Recurring concern

Failure to provide timely clinical review during ambulance call handling

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First reported 27 Feb 2018•Latest report 28 Oct 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to provide, initiate or complete timely clinical review during ambulance emergency-call handling when the caller's symptoms, risk or changing condition requires clinician involvement, including prolonged calls without clinical input and calls in which no clinician becomes involved despite an indication for clinical assessment.

Not included

  • Excludes ambulance-resource, dispatch, attendance and hospital-handover delays occurring after the required clinical review during call handling has been provided.
  • Excludes general call-handler triage or categorisation failures where no failure to obtain clinician involvement or review is identified.
  • Excludes the content or quality of clinical advice after a clinician has reviewed the call; those belong to clinical-advice concerns.
  • Excludes generic clinical staffing or training deficiencies unless they directly cause the absence or delay of clinical review during ambulance call handling.
Reports
6

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
7

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2018–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
5

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care2
NHS England2
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust2
Cleric Computer Services Limited1
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Office of the Chief Coroner1
Recipient name withheld1
South Central Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals of Northamptonshire NHS Group1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Lewis Aubrey GARFIELD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lewis Aubrey Garfield suffered an intracerebral haemorrhage at home on 4 December 2024, fell down the stairs, and was taken to John Radcliffe Hospital, where he died on 8 December 2024. Concerns included delays in clinical review and ambulance attendance, inadequate guidance to the family while awaiting an ambulance, and delays handing patients over from ambulances to hospitals, with wider delays affecting patient flow and ambulance availability.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in medically trained clinician review of ambulance call information

    Wider context from the report

    “b) The first call was at around 00:44 hours but it was not until over 4 hours later at 05:05 hrs that a medically trained clinician first reviewed the facts, immediately escalating it to category 1. ”

    Source location

    Lewis Aubrey GARFIELD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    East Midlands Ambulance Service must address the clinician’s upgrade rationale and the delay before clinical review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Because the clinician who made the call to Mrs Garfield referred to within your Regulation 28 report works for East Midlands Ambulance Service SCAS are unable to comment on the call or their rationale for upgrading the call to a Category 1 ambulance response. We are also unable to comment on the time that passed before a clinician reviewed the call. East Midlands Ambulance Service will need to respond to both of these points.”

    Source location

    Response from South Central Ambulance Service
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 October 2025

    Open published response
  2. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Amanda Jane GAINFORD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amanda Jane GAINFORD, aged 52, sustained abdominal injuries while detained in a mental health ward and later died at Aintree Hospital on 4 November 2022 from multiorgan failure due to splenic laceration and liver cirrhosis. The inquest identified missed opportunities to provide intravenous fluids and call an ambulance earlier while she had prolonged low blood pressure. It also raised concern that clinicians were not sufficiently aware of the ability to challenge ambulance call categorisation and request a clinical review from the ambulance service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clinician awareness of the ability to challenge ambulance call categorisation and request clinical review

    Wider context from the report

    “During the inquest the court heard evidence from the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) witness who confirmed that call handlers for the service are not medically trained but receive basic medical training. The system used nationally to categorise calls is reliant upon questions asked and information which is input by the call handler to achieve a categorisation of a call. In this case, there was no evidence the call categorisation was incorrect, however, an ambulance was called on 3 occasions due to Amanda's condition, on the last occasion that call was made by a Doctor on the scene providing care for Amanda, who as of the opinion that he was unable to keep the patient stable due to low blood pressure over a prolonged period. The NWAS witness gave evidence to the court that had the Doctor disagreed with the category 2 classification of the call or sought to escalate his clinical concerns regarding a patient, that he had the ability to challenge that and to request a review by a clinician available to NWAS. The Doctor was unaware that he had the ability to challenge the call handler categorisation and to seek a review by a clinician at NWAS, at which point the nature and seriousness of Amanda's condition could have been further reviewed and clearly understood. At a further course attended subsequently by the Doctor he advised that of 50 Doctors in attendance, only 1 was aware of the ability to escalate concerns regarding a patient and the categorisation of a 999 call to the Ambulance service and subsequent response time. It appears that this is an important fact unknown by many clinicians which would enable a clinician to clinician review of a critical patient and the use and dispatch of ambulance resources to prevent the loss of life in critical cases which are not automatically categorised at the highest level of response. ”

    Source location

    Amanda Jane GAINFORD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish and maintain a national framework enabling healthcare professionals to challenge ambulance call categorisation and request clinical review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report raised the concern that many healthcare professionals (HCPs) were unaware of their ability to challenge ambulance call handler categorisation and seek a review by a clinician.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The framework advises healthcare professionals that they may challenge the assigned ambulance category or response time based on clinical concern.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Framework includes the question order for HCP requests and the information that HCPs will be asked to provide. Clinicians using the HCP process are advised of both the category of call assigned and an estimated response time based on the current activity level. They are given the option to add anything else once that information is shared and would be able to challenge the category/response based on clinical concern.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 October 2024

