Recurring concern

Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted upon

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First reported 11 Sep 2013•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the end-to-end process for managing clinical investigation results when the result is not reliably made available to, brought to the attention of, correctly checked or interpreted by, and acted upon by the responsible clinical team.

Not included

  • Excludes failures concerning treatment monitoring or prescribing unless the assertion specifically concerns management of the resulting investigation result.
  • Excludes generic documentation, staffing, training or communication deficiencies that are not explicitly tied to the management of an investigation result.
  • Excludes administrative or test-ordering failures where no result-management deficiency is identified.
  • Excludes failures involving non-clinical items, equipment or processes unrelated to clinical investigation results.
Reports
108

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
138

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
168

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care15
NHS England12
Care Quality Commission7
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB5
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust4
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists4
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust4
Barts Health NHS Trust3
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency3
Recipient name withheld3
Royal London Hospital3
Ashford and St Peter'S Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
Bristol NHS Foundation Trust2
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Johanna Marie MORELAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Johanna Marie Moreland died on 8 March 2021 at Medway Maritime Hospital following intra-abdominal haemorrhage after a liver biopsy, in the context of advanced hepatocellular carcinoma. Concerns included delays in receiving lumbar puncture results and starting antiviral treatment, and failure to follow or record required observations after the biopsy due to miscommunication between Trust staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in making lumbar puncture results available

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Results from lumbar puncture taken on 26th February 2021 were made available on 4th March 2021. Evidence heard at the inquest was that Lumbar Puncture tests are usually for diagnosis of serious illness and would usually be made available within 24-48 hours. (2) The Lumbar Puncture results were positive for encephalitis and in the absence of the tests results, a liver biopsy was conducted and, there was a delay in antiviral treatment commencing. ”

    Source location

    Johanna Marie MORELAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The viral lumbar puncture results were received within the normal turnaround time for this outsourced investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has investigated the timeframe for the availability of Mrs Moreland’s results. The cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) sample was taken on Friday 26th February 2021 and was received at the Pathology department at 17:28 on the same evening. The standard cell count, protein and glucose levels and bacterial screening and culture, performed in our microbiology laboratory at North Kent Pathology Services based at Dartford, was available within normal turnaround time of 24-48hrs and was unremarkable.”

    Source location

    2021-0240-Response-from-Medway-Maritime-Hospital_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2021

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Samantha Singh · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Samantha Singh developed a suspected nut allergy, was assessed as having a mixed nut allergy, and was prescribed an EpiPen. On 25 July 2020, she became unwell at home and suffered a cardiac arrest attributable to anaphylactic shock; she could not be resuscitated. The concerns included the miscategorisation of her test results, prescription of only one EpiPen, and lack of referral to an allergy clinic or follow-up appointment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately categorise RAST test results

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Results of Miss Singh’s RAST test were wrongly categorised by the surgery as normal. As such, no further action was indicated by the surgery. It was only Miss Singh’s perseverance that led to a follow-up appointment being arranged to discuss the results with her GP where the mistake was discovered ”

    Source location

    Samantha Singh · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Robert Collins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Robert Collins died at Whipps Cross Hospital on 4 April 2018 as a result of a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm. The report describes delays and errors in identifying, communicating, and acting on the aneurysm, which required ongoing monitoring. Concerns were also raised about the CERNER system not reliably sending results to the appropriate clinician and about the limited visibility of radiology reports for unexpected significant findings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the results-routing system to send results to the referring clinician

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Inquest heard evidence that the current CERNER system does not always ensure that results are sent through to the referring clinician. The Inquest heard evidence of a “quirk” in the system whereby results will be sent through to doctors who have no involvement in the patient's care. 2. The Inquest heard evidence that radiologists can now drop reports into a folder where there are unexpected and significant radiological findings. There is a specific folder relating to the finding of abdominal aortic aneurysms. The radiologist however raised a concern at the Inquest that it is not easily apparent to the reporting radiologist that the report has reached the appropriate clinician. ”

