Recurring concern

Unreliable assessment of suicide and self-harm risk

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First reported 5 May 2013•Latest report 27 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls specifically dedicated to assessing suicide or self-harm risk, including identifying relevant factors, completing or updating assessments, assessing disclosed vulnerability or suicidal intent, using appropriate tools or protocols, and documenting the reasoning needed to support safe observation, referral or protective action across healthcare, custody, police and community settings.

Not included

  • Excludes generic mental-health risk assessments where suicide or self-harm risk is not the material concern.
  • Excludes failures in observation, treatment, referral, communication or protective measures after suicide or self-harm risk has been reliably assessed, unless the assessment process itself is also deficient.
  • Excludes generic staff training, staffing, documentation or communication deficiencies that are not directly dedicated to assessing suicide or self-harm risk.
  • Excludes the underlying occurrence of suicide or self-harm where no failure in a dedicated risk-assessment control is identified.
Reports
77

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
94

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
132

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service12
NHS England9
Department of Health and Social Care7
Home Office7
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust6
North London NHS Foundation Trust5
Metropolitan Police Service4
Ministry of Justice4
North East London NHS Foundation Trust4
Care UK3
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
HM Prison Service3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust2
General Medical Council2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Warren James Green · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Warren James Green, who was receiving care in an acute hospital following a serious attempt on his life, died on 20 August 2024 after jumping through a gap in a four-storey stairwell and sustaining a skull fracture and traumatic subdural haemorrhage. The concerns identified included delays in securing a psychiatric bed, inadequate supervision and safeguarding for a patient at high risk of self-harm, patients being able to leave the acute ward without appropriate assessment or staff awareness, and unclear escalation to consultant psychiatric oversight.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete appropriate risk assessments before high-risk patients leave the acute ward

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence identified a risk of patients at high risk of self-harm being able to leave the acute ward without appropriate risk assessment (2) The evidence identified a risk of patients at high risk of self-harm being able to leave the acute ward without the knowledge of the hospital staff The above shows a lacuna in terms of patients’ safety and safeguarding. (3) The evidence showed that the Mental Health Liaison Service relies on nurses to conduct initial assessments and follow up reviews of patients suffering with mental health issues and the mechanism by which escalation to a Consultants Psychiatric is decided and the factors to be taken into account for escalation are not at all clear. This leads to lack of Consultants oversight for these vulnerable patients. ”

    Source location

    Mr Warren James Green · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update policies and flowcharts guiding risk assessment and supervision of inpatients at high risk of self-harm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: The Trust has reviewed an updated relevant policies and flowcharts to assist clinical staff with guidance and processes when managing high risk of self-harm patients in an inpatient setting, to ensure the appropriate risk assessments and supervision are put in place to maintain their safety and minimise their ability to leave a ward without staff knowledge or appropriate supervision.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include Section 5(2) Mental Health Act guidance in the Trust’s Mental Health policy for high-risk patients attempting or intending to leave the ward.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mental Health Policy I am also including a copy of the staff guidance regarding Section 5(2) Mental Health Act which has now been included in the Trust’s Mental Health policy. This legal framework is an option for ward clinicians to use in situations where a patient has been assessed as high risk and attempts to leave the ward, or voices intent to leave the ward.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise awareness of the updated Section 5(2) guidance through the Nurses’ Grand Rounds programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm the Trust’s Mental Health Lead and Prevent Lead Nurse is undertaking a programme to raise awareness of this updated staff guidance at the Nurses' Grand Rounds. A training session is also delivered every 6 months to the FY2 doctors as part of their induction, in which this topic around Section 5(2) assessment of the Mental Health Act is covered. In addition, this has now been added into the Trust’s Mental Health Act training that is delivered each month online.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver Section 5(2) Mental Health Act training to FY2 doctors every six months during induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm the Trust’s Mental Health Lead and Prevent Lead Nurse is undertaking a programme to raise awareness of this updated staff guidance at the Nurses' Grand Rounds. A training session is also delivered every 6 months to the FY2 doctors as part of their induction, in which this topic around Section 5(2) assessment of the Mental Health Act is covered. In addition, this has now been added into the Trust’s Mental Health Act training that is delivered each month online.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add Section 5(2) Mental Health Act assessment to the Trust’s monthly online Mental Health Act training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm the Trust’s Mental Health Lead and Prevent Lead Nurse is undertaking a programme to raise awareness of this updated staff guidance at the Nurses' Grand Rounds. A training session is also delivered every 6 months to the FY2 doctors as part of their induction, in which this topic around Section 5(2) assessment of the Mental Health Act is covered. In addition, this has now been added into the Trust’s Mental Health Act training that is delivered each month online.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    MSE is responsible for responding to the risk of high-risk self-harm patients leaving the acute ward without appropriate risk assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concern 1) The evidence identified a risk of patients at high risk of self-harm being able to leave the acute ward without appropriate risk assessment”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Dean Martin Ford · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dean Martin Ford died by suicide on 10 March 2024 after leaving home, buying a length of rope, and being found hanging in Bedfords Park, Romford. Concerns included failures by two mental health teams to carry out a holistic risk formulation, an incorrect assessment of his risk as low, and the absence of audits for risk assessments of people referred but not accepted by the mental health and wellbeing team.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out holistic formulations of risk to self