    Open published response
  3. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Dow · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Dow died on 3 April 2023 after taking an overdose of medication while alone in a hotel room. He had indicated that the overdose might be an attempt to take his own life, but both ambulance calls were coded as category 3, with no clinician involved at the time. There were also concerns that the lack of response to three follow-up calls, potentially indicating loss of consciousness, did not lead to escalation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clinician involvement during emergency calls

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Despite giving a clear indication that he had taken an overdose of a lot of medication with an indication that he did so to take his own life the calls at 18.35 and 19.38 were both coded as category 3. 2. There was no involvement from a clinician at the time of either call. 3. Mr Dow was on his own in the hotel room. When a clinician called on 3 separate occasions there was no response. During her evidence Ms Lee, the Service Delivery Manager of the Emergency Operations Centre accepted that this could indicate that Mr Dow had lost consciousness but the call made at 18.35 was not escalated ”

    Source location

    Paul Dow · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Route overdose and poisoning calls through Clinical Navigation for timely clinician review, escalation, further triage and welfare action when specialist triage is delayed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since Mr Dow’s death, there have been various operational changes within the Trusts EOCs with regards to how emergency calls are dealt with.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The call did receive clinician review, including review by a Clinical Support Desk clinician and a Specialist Practitioner.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the time of these events, all category 3 and 4 calls presented in a ‘stack’ of calls in the Clinical Support Desk (‘CSD’) within the NWAS Emergency Operations Centre (‘EOC’), for review. The CSD is staffed by Senior clinicians who review all waiting category 3 and 4 calls in order to make a decision as to whether the call is appropriate for ambulance dispatch or whether further telephone triage is required.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

    Open published response
  4. Newcastle and North Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Shiya Jonathan Barnard Collins · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 29 April 2022, Shiya Jonathan Barnard Collins sustained a severe leg laceration after kicking a glass door panel and suffered catastrophic blood loss before an ambulance arrived. The principal concern was that the ambulance service’s computer system prevented clinicians from assessing or upgrading the response despite repeated calls indicating that his condition was deteriorating.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the control-room computer system to allow clinician assessment and upgrading of calls during ongoing live calls

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Seven calls were made to the North East Ambulance Service (following the initial call) indicating that Shiya Collins’ condition was deteriorating. Call handlers recognised the need for clinical input in order to facilitate a possible upgrade of the ambulance response to category 1. However, the locking facility on the Cleric computer system used in the control room precluded any clinician from assessing/upgrading the call because the system was locked and unable to be accessed whilst live calls relating to the case were ongoing. ”

    Source location

    Shiya Jonathan Barnard Collins · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Change records to open in read-only mode, requiring users to request a lock.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have consulted with our customers (Ambulance Trusts) to explore potential improvements and we have agreed that minor changes will be implemented within the system:”

    Source location

    Response from North East Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Streamline requests to release a record lock from one user to another.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have consulted with our customers (Ambulance Trusts) to explore potential improvements and we have agreed that minor changes will be implemented within the system:”

    Source location

    Response from North East Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The system did not wholly preclude clinician access or call upgrading because several built-in mechanisms could overcome a locked record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The lock feature is important to protect the integrity of the call and to stop data conflicts, the record (call) is only locked to an operator while they are active in the call. While it is technically correct that a clinician is not able to re-triage a call whilst it is in a locked state, I hope that the information I have provided adequately addresses the concern that “the computer system precluded any clinician from accessing/upgrading the call because the system was locked” Within the capabilities and provision of the Cleric system there are several means through which the ‘locking’ issue was able to have been overcome.(described above).”

    Source location

    Response from North East Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record locks will remain because they are fundamental, while existing operational procedures handle circumstances involving locked calls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important to note that the above changes will not eliminate locks as they remain a fundamental mechanism within these types of system, they are minor amendments to streamline existing functionality. System users also have robust operational processes/procedures in place to handle such circumstances.”

