Recurring concern

Failure to accurately record the identities of clinicians involved in patient care

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First reported 24 Nov 2014•Latest report 23 Jun 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes inaccurate, omitted, or untimely recording of the identity of clinicians who assess, advise on, discharge, or otherwise provide clinical care, where the identity is needed for safe communication, accountability, or subsequent decision-making.

Not included

  • Excludes failures to identify patients or other non-clinician individuals.
  • Excludes inaccurate recording of clinical observations, assessments, deterioration, decisions, or advice where clinician identity is not the shared concern.
  • Excludes general poor record-keeping or information-sharing deficiencies without a specific failure to record the identity of an involved clinician.
Reports
11

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
12

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
15

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Atrumed Ltd1
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Haughton Thornley Medical Centres1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
HM Prison Service1
Medway NHS Foundation Trust1
Mersey Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Mid Yorkshire Teaching NHS Trust1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
North London NHS Foundation Trust1
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Parents of Kinga Cieciorska1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Louise Elizabeth Amy Crane · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Louise Elizabeth Amy Crane, who had a history of mental health diagnoses and was detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act, was found suspended by a ligature at Highgate Mental Health Centre on 19 September 2024. The jury found that factors contributing to her death included chronic suicide risk, unsatisfactory information sharing and recording, inadequate risk management, staffing, and insufficient care and treatment on Topaz Ward. The report also raised concerns about record keeping, therapeutic engagement and professional curiosity, ward observations, communication, transitions between wards, and outstanding actions in the Trust’s action plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure that staff make records using their own identification and accurately identify the author

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Record Keeping / Professional Standards There was evidence that staff on Topaz Ward would sometimes use the ID card of another member of staff to makes notes on the records system, without making it clear who the entry was actually made by. In this case there were two entries that appeared to have been made by a support worker, that were actually made by a nurse. Such misleading and inaccurate record keeping risks significant confusion in the provision of care and potentially creates significant risk in relation to the continuity of care. ”

    Source location

    Louise Elizabeth Amy Crane · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Streamline Smart Card access and require bank staff to hold cards and complete Rio training before booking shifts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Record Keeping / Professional Standards The Trust recognises the vital importance of accurate record keeping in supporting safe patient care. It is acknowledged that access to Smart Cards to support the use of Rio (the Trust’s Electronic Patient Record system) has been an issue, particularly for staff working via our bank staff provider NHS Professionals (NHSP). As part of the EMS program, this was investigated and processes streamlined so that all existing and new staff are now able to apply for a Smart Card and complete RIO training. Going forward, in order to be booked onto a bank shift, NHSP staff must have a Smart Card. As a result, all staff (substantive and NHSP) can now make their own records on the RIO System thereby reducing any reliance on using other colleagues’ accounts.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review ward staff access daily and reinforce requirements against sharing Smart Cards or misattributing electronic records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ward managers are expected to complete a daily review of staff attending their wards to check access and ability to record accurately.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response
  2. West Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    David Barnet WILSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Barnet Wilson was admitted to hospital with suspected colitis and underwent a flexible sigmoidoscopy, during which a recognised colonic perforation occurred. He died at Pinderfields Hospital on 31 December 2022; concerns included inadequate explanation and tailoring of procedural risks, failure to mention the risk of death, and obtaining consent while he was under morphine sedation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify clinicians involved in consent discussions

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) The Consent Form did not identify those clinicians involved in discussing the decision with him, save for ████████ who obtained his signature at a time when he was under the influence of morphine sedation. ”

    Source location

    David Barnet WILSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Time and resource constraints make listing all staff involved throughout a patient's consent process impracticable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ideally the final consent form would list all MYTT staff who have been involved throughout the entire consenting process of the patient for a particular procedure. Unfortunately, time and resource constraints make this suggestion impracticable for implementation by the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid Yorkshire Teaching NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 June 2023

