Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care12
NHS England12
HM Prison and Probation Service6
Department for Transport5
Care Quality Commission4
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence3
Practice Plus Group3
Royal College of General Practitioners3
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health3
Association Of British Neurologists2
College of Policing2
Department for Education2
General Medical Council2
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Ministry of Justice2
National Police Chiefs’ Council2
Office of the Chief Coroner2
Pentonville Prison2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
BNF Publications1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council1
Brook Medical Centre1
Caring Limited1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Choice Support1
Cleveland Police1
Coastal Homecare – Hove Branch1
Community Disability Nurse1
DW Fitness First1
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy1
Disclosure and Barring Service1
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset County Council1
Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset Police1
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency1
Dwf LLP1
East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust1
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Emsworth Surgery1
Epilepsy Action1
Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust1
European Care & Lifestyles (UK) Limited1
Forest Bank Prison1
General Pharmaceutical Council1
GeoAmey PECS Limited1
George Abbot School1
Gloucestershire Health and Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Gloucestershire Social Services1
Godfrey Care1
Grant Shapps MP1
Great Ormond Street Hospital1
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership1
Greater Manchester Police1
Greenshades Coach Travel Limited1
Grosvenor Medical Centre1
Grupo de Turismo Gaviota S.A.1
Guy'S and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust1
HM Prison Service1
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Hazelmere Medical Centre1
Health and Safety Executive1
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust1
High Down Prison1
Home Office1
Independence Homes Limited1
Independent Futures1
James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee1
Kendal Calling1
Kettering General Hospital1
King Street Medical Centre1
Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust1
Lindholme Prison1
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital1
Medacs Healthcare Limited1
Medway NHS Foundation Trust1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
Midway Pharmacy1
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government1
NHS Birmingham and Solihull Integrated Care Board1
NHS Dorset Integrated Care Board1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
NHS Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Integrated Care Board1
NHS South West London Integrated Care Board1
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust1
North London NHS Foundation Trust1
Northfield Medical Centre1
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust1
Parc Prison and Young Offender Institute1
Parents of the deceased1
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Pentree Lodge1
Recipient name withheld1
Richmond Medical Centre (Solihull)1
Rochester Prison1
Royal College of Emergency Medicine1
Royal College of Physicians1
Royal College of Psychiatrists1
Royal College of Surgeons of England1
Royal London Hospital1
Sheffield Health Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Skills for Care Ltd1
Sodexo1
South Tees Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Southwinds1
Springbank Care Home Limited1
Springfield Medical Centre1
St Edward's School1
St George'S University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Stepping Hill Hospital1
Stockport Borough Council1
Suffolk County Council1
Sundon Medical Centre1
Surrey County Council1
Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust1
Sussex Police1
Tameside Borough Council1
Tameside General Hospital1
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust1
Tewkesbury Borough Council1
Thameside Prison1
The Children's Trust1
The Roehampton Surgery1
The Society Of British Neurological Surgeons1
Thomas Cook Tour Operations Limited1
Transport for London1
UCB Pharma1
University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Dorset NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals of North Midlands NHS Trust1
Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc1
Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust1
ukactive1

Most commonly raised concerns

All classifications 90 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

  1. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.9 reportsSelected
  2. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.7 reportsSelected
  3. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.6 reportsSelected
  4. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.4 reportsSelected
  5. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  6. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.4 reportsSelected
  7. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.4 reportsSelected
  8. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  9. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  10. Failure to provide timely clinical follow-up after medication prescribingPrescribed medication is not reliably followed up for effectiveness, safety, collection, adherence and patient response.3 reportsSelected
  11. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.3 reportsSelected
  12. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  13. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  14. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  15. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.3 reportsSelected
  16. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.3 reportsSelected
  17. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.3 reportsSelected
  18. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.3 reportsSelected
  19. Unsafe interoperability between prison custody and healthcare proceduresReports identify failures in the bounded interface between prison custody, contracted custody providers and healthcare services, where procedures, responsibilities and safety-relevant information do not operate together reliably.3 reportsSelected
  20. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  21. Failure to communicate safety-critical care information effectively between care providers and familiesReports identify unsafe communication between care providers and families, including failures to convey risks, care instructions, concerns or other information needed to support safe care and decision-making.2 reportsSelected
  22. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  23. Failure to ensure safe prisoner transfersRecurring concern that the end-to-end prisoner transfer process is unreliable, leaving transferred prisoners exposed to unmanaged risks or interruptions in essential support.2 reportsSelected
  24. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  25. Failure to reliably document the rationale for consequential decisionsDifferent reports identify missing or inadequate records explaining the rationale and evidential basis for consequential decisions, including the anchor’s crucial decisions and comparable mental-capacity, NRPF and transfer decisions. The shared concern is unreliable rationale documentation for decisions that affect safety, accountability and continuity of care, rather than any one decision type or record system.2 reportsSelected
  26. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  27. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  28. Failure to reliably refer patients to required specialist servicesThe anchor identifies a required physiotherapy referral that was not completed. A different report identifies delayed referrals to physiotherapy, occupational therapy, dietetics and Parkinson’s specialist services. Together these support an end-to-end concern with required specialist referrals not being made promptly and reliably, rather than a concern limited to one physiotherapy referral.2 reportsSelected
  29. Failure to secure and control medicationReports identify medication as remaining accessible, unsecured or inadequately controlled, creating risks of misuse, overdose, theft or access by people other than the intended patient.2 reportsSelected
  30. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  31. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  32. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  33. Incomplete clinical history-takingReports identify an unsafe clinical assessment condition in which relevant patient history is not obtained sufficiently to support recognition of symptoms, risks and appropriate care.2 reportsSelected
  34. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  35. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  36. Unreliable access to emergency communicationReports identify failures in dedicated emergency communication arrangements that can delay summoning or contacting emergency help.2 reportsSelected
  37. Unreliable communication of critical medication information to GPsRecurring deficiency in the medication-information exchange process between services and GPs, including information needed to maintain supplies, assess prescribing safety and support continuity of treatment.2 reportsSelected
  38. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  39. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  40. Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated careThe anchor identifies absent agreed communication means and inaccessible shared patient information between mental health agencies. Other canonical reports identify relevant risk information not being shared between agencies and poor inter-agency information sharing preventing coordinated care, supporting a recurring concern with the reliability of inter-agency care information sharing rather than only the anchor's repository or communication-channel failure.2 reportsSelected
  41. Unreliable management of medication doses not takenThe anchor identifies missing guidance for monitoring prescribed medication that self-administering patients do not take when dispensed. A different report identifies inconsistent procedures for responding when service users refuse or do not take medication. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of detecting, monitoring and escalating omitted or refused medication doses, rather than a concern limited to one guidance document or one home's procedure.2 reportsSelected
  42. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  43. Unreliable observation of people in custodyThe anchor report identifies failure to transfer and replicate medically required observation levels when a detained person moves into GEO AMEY custody, while a different report identifies uncertainty about whether the correct observation level, including constant watch, was provided to a person in prison custody. Together these support a recurring concern about the reliability of the custody observation process rather than only one handover or level-setting failure.2 reportsSelected
  44. Unreliable recording of required observations in care and custodyDifferent reports identify inaccurate, delayed, anticipatory or falsified records of required observations, including 15-minute observations in prison custody and patient-care settings. The shared unsafe condition is that observation records do not reliably reflect when and how observations were actually conducted, rather than any one observation frequency, recording location or electronic system.2 reportsSelected
  45. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  46. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  47. Unreliable urgent mental health referral and assessment pathwaysUrgent mental-health referral pathways do not reliably secure timely access, coordination and specialist assessment.2 reportsSelected
  48. Unreliable welfare-check processes for people whose health is of concernThe anchor identifies unclear purpose and use of the welfare sheet for monitoring prisoners whose health is of concern. A separate report identifies inconsistent criteria for what constitutes a welfare check and when it is recorded. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the bounded welfare-check process, rather than only the sheet or recording component.2 reportsSelected
  49. Unsafe cell-sharing decisions for prisonersRecurring deficiencies in the prison cell-sharing risk system can leave prisoners exposed to unsafe pairings or prevent them from understanding changes affecting their cell-sharing status.2 reportsSelected
  50. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

