Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

Last 3 years7 Sep 2023 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

28All reports 8SUDEP 20Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service1
James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Practice Plus Group1

Most commonly raised concerns

All classifications 28 reports 7 Sep 2023 – 7 Sep 2026

  1. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.3 reportsSelected
  2. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.2 reportsSelected
  3. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  4. Failure to secure and control medicationReports identify medication as remaining accessible, unsecured or inadequately controlled, creating risks of misuse, overdose, theft or access by people other than the intended patient.2 reportsSelected
  5. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  6. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  7. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.2 reportsSelected
  8. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.2 reportsSelected
  9. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.2 reportsSelected
  10. Unreliable communication of critical medication information to GPsRecurring deficiency in the medication-information exchange process between services and GPs, including information needed to maintain supplies, assess prescribing safety and support continuity of treatment.2 reportsSelected
  11. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.2 reportsSelected
  12. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  13. Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated careThe anchor identifies absent agreed communication means and inaccessible shared patient information between mental health agencies. Other canonical reports identify relevant risk information not being shared between agencies and poor inter-agency information sharing preventing coordinated care, supporting a recurring concern with the reliability of inter-agency care information sharing rather than only the anchor's repository or communication-channel failure.2 reportsSelected
  14. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.2 reportsSelected
  15. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  16. Unsafe interoperability between prison custody and healthcare proceduresReports identify failures in the bounded interface between prison custody, contracted custody providers and healthcare services, where procedures, responsibilities and safety-relevant information do not operate together reliably.2 reportsSelected
  17. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.2 reportsSelected

Reports matching this recurring concern

7 Sep 2023 – 7 Sep 2026 · 2 reports

Classification: all classificationsRecurring concern: Failure to secure and control medication
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Only concerns related to the selected recurring concern and their linked actions and positions are shown. Other concerns are counted within each report.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Susan Nora Elizabeth YOUNG · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Susan Nora Elizabeth Young was admitted to hospital after taking overdoses of prescription medication on 22 and 23 August 2024. She was transferred to a ward with directions for cardiac monitoring, but no clinical handover or monitoring instructions were provided. She was later found unresponsive and not attached to monitoring, and resuscitation failed; unused medication was subsequently found among her belongings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to secure patients' own medication

    Wider context from the report

    “NO clinical handover to receiving ward. No instructions passed on from the doctor re cardiac monitoring. Patients own medication found in her belongings which had been with her, after her death allowing her the opportunity to take another overdose. ”

    Source location

    Susan Nora Elizabeth YOUNG · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the updated Self-Harm Policy and patient-search procedure with Emergency Care staff and support acknowledgement of understanding.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ii. Action C2 - To share the self-harm policy across Emergency Care with a reference to this patient safety incident once the addendum as above has been added. I can confirm that the search policy has been shared with all ED clinical staff on the 16th April 2025 and was added to the self-harm policy as an addendum which is available on the intranet for all staff to access. Following this, a signatory list will be collected to ensure that all staff have read and understood the policy and its implications for patients presenting with self harm.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 9 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add a patient-search procedure to the Self-Harm Policy covering searches for medication and other items that could enable overdose or self-harm.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that the Trust's Self Harm Policy (copy attached) now includes an addendum (Appendix C) an SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) Search of Patients within the ED. The policy describes the rationale behind searching patients attending the ED in Mental Health crisis to reduce the risk of patients attempting further overdose or self-harm during their time in the ED. The updated policy has been uploaded to the Trust's intranet.”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 9 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate the updated Self Harm Policy and patient-search procedure to Emergency Care staff and promote its requirements through written and face-to-face communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “C2 Action Required – Local To share the self-harm policy across Emergency Care with a reference to this patient safety incident once the addendum as above has been added. Responsibility: Matron Urgent Care Timescale: 30th July 2025 RAG: W”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add a patient-search procedure to the Self Harm Policy, covering removal and safe storage of medications and other harmful items in Emergency Department patients at risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “C1 Action Required – Local To complete the agreed process for searching patients to maintain patient safety (this will form an addendum to the self-harm policy). Responsibility: Matron Mental Health Liaison / Consultant Timescale: 30th June 2025 RAG: A”

    Source location

    Response from James Paget University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response
  2. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Trevor Alan MONERVILLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Trevor Alan Monerville, who had been detained at HMP Lewes, was found unresponsive in his cell on 18 April 2021 and died after suffering from epilepsy and non-epileptic attack disorder. The principal concerns were inadequate monitoring and management of his epilepsy after the ACCT closed, poor communication and information-sharing between healthcare, prison staff and family, and insufficient staff training in managing epilepsy and seizures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a mechanism to report medication non-compliance to Security

    Wider context from the report

    “b. Communication between healthcare and prison staff especially when Trevor was returned to the wing, between the prison staff and family, briefing by prison managers to officers on the wing about Trevor’s condition were all inadequate. Evidence was heard about the lack of integration of various IT systems which contributed to poor communication. In spite of the evidence from PPG regarding the sensitivity of medical records which should not be disclosed to the prison staff, I remain concerned that there was no effective monitoring and management of Trevor on the wing once the ACCT was closed. There was no mechanism in place for prison and healthcare staff to report their concerns about Trevor’s non compliance with taking his medication to Security, thus preventing the cell from being searched for retained medication. ”

    Source location

    Trevor Alan MONERVILLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use confidential intelligence reports to notify Security when patients may be stockpiling medication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Pharmacy technicians manage medication compliance. They have now been given wings to lead on so that they have full oversight of patients on their own wing. SystmOne assists with supporting the identity of patients who have missed doses. In addition, the IR process is in place if it is believed or suspected that a patient might be stockpiling. An IR is an intelligence report that will be received confidentially by the security department.”

    Source location

    Response from Practice Plus Group
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing information-sharing protocols and weekly meetings are considered appropriate for communication and management of complex safety concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are Information Sharing protocols in place, as directed by national policy, which underpin the exchange of information between healthcare and prison staff. There are several regular meetings involving healthcare and prison staff where individual issues are raised and addressed, including the Safety Intervention Meeting and Multi-Disciplinary Complex Case Clinic, both of which are held weekly.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 January 2024

    Open published response

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Classification: all classifications7 Sep 2023 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: Failure to secure and control medication
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