Recurring concern

Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted upon

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First reported 11 Sep 2013•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the end-to-end process for managing clinical investigation results when the result is not reliably made available to, brought to the attention of, correctly checked or interpreted by, and acted upon by the responsible clinical team.

Not included

  • Excludes failures concerning treatment monitoring or prescribing unless the assertion specifically concerns management of the resulting investigation result.
  • Excludes generic documentation, staffing, training or communication deficiencies that are not explicitly tied to the management of an investigation result.
  • Excludes administrative or test-ordering failures where no result-management deficiency is identified.
  • Excludes failures involving non-clinical items, equipment or processes unrelated to clinical investigation results.
Reports
108

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
138

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
168

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care15
NHS England12
Care Quality Commission7
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB5
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust4
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists4
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust4
Barts Health NHS Trust3
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency3
Recipient name withheld3
Royal London Hospital3
Ashford and St Peter'S Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
Bristol NHS Foundation Trust2
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Claire Joan Elizabeth MEDHURST · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Claire Medhurst was admitted after a polypharmacy overdose, was discharged after treatment, and was readmitted with abdominal pain and severe liver abnormalities. Her acute liver failure was not recognised or treated for about six hours before she deteriorated and died on 24 February 2017. Concerns included the lack of cautionary advice about further use of paracetamol or ibuprofen at discharge and the failure of the laboratory to alert clinicians to abnormal results and toxic paracetamol levels.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of haematology laboratory alerting for abnormal ALT and toxic paracetamol results

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The treating clinicians did not receive an alert from the haematology laboratory for the abnormal results for ALT and toxic levels of paracetamol ”

    Source location

    Claire Joan Elizabeth MEDHURST · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an automated paracetamol phone-trigger and ALT alert prompting laboratory staff to telephone critical results to requesting clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. As a result of this incident an algorithm has been written to add a ‘paracetamol to phone’ trigger test. Furthermore, on the first occurrence of an ALT level outside of the safe range (>825), the system flags a reminder to the laboratory staff to telephone it through to the requesting clinician. This flagging system was implemented on 5th September 2017 and applies to all tests were the levels are outside of the safe range and require immediate actions by a clinician. The Biochemistry Department “when to telephone a result” document is attached as appendix 5.”

    Source location

    2017-0270-Response-by-Medway-NSH-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit compliance with SBAR reporting and associated critical-result protocols.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. An audit will be conducted in October 2017 to measure compliance with SBAR and the associated protocols, and ensure Trust procedures are being adhered to.”

    Source location

    2017-0270-Response-by-Medway-NSH-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 November 2017

    Open published response
  2. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Percy Jacks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Percy Jacks died from a pulmonary embolus after being found unresponsive the morning following treatment for chest pain. The report identified failings in the management of his anticoagulation medication, including poor communication between the hospital, GP surgery and care home, and inadequate systems for ensuring the medication continued for the intended period.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the hospital-to-GP DVT result communication system

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The investigation revealed that the system for the Bronglais Hospital contacting the GP was poor. The result of the DVT scan which took place on 6 February was sent to the incorrect GP surgery and despite an explanation as to why that happened no satisfactory explanation could be found. ”

    Source location

    Percy Jacks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake a review of discharge arrangements, focusing on communication and documentation supporting discharge from secondary to primary healthcare.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HIW has noted the findings of the inquest and assure you that this information will be used to inform our work. HIW is currently undertaking a review of discharge arrangements focusing on communication and the quality of documentation used to support patient discharge from secondary to primary healthcare. I can confirm that this report has been shared with the review lead to consider.”

    Source location

    2017-0329-Response-by-Welsh-Government
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a streamlined DVT pathway directing suspected cases to radiology, initiating primary treatment before ultrasound, and ensuring positive and negative results receive appropriate follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The process of managing potential DVT patients has been streamlined and a definite pathway introduced. All GP referrals which suspected DVTs are referred direct to the Hospital's Radiology Department as per the attached protocol. It is incumbent on the GPs to commence their primary prior to an ultrasound scan being undertaken. Following their scan, if the result is positive, the patient is referred back to the A & E Department where they are reviewed by the on-call Physicians. There is a pre-printed letter that is completed by the on-call physicians to the GP with recommendations and this is also copied to the Anticoagulation Clinic. If the result of the scan is negative, the patient is referred back to their GP for further evaluation.”