All reports in this date range

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 90 reports

Showing all concerns and their linked actions and positions from reports in this date range. Select a recurring concern above to narrow the evidence.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee Terence Curran died on 3 May 2011 while in custody at Forest Bank Prison, with naturally occurring ischaemic heart disease identified as the prime cause of death. Before his death, he experienced multiple episodes of transient loss of consciousness that were not diagnosed, and concerns were raised that recommended investigations and follow-up were not provided. Further concerns included incomplete implementation of recommendations, potentially misleading medical-note entries, and inadequate awareness or application of relevant clinical guidelines.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to fully investigate prisoners’ reported episodes of loss of consciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Evidence given at the Inquest also revealed a need for the training of Doctors working in prisons in that Doctors who provided general practice sessions at the prison (and in the community) gave evidence that they were unaware of the NICE Guidelines for Transient Loss of Consciousness Management in Adults and Young People despite such episodes being common in a prison environment. Additionally evidence was given by a Doctor that efforts were not made to fully investigate Lee Terence Curran’s episodes of loss of consciousness because, the Doctor explained, it was common for prisoners to claim to have suffered losses of consciousness as a form of drug seeking behaviour. ”

    Source location

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct NICE-compliant investigations of loss of consciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman investigated Lee Terence Curran’s death. At the conclusion of that investigation certain recommendations were made, two of which were as follows: a. “The Head of Healthcare should ensure that healthcare staff take full account of family history when arranging clinical investigations for prisoners who report, or are observed to have possible signs of high cholesterol or hypertension”. b. “The Head of Healthcare should develop a protocol that is NICE compliant for investigating episodes of loss of consciousness and should ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes.” Both of these recommendations were accepted. However the evidence given at the Inquest in relation to the implementation of recommendation a. was that all prisoners coming to Forest Bank Prison undertake the reception screening process and any prisoner with any identified, or any sign of, hypertension is referred to the hypertension clinic. A full account of the prisoner’s family history is then taken at that clinic. There was no evidence that any action had been taken to address that part of the Ombudsman’s recommendation that related to prisoners (such as Lee Terence Curran) who reported or showed signs of having high cholesterol. Likewise with recommendation b. The evidence given at the Inquest with regard to the implementation of that recommendation was that any individual who had a loss of consciousness would be automatically referred to a Doctor. That action does not encompass the whole of the Ombudsman’s recommendation. Particularly it does not ensure that investigations of episodes of loss of consciousness are NICE compliant nor does it ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes. It should be remembered here that Doctors saw Lee Terence Curran on five occasions following episodes of loss of consciousness and the NICE guidelines were not followed at any time. ”

    Source location

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make accurate and evidentially grounded entries in prisoners’ medical notes

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Evidence given at the Inquest revealed a potential need for the training of Prison staff as to the manner in which they make entries in prisoners’ medical notes. Expressly, incorrect, and potentially misleading, information had been entered in Lee Terence Curran’s medical notes concerning the episodes of loss of consciousness that he experienced. For example a nurse described one such episode as a “petit mal seizure,” whilst evidence at the Inquest made it clear that such could not have been the case. In addition those attending information did not make the basis upon which they were entering that information clear, that is they entered information that indicated that they had witnessed an event when they had not. ”

    Source location

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct clinical investigations of prisoners experiencing loss of consciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman investigated Lee Terence Curran’s death. At the conclusion of that investigation certain recommendations were made, two of which were as follows: a. “The Head of Healthcare should ensure that healthcare staff take full account of family history when arranging clinical investigations for prisoners who report, or are observed to have possible signs of high cholesterol or hypertension”. b. “The Head of Healthcare should develop a protocol that is NICE compliant for investigating episodes of loss of consciousness and should ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes.” Both of these recommendations were accepted. However the evidence given at the Inquest in relation to the implementation of recommendation a. was that all prisoners coming to Forest Bank Prison undertake the reception screening process and any prisoner with any identified, or any sign of, hypertension is referred to the hypertension clinic. A full account of the prisoner’s family history is then taken at that clinic. There was no evidence that any action had been taken to address that part of the Ombudsman’s recommendation that related to prisoners (such as Lee Terence Curran) who reported or showed signs of having high cholesterol. Likewise with recommendation b. The evidence given at the Inquest with regard to the implementation of that recommendation was that any individual who had a loss of consciousness would be automatically referred to a Doctor. That action does not encompass the whole of the Ombudsman’s recommendation. Particularly it does not ensure that investigations of episodes of loss of consciousness are NICE compliant nor does it ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes. It should be remembered here that Doctors saw Lee Terence Curran on five occasions following episodes of loss of consciousness and the NICE guidelines were not followed at any time. ”