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Despite clear guidance from NICE in September 2022 relating to the need for a holistic formulation of risk to self, two NELFT teams involved in Mr Ford’s crisis care failed to carry out a holistic formulation of the risk he posed to himself. (2) A clinical lead for the mental health and wellbeing team within NELFT, gave evidence at the inquest in December 2024 that Mr Ford’s risk was deemed to be low because “the main factor around risk is that he denied any risk to self and denied any suicidal thoughts”. This simplistic assessment of risk is not compliant with the NICE guidelines. It is of concern that a senior member - clinical lead - within the mental health and wellbeing team is not applying the correct risk formulation. ”

    Source location

    Dean Martin Ford · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver and expand face-to-face risk-formulation training across acute, rehabilitation and borough-based staff, including new starters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have undertaken a very thorough review of all policies, procedures and associated training and worked closely with our experts by experience. We launched our Risk Formulation training in September 2024 and have been delivering a day-long face-to-face training. The training utilises videos we made of experts by experience and carers talking about their experience of risk and suicide. We have now trained some 80% of our acute and rehabilitation colleagues, and moved to Borough based training in January 2025 and have started training colleagues in Barking and Dagenham.”

    Source location

    Response from North East London Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 December 2024

    Open published response
  3. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Stephen Beresford · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Stephen Beresford died at Bassetlaw District General Hospital on 7 July 2023 after applying a ligature while detained at HMP Ranby, having been discovered unresponsive and resuscitated. The jury found that he was suffering significant mental ill health and identified failings in the assessment and management of his mental health and self-harm risk, ACCT observations, completion of an action plan, response to his cell bell, and staffing. The report also raises concerns about prison leadership’s understanding and assessment of risk and its lack of candour and reflection during the inquest.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to understand and assess risk in ACCT processes and risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that the prison authorities have already taken important steps, which I am satisfied address many of the concerns arising from Mark’s death. I am concerned however, that despite very strong evidence to the contrary, they maintained the risk assessments conducted on 2 and 3 July were reasonable in all the circumstances. The supervising officer involved in the decision to close Mark’s ACCT on the morning of 3 July 2023, gave evidence that there was no likelihood Mark would commit further ACCTs of self-harm. While the inexperienced officer who later reopened the ACCT set Mark’s observations at one no more than two hours apart, relying in part on the fact that is what they had been set at when the ACCT had been reopened the previous day. However, there had since been two significant risk incidents and the officer did not consult a supervising officer as required by PSI 64/2011. It is difficult to understand the prison’s position that these assessments were reasonable in all the circumstances. Furthermore, on two occasions, the Head of Operations gave evidence that was incorrect and liable to mislead the jury and/or the coroner. He gave evidence confirming the requirement for a person raising a concern under the ACCT process to consult with a supervising officer in respect of observation levels. He then added: “I firmly believe that the supervising officers who gave evidence earlier this week, whether they recall it or not, would naturally have had that conversation, out of being inquisitive, that would be my own personal view point but in terms of the prison stance, that’s what the policy says.” When it was pointed out to him that that was not supported by either of the witnesses involved – who were both very clear that there had been no consultation - he apologised and suggested he had misunderstood. I am troubled by the fact that the Head of Operations, instead of reflecting on the significance of that evidence in terms of learning lessons from Mark’s death, suggested to the jury that these witnesses must have been mistaken. The second occasion concerned the issue of cell bell cover on the day of the event that caused Mark’s death. Mark was housed on HB3 North. The Head of Operations gave evidence that it is normal for both HB3 North and HB3 South to have a single officer detailed to deal with cell bells over the lunch period. The officer on duty on 3 July was however very clear in his evidence that he was detailed to cover HB3S only. Every other prison witness asked about this agreed that there should be an officer covering each side of HB3 over lunch. Curious and concerned as to how a member of the prison’s leadership team could have made such an error, I later recalled and asked the Head of Operations for an explanation. He could provide none. Although, he did later apologise for his difficulty answering other questions asked of him, explaining that he does not usually work in safer custody. 1. That, notwithstanding steps since taken to improve work around ACCT processes and risk assessments, there remains an issue with understanding and assessing risk, which extends up to the leadership team at HMP Ranby. 2. That there was a failure by the prison authorities to act with due reflection and candour during the inquest which, if unaddressed, will impede their ability to fully learn the lessons from deaths in custody. ”

