Recurring concern

Unreliable assessment of suicide and self-harm risk

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 5 May 2013•Latest report 27 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls specifically dedicated to assessing suicide or self-harm risk, including identifying relevant factors, completing or updating assessments, assessing disclosed vulnerability or suicidal intent, using appropriate tools or protocols, and documenting the reasoning needed to support safe observation, referral or protective action across healthcare, custody, police and community settings.

Not included

  • Excludes generic mental-health risk assessments where suicide or self-harm risk is not the material concern.
  • Excludes failures in observation, treatment, referral, communication or protective measures after suicide or self-harm risk has been reliably assessed, unless the assessment process itself is also deficient.
  • Excludes generic staff training, staffing, documentation or communication deficiencies that are not directly dedicated to assessing suicide or self-harm risk.
  • Excludes the underlying occurrence of suicide or self-harm where no failure in a dedicated risk-assessment control is identified.
Reports
77

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
94

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
132

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service12
NHS England9
Department of Health and Social Care7
Home Office7
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust6
North London NHS Foundation Trust5
Metropolitan Police Service4
Ministry of Justice4
North East London NHS Foundation Trust4
Care UK3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
HM Prison Service3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust2
General Medical Council2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Vaughan Lee WHALLEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Vaughan Lee WHALLEY was found unresponsive after being released on bail from police custody and died in hospital on 21 February 2023 despite surgery and supportive care. The principal concerns were that no assessment of his risk of suicide or self-harm on release took place, communication to police about any assessment was unclear, and the practitioner’s contact and subsequent review did not meet best practice or identify learning adequately.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess the risk of suicide or self-harm upon release

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) No assessment of the risk of suicide or self-harm upon release took place during the Deceased’s time in detention ”

    Source location

    Vaughan Lee WHALLEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a Health and Justice risk-assessment procedure covering suicide and self-harm assessment, information sharing, Police IT recording, verbal-feedback documentation, and recording declined assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of the concerns raised we have undertaken a review of the risk assessment processes across our Health and Justice Services. Some inconsistencies in the standards were identified which we have addressed by the development of a Standard Operating Procedure for risk assessment to be applied across Health and Justice Services. The SOP incorporates standards for conducting and sharing risk assessments for people in Police custody. Included in the SOP is a requirement for risk related information to be recorded in the appropriate place in Police IT systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver mandatory three-level suicide-mitigation training to Health and Justice clinical staff through e-learning and taught sessions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The revised standards will be supported and embedded by delivery of Suicide Mitigation Training to all clinical staff working in Health and Justice Services.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 October 2023

    Open published response
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Heather Findlay was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act at Mile End Hospital and ran away while on escorted leave on 11 June 2020. She was later found by a member of the public in a nearby park; the inquest concluded that she died by suicide, with a medical cause of death of hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and ████████ toxicity. The principal concerns included staff preparedness and procedures when a detained patient absconds, unclear responsibilities between ELFT and the police, communication of suicide risk, and the adequacy of risk grading and organisational learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise imminent suicide risk after a patient absconds

    Wider context from the report

    “6. ELFT staff all told me that, after Ms Findlay had run off, they still graded her as medium rather than high risk. She had had long term suicidal thoughts, had made previous attempts on her life and, prior to being admitted to hospital on 20 May 2020 had purchased ████████ and had planned to take this to kill herself. However, she had appeared to improve in hospital, and had been granted 15 minutes’ escorted leave twice a day since 1 June without incident. At one point in her evidence it appeared to me that the matron, taking the point that by running away Ms Findlay had acted in a manner that was wholly unexpected by the trust, was of the view that Ms Findlay should then have been re-categorised as high risk. However, following re-examination by counsel for ELFT the matron appeared to retract this and to return to her former position that, even after she had run away Ms Findlay was only of medium risk to herself. It is of course a matter of clinical opinion what risk grading a patient should be given, and no person can see into the future. However, • the jury found a failure by ELFT to recognise that, by 11 June 2020, Ms Findlay was at imminent risk of suicide by ████████; and • any investigation following a death like Heather Findlay’s presents an opportunity for sober and searching reflection. So I am concerned that an element of positional bias may have influenced the thinking of ELFT staff. I am concerned about this particularly because, when giving evidence at inquest, the ELFT serious incident investigation author was adamant that it was only appropriate for the HCA who called the police on 11 June 2020 after Ms Findlay had run away, to tell the police of a risk of self harm not of a risk of suicide. Her rationale for this was that the last time Ms Findlay had articulated a plan to kill herself, was when she was found in hospital with a ligature round her neck on 28 May 2020. This position seems lacking the necessary reflection. I draw your attention to earlier prevention of future deaths reports (PFDs) as follows: • Sent to ELFT on 8 June 2023 by Assistant Coroner Buckett following the inquest touching the death of Hilary (Billy) Guedalla, including concern regarding the failure of ELFT to inform the police of the serious suicide risk that the deceased posed to themselves; and the confusion among staff about who should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing. • Sent to ELFT on 25 January 2023 by me following the inquest touching the death of Andrew Largin, including concern about omissions from a serious incident investigation. • Sent to ELFT on 20 October 2021 by me following the inquest touching the death of Freeda Glausiusz, including concern about a lack of learning culture at ELFT. ”