    Source location

    Michael Robert Collins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the results-routing system to prevent sending results to uninvolved doctors

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Inquest heard evidence that the current CERNER system does not always ensure that results are sent through to the referring clinician. The Inquest heard evidence of a “quirk” in the system whereby results will be sent through to doctors who have no involvement in the patient's care. 2. The Inquest heard evidence that radiologists can now drop reports into a folder where there are unexpected and significant radiological findings. There is a specific folder relating to the finding of abdominal aortic aneurysms. The radiologist however raised a concern at the Inquest that it is not easily apparent to the reporting radiologist that the report has reached the appropriate clinician. ”

    Source location

    Michael Robert Collins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Ian Allen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ian Allen collapsed suddenly at the nursing home where he resided on 31 December 2019 and died soon after arriving at hospital. The medical cause of death was clozapine toxicity. Concerns included a high clozapine blood level not being acted upon, inadequate monitoring and dose adjustment after smoking cessation, and the absence of a system to escalate blood test results to the consultant.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a system for escalating blood test results to the consultant

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There was no system in place at the time to ensure blood test results were escalated to the consultant to ensure action was taken. ”

    Source location

    Ian Allen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to act on high clozapine blood test results through repeat testing and dose adjustment

    Wider context from the report

    “1. In February 2019 a blood test result confirmed that Mr Allen had a high level of clozapine in his blood. This was not acted upon and no further blood test was taken. The clozapine dose was not adjusted as it should have been. ”

    Source location

    Ian Allen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send pharmacy reports of clozapine results above 600 to the Clozapine Lead for direct escalation to the Consultant and Divisional Pharmacist.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a system in place whereby anomalous results received are escalated to the Consultant, for example, via the Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting, the administrative staff in receipt of paper results or by junior medical staff who have checked electronic investigations; however on this occasion it appears that this failed. We have therefore put in place an additional control whereby our Information Team will send a report to the pharmacy Clozapine Lead of any results >600 so that these can be escalated directly to the Consultant and the Divisional Pharmacist so that appropriate action can be taken. This will include discussion and action where appropriate at the Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting.”

    Source location

    2020-0161-Response-from-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 October 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit all patients prescribed clozapine on the identified doctor’s caseload for unconsidered anomalous results.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have commenced an audit of all patients prescribed Clozapine on Dr ████████’s caseload to ensure that there are no other patients for whom anomalous results have not been considered. In addition, we are in the process of issuing a practice alert to all of our Doctors reminding them of the importance of review when anomalous results are evident.”

    Source location

    2020-0161-Response-from-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 October 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a practice alert to doctors reminding them to review anomalous clozapine results.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have commenced an audit of all patients prescribed Clozapine on Dr ████████’s caseload to ensure that there are no other patients for whom anomalous results have not been considered. In addition, we are in the process of issuing a practice alert to all of our Doctors reminding them of the importance of review when anomalous results are evident.”

    Source location

    2020-0161-Response-from-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 October 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen multidisciplinary meeting focus on physical health and include clozapine in quality-improvement checks of testing and abnormal-result actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have existing Multi-Disciplinary team meetings in place across our organisation and are now specifically strengthening the focus on physical health within these meetings utilising a quality improvement approach. This will provide an additional system for checking that periodic tests have taken place, ensuring that they are routinely acted upon when they are abnormal. Clozapine has now been added to this project to increase awareness.”

    Source location

    2020-0161-Response-from-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 October 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Draft and send a clozapine safety alert to clinicians to support immediate action where necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, as we set out in response to your first point, further education will be built into the Post Graduate Medical Education programme to address any gaps in knowledge on clozapine. A safety alert is also being drafted and sent to all clinicians so that immediate action can be taken where necessary.”