    Source location

    Response from North East Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response
  5. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Josephine Celia BARKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Josephine Celia Barker suffered an unwitnessed fall and serious head injury in an Aldi car park on 15 February 2019. She waited over two hours for an ambulance after five 999 calls, and later died from her injuries on 3 March 2019. The principal concerns included inadequate triage and re-triage, failure to use clinical information from paramedics at the scene, lack of callbacks and clinical review, and the diversion of an allocated ambulance to a welfare briefing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of ongoing clinician input and clinical assessment during prolonged emergency call handling

    Wider context from the report

    “5. At no point did a clinician have any input into the calls after the initial question from the call handler of call 1 as to whether this was major trauma or not and therefore there was no clinical assessment by SECAMBS of Jo’s condition over the following two and a half hours: she was vomiting for over two hours after the fall, she had fluctuating consciousness and was rousable to shaking and not to voice. She had had a tonic-clonic seizure and had potentially been injured by being hit by a car. She was unable to open her eyes. ”

    Source location

    Josephine Celia BARKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 8 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain available healthcare professional assessment early in call handling

    Wider context from the report

    “3. An off-duty paramedic was on scene throughout and had clinical experience which was not asked for until the final 999 call when the call handler was passed to him by the second off-duty paramedic (from HART) who had arrived on scene and made the call. There has been no reason given as to why the off-duty paramedic’s assessment was not asked for earlier and I was told that there is a policy in place with reference to Health Care Professionals which has since been updated but does ”

    Source location

    Josephine Celia BARKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 8 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Kevan FUNNELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevan Funnell, described as an older man with a head injury, was found lying in a public highway on a freezing night in October 2017. The principal concern was the ambulance service’s delayed response, including concerns that the first two calls were not appropriately progressed or escalated and that the call-handling system was not fit for purpose in this case.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient call-taker training and confidence to involve clinicians in difficult calls

    Wider context from the report

    “At the Inquest into the death of Mr Funnell I heard that the ambulance have introduced a relatively new system of dealing with calls and it seems to me timely to write now because it was a matter of concern to me that the ambulance was so delayed in its response to Mr Funnell. You will be able to see the basic facts in Part 3 of the Record of Inquest. This was an older man with an obvious head injury lying in the public highway on a freezing cold night. The first call was at 23:36 and was apparently graded with a 30 minute response (I know that 30 minute responses do not exist now but they did at the time that we are talking about i.e. in October 2017). If the ambulance had arrived within the 30 minute response time it would have been at the scene by no later ten past midnight. At 16 minutes past midnight there was a second call, firstly to ask where the ambulance was and secondly to explain that Mr Funnell was now vomiting and there was blood in his vomit. This was not flagged up and I was told at the Inquest that if it had been, it would have upgraded the call. Therefore, following Call 2 there was no change in status, the caller was told to ring again if things got worse, an apology was given but there was no estimated time of arrival. Call 3 came in at 00:34 hours, i.e. 58 minutes after the first call to say that the patient was now unconscious. This call was upgraded to what was a Red 1 then and what I understand would be a C1 now. That is to say it was upgraded to an 8 minute response from 00:34 so the ambulance should have been there by 00:42 and in fact an ambulance arrived at 00:51. This is really a shocking performance. Apparently there has been an audit and Cal 1 passed the audit; I cannot think why. There was no inability to triage the call but no-one was assigned so effectively that call was abandoned. With regard to Call 2. Effectively Call 2 was also abandoned. Your Legal Advisor at the Inquest took issue with my using the term “abandoned” however, it seems to me that is exactly what happened and if there had not been a third call (all these calls were made by complete strangers to Mr Funnell who just found him lying in the road as they were coming and going about their business; it was they who took care of him, accepted responsibility for him, tried to keep him warm, tried to keep him comfortable, tried to keep him safe and they should be able to rely on a good ambulance response in those circumstances) it seems possible that he might have been left in the street for maybe another hour at least. I was told that the only way you can interrupt the system is by flagging up the need for a clinician. If that is not done, ████████ explained that during each shift a clinician will look at the stacked calls and will call back and make a decision about whether or not to upgrade the call. I was told that the fundamental problem was that the original triage was probably wrong and in any event there were no 30 minute responders available at that time. I was also told that the call taker can always use their initiative and ask a Clinician to come and intervene and advise them. ████████ agreed that it would be useful if there was more training for the call takers so that they did not feel inhibited from involving the clinicians in potentially difficult calls. During the course of my summing up I expressed the view that for Mr Funnell in this particular case, the Pathway system that SECAMB uses was not fit for purpose and in any event seems unsuited, without modification, to an emergency service. ”

    Source location

    Kevan FUNNELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind all call takers when to upgrade calls and seek senior guidance about NHS Pathways dispositions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For Mr Funnell, the call taker did not seek to upgrade the call. This was human error. The manager of the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) has used the learning from this case to remind all call takers about the circumstances to consider when upgrading a call and the need to seek senior guidance if there is any doubt about the disposition reached through NHS Pathways.”

    Source location

    Response from South East Coast Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026