    Source location

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Risk Assessment policy in light of recent NICE guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to your fifth and sixth concerns, risk assessment and prediction in relation to suicide are complex areas that the Trust is determined to address appropriately and robustly. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) published guidance in 2022 suggesting that risk stratification (e.g. medium and high risk) should not be used to predict future suicide or self-harm, and that risk assessment tools and scales should not be used for those purposes either. The emphasis should be on supporting the person’s immediate and long-term psychological and physical safety, and on risk formulation.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek external expert opinion on proposed changes to risk assessment policy and procedures before implementation work begins.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ELFT intends to review its policy for Risk Assessment and will consider recent NICE guidance in so doing. We will also be seeking an expert opinion from outside of the Trust about changes we propose for our policy and procedures before a programme of work to implement changes is undertaken, with consideration given to the implications for other organisations at that point. The expected timescale for this programme of work is six months.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Many concerns concern East London Foundation Trust and Metropolitan Police policy, making NHS England inappropriate to respond to them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The concerns in your Report relate to organisational policy at East London Foundation Trust as well as policy within the Metropolitan Police Service. NHS England is not therefore the appropriate organisation to respond to many of the concerns raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles was found unresponsive on 10 April 2021, suspended on a mental health ward, after being admitted under the Mental Health Act following an attempt to take his own life. The principal concerns included failures in risk assessment, observation practices, emergency response, record keeping, and governance processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to incorporate available clinical information into self-harm risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A failure to adequately assess risk of harm - Poor record keeping and a failure to read electronic records meant that important information was not considered at a Multi-Disciplinary Team (“MDT”) ward round on 6ᵗʰ April 2021. The MDT arrived at a conclusion that Mr Charles’ risk of self-harm was “no risk”. A psychologist’s assessment on the clinical record that assessed Mr Charles risk of self-harm as high on 31/3/21 was neither read nor incorporated into the MDT discussion. ”

    Source location

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use live RiO records for handovers, daily run-throughs and MDT ward rounds.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Risk assessment (lack of appropriate consideration of risks) – the Coroner found that poor | 1. | Handovers and daily run through to take place using live RiO | 1. Matrons, Ward Managers and Consultant Psychiatrists to be made aware that this needs to be in place”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit compliance with live-record use and risk-assessment processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. To be audited to ensure compliance | DON/AMD | June 2023”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about care provision and coordination are mainly for the NHS Trust to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises concerns over the provision and coordination of care that Winbourne received at North East London NHS Foundation Trust, which are mainly for the Trust to address. I understand that the Trust has already carefully considered the matters of concern in your report and has provided you with a comprehensive response as well as a copy of its action plan setting out the actions to be taken to improve care quality and patient safety.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response
  4. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Philip John BATTLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip John Battle died by suicide on 8 July 2022 after contacting the ambulance service about an overdose and an attempted hanging. The report raised concerns that the ambulance triage process focused on physical health rather than immediate mental-health and self-harm risks, and that no attempt was made to contact someone who could check on his safety. It also identified limited coordination and shared mental-health crisis resources between ambulance, police and health services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ambulance triage to assess presenting mental-health and self-harm risks