    Source location

    2017-0329-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record all suspected DVT referrals and follow up 48 hours later to confirm receipt of results.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have discussed this in our practice meeting and have made the following changes.”

    Source location

    2017-0329-Response-by-Rhayader-Group-Practic
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review how inspections assess timely information transfer between services, using policy, medicines and clinical expertise.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of the concerns being brought to our attention we have taken the opportunity to review how CQC checks that information about patients being transferred between services happens in a timely manner and whether there is any more we as a regulator can do to prevent an incident such as this from happening in future.”

    Source location

    2017-0329-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 6 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and improve the wording of the Key Lines of Enquiry on information sharing during transfers between services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have revised and improved the wording of our Key Lines of Enquiry and from November 2017 inspectors will be considering the following two specific questions when they are reviewing the safety of a practice, instead of one being a prompt supporting the other: ‘When people move between teams, services and organisations (which may include at referral, discharge, transfer and transition), is all the information needed for their ongoing care shared appropriately, in a timely way and in line with relevant protocols?’ and ‘How well do the systems that manage information about people who use services support staff, carers and partner agencies to deliver safe care and treatment? (This includes coordination between different electronic and paper-based systems and appropriate access for staff to records.)’”

    Source location

    2017-0329-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have inspectors use two specific information-sharing questions when reviewing practice safety from November 2017.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have revised and improved the wording of our Key Lines of Enquiry and from November 2017 inspectors will be considering the following two specific questions when they are reviewing the safety of a practice, instead of one being a prompt supporting the other: ‘When people move between teams, services and organisations (which may include at referral, discharge, transfer and transition), is all the information needed for their ongoing care shared appropriately, in a timely way and in line with relevant protocols?’ and ‘How well do the systems that manage information about people who use services support staff, carers and partner agencies to deliver safe care and treatment? (This includes coordination between different electronic and paper-based systems and appropriate access for staff to records.)’”

    Source location

    2017-0329-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Welsh Clinical Portal access was considered sufficient for the GP to review the patient's A&E attendance outcome despite the discharge summary issue.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All Primary and Secondary Care Doctors have access to the Welsh Clinical Portal. This allows them to access test, radiology and documentation for a patient wherever the patient receives cares in Wales, regardless of geographical or organisational boundaries. See attached printout from the NHS Wales Informatics Service website which provides further information. Mr Jacks' GP would have had access to this and would have been able to review the outcome of his attendance at the A & E Department at Bronglais General Hospital on 6 February 2017.”

    Source location

    2017-0329-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Including scan results with transferred patient records was considered sufficient, so no additional regulatory input was required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Cantilupe Surgery has informed CQC that hard copies of Mr Jacks’ notes, along with the scan results which were sent in error to the surgery by Bronglais General Hospital were collected by Capita on 10 February 2017. While Cantilupe Surgery did not contact the Bronglais Hospital to inform them of the error, they considered that the action of including the scan results along with Mr Jacks’ patient records were sufficient to ensure the information would reach the new practice promptly. The practice have informed us that in the event of a repetition of this kind of error they would inform the hospital in the light of Mr Jacks’ case. We do not consider that there is cause for additional input from CQC here.”

    Source location

    2017-0329-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Current inspection methodology was considered to cover the relevant care elements, so no additional policy change was required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of the concerns being brought to our attention we have taken the opportunity to review how CQC checks that information about patients being transferred between services happens in a timely manner and whether there is any more we as a regulator can do to prevent an incident such as this from happening in future.”