    Open published response
  3. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Louise Hancock · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Louise Hancock underwent a right total knee replacement on 2 March 2022, was discharged on 5 March 2022, and died at home on 28 March 2022. Her post-mortem cause of death was pulmonary embolus due to deep vein thrombosis, with immobility following the knee replacement. The concerns included apparent prescription of low-risk thrombosis prophylaxis despite her being assessed as high risk, an unidentified doctor’s prescription of dalteparin that was stopped after one dose, and possible discrepancies between summary and full thrombosis-prevention guidance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify the prescribing doctor and record prescribing decision-making

    Wider context from the report

    “I enclose the bundle of evidence. At pp A32-A54, you will find what I am told is the Trust’s Guideline Summary for Thrombosis Prevention and Anticoagulation. At p42, following elective knee replacement, it is suggested clinicians may choose any one of Aspirin ████████ for 14 days LMWH for 14 days and anti-embolism stockings Rivaroxaban ████████ once daily for 14 days As matters of fact, I am told Mrs Hancock was prescribed 14 days of aspirin, an apparent error, one unidentified doctor also prescribed Dalteparin which was stopped after a single dose. It is of concern that the doctor cannot be identified and I have no record of the decision-making. At C32, you will find the Trust’s full guidance for drug prophylaxis following elective knee replacement which is taken from its Thrombosis Prevention and Anticoagulation Policy v9.0 dated Feb 2022. It provides: Low risk – Aspirin ████████ daily for 14 days High Risk – Rivaroxaban ████████ daily for 14 days or Dalteparin or Enoxaparin for 28 days plus stockings (until discharge.) ████████ had not seen the full guidance previously despite it having been published for over a year which, as a consultant orthopaedic surgeon, is of concern in itself. █ further said that Mrs Hancock was high risk yet she appears to have been given prophylaxis for a low risk patient because the summary guidelines appear not to reflect accurately the full guidance. ████████, as I understood ███, said that it had been █ practice to prescribe aspirin to all high-risk patients since (at least) February 2022. This raises the question of whether other patients have died from a PE or DVT because of wrongly prescribed prophylaxis that have not been reported to this Office. You will need to consider the position. I have only considered the situation as it came before me, namely, for an elective knee replacement. As I understand the anticoagulation policy will have a much wider reach than that there is an obvious need to consider the implications across all the Trust’s services. ”

    Source location

    Julie Louise Hancock · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The records identify the prescriber and document the rationale for suspending aspirin and prescribing dalteparin.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “After discussion with Pharmacy and a review of the ePMA (Electronic prescribing & Medicines Administration) records there is a clear audit trail of who prescribed the Dalteparin and when.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2023

    Open published response
  4. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Kathryn Lynda Millard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kathryn Lynda Millard fell down stairs at a property where she was working on 10 May 2021 and was admitted to hospital with a fractured spine. She later developed green vomit, suffered a cardiac arrest on 13 May 2021, and could not be resuscitated; the jury recorded pulmonary embolism and deep venous thrombosis as the medical cause of death. Concerns included failure to document and implement a senior clinician’s direction, lack of awareness among nursing staff about anti-embolic stockings, and inadequate recording and communication following a review of her deteriorating presentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain identification of the attending clinician

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The nursing staff were concerned on the 12 May 2021 as to the presentation and prognosis of the deceased. Whomever attended (if they anybody did in fact attend), did not make any entry into Mrs Millard’s medical records. It is concerning that the Trust were not able to identify this individual and that they did not discuss the patient’s presentation and prognosis with the nursing staff. ”

    Source location

    Kathryn Lynda Millard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Mandy Jane DICKERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mandy Jane Dickerson attended the Urgent GP Care Centre on 26 April 2020 after several days of diarrhoea and vomiting, but was discharged without assessment by the medical team. She died at home on 30 April 2020 from sepsis. The principal concerns included a non-mandatory and unreliable sepsis template, inadequate recording and communication of key observations, and confusion about referral responsibilities when specialist assessment was requested.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the identity of medical registrars providing advice