    Source location

    2020-0161-Response-from-Birmingham-and-Solihull-Mental-Health-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 October 2020

    Open published response
  5. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Sandra O'Connor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Sandra O'Connor had a smear test in September 2014 that was reported as normal when it was not, and her cervical cancer was not diagnosed during examinations in August and November 2016. She was diagnosed and treated in March 2017, but her condition deteriorated and she died from metastatic squamous cell carcinoma of the cervix. The report identified concerns about the incorrect smear result and failures to recognise the cancer or the need for further assessment on several occasions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately report smear test results

    Wider context from the report

    “In this case as well as the fact that the smear test was incorrectly reported there were also 2 occasions when there was a failure to recognise a clinically obvious cancer of the cervix or a failure to recognise a need for further assessment in August and November 2016. In addition the evidence of the experts was that the abnormal appearance of the cervix should also have been diagnosed in February 2017. The North Bristol NHS Trust have developed a guide for “the management of abnormal cervix, ectropian, and post coital bleeding”* and it is the view of the trust that if this guide had been in place at the time that Julie’s medical condition would have been picked up earlier. *I attach a copy of the guide produced by the Trust. ”

    Source location

    Julie Sandra O'Connor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Sandra Dawne Scott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sandra Dawne Scott was prescribed treatment for a urinary infection, but the prescription was not available for collection after changes were made to the electronic prescribing system. She was admitted to hospital with worsening symptoms on 22 April 2019, deteriorated, and died on 23 April 2019. Concerns included the failure to act on hospital urine-test results and the lack of awareness among healthcare professionals of the electronic prescribing system issue; the evidence was that receiving the prescribed or indicated medication would have meant she did not die when she did.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to act on urine test results after patient discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The Royal Hallamshire Hospital received the results of a urine test on the 20.4.19 but did not act upon them as the patient had been discharged. ”

    Source location

    Sandra Dawne Scott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Edward Hearn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Edward Hearn died in hospital after a cardiac arrest, with the medical cause of death including sepsis, bronchopneumonia and multiple myeloma treated with chemotherapy. The report identified concerns that a high globulin result was not followed up, that he was discharged without a safe care plan to minimise fall risk during chemotherapy, and that cardiac monitoring requirements for Carfilzomib may not have been sufficiently definitive.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of laboratory abnormal-result repeating, alerting and follow-up

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The finding of a high globulin by a laboratory from a blood test in A&E was not followed up by either the laboratory or A&E department. It was not in College guidelines of tests which required urgent notification. It was indicative of a fatal disease, which was not diagnosed for approximately another 4 months. I accept the professional opinion of the haematologist that this was a system failure, which is not acknowledged by the Trust. The laboratory suggested an additional action to have an automated comment but that would still not deal with the problem of reports returning to physicians in secondary care. Evidence was heard that there is inconsistency in laboratory repeating and alerting of clinicians even between hospitals in the jurisdiction, and insufficient evidence of a safe system within the Trust. ”

    Source location

    Mr Edward Hearn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Highlight to Emergency Department medical staff the importance of reviewing abnormal blood results and arranging appropriate follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Emergency Department (ED) treating doctor did not note the raised total protein and globulin found on the sample sent on 12 August 2017. This case is being used to highlight to ED medical staff the importance of noting abnormal blood test results and ensuring appropriate follow-up (outpatient or GP). Work is also ongoing to highlight to clinical teams the importance of reviewing test results on inpatients daily. The Trust uses a system called ‘Safety Net’ to circulate key learning themes for clinical teams to be aware of. A Safety Net is being prepared in relation to raised protein/globulin and the association with multiple myeloma. The ‘Screening Diagnostic Improvement Group’ looks at systems to ensure that test results are reviewed promptly to reduce clinical risk.”

