Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care12
NHS England12
HM Prison and Probation Service6
Department for Transport5
Care Quality Commission4
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence3
Practice Plus Group3
Royal College of General Practitioners3
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health3
Association Of British Neurologists2
College of Policing2
Department for Education2
General Medical Council2
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Ministry of Justice2
National Police Chiefs’ Council2
Office of the Chief Coroner2
Pentonville Prison2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
BNF Publications1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council1
Brook Medical Centre1
Caring Limited1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Choice Support1
Cleveland Police1
Coastal Homecare – Hove Branch1
Community Disability Nurse1
DW Fitness First1
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy1
Disclosure and Barring Service1
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset County Council1
Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset Police1
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency1
Dwf LLP1
East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust1
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Emsworth Surgery1
Epilepsy Action1
Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust1
European Care & Lifestyles (UK) Limited1
Forest Bank Prison1
General Pharmaceutical Council1
GeoAmey PECS Limited1
George Abbot School1
Gloucestershire Health and Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Gloucestershire Social Services1
Godfrey Care1
Grant Shapps MP1
Great Ormond Street Hospital1
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership1
Greater Manchester Police1
Greenshades Coach Travel Limited1
Grosvenor Medical Centre1
Grupo de Turismo Gaviota S.A.1
Guy'S and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust1
HM Prison Service1
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Hazelmere Medical Centre1
Health and Safety Executive1
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust1
High Down Prison1
Home Office1
Independence Homes Limited1
Independent Futures1
James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee1
Kendal Calling1
Kettering General Hospital1
King Street Medical Centre1
Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust1
Lindholme Prison1
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital1
Medacs Healthcare Limited1
Medway NHS Foundation Trust1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
Midway Pharmacy1
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government1
NHS Birmingham and Solihull Integrated Care Board1
NHS Dorset Integrated Care Board1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
NHS Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Integrated Care Board1
NHS South West London Integrated Care Board1
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust1
North London NHS Foundation Trust1
Northfield Medical Centre1
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust1
Parc Prison and Young Offender Institute1
Parents of the deceased1
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Pentree Lodge1
Recipient name withheld1
Richmond Medical Centre (Solihull)1
Rochester Prison1
Royal College of Emergency Medicine1
Royal College of Physicians1
Royal College of Psychiatrists1
Royal College of Surgeons of England1
Royal London Hospital1
Sheffield Health Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Skills for Care Ltd1
Sodexo1
South Tees Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Southwinds1
Springbank Care Home Limited1
Springfield Medical Centre1
St Edward's School1
St George'S University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Stepping Hill Hospital1
Stockport Borough Council1
Suffolk County Council1
Sundon Medical Centre1
Surrey County Council1
Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust1
Sussex Police1
Tameside Borough Council1
Tameside General Hospital1
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust1
Tewkesbury Borough Council1
Thameside Prison1
The Children's Trust1
The Roehampton Surgery1
The Society Of British Neurological Surgeons1
Thomas Cook Tour Operations Limited1
Transport for London1
UCB Pharma1
University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Dorset NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals of North Midlands NHS Trust1
Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc1
Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust1
ukactive1

Most commonly raised concerns

All classifications 90 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

  1. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.9 reportsSelected
  2. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.7 reportsSelected
  3. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.6 reportsSelected
  4. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.4 reportsSelected
  5. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  6. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.4 reportsSelected
  7. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.4 reportsSelected
  8. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  9. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  10. Failure to provide timely clinical follow-up after medication prescribingPrescribed medication is not reliably followed up for effectiveness, safety, collection, adherence and patient response.3 reportsSelected
  11. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.3 reportsSelected
  12. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  13. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  14. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  15. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.3 reportsSelected
  16. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.3 reportsSelected
  17. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.3 reportsSelected
  18. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.3 reportsSelected
  19. Unsafe interoperability between prison custody and healthcare proceduresReports identify failures in the bounded interface between prison custody, contracted custody providers and healthcare services, where procedures, responsibilities and safety-relevant information do not operate together reliably.3 reportsSelected
  20. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  21. Failure to communicate safety-critical care information effectively between care providers and familiesReports identify unsafe communication between care providers and families, including failures to convey risks, care instructions, concerns or other information needed to support safe care and decision-making.2 reportsSelected
  22. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  23. Failure to ensure safe prisoner transfersRecurring concern that the end-to-end prisoner transfer process is unreliable, leaving transferred prisoners exposed to unmanaged risks or interruptions in essential support.2 reportsSelected
  24. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  25. Failure to reliably document the rationale for consequential decisionsDifferent reports identify missing or inadequate records explaining the rationale and evidential basis for consequential decisions, including the anchor’s crucial decisions and comparable mental-capacity, NRPF and transfer decisions. The shared concern is unreliable rationale documentation for decisions that affect safety, accountability and continuity of care, rather than any one decision type or record system.2 reportsSelected
  26. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  27. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  28. Failure to reliably refer patients to required specialist servicesThe anchor identifies a required physiotherapy referral that was not completed. A different report identifies delayed referrals to physiotherapy, occupational therapy, dietetics and Parkinson’s specialist services. Together these support an end-to-end concern with required specialist referrals not being made promptly and reliably, rather than a concern limited to one physiotherapy referral.2 reportsSelected
  29. Failure to secure and control medicationReports identify medication as remaining accessible, unsecured or inadequately controlled, creating risks of misuse, overdose, theft or access by people other than the intended patient.2 reportsSelected
  30. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  31. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  32. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  33. Incomplete clinical history-takingReports identify an unsafe clinical assessment condition in which relevant patient history is not obtained sufficiently to support recognition of symptoms, risks and appropriate care.2 reportsSelected
  34. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  35. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  36. Unreliable access to emergency communicationReports identify failures in dedicated emergency communication arrangements that can delay summoning or contacting emergency help.2 reportsSelected
  37. Unreliable communication of critical medication information to GPsRecurring deficiency in the medication-information exchange process between services and GPs, including information needed to maintain supplies, assess prescribing safety and support continuity of treatment.2 reportsSelected
  38. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  39. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  40. Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated careThe anchor identifies absent agreed communication means and inaccessible shared patient information between mental health agencies. Other canonical reports identify relevant risk information not being shared between agencies and poor inter-agency information sharing preventing coordinated care, supporting a recurring concern with the reliability of inter-agency care information sharing rather than only the anchor's repository or communication-channel failure.2 reportsSelected
  41. Unreliable management of medication doses not takenThe anchor identifies missing guidance for monitoring prescribed medication that self-administering patients do not take when dispensed. A different report identifies inconsistent procedures for responding when service users refuse or do not take medication. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of detecting, monitoring and escalating omitted or refused medication doses, rather than a concern limited to one guidance document or one home's procedure.2 reportsSelected
  42. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  43. Unreliable observation of people in custodyThe anchor report identifies failure to transfer and replicate medically required observation levels when a detained person moves into GEO AMEY custody, while a different report identifies uncertainty about whether the correct observation level, including constant watch, was provided to a person in prison custody. Together these support a recurring concern about the reliability of the custody observation process rather than only one handover or level-setting failure.2 reportsSelected
  44. Unreliable recording of required observations in care and custodyDifferent reports identify inaccurate, delayed, anticipatory or falsified records of required observations, including 15-minute observations in prison custody and patient-care settings. The shared unsafe condition is that observation records do not reliably reflect when and how observations were actually conducted, rather than any one observation frequency, recording location or electronic system.2 reportsSelected
  45. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  46. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  47. Unreliable urgent mental health referral and assessment pathwaysUrgent mental-health referral pathways do not reliably secure timely access, coordination and specialist assessment.2 reportsSelected
  48. Unreliable welfare-check processes for people whose health is of concernThe anchor identifies unclear purpose and use of the welfare sheet for monitoring prisoners whose health is of concern. A separate report identifies inconsistent criteria for what constitutes a welfare check and when it is recorded. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the bounded welfare-check process, rather than only the sheet or recording component.2 reportsSelected
  49. Unsafe cell-sharing decisions for prisonersRecurring deficiencies in the prison cell-sharing risk system can leave prisoners exposed to unsafe pairings or prevent them from understanding changes affecting their cell-sharing status.2 reportsSelected
  50. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