    Source location

    Mark Stephen Beresford · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide regular staff training and guidance on operating the ACCT process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that during the course of the inquest into Mr Beresford’s death the jury heard evidence from members of uniformed staff regarding their role in the management of the ACCT process. Embedding effective management of prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm through the ACCT process is vital for all establishments, and HMP Ranby continues to provide regular training and guidance to staff in its operation.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate ACCT guidance covering when to open an ACCT and when to hold a review after risk changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will be aware that since Mr Beresford’s death guidance has been sent to staff to improve their understanding of ACCT, including the need to consider opening an ACCT and where a prisoner is already on an ACCT to hold a case review if the individual’s level of risk changes. Where a case review is required, a new booking system ensures that these take”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a booking system to ensure required ACCT case reviews occur within an appropriate timescale.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will be aware that since Mr Beresford’s death guidance has been sent to staff to improve their understanding of ACCT, including the need to consider opening an ACCT and where a prisoner is already on an ACCT to hold a case review if the individual’s level of risk changes. Where a case review is required, a new booking system ensures that these take”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a three-stage quality assurance process to identify individual or wider ACCT upskilling needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “place within an appropriate timescale. A three-stage quality assurance process is also in place to identify areas where individual or wider upskilling is required.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for delivering suicide and self-harm risk management and the ACCT process at HMP Ranby sits with the Head of Safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you will also be aware responsibility for the delivery of the management of those prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm and the effective management of the ACCT process at HMP Ranby sits with the Head of Safety.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 October 2024

    Open published response
  4. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Parminder Singh Sanghera · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Parminder Singh Sanghera was arrested after displaying erratic behaviour, including running naked, and was taken to hospital before being held in police custody. He was released without charge on 13 February 2023 and was later found deceased in a canal near the custody suite. The principal concern was that, despite his behaviour and vulnerability, no full mental health assessment was undertaken before his release and risk assessments did not identify a risk of suicide or self-harm.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of hospital and police custody risk assessments to identify suicide or self-harm risk before release

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the inquest, I heard evidence Mr Sanghera was deemed to be suffering from behavioural issues rather than a mental health crisis and no full Mental Health Act assessment took place either at New Cross Hospital or whilst in custody at Oldbury Police station. 2. The risk assessments performed in hospital and police custody identified no concerns of risk of suicide or self-harm from release. However, evidence at the inquest showed that he was suffering from a mental health crisis at the time. 3. My concern is that given the erratic behaviour he was displaying and his vulnerability, further consideration should have been given for a full mental health act assessment to take place before release. Therefore, you may wish to consider reviewing the arrangements and assessments required before discharge from hospital or being released from custody. ”