    Source location

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to take full account of family history when clinically investigating prisoners with possible high cholesterol

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman investigated Lee Terence Curran’s death. At the conclusion of that investigation certain recommendations were made, two of which were as follows: a. “The Head of Healthcare should ensure that healthcare staff take full account of family history when arranging clinical investigations for prisoners who report, or are observed to have possible signs of high cholesterol or hypertension”. b. “The Head of Healthcare should develop a protocol that is NICE compliant for investigating episodes of loss of consciousness and should ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes.” Both of these recommendations were accepted. However the evidence given at the Inquest in relation to the implementation of recommendation a. was that all prisoners coming to Forest Bank Prison undertake the reception screening process and any prisoner with any identified, or any sign of, hypertension is referred to the hypertension clinic. A full account of the prisoner’s family history is then taken at that clinic. There was no evidence that any action had been taken to address that part of the Ombudsman’s recommendation that related to prisoners (such as Lee Terence Curran) who reported or showed signs of having high cholesterol. Likewise with recommendation b. The evidence given at the Inquest with regard to the implementation of that recommendation was that any individual who had a loss of consciousness would be automatically referred to a Doctor. That action does not encompass the whole of the Ombudsman’s recommendation. Particularly it does not ensure that investigations of episodes of loss of consciousness are NICE compliant nor does it ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes. It should be remembered here that Doctors saw Lee Terence Curran on five occasions following episodes of loss of consciousness and the NICE guidelines were not followed at any time. ”

    Source location

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of doctors’ awareness of NICE guidelines for transient loss of consciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Evidence given at the Inquest also revealed a need for the training of Doctors working in prisons in that Doctors who provided general practice sessions at the prison (and in the community) gave evidence that they were unaware of the NICE Guidelines for Transient Loss of Consciousness Management in Adults and Young People despite such episodes being common in a prison environment. Additionally evidence was given by a Doctor that efforts were not made to fully investigate Lee Terence Curran’s episodes of loss of consciousness because, the Doctor explained, it was common for prisoners to claim to have suffered losses of consciousness as a form of drug seeking behaviour. ”

    Source location

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. North London

    AI-generated summary

    Adrian Anthony Cowan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adrian Anthony Cowan, who was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, had a seizure on 14 June 2012 and was later found unresponsive in his room after being observed breathing normally. The inquest recorded natural causes, with pulmonary thromboembolism and deep vein thrombosis as the medical cause of death, alongside epilepsy and diabetes. Concerns related to unclear emergency-response guidance, including the failure to require the duty doctor to attend, and staff difficulties in responding calmly and applying basic life-support training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of emergency-response policy to require requesting duty doctor attendance

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That the trust policy dealing with the staff response did not include a clear set of guidance to those staff members responding to Mr Cowan’s collapse nor did the policy include the need, as part of the emergency response, to request the duty doctor to attend. ”

    Source location

    Adrian Anthony Cowan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of nursing staff to respond to collapses in a calm coordinated manner

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Some of the nursing staff were not able, when responding to Mr Cowan being found collapsed, act in a calm coordinated manner and were not able to apply the training they had received in basic life support. ”

    Source location

    Adrian Anthony Cowan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of nursing staff to apply basic life-support training

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Some of the nursing staff were not able, when responding to Mr Cowan being found collapsed, act in a calm coordinated manner and were not able to apply the training they had received in basic life support. ”

    Source location

    Adrian Anthony Cowan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear staff-response guidance for collapses

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That the trust policy dealing with the staff response did not include a clear set of guidance to those staff members responding to Mr Cowan’s collapse nor did the policy include the need, as part of the emergency response, to request the duty doctor to attend. ”

    Source location

    Adrian Anthony Cowan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Trust resuscitation policy to address emergency response guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would like to assure you that we have taken immediate action to review the Trust’s resuscitation policy, which at the time of Mr Cowan’s Death was up to date and was not due to be reviewed until 2015.”

    Source location

    2014-0111-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the resuscitation policy with deteriorating-patient actions, an expanded NEWS Score, and a requirement to contact the duty doctor during medical emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The update to the policy will incorporate additional action to be taken in the future in response to the “deteriorating patient”, and we will update and expand the “NEWS” Score, which is a nationally recognised tool for assessing patients whose physical health may be deteriorating. The revised policy will make clear the need to contact the duty doctor in the event of a medical emergency.”

    Source location

    2014-0111-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and regularly run lifelike-manikin resuscitation assessments and practical sessions across Forensic Service and Trust wards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to improve the confidence and competence of staff’s application of resuscitation techniques, regular assessments and practical sessions have been implemented using a lifelike manikin, designed to offer a highly realistic platform for the teaching of resuscitation. This approach is being revised and will in future be run regularly across all wards within the Forensic Service and the Trust. I have asked our Resuscitation Officer to conduct unannounced resuscitation scenarios across the Forensic wards so that we may further strengthen staffs ability to respond in an emergency situation.”

    Source location

    2014-0111-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Display step-by-step breathing-assessment and emergency-response guidance across all Forensic Service ward areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would like to clarify that the Trust’s resuscitation policy in place at the time of Mr Cowan’s death did list the actions to be taken to determine whether a patient was breathing or not, and explained what action was to be taken in such events. We have now displayed this step by step guide within all ward areas within the Forensic Service, and we will be introducing this in all our other inpatient areas. I would further wish to reassure you that the training provided to frontline staff will reiterate the changes in our policy once it has been ratified which I anticipate will have been completed by 30th April 2014.”

    Source location

    2014-0111-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the step-by-step emergency-response guide in all other inpatient areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would like to clarify that the Trust’s resuscitation policy in place at the time of Mr Cowan’s death did list the actions to be taken to determine whether a patient was breathing or not, and explained what action was to be taken in such events. We have now displayed this step by step guide within all ward areas within the Forensic Service, and we will be introducing this in all our other inpatient areas. I would further wish to reassure you that the training provided to frontline staff will reiterate the changes in our policy once it has been ratified which I anticipate will have been completed by 30th April 2014.”

    Source location

    2014-0111-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct unannounced resuscitation scenarios across Forensic wards to strengthen emergency response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to improve the confidence and competence of staff’s application of resuscitation techniques, regular assessments and practical sessions have been implemented using a lifelike manikin, designed to offer a highly realistic platform for the teaching of resuscitation. This approach is being revised and will in future be run regularly across all wards within the Forensic Service and the Trust. I have asked our Resuscitation Officer to conduct unannounced resuscitation scenarios across the Forensic wards so that we may further strengthen staffs ability to respond in an emergency situation.”