All reports in this date range

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 90 reports

Showing all concerns and their linked actions and positions from reports in this date range. Select a recurring concern above to narrow the evidence.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Francis James Lea, who was living in a care home, was transferred to a new GP without his family being informed. After a hospital admission for a seizure, his prescribed anti-epileptic medication was not continued because the new GP was unaware of the admission and prescription. The report raised concerns about involving next of kin, recording the rationale and consent or capacity assessment for changing GP, and ensuring a safe transfer of care between the care home and GP surgeries.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to involve next of kin in significant decisions for a patient with declining cognitive function

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) For a patient in a care situation, with declining cognitive function (as set out in his home care plan) it would seem appropriate to consider involving the next of kin in any significant decision such as change of GP. This would have enabled the family (who always ensured they accompanied Mr Lea for any medical care) to pass on the updated information, and this outcome would have been avoided. ”

    Source location

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the rationale and patient consent for a change of GP

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There appeared to be no notes on the patient's medical record regarding the rationale for this change, or any consent from the patient that he was in agreement that it should take place. There was also no record of whether any consideration of his capacity had been undertaken, and if so what the outcome of that decision was. ”

    Source location

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record consideration and outcome of the patient's capacity

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There appeared to be no notes on the patient's medical record regarding the rationale for this change, or any consent from the patient that he was in agreement that it should take place. There was also no record of whether any consideration of his capacity had been undertaken, and if so what the outcome of that decision was. ”

    Source location

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create a written, party-approved policy for future locality projects defining GP registration changes and responsibility for informing next of kin.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to a safe and effective transfer of care, it has been agreed that to avoid any similar accidents, for any future locality projects there will be a written policy which needs to have been signed off by all parties as to the clear process of facilitating any change of GP registration and who will be informing the next of kin where appropriate.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require care homes to confirm patients’ awareness, consent and appropriate next-of-kin notification when capable residents change GP practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to avoid such a situation arising again, we will as a practice be liaising with the care homes to request that:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require care homes to confirm next-of-kin notification and consent when residents lacking capacity change GP practice, with capacity concerns escalated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to avoid such a situation arising again, we will as a practice be liaising with the care homes to request that:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require robust project plans covering stakeholder, family and next-of-kin engagement, responsibilities, and communication of planned changes to care-home and GP-practice staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the course of our investigation, we have been informed by the care home manager that Mr Lea did have the capacity to make the decision to change GP practice. If a person has capacity, there is no requirement to inform the next of kin. However, we recognise that engaging with residents and their families is best practice when making changes such as this. Therefore there are a number of actions that will be put in place to ensure families are aware of future changes with which the CCG is involved:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact care homes to recommend policies and documentation standards for staff signing on behalf of residents who can consent but cannot physically sign.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the course of the investigation it was established that the care home manager had signed the form on behalf of Mr Lea although this was not made clear to the Practice. Therefore we will be contacting all care homes to recommend:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue standard practice application forms to membership practices, including a section for signing on behalf of another person.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the time of this incident, we have issued standard practice application forms to all of our membership practices. This includes a section for signing on behalf of somebody else.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require providers to document discussions and information received from residents, record potential changes in care plans and clinical systems, and update records promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Residents/patients are assumed to have capacity unless proved otherwise. As part of this project residents were given the choice as to whether to move practice. In future projects of this type, ELR CCG makes the following recommendations:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Care homes are responsible for confirming patient awareness, consent and, where appropriate, next-of-kin notification when facilitating GP practice changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Where a patient, with capacity, who is resident in a care home, changes GP practice and this change is facilitated by the care home, arrangements are put in place for the care home to provide written confirmation that the patient is aware of the change, the patient gives consent to the change and that where appropriate the patient’s next of kin have been informed.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The GP practice cannot directly inform next of kin because of patient confidentiality and practical difficulties identifying relevant family members.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mr Lea agreed to change GP practice and there was no suggestion that he did not have the capacity to make the decision to change GP. In such circumstances, the GP practice is not in a position to inform the next of kin due to the duty of confidentiality owed to the patient and practical difficulties of identifying relevant members of the family or next of kin.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The medical records showed no cognitive decline requiring a formal capacity assessment, so capacity was assumed for the GP change process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The medical records of the patient do not reflect any evidence of declining cognitive function requiring the need for a formal capacity assessment. The communication with the care homes in this project of swapping care home patients between practices was explicit in stating that the change of registered GP was an active informed decision to be communicated to the patient, or if the care home felt there was a lack of capacity for this to be discussed with next of kin. As part of this project letters were written to the care home patients which was sent to Mr Lea as well detailing the above. Hence it was assumed that Mr Lea had capacity to engage in this process.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Hazelmere-Medical-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Patients with capacity are not required to have next of kin informed about a change of GP practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the course of our investigation, we have been informed by the care home manager that Mr Lea did have the capacity to make the decision to change GP practice. If a person has capacity, there is no requirement to inform the next of kin. However, we recognise that engaging with residents and their families is best practice when making changes such as this. Therefore there are a number of actions that will be put in place to ensure families are aware of future changes with which the CCG is involved:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There is usually no need to record the rationale for changing a patient's registered GP in the medical record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is usually no need for documenting on patients medical records regarding rationale for change of GP.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Hazelmere-Medical-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Capacity assessments are not routinely undertaken unless there is a medical need.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As highlighted the care home was facilitating change of GP and patients were offered the choice of declining to change their registered GP. As mentioned earlier it is not common practice to hold capacity assessment unless there is a medical need.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Hazelmere-Medical-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response
  2. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Rebecca Gilbank · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rebecca Gilbank, a 25-year-old woman with severe myoclonic epilepsy and significant learning difficulties, was found unresponsive in bed at Clareville Lodge during the early hours of 12 May 2015. Staff were unable to obtain an outside telephone line from the office landline and used a personal mobile phone to call emergency services, while CPR was unsuccessful. The principal concerns were that a required 1.30am check had been missed because staff were attending to other service users, and that staff did not know how to obtain an outside line to emergency services, causing a delay of unknown duration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out required checks when staff are occupied with other service users