    Source location

    Mr Parminder Singh Sanghera · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit pre-release risk assessments monthly to monitor and improve their quality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(i) Over 90% of custody staff have completed the College of Policing vulnerability in custody training; (ii) Pre-release risk assessments are now subject to monthly audits to ensure quality; (iii) Detained persons now receive a leaflet signposting to support service pathways, a copy of which is enclosed with this response; (iv) The Health Care Provider specification now includes a requirement for their staff to have access to Summary Care Records (Mitie became the service provider on 1 September 2024 and have access to these records, whereas the previous provider did not). When the name, date of birth and address of the detained person is entered the Summary Care Records entry would provide an NHS number, GP details and potentially a pharmacy number.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mental-health input for people in police custody is provided through the locally organised Liaison and Diversion Service between police and mental-health services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, on the latter attendance the 12th February, the Trust does not provide any mental health “input” in relation to those in police custody. It is understood that this would be provided by the Liaison and Diversion Service – which will be organised at a local level between the police and mental health services and is subject to a Memorandum of Understanding between services. Again, this is not something that the Trust would have any involvement in.”

    Source location

    Response from Wolverhampton NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 September 2024

    Open published response
  5. Rutland and North Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Henrik LARSEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Henrik Larsen, a 52-year-old man, was found hanging at his home in Leicestershire on 6 January 2023 and died before a planned mental health triage call. Concerns included inadequate documentation and decision-making in multidisciplinary team meetings, inaccurate interpretation of risk information, insufficient risk assessment and discharge planning, and weaknesses in the serious incident investigation and learning process.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to robustly consider red-flag risk factors in risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Risk assessments At his initial triage (undertaken by the Central Access Point) Mr Larsen was deemed to be high risk. At a later MDT meeting Mr Larsen was deemed to be low risk. It is not possible to explore the rationale behind the downgrading of Mr Larsen’s risk to low because there is no documentation about the decision making. The Trust’s SI report identified the fact that several “red flag” risk factors which applied to Mr Larsen were not “robustly considered” when assessing Mr Larsen’s risk. The Trust’s SI report states that it was “unclear why it was felt the risks had subsided by the time of discharge on 3.12.2022”. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Henrik LARSEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete the review of the clinical risk-assessment competency framework and audit tool to strengthen monitoring of risk-assessment and formulation documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the assessment of risk is a key component to the effectiveness of the clinicians working within the Crisis team, the Trust is completing a review of our competency framework and the audit tool to support the monitoring of robust documentation of risk assessment/formulation. This review was completed on 02 August 2024. The outcomes of the review will be presented to the Urgent Care Quality and Safety Meeting on the 22 August 2024 to inform any required changes.”

    Source location

    Response from Leicestershire Partnership NHS (2)
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Present the risk-assessment review outcomes to the Urgent Care Quality and Safety Meeting to inform required changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the assessment of risk is a key component to the effectiveness of the clinicians working within the Crisis team, the Trust is completing a review of our competency framework and the audit tool to support the monitoring of robust documentation of risk assessment/formulation. This review was completed on 02 August 2024. The outcomes of the review will be presented to the Urgent Care Quality and Safety Meeting on the 22 August 2024 to inform any required changes.”

    Source location

    Response from Leicestershire Partnership NHS (2)
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the Central Access Point Standard Operating Procedure to require clinicians to review records, assess referrals and prioritise triage calls by risk, urgency and availability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Training and team meetings are important vehicles for us in reminding people of the importance of this, and we are also formalising this by updating the Central Access Point Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to be explicit that it is the clinician’s responsibility to manage their own allocated work for the shift, look through the referrals having considered the patient record and prioritise the triage calls on risk, urgency and patient availability.”

    Source location

    Response from Leicestershire Partnership NHS (1)
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Redesign the Safe and Well template with staff input, obtain clinical safety sign-off and make it available within the electronic patient record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a learning point from the feedback provided, we are reviewing the layout of the safe and well template to ensure that this is in a format which makes this as easy as possible for call takers to review the information and assess risk and capture information from the call. The new template will be co-produced with staff and will be signed off by the Information Management and Technology (IM&T) Clinical Safety and Improvement Group.”