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was in my view a failure to record and then to convey key information to the medical registrar who consequently may have given advice which was ill-informed. The nurse practitioner told me, in oral evidence and in a statement provided at the eleventh hour the night before the Inquest, that the measurements had been performed but simply not recorded. However, the remainder of the note was particularly and contemporaneously detailed with these critical observations being conspicuous in their absence. I found that the observations had not been made. In addition, no record was made of the name of the medical registrar making investigation of this element difficult. ”

    Source location

    Mandy Jane DICKERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require practitioners to record the names and times of specialty clinicians consulted in patient records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. As to paragraph 5 of your concerns, it is of course for each individual practitioner (in accordance with their relevant regulatory body and their professional obligations) to ensure that they record the key information about a patient and the patient’s presentation and that they accurately report the same to any other practitioner that they may contact in respect of a patient. It is now, however, part of Atrumed’s policy that practitioners must record (in a patient’s records) the name and times of any specialty clinicians that they speak to (please see attached) We carry out monthly audits of the records to ensure that this is happening and any issues that are identified are discussed with the Trust out our joint clinical governance meetings.”

    Source location

    2022-0100 - Response from Atrumed Healthcare
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit patient records monthly for compliance with specialty-consultation recording requirements and discuss identified issues at joint clinical governance meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. As to paragraph 5 of your concerns, it is of course for each individual practitioner (in accordance with their relevant regulatory body and their professional obligations) to ensure that they record the key information about a patient and the patient’s presentation and that they accurately report the same to any other practitioner that they may contact in respect of a patient. It is now, however, part of Atrumed’s policy that practitioners must record (in a patient’s records) the name and times of any specialty clinicians that they speak to (please see attached) We carry out monthly audits of the records to ensure that this is happening and any issues that are identified are discussed with the Trust out our joint clinical governance meetings.”

    Source location

    2022-0100 - Response from Atrumed Healthcare
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response
  6. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Tomasz Nowosad · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tomasz Nowosad was found hanging by a ligature in an ordinary, non-safe cell at HMP Manchester on 2 February 2017, shortly after being transferred from the healthcare centre. The report identifies concerns about risk assessment, including reliance on his denials of suicidal thoughts, incomplete and delayed clinical records, inconsistent use of interpretation services, and his transfer to an ordinary wing despite expressed fears and mental health risks. The inquest jury concluded that the death was suicide contributed to by neglect.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify participating healthcare staff and verify completeness of System One records

    Wider context from the report

    “5 6 It is suggested that whenever there is a healthcare interaction with a patient prisoner and more than one healthcare member of staff is present, their identities should be recorded and all clinically relevant information is included within the System One records and checked between those present as being full and complete ”

    Source location

    Tomasz Nowosad · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 7 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The healthcare provider is responsible for responding separately to concerns about clinical issues.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am grateful to you for bringing to my attention a number of matters of concern, many of which are relevant across the prison estate. I have consulted with the Governor of HMP Manchester and, where relevant, will mention action that has been taken locally at the prison as well as work that is taking place at national level. I understand that the healthcare provider is responding separately to your concerns about clinical issues.”

    Source location

    2019-0445-Response-from-HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 January 2020

    Open published response
  7. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kathleen McGeary · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kathleen McGeary died on 6 March 2018 from a head injury sustained in a fall at Tuxford Manor Care Home after her discharge from hospital. Concerns included inadequate assessment and treatment before discharge, unclear responsibility for discharge decisions, inadequate discharge documentation and communication, and her leaving hospital without prescribed antibiotics.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately record the identity of the discharging clinician

    Wider context from the report

    “2. No clinician took clear responsibility for discharging decision making. The recording of the identity of the discharging clinician was incorrect and communication between clinicians and nursing staff was unclear. ”

    Source location

    Kathleen McGeary · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Kinga Cieciorska · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kinga Cieciorska, a 16-year-old girl with complex medical needs, was taken to hospital with abdominal pain and distension. She was diagnosed with constipation and discharged, but deteriorated overnight and died after being returned to hospital on 11 March 2016; the stated cause of death was peritonitis from a perforated gastric ulcer. Concerns included failure to investigate tachycardia and an abnormal ECG, failures in recording and transmitting clinical information, and failure to consider the significance of her medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the identity of the specialist clinician giving advice