    Wider context from the report

    “Lack of check at 1.30am on 12 May 2015 Evidence at inquest revealed that the check was not carried out because the two members of waking night staff were busy dealing with other service users. The court heard evidence that this was not an isolated occurrence and that checks had been missed on other occasions in circumstances in which staff were dealing with other service users. ”

    Source location

    Rebecca Gilbank · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff knowledge about obtaining an outside telephone line to emergency services

    Wider context from the report

    “Lack of knowledge about how to obtain an outside telephone line Evidence at the inquest revealed that the staff on duty did not know how to obtain an outside line to emergency services and, after trying, had to rely on a personal mobile phone. This resulted in a delay of unknown duration. ”

    Source location

    Rebecca Gilbank · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review available night staffing resources at services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have considered the staff resources that are available at our services during the night. We believe that sufficient waking night staff are made available at our services. If an individual’s assessed needs mean that they require one to one support or a higher ratio of waking night staff to service users, we note that it is the responsibility of the local authority or CCG to arrange a care and support package which meets those assessed needs and to fund it appropriately.”

    Source location

    2016-0266-Response-by-Independence-Homes
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove the requirement to dial 9 for an outside telephone line.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Independence Homes has taken action in relation to this matter. At a meeting on 14 July 2016, at which we considered the evidence provided during the inquest, we immediately sought to rectify the issue of dialling 9 for an outside line from some of our locations. On 26 July 2016 we contacted our telephone provider and we changed our contract so that there is no longer a need to dial 9 to obtain an outside line. This change was communicated to staff verbally, by email on 7 September 2016 and in the Clareville Lodge Communications Book. Please find a copy of the email enclosed.”

    Source location

    2016-0266-Response-by-Independence-Homes
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate the changed outside-line procedure to staff verbally, by email and in the communications book.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Independence Homes has taken action in relation to this matter. At a meeting on 14 July 2016, at which we considered the evidence provided during the inquest, we immediately sought to rectify the issue of dialling 9 for an outside line from some of our locations. On 26 July 2016 we contacted our telephone provider and we changed our contract so that there is no longer a need to dial 9 to obtain an outside line. This change was communicated to staff verbally, by email on 7 September 2016 and in the Clareville Lodge Communications Book. Please find a copy of the email enclosed.”

    Source location

    2016-0266-Response-by-Independence-Homes
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local authorities or CCGs are responsible for arranging and funding higher staffing ratios required by assessed needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have considered the staff resources that are available at our services during the night. We believe that sufficient waking night staff are made available at our services. If an individual’s assessed needs mean that they require one to one support or a higher ratio of waking night staff to service users, we note that it is the responsibility of the local authority or CCG to arrange a care and support package which meets those assessed needs and to fund it appropriately.”

    Source location

    2016-0266-Response-by-Independence-Homes
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing waking-night staffing is considered sufficient for assessed needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have considered the staff resources that are available at our services during the night. We believe that sufficient waking night staff are made available at our services. If an individual’s assessed needs mean that they require one to one support or a higher ratio of waking night staff to service users, we note that it is the responsibility of the local authority or CCG to arrange a care and support package which meets those assessed needs and to fund it appropriately.”

    Source location

    2016-0266-Response-by-Independence-Homes
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clear guidance on obtaining an outside telephone line was already provided at the time of the death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note that, at the time of Ms Gilbank’s death, clear and accessible guidance on how to obtain an outside line was provided. I understand that there was a sign on the noticeboard in the staff office at Clareville Lodge which stated that staff should dial 9 for an outside line.”