    Source location

    2014-0111-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 February 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The resuscitation policy already listed actions for determining whether a collapsed patient was breathing and responding to such events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would like to clarify that the Trust’s resuscitation policy in place at the time of Mr Cowan’s death did list the actions to be taken to determine whether a patient was breathing or not, and explained what action was to be taken in such events. We have now displayed this step by step guide within all ward areas within the Forensic Service, and we will be introducing this in all our other inpatient areas. I would further wish to reassure you that the training provided to frontline staff will reiterate the changes in our policy once it has been ratified which I anticipate will have been completed by 30th April 2014.”

    Source location

    2014-0111-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 February 2014

    Open published response
  3. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Frederick Davidson was admitted to Epsom General Hospital with aspiration pneumonia after recurrent seizures and later died following a pneumothorax caused by an unnoticed and incorrectly placed nasogastric tube. Concerns included inadequate documentation and communication, the use and checking of the tube, delayed recognition and treatment of the pneumothorax, and delays in radiology reporting.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in medical treatment following pneumothorax

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise pneumothorax on X-rays

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate recording of nasogastric tube placement

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Feeding via nasogastric tube before completion of full checks

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record nasogastric tube feeding authorisation

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inappropriate use of nasogastric tubes for patients with advanced dementia and seizures

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unexplained gaps in clinical notes

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in forwarding and receiving X-ray reports from radiology

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Breakdown in communication between junior doctors and consultants

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Russell James Felstead · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Russell James Felstead, who had severe learning disabilities, epilepsy and a history of falls, was found unresponsive on the floor of his room on 7 January 2013 and died on 28 January 2013 after a subdural haematoma was identified and operated on. Relevant information about his falls and helmet was available in the hospital records from 7 January but was not noted by doctors until 11 January, when an urgent CT scan was requested.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to access and read all relevant information across nursing and clinical records

    Wider context from the report

    “Doctors must ensure that all relevant information is accessed and read even if this is in the Nursing notes as opposed to the Clinical records. It is clear that the information which prompted an urgent CT scan on the 11th January had been available in Mr Felstead’s medical records since the 7th January and his helmet had in fact been at the hospital. ”

    Source location

    Russell James Felstead · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton, who had epilepsy and was intermittently non-compliant with his medication, was detained at Cheadle Police Station without initially receiving his medication. He experienced seizures in custody and was later found collapsed in a cell at Stockport Magistrates’ Court; he died after being taken to hospital. The report identified concerns about medication verification and administration, recording and handovers, observation levels and cell checks, custody delays, and the accuracy and communication of medical and escort information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete MEDACS assessment forms and care plans accurately

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document non-assessment and avoid misleading medical records

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain and review detained persons’ relevant medical information

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of understanding of required custody observation levels and rationale

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately document custody cell checks

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete prisoner transfer documentation accurately

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to staff the Prisoner Processing Unit overnight

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff knowledge of MEDACS policies and protocols

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to transfer and replicate medical observation information during GEO AMEY custody

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of specific instructions and effective positioning for CCTV cell monitoring

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ineffective or absent handovers between custody staff

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately record custody visits and checks

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record custody risk assessments and rationale for unchanged assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the course of the evidence I heard that Mr Salton had remained in custody overnight and was not progressed as quickly as he could have been whilst in custody as there was no-one available to interview him. This is as a result of GMP policy on how people are progressed through custody. The Prisoner Processing Unit is not staffed overnight which leads to people being in custody longer than they should be and bringing GMP “up against the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act”. GMP cannot indicate how many people may have been detained in custody longer than they should have been under their new policy. 2. There was a lack of understanding amongst the custody staff and staff from other agencies as to the level of observations Mr Salton was on and why he was on those observations. It is important that everyone who has care of someone in custody understands what the observations have been, what they should be, when they are to be carried out, whether rousing is required and why the observations are set as they are – i.e. what the medical condition/ concern is. 3. When the deceased is visited and checked all such visits should be accurately recorded on the custody record. 4. Risk assessments carried out whilst in police custody should be recorded when they are done. If there are no changes to a risk assessment then this should be recorded and any rationale noted. 5. Handovers between Custody Sergeants were ineffective and there was no handover between the Civilian Detention Staff. Important information was missed or lost in translation. Proper handovers should take place as to a detained person’s condition, risk assessment, any medical condition, level of visits and other important matters. 6. The Prisoner Escort Form was incorrectly completed. The final Custody Sergeant should ensure that the transferring documentation is accurate. 7. There were no specific instructions to monitor Mr Salton whilst he was in the CCTV cell. The CCTV screen is situated furthest away from the desk where someone in the back office is more likely to be seated (next to the security controls) meaning that there is less likelihood of them “glancing” at the CCTV screen. 1. MEDACS should ensure that all staff are fully aware of the content of any MEDACS policies or protocols, where these can be located in the police station and if necessary receive any required training on the same (the Court heard that ████████ was not aware of the MEDACS Epilepsy Policy). 2. MEDACS should receive a verbal report from Custody Staff and as much information as possible as to the detained person’s medical condition. Even if they are solely to administer medication MEDACS staff should read any previous medical notes from the same stay in custody. 3. All staff are reminded of the need to record information on the MEDACS Assessment Form including completing a Care Plan. Such a form should be completed accurately including any negative answers to questions asked. 4. If a doctor or nurse is unable to complete a medical assessment or is not assessing an individual then this should be explained and any potentially misleading information should not be recorded. 1. Staff should be reminded of the levels of observation (cell checks) required on detained persons whilst in their custody. 2. Staff should be reminded that all cell checks should be accurately documented. 3. GEO AMEY should ensure that their staff have knowledge of and fully read any documentation available when collecting a detained person. This is especially true of any medical information and if there is a medical reason why someone is on a certain level / type of observation that this is replicated whilst in the custody of GEO AMEY. ”