    Wider context from the report

    “2. During the inquest it emerged there was evidence of systemic failings in recording of and transmission of information. The Junior Doctor failed to record the name of the Specialist Paediatric Registrar giving advice. More worryingly the Paediatric Registrar at inquest could not recollect giving any advice in relation to the patient. It also emerged during the inquest that medical notes provided by the GP were given to reception staff by the parents on admission. Unfortunately these documents were not forwarded or seen by the Junior Doctor on examination of the patient. ”

    Source location

    Kinga Cieciorska · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Anthony Collins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Anthony Collins lived in a care home and fell on 22 June 2015, sustaining chest injuries. He was not admitted to hospital at that time, was later admitted on 25 June, and died on 15 July 2015 after treatment for complications including sepsis, pneumonia and respiratory distress. The report raised concerns about paramedic decision-making and the GP’s assessment, including failures to recognise the seriousness of the injury and signs of a flail chest.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately record the professional identity of the clinician who assessed the patient

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The GP attended the patient on the 24th June and she assumed that he had been seen by a doctor on the 22nd because the record showed that he had been seen by a “practitioner”. In fact he had only been seen by the paramedic. This assumption very much detrimentally influenced her subsequent decision making.(Haughton Thornley Medical Centres) ”

    Source location

    Thomas Anthony Collins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record clear findings, admission or transfer rationale, fall circumstances, and responsibility for complete clinical notes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• When accidents happen in homes and care homes, we will ensure we record very clearly the findings and our rationale for not admitting the patient to hospital or transferring them to hospital. We will obtain more information surrounding the circumstances of a fall. The clinician who makes this decision will take responsibility for ensuring that the notes are complete and clear. We will ask for a detailed account from care home staff of witnessed falls and will obtain information from relatives where appropriate.”

    Source location

    2015-0469-Response-by-Haughton-Thornley-Medical-Centres
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a medical record-keeping course for GPs and reflect on its learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A medical record keeping course for GPs on the 6 October 2015 with subsequent reflection on the course.”

    Source location

    2015-0469-Response-by-Haughton-Thornley-Medical-Centres
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review medical records to ensure relevant information is recorded clearly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will share this incident’s findings and learning with our local GP colleagues at the next local meeting, to help prevent further deaths of this nature occurring. We will also include an update of this incident in our next practice meeting. Our medical records will be reviewed to ensure that all of the relevant information is recorded clearly.”

    Source location

    2015-0469-Response-by-Haughton-Thornley-Medical-Centres
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 November 2015

    Open published response
  10. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Harry Pryal · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Harry Pryal died on 8 January 2015 after an accidental fall, with the inquest recording bronchopneumonia and traumatic spinal cord injury as the medical cause of death. An X-ray identifying a suspected cervical spine fracture was not reported promptly, and the report raised concerns about communication and record-keeping, conflicting interpretations of a radiology service agreement, access to imaging, and the provision of physical healthcare services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record advice on medical treatment and care

    Wider context from the report

    “i. 5BP contact WWL for advise in relation to medical treatment for patients at the Lakeside Unit on a regular basis as a matter of protocol. The Doctors in psychiatry at the Lakeside Unit, are dependent upon such advice for the treatment and care of patients. The evidence identified that there is no note of the advice in the records maintained by WWL, neither to identify the Doctor giving advice nor the content of the advice. Furthermore evidence was given that this was a situation arising on a nationwide scale. The absence of any notes prevents a record of the advice for the purpose of continuity of treatment and any subsequent referrals, particularly in a case when the Doctor giving the advice is no longer available and further advice is requested by the referring Doctor for medical treatment. ”

    Source location

    Harry Pryal · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Lakeside Unit clinical notes to identify actions, times and clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “v. The evidence at the Inquest revealed that the notes completed by clinicians at the Lakeside Unit, failed to identify the times of actions by them and in one note failed to identify the identity of the clinician making the note. The notes were inadequate, particularly the notes which accompanied Mr Pryal on his transfer from the Lakeside Unit, to RAEI. The details to be included in a request for x-ray examination and the fact that an urgent x-ray examination required either a telephone call to the Radiologist or a note of priority on the x-ray form did not appear to be understood by clinicians at the Lakeside Unit, and demonstrated a lack of liaison and understanding between the two Trusts, which would be necessary to allow the terms of the Service Agreement to be operated and performed. ”