    Source location

    2016-0266-Response-by-Independence-Homes
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response
  3. Gloucestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Joseph Gunn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Joseph Gunn fell from height while using a staff staircase at a supermarket on 25 September 2014. The jury found the fall was probably caused by an epileptic event, and he died in hospital on 7 October 2014 from injuries sustained in the fall. The report raised concern that observed or reported epileptic events involving an employee at work were not recorded.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record observed or reported epileptic events occurring to employees at work

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Any observed or reported epileptic event occurring to a Morrison’s employee whilst at work was not recorded ”

    Source location

    Matthew Joseph Gunn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend return-to-work procedures to record reported epileptic events and remind staff to review individual risk assessments and refer employees for occupational-health assessment when necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(c) Where the epileptic event is reported via the return to work procedures this will be recorded on the employee’s file and a reminder included of the need to review the risk assessment for the individual and refer them to Occupational Health for Assessment, if necessary.”

    Source location

    2016-0217-Response-by-Morrisons
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update first-aid training and policy to require slips for every attendance, including cases without treatment or an available first aider, and train People Managers to review and file slips.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In light of your concern, Morrisons has taken the opportunity to refresh this procedure in order to re-emphasise the expected approach. As a result, Morrisons is implementing:”

    Source location

    2016-0217-Response-by-Morrisons
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Morrisons can only record events disclosed to it because equality legislation prohibits requiring employees to disclose epilepsy information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As Morrisons understands, the suggested purpose of recording any observed or reported epileptic event is so that it has information that may be of assistance to assess an employee’s epilepsy with respect to their work as necessary. As the evidence clearly reflected at the inquest, it is important to recognise that in order for Morrisons to have a full and accurate picture of an employee’s epilepsy, it would be necessary for it to be informed by the employee of epileptic events that occurred outside of work, for example, at home. It is only possible for Morrisons to record and act on the epileptic events that it is informed of.”

    Source location

    2016-0217-Response-by-Morrisons
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 June 2016

    Open published response
  4. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Benjamin Patrick Fraser · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Benjamin Patrick Fraser had terminal multiple myeloma and died at Doncaster Royal Infirmary on 24 September 2015 after his condition significantly progressed and palliative care was initiated. The report identified the absence of a robust system for conveying summary medical information to receiving A&E departments when inmates are transferred with an acute illness, which could delay diagnosis for other inmates.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a robust system for conveying summary medical information to receiving A&E departments during acute illness transfers

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard evidence that the medical records on the electronic Spine One contain a summary overview of a person’s medical status which should be sent to A&E Departments where patients have been referred. This information is readily accessible but in Mr Fraser’s case when he was referred to A&E on 15th August 2015, this information was not conveyed by them to the receiving hospital. I also heard in evidence that there is no system for ensuring that such information is sent and therefore is “hit and miss” as to whether or not it is sent. Whilst I concluded that in Mr Fraser’s case this did not affect the ultimate outcome due to him re-attending four days later and given the very aggressive nature of the cancer from which he was suffering, it is clear that for other inmates with different conditions, failure to provide such information may well delay diagnosis or make it extremely difficult to reach diagnosis. Accordingly consideration needs to be given to implementing a system where such information is conveyed for every such inmate in a timely fashion. Summary of concerns:- 1. Absence of a robust system for conveying summary medical information to receiving A&E departments when inmates are transferred with an acute illness. . ”

    Source location

    Anthony Benjamin Patrick Fraser · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a jointly authored procedure defining custodial and healthcare responsibilities for conveying summary medical information to receiving A&E departments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the receipt of the Regulation 28 Report, a collaborative meeting took place with the Governor of HMP Lindholme, ████████ and the Associate Director for Offender Health, ████████ and the Head of Healthcare at HMP Lindholme, ████████ and the Head of Security at HMP Lindholme, ████████. The purpose of the meeting was to develop a shared system to address the concerns you have raised in the Preventing Future Deaths report.”

    Source location

    2016-0225-Response-by-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the information-transfer procedure at the Offender Health Learning the Lessons Forum to support adoption by other establishments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A copy of the procedure will be shared at the Offender Health Learning the Lessons Forum on the 9th of September 2016, to ensure colleagues in other establishments also have a system in place for the transfer of medical information, thereby avoiding future deaths.”

    Source location

    2016-0225-Response-by-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake a compliance review of the information-transfer procedure to confirm full implementation of the system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A procedure was co-authored by the group, clearly identifying the roles and responsibilities of both Custodial and Healthcare staff. A copy of the procedure has been included with this letter. The procedure has been issued to staff and is now in operation. A review of compliance will be undertaken by the Head of Healthcare within the coming month, to ensure we have achieved full implementation for a robust system of conveying summary medical information to A&E depts.”

    Source location

    2016-0225-Response-by-Nottinghamshire-Healthcare-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2016

    Open published response
  5. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher James B Sears · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher James B Sears, a 13-year-old boy, died on 13 November 2014 after a seizure-like episode on a school bus; resuscitation attempts were unsuccessful. The report raised concerns about the absence of Basic Life Support training and emergency protocols for school-bus drivers, delays in calling emergency services, and difficulties alerting the bus company where there was no formal diagnosis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inability of schools to inform bus companies about concerns without a formal diagnosis

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The school were unable to inform the bus company concerned without a formal diagnosis and to put protective measures in place. ”

    Source location

    Christopher James B Sears · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of requirements for contracted pupil-transport bus companies to ensure driver Basic Life Support training

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There is no requirement for bus companies tendering for contracts from Local Authorities to transport pupils/students to ensure all their drivers have undergone training in Basic Life Support. ”

    Source location

    Christopher James B Sears · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide Basic Life Support training as routine secondary education

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Basic Life Support training is not taught as a matter of course to young adults in secondary education and is not part of the national curriculum. ”

    Source location

    Christopher James B Sears · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a Basic Life Support qualification requirement for pupil-transport drivers

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There is no requirement for drivers transporting pupils/students to hold a Basic Life Support qualification. ”

    Source location

    Christopher James B Sears · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of emergency-response protocols for drivers driving buses

    Wider context from the report

    “3. No protocols were in place to assist a driver as to what to do in an emergency situation whilst driving a bus including the need to call the emergency services at the earliest opportunity. ”

    Source location

    Christopher James B Sears · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inability to put protective measures in place for bus transport concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The school were unable to inform the bus company concerned without a formal diagnosis and to put protective measures in place. ”

    Source location

    Christopher James B Sears · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consult on a revised version of the guidance on school transport.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is our intention that LAs should ensure that school bus drivers and escorts have training in basic life support skills and in the implementation of emergency protocols (your third ‘Matter of Concern’). We intend to consult on a revised version of the guidance on school transport in the autumn. Subject to any responses received in response to this consultation, we will consider whether we should further clarify both the description of the training that drivers should undertake and our expectation that training for bus drivers and escorts should include basic life support training alongside the implementation of healthcare protocols, including emergency protocols.”