    Source location

    2017-0329-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 6 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response
  3. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Sarah Poole · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Sarah Poole was admitted to hospital with sudden headache and back pain, but an abnormal ECG was incorrectly considered normal and she was discharged home. She was readmitted the following day, diagnosed with an aortic dissection and underwent emergency surgery, but developed complications and died on 5 November 2016. The principal concern was a failure to record and endorse the reviewing doctor’s name and to consider previous abnormal ECG results during handover.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to take previous abnormal ECG results into account during paramedic handover

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Evidence emerged during the inquest that there were failures to record and endorse the name of the Doctor reviewing the ECG and a failure to take into account previous abnormal ECG results during the handover from the paramedic staff. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Sarah Poole · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Summarise electronic ambulance handover information into one or two sheets and attach it to emergency department documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the ambulance handover there have been problems with the new electronic handover system producing lengthy documents. However, we have now introduced a way of summarising this information into 1 to 2 sheets which will be printed off and attached to the ED patient documentation. To ensure that medical staff review this information we have included in the discharge checklist (shared at the inquest) a statement which will ask the clinician to confirm that they have read the pre-hospital information. The checklist has been agreed by the Senior Team in ED and is in the process of being incorporated electronically into the printed element of ED patient documentation. We cannot confirm at this time the exact implementation date but it will be within the next month, and along with the ECG process we plan to audit the compliance with the discharge checklist on a monthly basis.”

    Source location

    2017-0176-Response-by-The-Royal-Wolverhampton-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate a clinician confirmation that pre-hospital information was reviewed into the emergency department discharge documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the ambulance handover there have been problems with the new electronic handover system producing lengthy documents. However, we have now introduced a way of summarising this information into 1 to 2 sheets which will be printed off and attached to the ED patient documentation. To ensure that medical staff review this information we have included in the discharge checklist (shared at the inquest) a statement which will ask the clinician to confirm that they have read the pre-hospital information. The checklist has been agreed by the Senior Team in ED and is in the process of being incorporated electronically into the printed element of ED patient documentation. We cannot confirm at this time the exact implementation date but it will be within the next month, and along with the ECG process we plan to audit the compliance with the discharge checklist on a monthly basis.”

    Source location

    2017-0176-Response-by-The-Royal-Wolverhampton-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit compliance with the emergency department discharge checklist monthly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the ambulance handover there have been problems with the new electronic handover system producing lengthy documents. However, we have now introduced a way of summarising this information into 1 to 2 sheets which will be printed off and attached to the ED patient documentation. To ensure that medical staff review this information we have included in the discharge checklist (shared at the inquest) a statement which will ask the clinician to confirm that they have read the pre-hospital information. The checklist has been agreed by the Senior Team in ED and is in the process of being incorporated electronically into the printed element of ED patient documentation. We cannot confirm at this time the exact implementation date but it will be within the next month, and along with the ECG process we plan to audit the compliance with the discharge checklist on a monthly basis.”

    Source location

    2017-0176-Response-by-The-Royal-Wolverhampton-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Ahshiyah Bibi · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ahshiyah Bibi died at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital on 22 December 2016 after admission with reduced consciousness and acute renal failure. During her treatment, there was a delay in commencing treatment for high potassium and an insulin prescribing and dispensing error. The report identified concerns about missing blood gas results and the absence of a Trust-wide review or system to reduce the risk of similar errors.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to act on identified missing blood gas results

    Wider context from the report

    “3. ████████ evidence was that although he has investigated the insulin prescribing error and it has been discussed with the individuals involved there has not been a Trust wide review of the risks of this occurring again and consideration of a system to reduce the risk of error. The problem of missing blood gas results was identified by ████████ but not considered for further action within the department or across the Trust. ”

    Source location

    Ahshiyah Bibi · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure arterial blood gas results remain available to clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When reviewing Mrs. Bibi at 02:14 ████████ did not have the results from an arterial blood gas performed by the nursing team at 01:52 which demonstrated high potassium therefore treatment for high potassium was not commenced until approximately 04:00 when the high potassium had been identified. It was the evidence of ████████ and ████████ that from time to time the hard copy blood gas results do get separated from the records and if the Clinician doesn’t know the test has been undertaken they will have no reason to go and source the results. ”