    Source location

    Response from Leicestershire Partnership NHS (1)
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Red-flag risk factors alone do not establish likelihood of self-harm or suicide; risk decisions should be based on clinical formulation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The risk assessment undertaken by the clinician presenting a case to the MDT, forms part of the information considered by the MDT in accordance with NICE [NG225] guidelines which state that decisions about care should not be made based on risk assessment tools and should be based on clinical formulation. Additionally, they state that the aforementioned 'red flag' risk factors alone do not indicate the likelihood of self-harm or suicide amongst the patients under crisis (who by the nature of their presentation, would all be deemed at a higher level of risk than those in the general population). The MDT considers the clinicians assessment of risk at the time of assessment. When the outcome of the MDT is shared with the patient, it offers a further opportunity for the clinician to assess whether the risk presentation has changed from the previous assessment.”

    Source location

    Response from Leicestershire Partnership NHS (2)
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

    Open published response
  6. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Paul David TEMPLETON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul David Templeton died at Ipswich Hospital on 20 April 2023 following termination of life support after asphyxiation. The Jury found that prolonged refusal to eat or drink while detained under the Mental Health Act should have been recognised as action to end his life and as elevating his suicide risk, including by other means. The report raises concern that the response from Norfolk & Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust did not adequately address these failures in suicide risk assessment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise elevated suicide risk from prolonged refusal to eat or drink

    Wider context from the report

    “In the words of the Jury: “Initial and all subsequent assessments seriously fail to recognise that Paul’s prolonged choice not to eat or drink were in fact indications of ‘action’ to end his own life and therefore he should have been considered as a suicide risk.” Action is needed to prevent future failure to recognise (a) when the prolonged choice of a patient detained under the Mental Health Act not to eat or drink should be regarded as an action to end their own life; and (b) when such a patient’s prolonged choice not to eat or drink should be recognised as elevating that patient’s suicide risk (including of suicide by means other than malnourishment). ”

    Source location

    Paul David TEMPLETON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold a reflective multidisciplinary away day using food-and-drink case studies to strengthen holistic clinical risk assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to your concerns (a) & (b) we have acted to secure assurance that assessors working within Willows ward have the skills and awareness required to undertake comprehensive holistic risk assessments, including an understanding and awareness of the significance of food and drink in mental health risk assessment. A reflective Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT) Away Day was held on 15th and 17th May 2024. During this, the team explored the application of clinical risk assessment skills to a range of different cases. This was undertaken to support the transition of knowledge into clinical practice and provide assurance of consistency between staff members. The case studies included scenarios related to food and drink to raise staff awareness. To maintain a good standard of clinical practice this will be discussed in clinical supervision and reviewed within future team meetings.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss food-and-drink risk assessment in clinical supervision and review it in future team meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to your concerns (a) & (b) we have acted to secure assurance that assessors working within Willows ward have the skills and awareness required to undertake comprehensive holistic risk assessments, including an understanding and awareness of the significance of food and drink in mental health risk assessment. A reflective Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT) Away Day was held on 15th and 17th May 2024. During this, the team explored the application of clinical risk assessment skills to a range of different cases. This was undertaken to support the transition of knowledge into clinical practice and provide assurance of consistency between staff members. The case studies included scenarios related to food and drink to raise staff awareness. To maintain a good standard of clinical practice this will be discussed in clinical supervision and reviewed within future team meetings.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use daily team huddles to prompt consideration of eating and drinking in holistic clinical risk assessments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure focus on appropriate clinical risk assessment, the Team are using Daily Team huddles to prompt assessors to consider holistic care / including eating and drinking within their clinical risk assessments. To support this, we have also made changes to the SBAR (Situation Background Assessment Recommendation) record that the team use to communicate and share patient information at handover. The revised SBAR provides more information about eating and drinking (identifying quantity not just appetite) to inform clinical risk assessment.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise SBAR handover records to capture eating-and-drinking quantity, not only appetite, for clinical risk assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure focus on appropriate clinical risk assessment, the Team are using Daily Team huddles to prompt assessors to consider holistic care / including eating and drinking within their clinical risk assessments. To support this, we have also made changes to the SBAR (Situation Background Assessment Recommendation) record that the team use to communicate and share patient information at handover. The revised SBAR provides more information about eating and drinking (identifying quantity not just appetite) to inform clinical risk assessment.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and deliver bespoke training linking suicide prevention with malnourishment, with subject-matter expert support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The challenge for the Trust is to secure a training package which sufficiently addresses both clinical risk assessment and food and nutrition. The national approved training, required as mandatory by the Trust, does not reference suicide through malnourishment. The Trust’s 3PS (Presenting, predisposing, precipitating, perpetuating & protective factor training) programme highlights the importance of good nourishment but does not link this to suicide. We recognise that to deliver content linking suicide prevention training with content referencing malnourishment we will need to develop and deliver a bespoke package of training supported by subject matter experts. We are in the process of discussing this with our Physical Health team and raising this with NHS England and the Royal College of Psychiatrists for their broader consideration.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 April 2024