    Source location

    2016-0212-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider clarifying training expectations for school bus drivers and escorts, including basic life support and emergency healthcare protocols.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is our intention that LAs should ensure that school bus drivers and escorts have training in basic life support skills and in the implementation of emergency protocols (your third ‘Matter of Concern’). We intend to consult on a revised version of the guidance on school transport in the autumn. Subject to any responses received in response to this consultation, we will consider whether we should further clarify both the description of the training that drivers should undertake and our expectation that training for bus drivers and escorts should include basic life support training alongside the implementation of healthcare protocols, including emergency protocols.”

    Source location

    2016-0212-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Promote a programme of study covering emergency procedures and basic first aid for young people.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Promoting a programme of study that teaches young people how to recognise and follow health and safety procedures and how to use emergency and basic first aid.”

    Source location

    2016-0212-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a statutory duty requiring governing bodies to support pupils with medical conditions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On your concern that the school did not, as a result of no medical diagnosis, have a medical plan in place, we have already introduced a new duty on governing bodies to support pupils with medical conditions. This was introduced by Section 100 of the Children and Families Act 2014 which came into force on 1 September 2014. Our aim is to give parents confidence that the right support and systems will be put in place to ensure that pupils receive the support they need. This is a clear signal to schools that supporting pupils with medical conditions is an important issue and will help them to meet their legal responsibilities.”

    Source location

    2016-0212-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add a reference to medical-support planning advice in home-to-school transport guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We believe this provides the right level of guidance to schools to ensure that effective healthcare plans are put in place, whilst allowing the flexibility they need when handling an individual pupil’s needs. We will, however, ensure that there is a reference to this advice within our guidance on home to school transport so that LAs are aware of the responsibilities of schools in drawing up such plans.”

    Source location

    2016-0212-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue statutory guidance setting minimum expectations for school policies, procedures and individual healthcare plans for pupils with medical conditions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The statutory guidance came into force alongside the new duty on 1 September 2014 and is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/supporting-pupils-at-school-with-medical-conditions--3. The guidance sets out our minimum expectations of schools, and covers the preparation and implementation of school policies for supporting pupils with medical conditions and the use of individual care plans. Schools must have a ‘supporting pupils with medical conditions’ policy. The governing board should ensure that policies, plans, procedures and systems are properly and effectively implemented.”

    Source location

    2016-0212-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for requiring bus companies to provide drivers with basic life support training rests with the Department for Transport.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your concern that LA contractual arrangements do not require tendering bus companies to ensure that their drivers are qualified in basic life support skills is a matter for the Department for Transport (DfT), and we understand that Andrew Jones is replying separately to you on this issue.”

    Source location

    2016-0212-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mandatory basic life-support training for bus drivers is not proposed because existing guidance and flexible Driver CPC arrangements are considered sufficient.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Driver CPC is purposely designed to be flexible in its application – no specific part of the periodic training syllabus is mandatory, and the Department believes that this is important to ensure that training can be focussed on every individual’s specific training needs. In 2014/15 275,900 drivers chose to undertake training courses that taught them either basic or more advanced first aid techniques; while that total includes both bus and HGV drivers, it nevertheless suggests strong take-up.”

    Source location

    2016-0212-Response-by-Department-for-Transport
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing voluntary PSHE arrangements, guidance and promoted resources are considered sufficient to support pupils’ first-aid and emergency medical training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, on your concern that basic life support training is not taught as a matter of course to young adults, whilst schools are not under a statutory duty to provide emergency life skills teaching, many do teach it as part of personal, social, health and economic (PSHE) education.”

    Source location

    2016-0212-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 May 2016

    Open published response
  6. Blackburn, Hyndburn and Ribble Valley

    AI-generated summary

    David Aughton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Aughton sustained a severe traumatic brain injury in 1999 that led to epileptic seizures. During a hospital admission for a cystoscopy in December 2015, his anticonvulsant medication was not administered; he subsequently had a grand mal convulsion causing aspiration pneumonia and died on 25 January 2016. The principal concern was that there was no mechanism to ensure essential medications were prescribed, dispensed and administered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a mechanism ensuring essential medications are prescribed, dispensed and administered

    Wider context from the report

    “That despite the fact that his regular medications including lamotrigine and sodium valproate were recorded in his medical records, those medications had not been dispensed, leading to a grand mal convulsion it was apparent that there was no mechanism in place to ensure that essential medications were prescribed, dispensed and administered. ”

    Source location

    David Aughton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Monica Elaine Lewis-Hinds · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Monica Elaine Lewis-Hinds suffered a seizure at home after midnight on 16 January 2015 and later suffered a further seizure that led to asphyxia, cardiac arrest and death. The concern was that the ambulance call handler did not ascertain the type of seizure, delaying the response, and that the London Ambulance Service triage protocol did not require this question to be asked in all cases.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to proactively ask and record the type of fit during triage calls

    Wider context from the report

    “The protocol used by the London Ambulance Service for triage calls includes a question about the type of fit, but the question is not posed by the call handler to the caller, and the section is only completed if the caller offers the information. In view of the potential consequences for the patient, this part of the protocol may require amendment, so that the question is put pre-emptively in all cases. ”