    Source location

    Ahshiyah Bibi · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Annette KRASINSKY-LLOYD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Annette KRASINSKY-LLOYD died at Royal Surrey County Hospital on 20 April 2016 after an unwitnessed fall caused a pelvic fracture and retro-peritoneal haemorrhage, resulting in hypovolemic shock. The report identified inadequate A&E governance and delays in consultant involvement, investigations, reversal of anticoagulation and blood transfusions, as well as inadequate monitoring that contributed to poor intravenous access.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in obtaining test results

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Notwithstanding (1) there were additional delays in obtaining results of tests and the conduct of an appropriate assessment of the deceased’s condition. This in turn led to delays in reversing the deceased’s anti-coagulation therapy and administering blood transfusions. ”

    Source location

    Annette KRASINSKY-LLOYD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Grant Lincoln RICHARDS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Grant Richards died by suicide on 19 October 2016 after ejecting himself from a tenth-floor window and suffering catastrophic injuries. The report identified failures to act on an A&E request for chest-clinic follow-up, failures in contingency and audit systems, omissions in GP reporting, and failures to act on mental-health service fax communications. It noted that anxiety about possible lung cancer may have prolonged or exacerbated his depression leading to his suicide.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to act on requested clinical follow-up

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr Richards previous medical history included diagnoses of depression, and anxiety, for which he was treated at various times pharmacologically, by inpatient treatment in a secure hospital, by access to the Home Treatment Team and by community based mental health care. His history included self-harm and suicide attempt. His anxieties included financial worry, debt, unemployment and eviction. He attended A&E at Whipps Cross Hospital on 23rd July 2016 for treatment of pain in his right loin. Whilst there he was x-rayed to the chest, which revealed a “shadow” on the right side. The hospital advised Mr Richards and his sister who attended with him that this matter would be raised with the GP, and he was informed that the hospital recommended follow-up in the chest clinic. The discharge summary recorded “disch for GP F/Up – to check progress” and also specifically noted the clinician’s comments which included “please arrange F/U in the chest clinic”. A letter was given to the patient as well as emailed to the GP surgery. The initial GP evidential witness report to the Coroner, prepared for submission to the Inquest, made no mention of this event. I heard evidence that the usual surgery protocol was that a reviewing doctor would assess all emailed reports received into the surgery, and in a case like this would instruct the surgery receptionist to contact the patient to arrange an appointment for such follow-up to be actioned. The evidence was that this did not happen. There was no follow-up. When Mr Richards was next seen in surgery on 5th October 2016, the x-rays were not discussed and there was no discussion of the requested follow-up with either the doctor, Mr Richards or his sister. The evidence was that Mr Richards was thought to be alarmed at the prospect that he might have lung cancer, from which his mother had died, and it was possible that this anxiety played a part in the prolongation or exacerbation of his depression leading to his suicide. Additionally, evidence was given that in the course of a Root Cause Serious Incident Investigation conducted by an independent panel at the behest of the mental health authority (North East London Foundation Trust) that documents were sent electronically by fax from agencies of the Trust, especially the home treatment team and/or the Redbridge Access and Assessment Brief Intervention Team, which the GP surgery did not act upon although the Trust had received successful transmission reports generated by the fax machine. The features of: a) failure to act upon the request in the A&E discharge summary; b) failure to have a contingency system or audit in place to ensure that such failures are not missed; c) failure to include reference to the attendance at A&E and the discharge summary generated as a result of it, in the GP evidential report; d) and failure to act on fax documents sent to the surgery, all indicate a want of management control, lack of suitable procedures in place and a poor attention to documents received. ”

    Source location

    Grant Lincoln RICHARDS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Paul William BARBER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul William BARBER had recently diagnosed aggressive lung cancer and developed pericarditis with fluid around his heart. Samples of the fluid were sent to microbiology in the wrong containers, causing a potential delay, and the identification of two organisms was not reported to clinicians until shortly after his death. The report identified these as failings, while stating that, on the balance of probabilities, they did not affect the outcome in this case.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in reporting important microbiology results to clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Delay in reporting important results to clinicians. On the 22nd July bacterial growth was detected in the bottles and gram staining showed gram positive cocci – this information was passed to the medical team looking after Mr Barber. On the next day, Saturday 23rd July, the laboratory found the same sample growing two organisms. This indicated that Mr Barber had a bacterial pericarditis – this was a very unusual situation and the identification of the organisms ought to have been given on the Saturday as soon as it was known to the medical team. For some reason the organisms were not reported until Tuesday 26th July shortly after Mr Barber’s death. Had these results been given appropriately on the 23rd July appropriate steps could have been taken to treat the patient with antibiotics. It is right to say that in this particular case on the balance of probabilities the two failings mentioned above did not affect the outcome – however it is right to report this so that these mistakes are highlighted and do not occur again either in this Hospital Trust or any other. ”