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence has been received that Philip Battle self-referred to the ambulance service stating he had taken an overdose and that he had tried to hang himself. The then triage system (medical priority dispatch) concentrated on questions relating to physical health such as his physiological function rather than assessing the actual presenting risks from poor mental health including self-inflicted fatal harm. Mr Battle lived in warden monitored sheltered accommodation and no inquiry was made about whether someone could be telephoned to check on his safety. Even if Mr Battle had not been in sheltered accommodation, it was unclear as to why there was no triage question about a phone number for a friend or relative. Evidence was given that NWAS work with Lancashire police and the health service in Blackpool with the Synergy project sharing the resources of a triage mental health car. These arrangements and relationships do not exist in Liverpool. The Court was concerned about silo - public health working between Blue light services - given the limited mental health intervention resource for NWAS was not on duty on the morning of 8th July and there was no call to Merseyside Police to see if its Mental Health triage car was available to intervene. Evidence was heard that these services need commissioning and there was no arrangement between Merseyside Police and the NWAS to share mental health intervention resources. This issue appears to become more important when the court heard of the plans for three mental health ambulances to be available in Merseyside and Cheshire in the near future. The Court would like the ambulance service, Police and health providers to work together with the public funds at their respective disposal to develop in concert and to share community mental health crisis intervention resources for the good of the public. ”

    Source location

    Philip John BATTLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Lee · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Lee, aged 22, died by hanging at a disused quarry on 16 September 2021, with the intention to end his life; the inquest concluded that his death was suicide. The report identified concerns about superficial risk assessments, the absence of a key worker, communication with the armed forces and family, and uncertainty about risk-based information sharing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Superficiality of suicide risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “5.1 While acknowledging Daniel’s high level of contact with the IHBBT team, the evidence was that no one was taking responsibility for his care in a ‘key worker’ type role. The large number of people seeing Daniel did not make deep professional relationships with him which would allow his needs and risks to be addressed in a person centred and properly risk sensitive way. The relationships with Daniel were superficial and this infected the risk assessment process. The large number of mental health professionals in contact with Daniel inhibited him establishing deep relationships of trust. 5.2 The risk assessments themselves were therefore superficial, often relying uncritically on self-reporting without meaningfully engaging in suicide risk prevention. The initial risk assessment on first contact on 16.07.21 was flawed in that, despite the presenting context being an attempt at suicide by hanging, the risk assessment was ‘low risk of suicide’. 5.3 Daniel was a serving soldier and there was a failure to meaningfully communicate and engage with his Regiment and the medical staff attached to it. 5.4 Communication with the family was superficial and the evidence was that their perception was that they couldn’t fully share issues and concerns because of perceived barriers in information sharing. This may not have been the team’s intention, but it was the reality felt by the family. This inhibited their engagement with the team in Daniel’s best interests. The evidence of ████████ was that engagement with the family was important because they were the people who knew Daniel best and who would be the first to identify any risks or concerns. 5.5 There was evidence that staff in the team struggled with decision making around information sharing. For example, on 15.09.21, the day before he died, Daniel’s girlfriend called to share concerns about his wellbeing. The person taking the call indicated that Daniel’s lack of knowledge of her referral placed the team in difficulty in sharing the information. In the event, a practitioner saw Daniel for a visit only a few minutes later and correctly identified his need for an urgent psychiatric review. Notwithstanding this, I considered that this was evidence of a failure to understand the basics of risk-based information sharing. 5.6 In summary, therefore, I considered that there was evidence that a failure to address these issues could create a risk of further deaths: • Superficiality of risk assessments • Lack of a key worker approach • Lack of communication with the armed forces, army in this case • Superficiality of communication with the family • Anxiety about appropriate risk sharing ”

    Source location

    Daniel Lee · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate three shared Key Workers using clinical-risk and staff-availability criteria, with regular caseload audits to confirm allocation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a result of the learning from Mr Lee’s death, how the team allocates a Key Worker has changed to include the following:”

    Source location

    Response from South West Yorkshire Partnership
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The 16 July 2021 risk assessment was not flawed; two experienced clinicians considered relevant static and dynamic risk factors before grading risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We note your concern that the “risk assessment on 16.07.21 was flawed”. This assessment was completed by an experienced Psychiatrist and Mental Health Nurse, both of which agreed with the assessment of self-harm and suicide risk following the assessment. A risk assessment considers a wide and diverse range of information, as evidenced by the clinical entries for this contact, the IHBTT inquest statement and the Serious Incident Investigation report. There was a recent history of attempted ligature, the circumstances around that were explored, factors including Mr Lee’s engagement, insight into his problems, future planning and presentation post self-harming event were all considered as part of the global assessment of risk. These factors when combined informed the grading of the risk.”