    Source location

    Monica Elaine Lewis-Hinds · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wilfrid Pearson was admitted to Tameside Hospital on 22 April 2015 with epilepsy, developed status epilepticus, and died at a local hospice about a month later. Concerns included possible failures in updating and communicating the status epilepticus protocol, unclear and incomplete records, inadequate escalation of care, staffing pressures, and the legal basis for detaining him after he left the ward.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain an up-to-date Status Epilepticus protocol

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The protocol for the observation, diagnosis and treatment of Status Epilepticus was written by the Consultant Neurologist who gave evidence to me. There was some doubt as to whether the document had been properly updated and whether and how it was promulgated to all relevant medical staff including locum doctors. ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to promulgate the Status Epilepticus protocol to all relevant medical staff

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The protocol for the observation, diagnosis and treatment of Status Epilepticus was written by the Consultant Neurologist who gave evidence to me. There was some doubt as to whether the document had been properly updated and whether and how it was promulgated to all relevant medical staff including locum doctors. ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish lawful authority for detaining an agitated patient

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The deceased “absconded” from the ward and was described as agitated and confrontational. He was “brought back to the ward by Security”. I was told that no D.O.L.S. order was made or even contemplated, and he was not subject to compulsory detention under the Mental Health Act, therefore one has to ask where they derived the legal authority to detain the patient? ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure by ITU doctors to prioritise brain protection

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was no understanding of the need for, and method of, escalation of the care to the HDU or ITU and indeed according to the expert witness instructed by the Trust the impression is that the ITU doctors did not consider that brain protection was a high priority in Mr Pearson’s case”. ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to understand the need for and method of escalating care to HDU or ITU

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was no understanding of the need for, and method of, escalation of the care to the HDU or ITU and indeed according to the expert witness instructed by the Trust the impression is that the ITU doctors did not consider that brain protection was a high priority in Mr Pearson’s case”. ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ITU registrar attendance at the ward when required

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There appears to have been a huge stress on the junior medical staff and I was told that “the ITU Registrar refused to attend the ward, but it is not normal for the ITU registrar to refuse to attend” and one of the junior doctors said “we were short staffed and overstretched”. This seems to have added to the omissions of care which were apparent. ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate clarity, accuracy and completeness of medical and nursing notes

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The medical and nursing notes for Mr Pearson left much to be desired in terms of their clarity, accuracy and completeness. ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient junior medical staffing capacity