    Source location

    Paul William BARBER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss the delayed laboratory-result notification at a microbiology and infection clinical governance meeting as training for registrars prioritising urgent follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concerning the delay in updating the clinicians caring for the patient about the new laboratory findings, the microbiology and infection department have discussed Mr Barber’s case in detail at their clinical governance meeting, as part of training for microbiology registrars to help them discriminate effectively in prioritising urgent follow up for appropriate specimens.”

    Source location

    Paul-Barber-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 August 2017

    Open published response
  8. North Wales (Eastern and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Raymond Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Raymond Edwards underwent surgery for ischaemic bowel and later developed an anastomotic leak, sepsis and multi-organ failure; he died on 2 December 2015. The principal concern was the absence of a reliable system for ensuring that histology results reached the named consultant, in this case delaying awareness of amyloidosis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a reliable system for delivering histology results to named consultants

    Wider context from the report

    “During the Inquest it became clear that there is no reliable system or protocol for the dissemination of histology results to the named consultant for a patient. In this case the consultant for Mr Edwards informed the inquest that the histology result had gone to the file of Mr Edwards as he had been discharged. He did not chase the result as the operation passed without incident. The Consultant informed the court that had he had the result of histology showing amyloidosis that he would immediately have referred the patient on for urgent investigation of this serious condition. Having had these results at an early stage would have informed the treatment for Mr Edwards subsequently. The fact that this information was not passed in a timely fashion did not cause or contribute to the death of Mr Edwards. However, it is clear that unless there is a clear system for bringing histology results to the attention of a named Consultant that there could be a death in future. The consultant himself identified a need for a more robust system of delivering histology reports to consultants. ”

    Source location

    Mr Raymond Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement Procedure MD23 to mitigate risks from failure to act on diagnostic results.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of cases where failure to act on findings caused delays in patient treatment a series of meetings were arranged to review current practice and establish consistent and robust systems for disseminating results following examinations and tests. Work was undertaken to develop BCUHB Procedure MD23 ‘Procedure to mitigate the risks due to failure to act on diagnostic results’ based on NPSA 16 guidance. This procedure was approved at the end of 2016 and a copy is in the action plan.”

    Source location

    2017-0029-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop the CHAI Ping electronic reporting solution to alert requesting clinicians, record action taken, and reduce printing of WCP results.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To strengthen this process an electronic reporting system with a function to alert the requesting clinician when histology reports are authorised for viewing needs to be made available. Work has begun to develop the CHAI Ping app to provide the solution to the current gap in the WCP of ‘notification’ that a result is available and ‘authorise and recording of action taken’. This would work with the WCP to enable the organisation to improve assurance and stop printing reports for the results in scope i.e. those available to view in the WCP.”

    Source location

    2017-0029-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Following up and acting on histology results remains the ultimate responsibility of the health professional who ordered the investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is the ultimate responsibility of the health professional ordering the investigation to follow up the results and to act on them. This has been facilitated by the histology reports being sent to the requesting clinician and not the clinical location of the procedure. However paper histology reports may not reach their intended destination and for this reason all histology reports are also made available to the named Consultant on the Welsh Clinical Portal (WCP).”

