriorated, underwent an amputation, and died on 2 November 2014. The report identified concerns about delayed referral to secondary care, poor communication between healthcare professionals, unclear responsibility for making the referral, and administrative failures that meant the referral was not dispatched.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear ownership and responsibility for referrals to secondary care

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The GP who had most contact with the deceased in a 2 year period considered making a referral to secondary care on 17th October 2014 and instead of making the referral himself, passed the responsibility to make a referral to another GP (who worked one day per week) and who had previously sent a one page letter of referral to secondary care more than 2 years earlier. The GP gave evidence that he thought it appropriate for the original GP to make the referral as that GP had done the first one and was acquainted with the matter. The second GP gave evidence to say that she did not agree with this action because although, in principle, if there had been a recent referral it might have been appropriate for the original referring GP to make a second referral however after 2 years it was “stretching it a bit”. There was a lack of ownership and responsibility for the deceased’s care and making a referral to secondary care. There needs to be consideration given to the formulation of clear guidance as to which GP and in what circumstances has a responsibility for referrals to secondary care. ”

    Source location

    James Bewick Graham · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require urgent secondary-care referrals to be discussed with the senior administrator and senior nurse.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following steps have been taken to address your concerns surrounding the manner in which referrals to secondary care are made and monitored:-”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inform the current GP provider of requirements for secondary-care referrals under the new contract.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Following the commencement of the new contract arrangements relating to the provision of healthcare services at HMP Frankland on 1 April 2015, the former head of healthcare at HMP Frankland is now employed by Spectrum Community Health CIC and therefore the current provider of GP Services at HMP Frankland is aware and informed of the requirements relating to referrals to secondary care.”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce podiatry procedures requiring SystmOne communication and urgent tasking for necessary secondary-care referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On reviewing this case it is felt that the podiatrist followed the protocol set at that time for the high security environment as it was not possible to speak to the GP. In order to prevent future similar situations occurring Premier Physical Healthcare have introduced the following procedures into the offender healthcare policies.”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue referral guidance requiring the referring doctor to complete and monitor referrals, retain responsibility, and avoid delegating urgent referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Directive has been issued by Spectrum Community Health CIC, that states;”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 5 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate and discuss GMC guidance on delegation and referral through continuing professional development.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The GMC guidelines regarding delegation and referral have been circulated and discussed as part of Continuing Professional Development.”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 6 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response
  9. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Adrian Mark Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adrian Mark Smith attended hospital after seizures and was later found to have a bilateral frontal brain haemorrhage and sagittal sinus thrombosis. He underwent decompression surgery after a further brain bleed and died on 8 June 2015; the inquest concluded that his death resulted from a complication of heparin treatment. The principal concern was that Good Hope Hospital did not follow specialist advice to undertake an MRI scan to confirm the possible diagnosis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow specialist advice

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Clear instruction was given by the Queen Elizabeth hospital to undertake an MRI scan to confirm the possible diagnosis. This instruction was not followed by the staff at Good Hope Hospital. Systems need to be put in place to ensure that specialist advice is followed. ”

    Source location

    Adrian Mark Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Radiologists need not automatically follow specialist requests because they independently assess clinical need, likely benefit and potential intervention.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Clear instruction was given by the Queen Elizabeth Hospital to undertake an MRI scan to confirm the possible diagnosis. This instruction was not followed by the staff at Good Hope Hospital. Systems need to be put in place to ensure that specialist advice is followed.”

    Source location

    2015-0378-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 October 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026