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There appears to have been a huge stress on the junior medical staff and I was told that “the ITU Registrar refused to attend the ward, but it is not normal for the ITU registrar to refuse to attend” and one of the junior doctors said “we were short staffed and overstretched”. This seems to have added to the omissions of care which were apparent. ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the Trust’s Status Epilepticus Policy using current clinical guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am informed that since Mr Pearson’s admission in April 2014 nearly two years ago, Dr Douglass has revised the Trust’s Status Epilepticus Policy on two occasions, firstly in direct response to the admission of Mr Pearson and additionally at the time of review in 2015. The policy has been revised to assist clinicians in being able to more easily review and understand the appropriate steps to take when a patient presents with Status Epilepticus. The revisions were made by direct reference to recent guidance on Status Epilepticus published in the Lancet Medical Journal. Please find enclosed a copy of our current policy.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include the Status Epilepticus Policy in the mandatory Junior Doctor Grand Round.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust’s Education Department have confirmed that Status Epilepticus Policy will now be included as part of the Junior Doctor Grand Round (this is the training programme that all Junior Doctors must complete). The Trust’s intranet has a search facility for documents which directs staff seeking guidance to documents including the Status Epilepticus Standards. The search also directs staff to the NICE Guidance Quality Standards for Epilepsies.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate the Status Epilepticus Policy through junior doctor training, medical team discussions and the Trust intranet.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As well as making improvements to the Trust’s local policy, steps have been taken to ensure all clinicians at the Trust have awareness of the policy. It has been included as part of the training of Junior Doctors, and has been discussed with the Trust’s medical teams. The policy is also easily available for clinicians on the Trust’s intranet.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Promote Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards principles through executive bulletins and Trust-wide posters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition Weightmans LLP have provided four sessions of Mental Capacity Training in September and October of 2015 for medical staff and Consultants. The Trust has another session scheduled for May 2016. To further promote the principles of DOLS and ensure staff are aware of these the trust has promotes this through the Trusts communication including my Chief Executive Bulletins ‘Catch up with Karen’ and posters have been distributed and displayed across the Trust. The Quality and Governance Team monitor DOLS and the timescales and a report is produced weekly which provides an update to the Director of Quality and Governance on the status of DOLS. Since the admission of Mr Pearson the Trust has undergone two CQC visits during which we have been challenged and scrutinised against the Trusts processes in place for Safeguarding Adults and Mental Capacity.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards compliance and timescales through weekly reports to the Director of Quality and Governance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition Weightmans LLP have provided four sessions of Mental Capacity Training in September and October of 2015 for medical staff and Consultants. The Trust has another session scheduled for May 2016. To further promote the principles of DOLS and ensure staff are aware of these the trust has promotes this through the Trusts communication including my Chief Executive Bulletins ‘Catch up with Karen’ and posters have been distributed and displayed across the Trust. The Quality and Governance Team monitor DOLS and the timescales and a report is produced weekly which provides an update to the Director of Quality and Governance on the status of DOLS. Since the admission of Mr Pearson the Trust has undergone two CQC visits during which we have been challenged and scrutinised against the Trusts processes in place for Safeguarding Adults and Mental Capacity.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Employ a Lead Nurse to advise staff and monitor compliance with Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Again I am disappointed and concerned that HM Coroner found that it was unclear where the Trust derived that Legal Authority to detain the patient. I would like to take this opportunity to reassure HM Coroner that the Trust has undertaken a significant amount of work in relation to Safeguarding Adults and DOLS since 2014, and in particular promotion of when a DOLS is to be considered. The Trust employed a Lead Nurse who provides support and advice on DOLS for staff in May 2014 and who also monitors that processes are followed. The Trust works closely with the local Authority DOLS leads and Mental Capacity Advocates. Regular MCA/DOLS training sessions have been held in the Trust provided by an external expert in Mental Capacity and DOLS; this is open to all staff in the Trust.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with local-authority Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards leads and Mental Capacity Advocates on safeguarding processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Again I am disappointed and concerned that HM Coroner found that it was unclear where the Trust derived that Legal Authority to detain the patient. I would like to take this opportunity to reassure HM Coroner that the Trust has undertaken a significant amount of work in relation to Safeguarding Adults and DOLS since 2014, and in particular promotion of when a DOLS is to be considered. The Trust employed a Lead Nurse who provides support and advice on DOLS for staff in May 2014 and who also monitors that processes are followed. The Trust works closely with the local Authority DOLS leads and Mental Capacity Advocates. Regular MCA/DOLS training sessions have been held in the Trust provided by an external expert in Mental Capacity and DOLS; this is open to all staff in the Trust.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver continuing Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards training for Trust staff, including the scheduled May 2016 session.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Again I am disappointed and concerned that HM Coroner found that it was unclear where the Trust derived that Legal Authority to detain the patient. I would like to take this opportunity to reassure HM Coroner that the Trust has undertaken a significant amount of work in relation to Safeguarding Adults and DOLS since 2014, and in particular promotion of when a DOLS is to be considered. The Trust employed a Lead Nurse who provides support and advice on DOLS for staff in May 2014 and who also monitors that processes are followed. The Trust works closely with the local Authority DOLS leads and Mental Capacity Advocates. Regular MCA/DOLS training sessions have been held in the Trust provided by an external expert in Mental Capacity and DOLS; this is open to all staff in the Trust.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Change and review the Critical Care Unit processes and care pathway.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The decision to escalate a patient to critical care is ultimately a clinical decision made by clinicians based on the patient’s clinical picture at a point in time. The Trust has a standard for the admission and discharge for Critical Care which provides guidance for clinical staff on the process for admission/escalation and this was revised in May 2014 to include further detail in relation to the National Early Warning Score and escalation and reviewed again in May 2015. This is available to all staff on the Trust’s intranet. The Critical Care Unit and the processes and pathway for Critical Care have been subject to extensive change since April 2014 and have been subject to independent third party review and inspection. They have been reviewed by the CQC as an independent third party in April 2015.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and publish Critical Care admission, discharge and escalation standards, including National Early Warning Score guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The decision to escalate a patient to critical care is ultimately a clinical decision made by clinicians based on the patient’s clinical picture at a point in time. The Trust has a standard for the admission and discharge for Critical Care which provides guidance for clinical staff on the process for admission/escalation and this was revised in May 2014 to include further detail in relation to the National Early Warning Score and escalation and reviewed again in May 2015. This is available to all staff on the Trust’s intranet. The Critical Care Unit and the processes and pathway for Critical Care have been subject to extensive change since April 2014 and have been subject to independent third party review and inspection. They have been reviewed by the CQC as an independent third party in April 2015.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise nursing documentation and reinforce Ward Manager and Matron monitoring of documentation quality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am disappointed that HM Coroner found the medical and nursing records left much to be desired and I am sorry that you found this to be the case. HM Coroner will be aware that individual nursing and medical clinicians are responsible for their own professional standards. The Trust has a standard for medical record keeping and expects records to be timed and reflect an actual chronology. The Clinicians carrying out the assessment should document the time the assessment was carried out as well as the time of the medical entry. This is our Trust standard and the Trust encourage and promote this. The Trust has, since Mr Pearson’s admission, revised some of the nursing documentation and reinforced the role of Ward Managers and Matrons in monitoring the quality of documentation completed by staff.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit key aspects of medical clinical documentation through the Trust’s Clinical Audit programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust’s Clinical Audit programme, the Trust’s Clinical Lead for Clinical Audit has been working with doctors in training and audits have been undertaken which include key aspects of medical clinical documentation.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review medical staffing rotas to maximise senior cover and monitor staffing levels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the time of Mr Pearson’s admission the rotas for medical staffing have been reviewed to maximise appropriate levels of senior cover and to monitor the levels of medical staffing.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue recruiting medical staff and collaborate with Health Education North West and junior doctors to improve training experience and long-term attraction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These take into account the mix in relation to substantive staff and locum staff. The Trust maintains an ongoing recruitment programme and has been working with Health Education North West and junior doctors to improve the experience of junior doctors in training and to attract medical staff long term.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The decision to escalate a patient to critical care is ultimately a clinical decision made by clinicians based on the patient’s clinical condition.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The decision to escalate a patient to critical care is ultimately a clinical decision made by clinicians based on the patient’s clinical picture at a point in time. The Trust has a standard for the admission and discharge for Critical Care which provides guidance for clinical staff on the process for admission/escalation and this was revised in May 2014 to include further detail in relation to the National Early Warning Score and escalation and reviewed again in May 2015. This is available to all staff on the Trust’s intranet. The Critical Care Unit and the processes and pathway for Critical Care have been subject to extensive change since April 2014 and have been subject to independent third party review and inspection. They have been reviewed by the CQC as an independent third party in April 2015.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response
  9. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    William Francis Driscoll · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Francis Driscoll died at Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham on 30 June 2015 from injuries sustained when a vehicle mounted the pavement and hit him while he was walking. The driver lost control during an epileptic seizure. The report identified serious deficiencies in the DVLA medical assessment process, including limited investigation of health conditions and failure to follow up an identified relevant consultant, which could allow inadequately assessed drivers to continue driving.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow up a GP’s identification of a relevant consultant

    Wider context from the report

    “████████ gave evidence that if he had been aware of the incident in September 2014 he would have carried out further investigations revealing the epilepsy that was ultimately diagnosed in August 2015 and thus preventing ████████ from driving before the collision with the deceased. It appears that there are serious deficiencies in the medical assessment process as regards the limited investigation into the health conditions on the form POLN3 and/or in not following up the GP’s identification of a ‘Relevant Consultant’. As a consequence drivers may be permitted to drive who have not been adequately assessed as fit to do so. ”

    Source location

    William Francis Driscoll · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Limited investigation into health conditions declared on form POLN3