    Open published response
  7. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Adrian Michael James · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adrian Michael James died after falling from the fourth-floor balcony of his block of flats while experiencing severe and enduring mental illness, including paranoia and a high background risk of suicide. The principal concerns were that he was not assessed by a consultant, proactive care was not considered during his mental health crisis, insufficient attention was given to impulsive suicide risk, no follow-up assessment occurred after a police-interrupted treatment session, and communications between services were inadequate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to adequately assess the risk of impulsive suicide

    Wider context from the report

    “3.    That insufficient consideration appeared to have been given to the risk of impulsive suicide with instead assessment focussing on his denial of increased active suicidal intent. ”

    Source location

    Adrian Michael James · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue guidance reminding staff to consider consultant psychiatrist assessment for people with complex emotional needs and suicide risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are issuing additional guidance around managing risk of suicide in those with a diagnosis of Personality Disorder (or more commonly now known as Complex Emotional Needs) reminding staff to consider the need for assessment by a Consultant Psychiatrist.”

    Source location

    Response from Central and North West London
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responding to the Coroner’s specific concerns falls outside NHS England’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within NHS England’s remit to respond to the specific concerns set out by the Coroner in your Report and it is appropriate that Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust (“the Trust”) respond to these. We understand you have also directed your Report to the Trust to respond to your concerns. NHS England has been asked to be sighted on the Trust’s response to you and will carefully consider this.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust is responsible for responding to the Coroner’s specific concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not within NHS England’s remit to respond to the specific concerns set out by the Coroner in your Report and it is appropriate that Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust (“the Trust”) respond to these. We understand you have also directed your Report to the Trust to respond to your concerns. NHS England has been asked to be sighted on the Trust’s response to you and will carefully consider this.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response
  8. Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent

    AI-generated summary

    Jamie Peter Norman PILKINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jamie Peter Norman PILKINGTON died after his vehicle left the road, struck a tree and caught fire in the early hours of 12 March 2023. At the time, he was under the care of Mental Health Services and had been expressing suicidal thoughts. Concerns included failures to complete suicide risk assessments and insufficient exploration and management of issues relevant to his suicide risk during mental health assessments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate exploration of matters affecting suicide risk

    Wider context from the report

    “During a Mental Health triage with the Mental Health and Social Inclusion Hub on 8th February 2023 there was a failure to complete the Risk Assessment in relation to his risk of suicide. When referred to and assessed by the Integrated Mental health Team on 3rd March 2023 again there was a failure to complete a Risk Assessment as to his risk of suicide. Furthermore, in an appointment on 3rd March 2023 1. Suicidal/self-harm thoughts not explored in detail. 2. There was no exploration of his statement to the effect he was actively researching methods of taking his own life. 3. There was no exploration regarding efficacy/concordance with medication. 4. There was no discussion around distraction techniques, coping mechanisms or information about contact details for other services. 5. There was no discussion regarding his support network, next of kin etc. 6. There was no indication of next steps, timescales or when he could expect to be informed of the onward plan and no definite date when his case would be discussed with the Multi Disciplinary Team. On hearing evidence of the investigation into the Mental Health care which he received, beyond offering further training and support to nursing staff and mental health professionals, no assurance could be given of a system change to ensure that such Risk Assessments were completed or that appropriate and adequate exploration is made of matters which may affect how the risk of suicide is managed. ”