    Source location

    Billy Paul Thomas Salton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Print clinicians’ electronic care plans for custody sergeants to reduce discrepancies between clinical and police records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The electronic record system means that the clinicians Care Plan is printed out and given to the custody sergeant: this reduces the risk of different information being written in the clinician’s own records, to that written on the paperwork for the police.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the electronic medical-record system to determine whether screening tools and mandatory completion controls should be added.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Medacs are in the process of reviewing the electronic MedacsFME system to include screening tools and dropdown boxes that will make it impossible to move onto the next section without completing the information.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct annual audits of clinicians’ medical-note quality, address concerns individually and complete the scheduled re-audit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Lead Doctors and Lead Nurses have been tasked with completing annual audits of the quality of the medical notes of all clinicians in their teams, and have been asked to address any concerns on an individual basis with staff. A re-audit is due in June 2014.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train and audit clinicians on completing the electronic medical record, including care plans and significant negative answers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note your advice to remind staff of the importance of recording information on the Medacs assessment form, including a care plan and any negative answers to questions asked. I agree with you that it is important for staff to record significant negatives answers, as the tendency can sometimes be to record the positive answers they receive only. Unfortunately, it is not possible for staff to make a record of every question asked, and every answer given, or refused to be given, but the significant information must be recorded.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct weekly electronic-record-use audits and address issues identified with clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In May 2013 Medacs commenced a weekly audit of the ‘use of computer system’ The Client Service Managers address any issues identified with the clinicians. This is a continuing task.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a computerised MEDACS clinical-record system requiring typed 708e forms and direct transcription into the ICIS custody system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GMP has reviewed its arrangements for communication between custody and clinical staff to negate the practice of MEDACS staff working on two separate records of notes and to improve the continuity of care provided to detainees with health needs.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enable MEDACS clinicians to enter care plans directly into the custody system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To improve clarity on levels of observations we have amended the ‘drop down’ menus accessible to the MEDACS clinicians attending custody suites. Plans are in place to enable MEDACS to directly input their care plans onto our custody system which will further improve communication between custody and clinical practitioners.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use electronic records instead of handwritten forms, removing the requirement to label examinations as completed or refused.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note your recommendation that if a clinician is unable to complete an assessment that this should be explained and ‘any potential misleading information should not be recorded’. Given the nature of the work in police custody, our healthcare staff frequently attend to assess detainees who refuse to co-operate. In most cases it is for the detainee to decide whether they consent to an assessment, or choose to refuse, or answer questions about their health. Our investigation report identified that in this case a nurse circled “completed” on the handwritten form re: “examination/observations completed/refused”. Mr Salton had answered some questions, but refused to answer others. The handwritten forms are no longer used, and the electronic record system does not ask the staff member to select either ‘complete’ or ‘refused’.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require clinicians to obtain custody-sergeant handovers and follow pre- and post-assessment guidance to review relevant medical history, medication and previous entries.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You advise that Medacs clinicians should receive as much information as possible from the custody staff about the detainee’s medical condition and that even if they are there to solely administer medication, they should read any previous medical notes from the same day in custody. I am also keen to ensure that medical staff have all the relevant information that they require in order to administer medication, and that they read other relevant information which is available. Medacs staff are required to receive a verbal handover from the custody sergeant before seeing any detainee. This has been explained more fully in policy, and is included specifically in the Medacs Foundation course.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend MEDACS observation-level dropdown menus to improve clarity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To improve clarity on levels of observations we have amended the ‘drop down’ menus accessible to the MEDACS clinicians attending custody suites. Plans are in place to enable MEDACS to directly input their care plans onto our custody system which will further improve communication between custody and clinical practitioners.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide staff inputs using case studies to reinforce recording risk-assessment rationales and custody actions accurately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I do agree with this but can see how this can degrade into quite significant events not being accurately recorded. We will, therefore, shortly be giving a series of inputs to staff which will”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue and check improved guidance for sergeants on completing, timing and signing off Prisoner Escort forms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since your observations we have put out improved guidance on completion of the PER form to sergeants which include what to record, when it is to be done and how it is to be signed off. This has been extensively checked and has led to improvements in standards.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain hard-copy and electronic policy access in every custody suite and disseminate revised policies through lead clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I agree that it is important that all staff know where to look to seek guidance and where the policies are to refer to. I would like to reassure you that before they start work alone, all new healthcare staff complete a 3 day shadowing period with an experienced clinician. During this 3 day period they are made aware of the content of the Medacs policies and procedures and how these can be located whilst on duty and they are now required to sign to say they have had this information. All policies and procedures are located in every custody suite in both hard copies in a file and on the desktops of the medical room computers. Every time a policy is reviewed or revised a communication is disseminated from the Head of Clinical Services via all lead clinicians by e-mail and the relevant policy is updated in the folder and the desktop.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require new healthcare staff to complete three-day clinical shadowing and sign that they received guidance on locating and using policies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I agree that it is important that all staff know where to look to seek guidance and where the policies are to refer to. I would like to reassure you that before they start work alone, all new healthcare staff complete a 3 day shadowing period with an experienced clinician. During this 3 day period they are made aware of the content of the Medacs policies and procedures and how these can be located whilst on duty and they are now required to sign to say they have had this information. All policies and procedures are located in every custody suite in both hard copies in a file and on the desktops of the medical room computers. Every time a policy is reviewed or revised a communication is disseminated from the Head of Clinical Services via all lead clinicians by e-mail and the relevant policy is updated in the folder and the desktop.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a custody-office work system that improves CCTV monitoring coverage and accountability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The programme of work I described earlier in improving communication and management of the office is looking at every aspect of the roles staff undertake in Custody. The monitoring of CCTV is one of those roles and they will be looking for a system that matches or improves the coverage of CCTV we have and also provide greater accountability.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Standardise sergeant handovers around accurate Custody Summary Screens and communication of key detainee risk information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have conducted a review of handovers between sergeants. As a result we have made it clear to sergeants that the handover need not be a comprehensive review of each detainee. Rather, they should have completed the Custody Summary Screen so that all the relevant detail is available on the ICIS system and the handover should contain key risk issues, for example medical conditions, medication required and so forth.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require recording of unchanged risk assessments and monitor compliance through Custody Inspector dip sampling.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You are right to point out that all risk assessments, including those where there is no change in the detainee’s circumstances, should also be recorded. This requirement has been communicated to custody staff and is currently being monitored by Custody Inspectors undertaking dip sampling of custody records.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Staff cannot record every question, answer or refusal, but must record significant information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note your advice to remind staff of the importance of recording information on the Medacs assessment form, including a care plan and any negative answers to questions asked. I agree with you that it is important for staff to record significant negatives answers, as the tendency can sometimes be to record the positive answers they receive only. Unfortunately, it is not possible for staff to make a record of every question asked, and every answer given, or refused to be given, but the significant information must be recorded.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assessments cannot always be completed because detainees may refuse to cooperate or answer health questions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note your recommendation that if a clinician is unable to complete an assessment that this should be explained and ‘any potential misleading information should not be recorded’. Given the nature of the work in police custody, our healthcare staff frequently attend to assess detainees who refuse to co-operate. In most cases it is for the detainee to decide whether they consent to an assessment, or choose to refuse, or answer questions about their health. Our investigation report identified that in this case a nurse circled “completed” on the handwritten form re: “examination/observations completed/refused”. Mr Salton had answered some questions, but refused to answer others. The handwritten forms are no longer used, and the electronic record system does not ask the staff member to select either ‘complete’ or ‘refused’.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Medacs
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing CCTV arrangements are considered sufficient; staff will not be specifically instructed to observe the screen for Level 2 observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At present we remain satisfied with our current arrangements for CCTV usage. We do use CCTV for constant observations in some cases. However, in the case with Mr Salton, the level of observations was at Level 2.”