    Source location

    Response from South West Yorkshire Partnership
    Page 4 · response
    Published 25 November 2022

    Open published response
  6. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel John O’Sullivan was found deceased on 27 March 2019 while a voluntary psychiatric patient at St Charles Hospital, after leaving the hospital unescorted and failing to return. The principal concerns were failures to update his self-harm risk assessment, formulate a care and treatment plan, document unescorted leave, and promptly notify police when he did not return. The report also raised concerns that the hospital’s serious incident investigation did not identify or investigate these issues adequately.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to update suicide self-harm risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “1) On completion of the inquest, I found the decision to rescind detention under s.2 on 25/3/19 was undermined in two essential respects: a) A failure to update a suicide self-harm risk assessment. b) A failure to formulate a Care and Treatment plan identifying core treatment needs. A Serious Incident Investigation (SII), commissioned by CNWL, completed on 9/9/2019, investigated the Risk Assessment and made recommendations which I heard from a CNWL witness had subsequently been implemented and I am satisfied that his risk to life has been satisfactorily reduced. However, I remain concerned that the Care and Treatment plan aspect was not identified by the SII and as such no recommendations were identified and followed up. The psychiatrist who rescinded s.2, on 25/3/2019, was unable to participate in the inquest through illness. As a result, I instructed an independent expert psychiatrist who gave evidence that there had been no treatment plan addressing Daniel’s core treatment needs. The core treatment needs were that Daniel required antipsychotic medication to control his delusional beliefs and psychological intervention to address his substance misuse which exacerbated his delusional beliefs. The expert also identified from statements and medical records that Daniel lacked insight into his mental health conditions and thereby lacked capacity. The treatment Daniel required was twofold. Assertive treatment of the delusional disorder with antipsychotics, whilst detained under s.2, to achieve stability, coupled with psychological therapy to address the illicit drug use. I heard evidence that antipsychotics could not commence until the results of liver function tests were available, but this did not persuade the expert, that recession of s.2 was correct. The psychiatrist who rescinded s.2 on 25/3/19 was interviewed by the SII but the care and treatment plan aspect was not explored by that investigation. My concern is that failures in the formulation of a Care and Treatment Plan made a significant contribution to the death and this failing was not exposed until the inquest when it could have been identified much earlier by the SII in September 2019. The fact that a Care and Treatment plan was not formulated gives me concern that the mistake could be repeated in future and my concern is compounded by the SII failing to investigate and make recommendations arising from this issue. ”

    Source location

    Daniel John O’Sullivan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce Advanced Clinical Practitioners to support care planning, risk management and identification of Care and Treatment Plan deficiencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, St Charles Mental Health Unit has recruited and trained Advanced Clinical Practitioners (ACPs). One of the roles of the ACP is to support the MDT and in particular the nursing team with specific interventions, care planning and risk management. This includes reviewing the Care and Treatment Plan and highlighting any deficiencies.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Clinical Risk Assessment and Safety Policy and mandate its associated e-learning for staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Clinical Risk Assessment and Safety Policy was reviewed in April 2021 which includes an e-learning package introduced in October 2020 which is now a mandatory requirement for staff to complete.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 25 October 2022

    Open published response
  7. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Katharine Mary TYRER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Katharine Mary TYRER died at the scene on 12 April 2018 after being found unresponsive with a ligature in a bathroom on the Lakefield Ward. The report identified concerns about the ward layout limiting observation, inadequate risk assessment, missed opportunities to respond to increased short-term risk, and the absence of a clear protocol for escalation and enhanced monitoring.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear protocol for responding to short-term suicide risk after a trigger event

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The argument with her husband was a trigger event for Katharine. She was seen briefly by some ward staff between her return to the ward at around 10:25 and 11:00, but left completely unattended between 11:00-12:00. The jury felt that there was a missed opportunity at this time to affect the outcome and that the assessment of the risk that Katharine posed to herself had been inadequate. The evidence indicated that ward staff (seemingly regardless of their level of experience and seniority) who attend a patient in a situation like this are left to determine what (if any) action to take based upon their clinical judgement. In particular, it is left to the individual to decide whether escalation to a senior clinician would be appropriate and whether observations or monitoring (or even simply staying with the patient) should be increased for a period of time. I was told that it would not be unworkable in any scenario such as this (involving knowledge of a trigger event in the case of an impulsive patient with a known history of suicide attempts and self-harm) for there to be a procedure which called for an automatic review by the senior clinician on the ward at the time. However, that is not the current situation. I am concerned that, in the absence of a clear protocol, relatively junior staff (who may not be able to effect an adequate risk assessment) may not be equipped to determine how best to address the short-term risk. ”

    Source location

    Katharine Mary TYRER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Supportive Observation and Engagement Policy to require automatic senior review when non-registered staff identify a trigger event.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “specific regards to the Supportive Observation & Engagement Policy (CP25) we have further reviewed Issue 12 (Implemented 30 August 2022) and note that in the zonal section of the policy (Appendix 1) it does articulate the need to escalate changes in behaviour to a more senior member of staff in addition to peer independent peer review.”