    Source location

    Harry Pryal · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Direct clinicians to fully record specialist clinical advice, including colleagues’ names, grades and contact details.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A directive has been given to all clinicians within the Trust relating to the recording of clinical advice by specialist services. In Mr Pryal's case, this was with the medical registrar for medicine. There is a requirement that all clinical advice we receive is fully recorded, with emphasis on the recording of the name, grade and contact details of clinical colleagues we speak to. This has been sent out for immediate action via an internal email.”

    Source location

    2015-0391-Response-by-5-Borough-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the clinical-record audit process and consider policy changes based on audit recommendations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust's records manager is reviewing the process for clinical record audit in line with recent organisational changes that have occurred. This is being completed by the Records Management team and reported to the Chief Nurse and Executive”

    Source location

    2015-0391-Response-by-5-Borough-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standardised transfer proforma recording medical background, referral reasons and prior discussions for transfer between the Trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, the Trust has been working with 5BP to create a standardised proforma for use on transfers between the two organisations (please see Appendix 1). The proforma, setting out the patient’s medical background, reason for referral, and any prior discussions, would be sent upon transfer and kept within the medical records. Both Trusts are looking to pilot these proformas following approval from the respective clinical committees.”

    Source location

    2015-0391-Response-by-Wrightington-Wigan-and-Leigh-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standardised transfer proforma for inclusion in care records between the two trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have developed a standardised proforma for use on transfer between the Trust and Wrightington, Wigan and Leigh NHS Foundation Trust to be kept within the care record. These proforma have been created by the clinicians who will be using them and have been discussed at the Wigan Medical Staff Committee (minutes available).”

    Source location

    2015-0391-Response-by-5-Borough-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Documenting external referral discussions contemporaneously is difficult because calls occur during clinical duties and patients often lack accessible Trust records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am advised that the Trust’s Medical Registrar on-call receives approximately 60 to 70 bleeps a day during his 12 hour shift. The majority of those relate to internal queries; however around 5-10% are telephone referrals from external providers, (such as 5BP, GPs, and other NHS hospitals). Often these calls are taken whilst the health professional is on a ward undertaking clinical duties, therefore making it difficult for a note to be made of that discussion, especially as these calls do not relate to patients currently being treated within the Trust.”

    Source location

    2015-0391-Response-by-Wrightington-Wigan-and-Leigh-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The health professional seeking advice is responsible for ensuring a full and accurate record of the clinical advice received.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “According to the General Medical Council, and Royal College guidance, there is a duty on the health professional seeking the advice to ensure a full and accurate record is kept. I note a directive has been given to clinicians within 5BP to ensure all clinical advice received is fully recorded, and for the documentation to include the health professional’s name, grade and contact details.”

    Source location

    2015-0391-Response-by-Wrightington-Wigan-and-Leigh-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local providers are responsible for reviewing local systems concerning X-ray reporting, electronic viewing and patient-note recording.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You outline the circumstances which led to this situation and direct several concerns to the 5 Boroughs Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (5BP) and Wrightington Wigan and Leigh NHS Foundation Trust (WWL) which relate to their joint Service Agreement, the reporting times for X-rays, the electronic systems available to support web viewing of X-rays and the recording of appropriate patient notes. These concerns are about the local systems that are in place and rightly addressed to the local providers, who I am confident will consider and review.”

    Source location

    2015-0391-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 September 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local-level services are responsible for implementing the recording of clinical information in patient notes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst the actual recording of patient notes is something that is agreed and implemented at local level, the general move away from paper to integrated digital care records should improve the comprehensiveness of information held, including essential diagnostic tests and it’s availability to all professionals engaged in the care of individual patients.”

    Source location

    2015-0391-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 September 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026