    Source location

    2017-0029-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response
  9. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Gordon Arthur · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gordon Arthur underwent a right total hip replacement on 18 August 2016 and subsequently developed an infection at the surgical site, suffered a cardiac arrest, and died on 5 October 2016. The principal concern was the lack of policies governing investigative tests and the notification of results to consultants, which could result in patients not receiving required treatment and a future death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of policies governing notification of investigative test results to responsible Consultants

    Wider context from the report

    “i. The lack of policies dealing with the process of investigative tests and the notification of their results to Consultants in charge of a patient’s care could lead to patients not being given the treatment they require, which could result in a future death. I therefore request that you review the policies and procedures relating to investigative procedures and the reporting of their results to the Consultant in charge of the patient’s care in order to prevent a future death. ”

    Source location

    Gordon Arthur · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a joint review of policies governing radiological investigation requests and communication of results to requesting clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following receipt of your letter the Clinical Director for Radiology and the Clinical Director for the Orthopaedic service carried out a joint review of the current trust policies in relation to the ordering of radiological investigations and how the results of such investigations are communicated to the requesting clinicians.”

    Source location

    2017-0009-Response-by-Salford-Royal-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate radiology notification protocols by email and discuss them at the Orthopaedic clinical governance meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is clear that channels of good communication are needed to ensure that this system is effective. The review confirmed that Salford Royal NHS Trust has the following protocols in place;”

    Source location

    2017-0009-Response-by-Salford-Royal-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing radiology notification protocols and communication arrangements are considered sufficient to support timely review and appropriate treatment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is clear that channels of good communication are needed to ensure that this system is effective. The review confirmed that Salford Royal NHS Trust has the following protocols in place;”

    Source location

    2017-0009-Response-by-Salford-Royal-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response
  10. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Lita SERKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lita Serkes underwent surgery at Whipps Cross Hospital on 22 July 2016, suffered a stroke the following morning, was transferred to the Royal London Hospital later that day, and died on 24 July. The concerns included discrepancies in observations and clinical records, delay in transfer for specialist stroke care, undelivered pain relief, and delayed recognition and assessment of a significant bleed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of computer systems delaying access to blood results

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The same surgeon described in court his view that [static] imaging did not disclose any active bleeding and so there was no indication to return to theatre. However, later in evidence he agreed that the scans simply showed a collection of blood and could not demonstrate whether the bleeding was active. When I asked about the haemoglobin, he responded that at 3.04pm that afternoon, it was recorded as 7 (he said 7, not 70), having dropped from a normal level of 120. He explained that this result might have been available earlier, but the computers were down in the middle of the day. After further discussion, the surgeon told me that, given the 8cm haematoma he had diagnosed at the beginning of the day (Saturday, 23 July), he now believes that more efforts should have been made to review the blood results earlier, and in any event before Mrs Serkes was transferred to the Royal London Hospital. He said that if he had considered the blood results earlier in the day, he would have recognised a much bigger bleed than he actually appreciated. He said that he would probably have advised a further laparotomy – though of course there is no way of knowing if Mrs Serkes would have survived that. ”

    Source location

    Lita SERKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review blood results promptly before emergency transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The same surgeon described in court his view that [static] imaging did not disclose any active bleeding and so there was no indication to return to theatre. However, later in evidence he agreed that the scans simply showed a collection of blood and could not demonstrate whether the bleeding was active. When I asked about the haemoglobin, he responded that at 3.04pm that afternoon, it was recorded as 7 (he said 7, not 70), having dropped from a normal level of 120. He explained that this result might have been available earlier, but the computers were down in the middle of the day. After further discussion, the surgeon told me that, given the 8cm haematoma he had diagnosed at the beginning of the day (Saturday, 23 July), he now believes that more efforts should have been made to review the blood results earlier, and in any event before Mrs Serkes was transferred to the Royal London Hospital. He said that if he had considered the blood results earlier in the day, he would have recognised a much bigger bleed than he actually appreciated. He said that he would probably have advised a further laparotomy – though of course there is no way of knowing if Mrs Serkes would have survived that. ”

    Source location

    Lita SERKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reiterate to all medical staff the availability of point-of-care tests for deteriorating patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. The Trust has reiterated to all medical staff the availability and option of using point of care tests when managing deteriorating patients. These are tests that can be carried out at the point of care ie. without having to send the sample to the laboratory. The Trust feels that by highlighting this option to all staff will ensure that investigations will be performed with the appropriate degree of urgency in the future.”

    Source location

    2016-0458-Response-by-Barts-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026