    Source location

    Jamie Peter Norman PILKINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train staff in suicide awareness, risk formulation and collaborative safety planning across the organisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “MPFT has explored the guidance and what this means for clinicians working with those who may be at risk of suicide. It is recognised that the existing FACE risk assessment is no longer indicated for use in suicide as it is not possible to predict suicide due to the dynamic nature of this. There is building evidence of the effectiveness of safety planning in suicide mitigation, which requires the training and roll out of safety planning skills and tools across the whole organisation. By December 2023 we had trained 1281 staff across the trust in suicide awareness training (e-learning), the safety planning training is face to face and is resource intensive to deliver due to ensuring fidelity against the model therefore numbers for this are lower.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include families and carers in collaborative safety planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Family and carer engagement; ensuring that families and carers are included in safety planning,”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response
  9. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Teresa Chmielek · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Teresa Chmielek took her own life at home on 17 June 2023, after a referral to mental health services concerning her suicide risk was rejected without contact or a face-to-face review. The concerns included failure to identify or recognise the reported recent suicide attempt, lack of meaningful multidisciplinary discussion and direct contact, inadequate referral arrangements and documentation, and the absence of procedures and auditing for referral decisions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify or recognise suicide risk during referral screening

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The notes made by the SPoE Nurse for use during discussion at the screening MDT meeting did not include any reference to the report of a recent suicide attempt and the Court was not satisfied that the risk of suicide had been identified or recognised by the SPoE Nurse ”

    Source location

    Teresa Chmielek · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Nicholas LEGER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nicholas Leger took his own life sometime between 7:30pm and 10:30pm on 20 February 2023, after learning via his solicitor that he had been charged. He had previously attempted to take his own life and had disclosed concerns about his mental health, but there had been no formal police assessment of his mental health or risk of suicide or self-harm for more than three months. The report identified a risk that people charged by Postal Charge Requisition could take their own lives where there was no formal mechanism to assess their mental health and risk at the time of charge.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a formal mental health and suicide or self-harm risk assessment at PCR delivery

    Wider context from the report

    “• That whether an individual is, exceptionally, considered to be in a high-risk category (such as to cause a PCR to be delivered in person) is reliant on information about their mental health coming to the attention of the OIC. There is no formal requirement for the OIC proactively to seek this information. • That there is no formal process for assessing an individual’s mental health and/or risk of suicide or self-harm at the time of delivery of a PCR. It is important to note the following: • At the point of charge, nothing has been proven against the individual concerned. They face an allegation, and are innocent if and until proven guilty to the criminal standard. • Many people are RUI’d. As such, PCR is now routinely used to bring most criminal charges. • Individuals who have been RUI’d can remain with this status for long periods of time (months or years) before a decision is made whether or not to charge them. • Whilst there are formal procedures to assess an individual’s mental health and risk of self-harm or suicide when they attend a police station for interview, once they have left the police station there are no such formal procedures (as above), notwithstanding the potential for a substantial period to elapse between the time they last attended a police station and the time that they are charged. • Being charged with any criminal offence, especially one which carries the potential for a custodial sentence, can, self-evidently, have a significant deleterious effect on an individual’s mental health. It appears to me that, in the absence of a formal mechanism to assess, at the time of being charged, an individual’s mental health and risk of suicide or self-harm, there is an obvious risk of individuals in the future taking their own lives as a result of being charged by way of a PCR (potentially following a lengthy period of having been RUI’d and potentially months or years since there was last any consideration by the police of their mental health and risk of suicide or self-harm). ”

    Source location

    Nicholas LEGER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a policy requiring supervised, documented risk assessments before issuing PCRs to recordable-offence suspects, including risk management and decisions on personal service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this Prevention of Future Deaths report, a proposal will be made for the implementation of a new policy requiring a risk assessment to be completed by the OIC, no earlier than fourteen days prior to issuing the PCR. This would build on the intelligence already gathered through the relationship between the OIC and the suspect, including any risk assessments completed at the time of their arrest/detention/voluntary interview under caution and by the Custody Sergeant upon release from custody. This would then form the basis of a decision as to whether to post or serve the PCR in person.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 8 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Current pre-charge bail arrangements and guidance provide further opportunities to assess suicide risk, so additional assessment at postal charge requisition is not identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Conclusion It is unlikely that someone released on bail for sexual offences would now revert to RUI. This means that they would be recalled to custody for charge, where a pre-release risk assessment can be completed, for which there is full guidance. There is specific custody training aimed at reducing the risks of post detention suicides.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 4 · response
    Published 8 September 2023

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026