    Source location

    2014-0002-Response-by-Greater-Manchester-Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 January 2014

    Open published response
  6. Teesside

    AI-generated summary

    STUART ARRON COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stuart Arron Collins was taken to hospital while intoxicated and fully conscious, but was discharged several hours later with a reduced level of consciousness. After arriving at an address, he became unconscious and suffered cardiorespiratory arrest before being returned to hospital, where he died later that day. Concerns included uncertainty about his assessment on arrival, the absence of required hourly nursing observations, incomplete nursing records, and the possible accessibility of alcohol hand sanitiser gel.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hand sanitiser gel stored within possible patient reach in A&E

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Evidence was given that the hand sanitiser gel was collected from the A&E department. However further evidence was given that the collected hand gels (estimated at 20 in number) were placed on the nurses station very close to Mr Collins’s cubicle. There was contradictory evidence as to whether Mr Collins could have accessed the hand gel from the nurses station. ”

    Source location

    STUART ARRON COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to keep A&E nursing notes complete and up to date

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Evidence was given that the nursing notes in A&E were not fully completed and were not kept up to date. There was no apparent recording about Mr Collins’s epilepsy or the need for the hand sanitiser gel to be moved out of his reach. ”

    Source location

    STUART ARRON COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record nursing-observation frequency on the A&E whiteboard

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Evidence was given that Mr Collins was added to the whiteboard in the A&E dept but that the information regarding the frequency of his nursing observations was not. It was stated that this led to no nursing observations being taken during his first time at A&E on 9.10.12 ”

    Source location

    STUART ARRON COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Uncertainty over assessment on arrival at A&E

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appeared to be a degree of uncertainty as to whether Mr Collins was assessed upon his arrival at the A&E department at James Cook University Hospital ("the hospital")at approx. 00.45 or whether information previously obtained by paramedics was utilised in lieu of an assessment on arrival. ”

    Source location

    STUART ARRON COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to take hourly nursing observations in A&E

    Wider context from the report

    “2. It was stated that Mr Collins should have had hourly nursing observations taken during his first admission to A&E on 9.10.12, ie between 00.45 and his discharge at 04.30, but none were taken. ”

    Source location

    STUART ARRON COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Check hand-gel dispensers regularly, keep them correctly located and maintained, and replenish them when required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Whilst dispensers were removed in the vicinity of Mr Collins, the organisation of the department was not ideal. Following discussion with the Emergency Department, it has been agreed that all hand gel dispensers will be checked on a regular basis and replenished when required. The issue of the hand gel dispensers has also been discussed with the staff and both parties had been made aware of the risk to both staff and patients had the dispensers not been available.”

    Source location

    2013-0300-Response-by-South-Tees-Hospitals-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Make staff aware of the importance of keeping the area clean and tidy and reporting environmental problems immediately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are aware that this occurred and plans are in place to ensure that there will be no repetition of these events. In particular, we have ensured that all staff are aware of the importance of keeping the area clean and tidy. We have also commenced a programme of checks to ensure that the hand gel dispensers are correctly located and maintained. At the same time, we have made all staff aware of the need to check the environment and to report any problems immediately.”

    Source location

    2013-0300-Response-by-South-Tees-Hospitals-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Return hand-gel dispensers to their correct locations throughout the department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Evidence given that the A&E department was very busy on the night that Mr Collins died. There were several members of the A&E department, however further evidence was given that the collected hand gels were not in the correct place and had been incorrectly located by the department. The design of the department ensures that all cubicles are close together and there is not a great distance to travel between them. This also applies to the hand gel dispensers, which are located throughout the department. The issue of the hand gel dispensers was discussed with the staff and the matter was addressed. The hand gel dispensers were subsequently returned to their correct positions.”

    Source location

    2013-0300-Response-by-South-Tees-Hospitals-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind nursing staff to complete and accurately record patient observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Evidence given that the nursing notes in A&E were not fully completed and were at times not completed. The recording of Mr Collins’ observations was not always adequate. The Trust has reviewed the relevant documentation and identified that the observation records had not been completed appropriately. Following this review and the feedback from the management team, the nursing staff were reminded of the importance of complete and accurate recording of observations.”

    Source location

    2013-0300-Response-by-South-Tees-Hospitals-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The department’s layout and distributed hand-gel dispensers meant staff did not have a significant distance to travel between cubicles.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Evidence given that the A&E department was very busy on the night that Mr Collins died. There were several members of the A&E department, however further evidence was given that the collected hand gels were not in the correct place and had been incorrectly located by the department. The design of the department ensures that all cubicles are close together and there is not a great distance to travel between them. This also applies to the hand gel dispensers, which are located throughout the department. The issue of the hand gel dispensers was discussed with the staff and the matter was addressed. The hand gel dispensers were subsequently returned to their correct positions.”

    Source location

    2013-0300-Response-by-South-Tees-Hospitals-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust found no evidence that Mr Collins could access hand gel at the nurses’ station or that this contributed to his death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We can find no evidence to the effect that Mr Collins was able to access hand gel at the nurses’ station. If you have any evidence to the contrary or any evidence that this contributed to his death then we would be grateful to receive it so that we can investigate further.”