    Source location

    Response from Kings College Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare a Safety Net communication on raised protein or globulin and its association with multiple myeloma.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Emergency Department (ED) treating doctor did not note the raised total protein and globulin found on the sample sent on 12 August 2017. This case is being used to highlight to ED medical staff the importance of noting abnormal blood test results and ensuring appropriate follow-up (outpatient or GP). Work is also ongoing to highlight to clinical teams the importance of reviewing test results on inpatients daily. The Trust uses a system called ‘Safety Net’ to circulate key learning themes for clinical teams to be aware of. A Safety Net is being prepared in relation to raised protein/globulin and the association with multiple myeloma. The ‘Screening Diagnostic Improvement Group’ looks at systems to ensure that test results are reviewed promptly to reduce clinical risk.”

    Source location

    Response from Kings College Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the Screening Diagnostic Improvement Group to review systems for prompt test-result review and reduced clinical risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Emergency Department (ED) treating doctor did not note the raised total protein and globulin found on the sample sent on 12 August 2017. This case is being used to highlight to ED medical staff the importance of noting abnormal blood test results and ensuring appropriate follow-up (outpatient or GP). Work is also ongoing to highlight to clinical teams the importance of reviewing test results on inpatients daily. The Trust uses a system called ‘Safety Net’ to circulate key learning themes for clinical teams to be aware of. A Safety Net is being prepared in relation to raised protein/globulin and the association with multiple myeloma. The ‘Screening Diagnostic Improvement Group’ looks at systems to ensure that test results are reviewed promptly to reduce clinical risk.”

    Source location

    Response from Kings College Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that every elevated globulin requires extensive investigation, citing multiple causes and poor clinical utility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust recognises that a raised globulin (a constituent of total protein, which itself was elevated) as a component of liver function tests (LFTs) was not acted upon following an inpatient medical admission with pericarditis in August 2017, and that multiple myeloma was diagnosed in December 2017, when the Deceased presented at the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Kings College Hospital
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Critical-result telephone notification follows professional recommendations, which do not classify elevated total protein as requiring communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust follows the Royal College of Pathologists’ recommendations by telephoning out critical results to the requesting clinician or teams, 24 hours a day. Neither the recommendations in place at the time, ‘Out-of-hours reporting of laboratory results requiring urgent clinical action to primary care: Advice to pathologists and those that work in laboratory medicine, November 2010’, nor the recommendations superseding that document, ‘The communication of critical and unexpected pathology results, October 2017’, identify elevated total protein as a result that needs to be communicated to the requester as a critical limit.”

    Source location

    Response from Kings College Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 May 2019

    Open published response
  8. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Richard HINTON attended A&E with right calf pain and swelling after being advised to attend because of a possible clot. He was discharged before a markedly raised D-Dimer result became available; the inquest recorded pulmonary embolus due to deep vein thrombosis and bleeding duodenal ulcer, with a conclusion of “Preventable Natural Cause”. Concerns included failures in recording and communicating the D-Dimer request and result, delayed testing, inadequate documentation, and other system and process failures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Intermittent systems errors delaying D-Dimer results

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Other matters arising. a) A second set of observations should have been made before Mark was discharged. This did not happen. b) The D-Dimer test result was delayed due to a systems error with the CS2500 machine. It is stated that this may have happened intermittently and is then corrected. Had the system error not occurred it is likely that the (8th) result would have been available on screen for the discharging doctor to review. c) Telephone results are not made if the patient is an in-patient in A&E. The Standing Operation Procedure (SOP) in Pathology states “D-Dimer greater than 500ug/l telephone to GP, out-patients and outlying hospitals (excludes SATH in-patients)”. Is a patient waiting assessment in A&E an out-patient or in-patient or some other category? d) Differential diagnosis. Had all the information to the discharging doctor a differential diagnosis of DVT may have been made and recorded. e) A body map had not been completed at any time. f) Oramorph was recorded as having been given but not checked. Also it may the mask symptoms of pain. g) Whilst D-Dimer tests were becoming routine rather than clinically required, Mark had come in with a possible ‘clot’ whether his earlier symptoms had improved or not. h) The absence of documentation made it difficult if not impossible to resolve factual discrepancies between members of staff. i) The impression given by witnesses was that they were under pressure (racing against the clock) to meet the 4 hour deadline in A&E. ”