    Source location

    Response from Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide face-to-face clinical risk training using formulation and SystmOne application to all inpatient staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to the update of the policy, further training is being provided to all in-patient staff as part of a Quality Improvement approach. With effect from December 2022 face to face clinical risk training using a formulation approach will be delivered linking the 5 ’p’s model (predisposition to risk, precipitating factors for risk, perpetuating factors for risk preventative factors for risk) with the practical application of SystmOne (electronic patient record system).”

    Source location

    Response from Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 October 2022

    Open published response
  8. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Antony Christopher MCLELLAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Antony Christopher McLellan was found unresponsive, hanging by a ligature in the garage at his home on 9 July 2021; his death was recognised that afternoon and the inquest concluded that he died by suicide. Concerns included that assessment and formulation of risks and safety did not fully explore the impact of his autism, including how he might communicate distress and risk, and that autism-informed support and services required significant improvement and expansion.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to incorporate autism into assessment and management of self-harm risk

    Wider context from the report

    “1 Mr McLellan was diagnosed over 2016/16 as being autistic with a designation of Asperger’s Syndrome. He was also diagnosed as experiencing Bipolar Disorder, an attribution he did not accept which he repeatedly asserted to both previous Mental Health care providers and the subsequent Trust clinicians tasked with supporting him at the time of his death, Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust (“TEWV”) 2 He insisted his difficulties were linked to his autism and not mental disorder. It was accepted that he experienced autism and that was part of his individuality and that in addition he may have had a mental health disorder. It was accepted that his care and treatment cannot unbundle the two but he should be treated holistically. 3 Assessment and formulation of risks and safety summary did not fully explore the impact of his autism. There was little to suggest that TEWV staff) considered the higher prevalence of suicide for individuals with a diagnosis of autism and that Mr McLellan may have communicated his distress and risks information differently to an individual without a diagnosis of autism during his periods of crisis or increased risk and c) made sufficient reasonable adjustments in relation to the impact of his autism. 4 At the time of his death, TEWV had progressed from a low baseline in the Trust’s work in North Yorkshire to address perceived underdevelopment in their services for the autistic patient when presenting with a mental health disorder. It had expanded the use of a specialist team (Autism Project Team- “APT”) to extend its work into North Yorkshire caseload. The steps taken were incremental and not all staff understood that Team and access to that important resource. It is recognised that improvements would take time and be resource dependent as well however. 5 APT has three specialist and autism dedicated practitioners working exclusively with autism across the whole Trust in both its regions of commissioned care although there are also non-dedicated clinicians with some expertise of autism within TEWV. TEWV does not treat autism in North Yorkshire. 6 TEWV in its recent audit indicates about 17% of the individuals open to TEWV (over 10,000 in number) have an autism marker or have an ICD-10 diagnosis of autism or experience suspected/confirmed autism or have a referral including being suspected as autistic. 7 There was no direct causation to the suicide found that directly attributed the acts he took to his autism from the evidence. However Mr McLellan’s distress and stressors before his death included his feelings that he was not getting what he saw to be the right help and that he would not lose his feelings of helplessness such that he took his own life. The concern is that the very significant number of those open to TEWV with an autism marker has increased and will continue to do so and that the higher prevalence of suicide within that expanding group will lead to higher risk of, and numbers of, autistic individuals dying because of suicide both within TEWV locally but also nationally. Urgent solutions are required to prevent further deaths of autistic individuals especially those with mental health disorder by rapidly improving and expanding provisions for assessment and management of risk of harm to themselves for individuals within the autism spectrum while presenting with a mental health disorder. ”