    Source location

    2013-0300-Response-by-South-Tees-Hospitals-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Trust policy considered the Early Warning Score insufficient to require medical review, so observation levels and frequency were managed under existing arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. The Trust’s first admission to A&E on 1.01.12, between 00:44 and his discharge at 04:30 was as the ACE record suggested. The Trust’s Policy C316 Recommendation and Response to Acute Illness in Adult Hospital Patients set out standards for the assessment of acutely ill patients. Early Warning Score was calculated as 2 on admission and according to Trust policy this would not constitute an indication for a medical review. Level of observation and frequency of observations was therefore managed in accordance with current Trust policy and indeed would not have required a doctor to review.”

    Source location

    2013-0300-Response-by-South-Tees-Hospitals-NHS-Foundation-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 27 December 2013

    Open published response
  7. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Kate Louise PIERCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kate Louise PIERCE died on 14 March 2013, aged 7, following complications associated with meningitis, including acquired cerebral palsy, epilepsy and chronic lung disease. The report raised concerns about the handling of her diagnosis at Wrexham Maelor Hospital and whether a doctor misled her parents about obtaining a second opinion. It also raised concerns about that doctor's fitness to practise and continued work as a GP, identifying a risk of future deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to correctly diagnose patients' conditions

    Wider context from the report

    “On the 29th of March 2006 Kate was taken into the Wrexham Maelor Hospital where she was examined by a Dr ████████. It appears from the evidence available that he failed to deal correctly with the diagnosis of Kate's condition and furthermore there is a belief that he may have misled the parents of Kate by indicating that he had sought a second opinion from a colleague before discharging her when this was not in fact the case. I understand that enquiries were made previously by the GMC following a complaint against Dr ████████ but that no action has been taken due to legal action by the Dr in view of the elapse of a relevant time limit. In the course of my current investigation following Kate’s death, a statement has been obtained from a witness namely Dr ████████ and a copy of this is annexed hereto. My view is that this statement casts doubt on Dr ████████ fitness to practice and this is of grave concern as my understanding is that he currently continues to practice as a GP within my Corner Area. In view of this I consider that there is a risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise PIERCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide truthful information about seeking clinical second opinions

    Wider context from the report

    “On the 29th of March 2006 Kate was taken into the Wrexham Maelor Hospital where she was examined by a Dr ████████. It appears from the evidence available that he failed to deal correctly with the diagnosis of Kate's condition and furthermore there is a belief that he may have misled the parents of Kate by indicating that he had sought a second opinion from a colleague before discharging her when this was not in fact the case. I understand that enquiries were made previously by the GMC following a complaint against Dr ████████ but that no action has been taken due to legal action by the Dr in view of the elapse of a relevant time limit. In the course of my current investigation following Kate’s death, a statement has been obtained from a witness namely Dr ████████ and a copy of this is annexed hereto. My view is that this statement casts doubt on Dr ████████ fitness to practice and this is of grave concern as my understanding is that he currently continues to practice as a GP within my Corner Area. In view of this I consider that there is a risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise PIERCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continued practice by a GP whose fitness to practice is in doubt

    Wider context from the report

    “On the 29th of March 2006 Kate was taken into the Wrexham Maelor Hospital where she was examined by a Dr ████████. It appears from the evidence available that he failed to deal correctly with the diagnosis of Kate's condition and furthermore there is a belief that he may have misled the parents of Kate by indicating that he had sought a second opinion from a colleague before discharging her when this was not in fact the case. I understand that enquiries were made previously by the GMC following a complaint against Dr ████████ but that no action has been taken due to legal action by the Dr in view of the elapse of a relevant time limit. In the course of my current investigation following Kate’s death, a statement has been obtained from a witness namely Dr ████████ and a copy of this is annexed hereto. My view is that this statement casts doubt on Dr ████████ fitness to practice and this is of grave concern as my understanding is that he currently continues to practice as a GP within my Corner Area. In view of this I consider that there is a risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise PIERCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The five-year statutory rule and unsuccessful exceptional-circumstances test prevented further investigation of the historical events and audit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We considered the complaint by Mr ████████ in accordance with our statutory framework and initially decided to investigate the case although the events at that time were more than five years old. Our statutory rules preclude us from investigating events that are more than five years old unless it is in the public interest in the exceptional circumstances to do so.”

    Source location

    2013-0363-Response-by-General-Medical-Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsible Officer oversight, complaint reporting and periodic revalidation were considered sufficient to address concerns about current fitness to practise.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of Dr ████████ current fitness to practise, we have not received any further complaints about Dr ████████ since 2007. Additionally, as part of the process of revalidation of a doctor’s licence to practise, doctors must have a Responsible Officer whose statutory duties include reporting concerns to us, if they call into question a doctor’s current fitness to practise. Our Employer Liaison Advisor who is a senior member”

    Source location

    2013-0363-Response-by-General-Medical-Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 December 2013

    Open published response
  8. Cardiff & the Vale of Glamorgan

    AI-generated summary

    Sandra Wordingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sandra Wordingham, a resident of Springbank nursing home, was found unconscious after a suspected epileptic fit on 22 July 2013 and remained unconscious overnight before being taken to hospital. She died in hospital on 26 July 2013; the medical cause of death was recorded as intracerebral haemorrhage. The principal concern was that no medical opinion was sought despite her remaining unconscious for longer than expected after an epileptic fit, creating a risk to similarly treated residents.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Risk of unnecessary death or injury to residents treated without appropriate assessment of unconsciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Residents in an unconscious state who are treated in future in the same way as Sandra Wordingham may be at risk of unnecessary death or injury. ”

    Source location

    Sandra Wordingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide early medical attention for gradual onset stroke

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) While Sandra Wordingham suffered a profound insult which could not have been altered, had she suffered a gradual onset stroke then intervention could have been offered. In that event early medical attention would have saved her. ”

    Source location

    Sandra Wordingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek medical opinion for prolonged unconsciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Sandra Wordingham, was put to bed in the nursing home in an unconscious state after a suspected epileptic fit. In fact she had suffered a sudden primary intracerebral haemorrhage. No medical opinion was sought even though Sandra Wordingham remained unconscious throughout the night for a longer period than would be expected after an epileptic fit. ”