    Source location

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear telephone-reporting arrangements for A&E patients

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Other matters arising. a) A second set of observations should have been made before Mark was discharged. This did not happen. b) The D-Dimer test result was delayed due to a systems error with the CS2500 machine. It is stated that this may have happened intermittently and is then corrected. Had the system error not occurred it is likely that the (8th) result would have been available on screen for the discharging doctor to review. c) Telephone results are not made if the patient is an in-patient in A&E. The Standing Operation Procedure (SOP) in Pathology states “D-Dimer greater than 500ug/l telephone to GP, out-patients and outlying hospitals (excludes SATH in-patients)”. Is a patient waiting assessment in A&E an out-patient or in-patient or some other category? d) Differential diagnosis. Had all the information to the discharging doctor a differential diagnosis of DVT may have been made and recorded. e) A body map had not been completed at any time. f) Oramorph was recorded as having been given but not checked. Also it may the mask symptoms of pain. g) Whilst D-Dimer tests were becoming routine rather than clinically required, Mark had come in with a possible ‘clot’ whether his earlier symptoms had improved or not. h) The absence of documentation made it difficult if not impossible to resolve factual discrepancies between members of staff. i) The impression given by witnesses was that they were under pressure (racing against the clock) to meet the 4 hour deadline in A&E. ”

    Source location

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record blood-test requests, reasons and outstanding results

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The information chain. a) When Mark (as the family wish him to be referred to) attended A&E he informed the triage nurse (nurse A) that he had contacted 111 who advised to go to A&E due to possible ‘clot’. That information was not recorded or passed on to others. Recorded examination of Mark included pain and obvious swelling to right calf. b) The Staff Nurse (nurse B) who then carried out observations on Mark came to the view that he ‘could probably do with a D-Dimer’. That nurse states she passed that information to the next (third) nurse (nurse C). c) Nurse C states that information was not passed to her. She was unaware that Mark had pain in his calf and therefore had no reason to request bloods, particularly a D-Dimer test, and had no knowledge of them being requested. d) At or around 19:33 hours it appears that bloods, including a D-Dimer test were requested. However there is no record of these (8) test being recorded or who ordered them or why. e) When the attending doctor first saw Mark at 21:06 hours he saw the results of 7 blood tests none of which indicated to him the presence of a possible DVT. The 8th blood test (i.e. the D-Dimer test) was not shown and as there was no record of it having been requested he did not know it was outstanding and nor in his opinion, was it required. Upon the information before that doctor he medically discharged Mark from hospital. Following Marks’ discharge from hospital the result of the D-Dimer test became available which would have led to Mark being admitted with treatment which probably would have saved his life. ”

    Source location

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit ED staff compliance with documentation requirements and repeat the audit monthly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Agreed. The Trust relies on the integrity of individuals to maintain professional standards of completing documentation. There are clear guidelines issued by both the NMC and the GMC which should be adhered to. An action from the RCA was to audit whether the ED staff were compliant in completing documentation. The initial audit results showed poor compliance and the plan is for the audit to be repeated monthly. The results have been discussed by the senior ED management team who are tasked with bringing improvement.”

    Source location

    2019-0142-Response-by-The-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Because ED patients are classified as in-patients, pathology does not telephone D-Dimer results; the requester must check the system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c. Telephone results are not made if the patient is an in-patient in A&E. The Standing Operation Procedure (SOP) in Pathology states “D-Dimer greater than 500ug/l telephone to GP, out-patients and outlying hospitals (excludes SATH in-patients)”. Is a patient waiting assessment in A&E an out-patient or in-patient or some other category?”

    Source location

    2019-0142-Response-by-The-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The alert facility existed; failure to complete it was attributed to human factors rather than a system failure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a. The system did not require or mandate the person who requested blood tests, specifically in this case a D-Dimer test, to record that request or the reason for it. There was no alert system which would have alerted the final decision maker of that request. At that time a health care assistant, staff nurse or doctor could have requested the tests. Only a doctor may do so now.”