    Wider context from the report

    “████████ gave evidence that if he had been aware of the incident in September 2014 he would have carried out further investigations revealing the epilepsy that was ultimately diagnosed in August 2015 and thus preventing ████████ from driving before the collision with the deceased. It appears that there are serious deficiencies in the medical assessment process as regards the limited investigation into the health conditions on the form POLN3 and/or in not following up the GP’s identification of a ‘Relevant Consultant’. As a consequence drivers may be permitted to drive who have not been adequately assessed as fit to do so. ”

    Source location

    William Francis Driscoll · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Oxfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Connor Sparrowhawk · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Connor Sparrowhawk died on 4 July 2013 at STATT after drowning following an epileptic seizure while in the bath; the jury found that neglect contributed. The report raises concerns about whether sight or sound observations during bathing can effectively prevent drowning in patients with epilepsy, and whether RIO adequately captures and makes accessible patients’ epilepsy histories.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of RIO to support complete recording and accessibility of patients' epilepsy information

    Wider context from the report

    “2) The second matter of concern is in relation to RIO and the fact that there does not appear to be an appropriate prompt or place to record details about a patient's epilepsy/history. In Connor's case, this led to details of his epilepsy being placed on the care plan. Even though there have been improvements, including the introduction of the epilepsy tool kit, it is not clear whether, even now, all the required information about epilepsy can be captured on RIO and therefore, is easily accessible to staff. ”

    Source location

    Connor Sparrowhawk · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain effective bathing observations for patients with epilepsy

    Wider context from the report

    “1) It appears that the current recommendation at the Trust is for patients with epilepsy to be able to choose to bath but to be the subject of sight/sound observations. There are obvious difficulties in respect of patient dignity with observations by sight. As far as observations by sound are concerned, it is envisaged that a member of staff will be sat outside the bathroom door while the patient takes a bath. I am concerned however that observations by sound alone may not prevent someone from drowning. A person can drown in seconds if they are rendered unconscious by an epileptic fit. It also seems to me that a member of staff in, for example, the corridor is likely to be distracted by other members of staff and patients and may also have an occasional requirement to obtain a drink or use the toilet etc. In reality, on a busy ward, particularly with a patient who has reasonably well controlled epilepsy, the concern is that close observation by sight/sound is unlikely to be maintained. I am concerned that this policy is simply setting the Trust up to fail. I understand that a decision was taken sometime after Connor's death to stop bathing. I also understand however that the CQC when they carried out one of their inspections was critical of this decision due to the fact that the CQC are not in favour of blanket bans of this nature. I am sending a copy of this letter to the CQC for them to comment on. My concern is therefore in relation to the effectiveness of bath time observations for patients with epilepsy. ”

    Source location

    Connor Sparrowhawk · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add a specific physical-health-risk prompt to the overarching RiO risk assessment form.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important that staff record risks around all physical health problems and not just epilepsy. A change request has also been made with regards to the overarching RiO risk assessment form for mental health and learning disability services. This will provide a specific prompt for physical health risks to be noted. We expect this to be available in a future OpenRiO release planned to occur in March 2016. In the meantime, there is guidance available for staff within the comprehensive Learning Disability Service Specific Guidance for RiO which advises them that physical health risks (with specific mention of epilepsy) should be noted in the ‘Other Risk Behaviours’ section of the existing form. ████████ has undertaken considerable work to promote this guidance within the division.”

    Source location

    2015-0445-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Build and release electronic epilepsy assessment forms in OpenRiO for Learning Disability and other relevant Trust services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You were concerned that RiO, the electronic patient record, did not have an appropriate place to record details about a person’s epilepsy. This has been considered by ████████ who is an Informatics Clinician, the OpenRiO Learning Disability Clinical Lead and a Community Learning Disability Nurse by background.”

    Source location

    2015-0445-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Promote Learning Disability Service Specific Guidance for recording physical-health risks, including epilepsy, in RiO.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important that staff record risks around all physical health problems and not just epilepsy. A change request has also been made with regards to the overarching RiO risk assessment form for mental health and learning disability services. This will provide a specific prompt for physical health risks to be noted. We expect this to be available in a future OpenRiO release planned to occur in March 2016. In the meantime, there is guidance available for staff within the comprehensive Learning Disability Service Specific Guidance for RiO which advises them that physical health risks (with specific mention of epilepsy) should be noted in the ‘Other Risk Behaviours’ section of the existing form. ████████ has undertaken considerable work to promote this guidance within the division.”

    Source location

    2015-0445-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Collate results from epilepsy, bathing-risk and physical-health audits to inform further improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Compliance with policies and guidelines and with record keeping standards is assessed on an ongoing basis through management supervision and the peer review process. Audits are also regularly performed with an Epilepsy audit, bathing risk audit and physical health audit having been undertaken in the learning disability division in the last quarter. The results of these are being collated and will inform further improvements that are required.”

    Source location

    2015-0445-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate the OpenRiO release and explain use of the electronic epilepsy forms through Trust-wide, divisional and governance channels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The release of the new version of RiO with the epilepsy forms will be accompanied by a comprehensive communication plan to ensure staff are aware of their availability. This will include the following:”

    Source location

    2015-0445-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Finalise and ratify the Trust-wide protocol for safe bathing and showering of people with epilepsy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Clinical Director for Learning Disability Services, ████████, has led this piece of work alongside members of the Epilepsy Clinical Area of Practice group within the division. Although a comprehensive Epilepsy Map and Toolkit have been developed which cover all areas of risk, a decision has been made to write a new protocol specifically for bathing. This has been drafted by ████████, Consultant Nurse, again in conjunction with a range of practitioners. The document is called Protocol for the Safe Bathing and Showering of People with Epilepsy and has just been through a consultation process among senior clinical staff members. As a result of this, suggestions have been made as to some additions that are required to make it applicable to every speciality across the Trust rather than just the Learning Disability Division.”

    Source location

    2015-0445-Response-by-Southern-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 November 2015

    Open published response

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Classification: all classifications19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: all recurring concerns
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