    Source location

    Antony Christopher MCLELLAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    TEWV is responsible for delivering mental health services and making autism-related reasonable adjustments under its contract.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CCG (and now ICB) commission Tees, Esk, Wear Valley NHS Trust (TEWV) to provide the Mental Health provision to the residents of North Yorkshire. This would be the case whatever the Mental Health condition is and whether that is suspected, being assessed or diagnosed. The contract requires this provision of service. In addition to this where an individual with mental health conditions also has a diagnosis of autism, the contractual expectation would be that TEWV would make reasonable adjustments to their service to ensure that it is delivered to meet the needs of those individuals with autism and a mental health condition.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 September 2022

    Open published response
  9. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Samuel Joseph Gomm · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Samuel Joseph Gomm, who had chronic mental ill health exacerbated by periods of alcohol abuse, died after deliberately self-inflicting lacerations to his neck at home on 3 June 2019. The principal concerns related to the WARRN risk-assessment tool: its format, accessibility and presentation could make fluctuating self-harm risks difficult for new or infrequent users to identify, potentially resulting in under-estimation of risk and sub-optimal mitigating measures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the WARRN assessment tool to prompt consideration and recording of advocacy referrals and capacity assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The evidence I received indicated that the WARRN assessment documentation/tool could be routinely accessed, updated & revised by the Integrated Team. It was a fluid document for the purpose of recording information as to the current assessment of risk(s) of self-harm & how that risk(s) was to be mitigated. Whilst I received evidence that in practice, such risk assessments were being undertaken with Sam, the WARRN documentation did not necessarily reflect that, nor was it optimally viewable in terms of clearly recording fluctuating presentations & any accompanying re-assessment of risk. (3) It appeared to me that the format/layout of the WARRN tool, its accessibility, & in particular, its ability to provide a user with clear & easily viewable information as to how Sam’s risk of self-harm had fluctuated/altered/changed in the months preceding his death, could lead to important information/assessments being lost to a new/infrequent user. This, for example, might be a new care co-ordinator (as in Sam’s case), Crisis Team/Community Nurse, or clinician not previously involved with Sam. (4) Given the variety of services involved in Sam’s care, this central document, addressing & recording fluctuating risk appeared to me to be a crucial document in the recording of current risk (eg emphasis). The ability of those charged with Sam’s care to view those fluctuations might be hampered by the current presentation of/access to such information. That could lead to an under-estimation of the current risk & sub-optimal mitigating measures being put in place. (5) The WARRN assessment tool might also benefit from a greater degree of interaction between it & the user. For example, it was clear, on the evidence that Social Worker’s, Mental Health Nurses & Clinicians were all busy addressing the needs (& assessing risk) of a wide number & variety of patients. Prompting (my emphasis) the user to consider & record referrals for, for example, to advocacy services & for capacity assessments might optimise the benefits of the tool & reduce the risk of such opportunities being missed/un-recorded. Such then leading to the potential absence of key information for new/infrequent users when assessing risks of self-harm ”

    Source location

    Samuel Joseph Gomm · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the WARRN documentation to clearly and accessibly record fluctuating self-harm risk and reassessments

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The evidence I received indicated that the WARRN assessment documentation/tool could be routinely accessed, updated & revised by the Integrated Team. It was a fluid document for the purpose of recording information as to the current assessment of risk(s) of self-harm & how that risk(s) was to be mitigated. Whilst I received evidence that in practice, such risk assessments were being undertaken with Sam, the WARRN documentation did not necessarily reflect that, nor was it optimally viewable in terms of clearly recording fluctuating presentations & any accompanying re-assessment of risk. (3) It appeared to me that the format/layout of the WARRN tool, its accessibility, & in particular, its ability to provide a user with clear & easily viewable information as to how Sam’s risk of self-harm had fluctuated/altered/changed in the months preceding his death, could lead to important information/assessments being lost to a new/infrequent user. This, for example, might be a new care co-ordinator (as in Sam’s case), Crisis Team/Community Nurse, or clinician not previously involved with Sam. (4) Given the variety of services involved in Sam’s care, this central document, addressing & recording fluctuating risk appeared to me to be a crucial document in the recording of current risk (eg emphasis). The ability of those charged with Sam’s care to view those fluctuations might be hampered by the current presentation of/access to such information. That could lead to an under-estimation of the current risk & sub-optimal mitigating measures being put in place. (5) The WARRN assessment tool might also benefit from a greater degree of interaction between it & the user. For example, it was clear, on the evidence that Social Worker’s, Mental Health Nurses & Clinicians were all busy addressing the needs (& assessing risk) of a wide number & variety of patients. Prompting (my emphasis) the user to consider & record referrals for, for example, to advocacy services & for capacity assessments might optimise the benefits of the tool & reduce the risk of such opportunities being missed/un-recorded. Such then leading to the potential absence of key information for new/infrequent users when assessing risks of self-harm ”