    Source location

    2019-0142-Response-by-The-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
  9. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    William Clifford ATHERTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Clifford Atherton was admitted to hospital on 29 May 2017 with abdominal symptoms, urinary retention and poor kidney function. He was discharged despite worsening renal function and deterioration, and died after returning severely unwell with vomiting of faecal matter, a distended abdomen and severe pain; the reported cause was bowel obstruction. Concerns included the lack of senior medical review and nursing observations, failure to recognise warning signs and worsening blood results, and inconsistent early warning score documentation and escalation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise worsening condition from blood results

    Wider context from the report

    “That no medical review of Mr Atherton took place after the ward round on 30th. That his worsening condition was not recognised by the junior doctor reviewing the blood results. That no nursing observations were carried out in the several hours whilst he waited to go home and that potential warning signs of a bowel obstruction were not recognised and acted upon. His documentation was incorrectly filled in (early warning scores EWS) and thus the proper escalation of treatment which this should have triggered did not take place. That the different department at QEH appear to complete EWS differently results in inconsistent scoring and the potential to not escalate treatment of a patient who needs it. ”

    Source location

    William Clifford ATHERTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Kiff · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Kiff experienced repeated consultations for vaginal discharge, urinary symptoms, heavy menstruation and lower abdominal pain before cervical cancer was diagnosed after an urgent referral in July 2013. The cancer had metastasised to the liver and, after treatment and subsequent decline, she suffered a cardiac arrest and died at Fairfield General Hospital on 14 October 2015. The report identified concerns about failure to follow cancer referral guidance, inadequate examination and history-taking, poor record-keeping and communication, lack of continuity of care, reluctance to perform internal examinations, and inadequate processes for reviewing test results.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate processes for recording test results in electronic patient records

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The processes and procedures in place for reviewing test results and ensuring that they appear within the patient's electronic records appears to be inadequate. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Kiff · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate processes for reviewing test results

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The processes and procedures in place for reviewing test results and ensuring that they appear within the patient's electronic records appears to be inadequate. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Kiff · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use updated diagnostic-result processes to action results on receipt, arrange follow-up for results requiring it, notify patients appropriately, and audit actions in clinical records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The practice has robust processes in place to ensure all diagnostics are actioned on the same day of receipt and where there is an abnormal result these are followed up with the patient. The GP can readily look in the clinical records to review why the test was performed. On most occasions the GP who orders the test will be reviewing the results, but this is not always possible due to patterns of working. In addition, some providers return results to the registered GP rather than the one requesting the test.”

    Source location

    2017-0407-Response-by-Stonefield-Street-Surgery
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Test results were clearly visible in the electronic record, contrary to the concern that results were not appearing within patient records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All test results relating to Miss Sarah Kiff are clearly visible within the patient electronic record. The EMIS computer system records date test requested date received, date of review and filing as well as any practice notes made by the doctor. The report comments on the Ultrasound Scan result for Miss Kiff, but the records clearly show that the report was received on the 25th February, seen and noted to be normal and filed in the patient record, so this was unfortunately not available for her appointment with Dr Younis on 22nd February 2013. This is all auditable within the clinical system.”

    Source location

    2017-0407-Response-by-Stonefield-Street-Surgery
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing diagnostic-result processes ensure tests are actioned on receipt, abnormal results are followed up, and actions are auditable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The practice has robust processes in place to ensure all diagnostics are actioned on the same day of receipt and where there is an abnormal result these are followed up with the patient. The GP can readily look in the clinical records to review why the test was performed. On most occasions the GP who orders the test will be reviewing the results, but this is not always possible due to patterns of working. In addition, some providers return results to the registered GP rather than the one requesting the test.”

    Source location

    2017-0407-Response-by-Stonefield-Street-Surgery
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 February 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026