    Source location

    Sandra Wordingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide all staff with first-aid and life-support training focused on the immediate care of unconscious residents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improved First Aid & Life Support Training All staff to attend training with specific training element for the immediate care of the unconscious person Persons Responsible: ████████ Operations Manager Springbank & ████████ Manager Date By: Planned for March 2014.”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assess nurses’ competency in recognising consciousness levels, providing and documenting life support, conducting neurological observations, and following relevant guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ensuring Nursing Staff Competency Following training and instruction nurses will have an assessment of their competency to:”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Instruct staff to summon emergency services promptly for unconscious residents, follow valid DNNAR instructions, and use a protocol available to all staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Summoning Emergency Assistance”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inform nurse agencies and provide their head offices with the unconscious-person management protocol.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Providing & Sharing Information about the management of unconscious people with Bank and Agency Nurses working occasional shifts”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide the unconscious-person management protocol to occasional staff through agency induction materials.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Providing & Sharing Information about the management of unconscious people with Bank and Agency Nurses working occasional shifts”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update residents’ risk assessments and care plans with specific information about causes of unconsciousness, including detailed epilepsy seizure types and recovery periods.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Knowledge of probable reasons and causes for residents who may become unconscious due to epilepsy (and other illnesses)”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response
  9. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    ROSEMARY BRONWYN FERGUSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    ROSEMARY BRONWYN FERGUSON, who had a long-standing history of epilepsy, was admitted after a head injury from a fall and was assessed as unfit for discharge because of risks associated with further falls. Despite recommendations that she remain in hospital, she was discharged to the care of a friend and was found deceased alone at home on 11 March 2013; the medical cause of death was recorded as sudden unexpected death in epilepsy. The principal concerns were that Social Services were not notified of the discharge, the friend’s expected role was unclear, and hospital records did not adequately document key communications and the date of discharge.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to notify Social Services of discharge contrary to their recommendations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The social workers left work on Friday 8th March, 2013 believing that, following their recommendations, Ms Ferguson would remain in hospital over the weekend and accordingly they did not put into place any support measures for her. The clinician’s decision to discharge her before support measures could be put in place was not communicated to Social Services. If it had been, this would have given an opportunity for them to take urgent supportive action. As it transpired, Ms Ferguson died from Natural causes rather than, for example, Injuries sustained in a further fall, or a deterioration of her earlier head injury, but I apprehend danger in the future if discharge occurs contrary to Social Service recommendations without the discharge being notified to them. ”

    Source location

    ROSEMARY BRONWYN FERGUSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity in communicating post-discharge supervision expectations to informal carers

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The clinician discharged Ms Ferguson based on clinical issues and NICE guidelines. She was discharged to the care of her friend ████████ The only conversation between the clinicians and ████████ was a telephone call in which it was arranged for Ms Ferguson to be driven straight to his home on leaving hospital. This duly took place, but ████████ did not understand that the clinician expected him to remain in her company for at least the next 24 hours in order to watch for any significant changes in her condition and accordingly, he did not remain with her constantly. There was clearly a difference of perception about his role, possibly as a result of lack of clarity in the conversation between himself and the clinician. I am concerned that a repetition of this in other cases may lead to danger. ”

    Source location

    ROSEMARY BRONWYN FERGUSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain complete and accurate records of discharge decisions and timing

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The Hospital Notes were scanty and there appear to be material omissions to record important decisions such as a detailed note of the telephone call between ████████ and the clinician, properly timed and recording clearly what was intended. Further, it was difficult to trace from the Notes, the actual day of discharge, the clinician believing it to be the 8th March and ████████ believing it was the 9th March. Some computer records were presented to the Court suggestive of a discharge on the 8th March, but this information appears to be missing from the actual hand-written Notes. I am concerned that such problems with communication can lead to misunderstandings to the detriment of all concerns. ”

    Source location

    ROSEMARY BRONWYN FERGUSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Gloucestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Onley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Onley, a resident at Orchard House, was found face down in his bath on 22 June 2012 and was concluded to have died from sudden unexplained death in epilepsy. Concerns included insufficient support for taking anti-convulsant medication, inadequate management of medication-related risks, and insufficient evening supervision.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient supervision to safeguard safety and wellbeing

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The supervision provided to Daniel during the evening of Thursday 21st June 2012 was not sufficient to safeguard Daniel’s safety and wellbeing. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Onley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to manage risks associated with medication management

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There had been a failure to manage risks associated with Daniel’s management of his medication. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Onley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient arrangements to support taking anti-convulsant medication

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That the arrangements in place to support Daniel to take his anti-convulsant medication were insufficient. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Onley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review service staffing adequacy periodically through performance and contract monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Future audit of arrangements”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish General Manager and Care and Support Manager posts and appoint additional competent support staff at the Grange.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Specifically, with regard to arrangements in the Grange, i.e. the service where Daniel lived, the posts of General Manager and Care and Support Manager have been established and additional support staff have been appointed with the necessary competencies, knowledge, qualifications, skills and experience to ensure adequacy of staff cover and the safety of the service at all times.”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind managers to provide supervision at all times commensurate with each person’s assessed needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The supervision provided to Daniel during the evening of Thursday 21st June 2012 was not sufficient to safeguard Daniel’s safety and wellbeing”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the Coroner’s concerns with operational managers to support open learning and required practice changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6 Organisational Learning”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a Trust-wide Medicines Policy governing the obtaining, recording, handling, storage, administration and disposal of medicines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Policy revision”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate regular training on managing risks associated with medicines into the Trust staff training plan.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regular training on the management of risks has been incorporated into the Trust’s staff training plan.”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit risk-assessment, capacity-assessment and documented-medicine-support records at least every six months.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Future audit of arrangements”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct internal medicines-management audits across all nine Trust communities to assess compliance with safety standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Audit of existing arrangements”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement common Trust-wide paperwork and work systems for identifying, assessing and managing medicine-related risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The concerns expressed by the Coroner have been shared with operational managers in order to ensure lessons are learned openly and frankly and any required changes to practice are made. For example, as a result of organisational learning, common paperwork has been implemented across the Trust regarding the identification; assessment and management of risks related to handing medicines. The introduction of such a common paperwork and systems of work will greatly assist risk mitigation, improve consistency in operational practice and also provides an essential benchmark for quality auditing purposes.”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require documented medicine risk assessments, capacity assessments and support instructions, with six-monthly or trigger-based reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improvements to the management of risks associated with the administration of medicines in trust services”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carry out medicines-policy compliance checks at least every six months under the Operations Director’s direction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Future audit of arrangements”

    Source location

    2013-0208-Response-by-The-Camphill-Village-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 September 2013

    Open published response

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Classification: all classifications19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: all recurring concerns
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