    Source location

    Samuel Joseph Gomm · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue six-monthly Welsh Applied Risk Research Network record audits by Powys Teaching Health Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “22. In October 2021 and April 2022 Powys Teaching Health Board undertook an internal audit of Welsh Applied Risk Research Network documentation. Compliance with reviews and the quality of content was rated as good. Powys Teaching Health Board will continue to audit Service User records on a 6 monthly basis.”

    Source location

    Response from Powys County Council and Powys Teaching Health Board
    Page 7 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinstate advocacy clinics in community mental-health teams and inpatient units.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “36. The offer of advocacy is a legal requirement of both the Mental Health Measure (2010) and the Social Services Well Being Act, 2014. This is reflected in Care and Treatment Programme documentation, where staff are directed to offer advocacy and to confirm whether it is required. This is reported on through Powys County Council Business Insight programme and in Powys County Council audits. Advocacy clinics have been reinstated in CMHT’s and inpatient units following Covid19. These are advertised in patient access areas and can be booked directly with the advocate if preferred.”

    Source location

    Response from Powys County Council and Powys Teaching Health Board
    Page 11 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve inpatient staff WCCIS access and training so staff can complete risk documentation without duplicate Word templates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. As Powys Teaching Health Board inpatient staff are currently only able to read information stored on the Welsh Community Care Information System for case recordings, they have relied on a Welsh Applied Risk Research Network Word Document. This is then uploaded and attached to Welsh Community Care Information System by admin staff. It is accepted that this has led to a duplication of work and the risk of important information being lost. Having identified this, Powys Teaching Health Board are updating training and access arrangements for inpatient staff required to complete the Welsh Applied Risk Research Network document. This will ensure that all Welsh Applied Risk Research Network document will be recorded on the Welsh Community Care Information System and there will no longer be a need to use the Word Document template.”

    Source location

    Response from Powys County Council and Powys Teaching Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update WCCIS to record risk chronologies and significant self-harm events, supporting dynamic reassessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “16. This would include but is not limited to events such as, relationship breakdown, loss of care, increase in substance use, increase in contact with services, particularly out of hours. All significant self-harming events should be recorded on the document, this includes disclosure of thoughts of self harm. To support this WCCIS will be updated to include a Chronology of events to enable workers to keep a succinct and easily accessible record. This will allow staff to easily identify if there has been a recordable event, creating a clear timeline of presenting risks. This will alert practitioners to any changes or patterns of behaviour and enable better dynamic risk assessing.”

    Source location

    Response from Powys County Council and Powys Teaching Health Board
    Page 6 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Welsh Applied Risk Research Network form cannot be altered because it must remain in its original evidence-based form.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “27. Work is currently in progress to ensure that the correct Welsh Applied Risk Research Network is available on the WCCIS system by the end of July 2022. This will enable all Community Staff to have access to the copyrighted version, stored in an easily accessible part of the database. This can be accessed by both Powys Teaching Health Board and Powys County Council. To enable the Welsh Applied Risk Research Network to maintain its evidence base it needs to remain in its original state and cannot be altered to provide additional prompts or data collection. The accompanying CTP documentation focuses on areas not directly included in Welsh Applied Risk Research Network. For example, capacity is”

    Source location

    Response from Powys County Council and Powys Teaching Health Board
    Page 8 · response
    Published 16 September 2022

    Open published response
  10. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew John Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew John Evans was a 47-year-old man who developed insomnia, anxiety and depression during the third COVID-19 lockdown and died on 16 June 2021 after ending his life. The principal concerns related to the GP’s lack of mental-health assessment, suicide-risk assessment, follow-up and consideration of referral; the general practice’s prescribing, communication and clinical-governance arrangements; and TalkPlus’s lack of clear guidance on referral to secondary mental-health services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ask about or document suicidal ideation and self-harm

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The actions of the General Practitioner The GP was not sufficiently proactive with multiple lost opportunities to provide better care and support for Matthew. The GP did not undertake a mental health assessment to assess the severity of Matthew’s difficulties and to ascertain whether further support or referral to secondary mental health care were indicated in any of the four telephone consultations. He did not ask or document at any time if Matthew had any suicidal ideation or acts of self-harm. The GP did not offer a face-to-face consultation or arrange a follow up appointment. The GP declined to prescribe Zopiclone and whilst he referred Matthew to the benefits of Melatonin he did not offer a prescription. He prescribed Mirtazepine having not done so before for someone in Matthew’s position on a background of having no post graduate qualifications in mental health. Furthermore, he did not document any warning of the possible side-effects of this drug including the possible increased risk of suicidal ideation with commencing the drug. It is unclear whether the GP had read the letters from TalkPlus. He did not ask permission as to whether it was possible to inform or involve Matthew’s partner and family in his on-going care. ”

    Source location

    Matthew John Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share suicide and self-harm documentation and assessment learning with all Frimley GP practices through bulletins, meetings, clinical leads and prescribing updates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NHS Frimley ICB will be carrying out a number of actions following the inquest. These include sharing the concerns raised with all GP practices in the Frimley area. The learning will focus particularly on the importance of good documentation in recording risk of suicide or self-harm following a consultation when someone has been assessed as having suicidal ideation or is at risk of acts of self-harm.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Firmley
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver a recorded virtual training session on mental health assessment and documentation, then distribute the recording to all practices.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The practices across the ICS will also be reminded of the importance of a good mental health assessment using recognised mental health tools. There are already templates for PHQ9 and GAD on the GP systems for them to use. The learning will be shared with practices in July 2022 in the GP bulletin. In September 2022, there will be a virtual training session, which will be recorded, on mental health assessment, which will also include documentation. The recording will be sent to all practices following the event.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Firmley
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Attend a CPD course on recognising mental-health suicide risks for reminder and ongoing professional development.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “13. ████████ has identified a CPD course concerning Mental Health – recognize suicide risks, which he shall be attending by way of reminder and on-going professional development.”

    Source location

    Response from Farnham Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The circumstances were a specific case, not widespread poor care, and the care provided was not unsafe.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are satisfied, at this point, that the circumstances surrounding Mr Evans’ death were a specific case and not indicative of widespread poor care on the part of the provider. Whilst we have concluded that improvements could have been made in the care and treatment provided to Mr Evans, this was not unsafe. We are pleased to see the provider has identified areas of improvement in its care and treatment, and we are assured that the actions taken will protect others using the service from harm. At this stage we have decided not to instigate any further action. However, we will continue to regularly monitor the provider and, where”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commisson
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further action is currently considered necessary because the provider’s actions are expected to protect service users from harm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are satisfied, at this point, that the circumstances surrounding Mr Evans’ death were a specific case and not indicative of widespread poor care on the part of the provider. Whilst we have concluded that improvements could have been made in the care and treatment provided to Mr Evans, this was not unsafe. We are pleased to see the provider has identified areas of improvement in its care and treatment, and we are assured that the actions taken will protect others using the service from harm. At this stage we have decided not to instigate any further action. However, we will continue to regularly monitor the provider and, where”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commisson
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Regulatory action can target registered managers or providers, but not failings attributed solely to individuals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you may be aware, CQC can only take regulatory action against a registered manager or a registered provider, but not when failings of an individual have been identified.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commisson
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concerns do not indicate that the doctor poses a patient risk or undermines public confidence in doctors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The AR is assured that the matters contained in your complaint do not raise concerns that ████████ poses either a risk to patients or undermines the public’s confidence in doctors. Although we do not need to investigate further, we will share your concerns with the doctor’s responsible officer and ask the doctor to discuss it with their appraiser as part of their revalidation.”

    Source location

    Response from General Medical Council(2)
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further investigation is considered necessary, although the concerns will be shared for discussion during revalidation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The AR is assured that the matters contained in your complaint do not raise concerns that ████████ poses either a risk to patients or undermines the public’s confidence in doctors. Although we do not need to investigate further, we will share your concerns with the doctor’s responsible officer and ask the doctor to discuss it with their appraiser as part of their revalidation.”

    Source location

    Response from General Medical Council(2)
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The GP disputes that no mental health risk assessment occurred, stating that he asked about suicidal ideation and self-harm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The GP did not undertake a mental health assessment to assess the severity of Matthew’s difficulties and to ascertain whether further support or referral to secondary mental health care were indicated in any of the four telephone consultations. He did not ask or document at any time if Matthew had any suicidal ideation or acts of self-harm.”

    Source location

    Response from Farnham Practice
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2022

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026