Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

Grosvenor Medical Centre1
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Sheffield Health Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Tameside Borough Council1
Tameside General Hospital1

Most commonly raised concerns

Non-SUDEP 68 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

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  1. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.5 reportsSelected
  2. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.5 reportsSelected
  3. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  4. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.4 reportsSelected
  5. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  6. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.3 reportsSelected
  7. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  8. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  9. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  10. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  11. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  12. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  13. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  14. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  15. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  16. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.2 reportsSelected
  17. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  18. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  19. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  20. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.2 reportsSelected
  21. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  22. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  23. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.2 reportsSelected
  24. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  25. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.2 reportsSelected
  26. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.2 reportsSelected
  27. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  28. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  29. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.2 reportsSelected
  30. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.2 reportsSelected
  31. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  32. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  33. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

Reports matching this classification and recurring concern

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 2 reports

Classification: non-sudepRecurring concern: Unreliable mental health referral pathways
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Only concerns related to the selected recurring concern and their linked actions and positions are shown. Other concerns are counted within each report.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Bryan Andrews and Mary Andrews · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Bryan and Mary Andrews died at their home on 27 November 2022 from multiple stab wounds inflicted by their adult son. The principal concern was a lack of communication between services about the relationship between his epilepsy and psychotic symptoms, resulting in treatment delays, rejected referrals and failures to share important information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in triaging and progressing referrals for mental health care

    Wider context from the report

    “There was a lack of communication between services about the relationship between the diagnosis of epilepsy and the psychotic symptoms experienced by the person responsible for the deaths. This led to significant time lapses in treatment and rejection of referrals, most notably: i. On 18 November 2020 an urgent referral was made to the Single Point of Access Team by his General Practitioner, concerned about his prolonged suicidal ideation. He was referred back to his General Practitioner by the Single Point of Access Team with a request that the General Practitioner refer him to access the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service. ii. On 20 November 2020 his General Practitioner referred him to the Single Point of Access Team again, requesting they liaise with the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service as per Trust guidelines. iii. Correspondence between the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service and the Single Point of Access Team revealed that whilst the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service offered work on living with chronic conditions, they did not have a programme specific to epilepsy. A referral to the Neurology Therapy Service was made and it was decided a request to the General Practitioner for the mental health nurse in the surgery to offer an assessment was appropriate. The surgery were not informed of this. iv. On 16 December 2020 the Single Point of Access Team received a referral from a consultant neurologist requesting a medication review as his anxiety levels were affecting his epilepsy treatment. It was felt at that as the General Practitioner was reviewing his medication, a review wasn’t required. This was not communicated to the consultant neurologist. v. On 29 April 2022 he called the Single Point of Access Team saying he was having a serious psychotic episode and thought he was going to kill someone. The call was treated as a crisis call during which he decided to attend the emergency department. Once there he was assessed by the Liaison Psychiatry Team. He was referred to the Home Treatment Team, but his consultant neurologist was not informed. vi. On 3 May 2022 a trial of anti-psychotic medication was discussed at a medical review. The required consultant review of whether to prescribe anti-psychotic medication with his epilepsy medication was not carried out. vii. On 4 May 2022 a referral to the Early Intervention Service was rejected as not meeting the criteria for first episode psychosis, despite clear evidence of psychosis in the assessment by the Liaison Psychiatry Team on 29 April 2022 and in subsequent contacts with the Home Treatment Team. viii. On 5 May 2022 a first referral was made to the Emotional Wellbeing Service via email asking for their input into his care. The email was sent to an address not manned daily. When a response was provided it was unclear whether a new treatment episode had been opened. ix. On 09 May 2022 he was discharged from the Home Treatment Team. The discharge was reliant on Emotional Wellbeing Service intervention and a follow up from his General Practitioner. A discharge summary was not sent to his General Practitioner. x. On 4 October 2022 a referral was sent to the Single Point of Access Team by his General Practitioner that he was presenting as paranoid and delusional with suicidal ideation. A screen for urgency found this was a routine referral. The referral was triaged on 22 November 2022 when he was invited to contact the Single Point of Access Team for a further discussion. ”

    Source location

    Bryan Andrews and Mary Andrews · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inappropriate rejection of referrals despite evidence of psychosis

    Wider context from the report

    “There was a lack of communication between services about the relationship between the diagnosis of epilepsy and the psychotic symptoms experienced by the person responsible for the deaths. This led to significant time lapses in treatment and rejection of referrals, most notably: i. On 18 November 2020 an urgent referral was made to the Single Point of Access Team by his General Practitioner, concerned about his prolonged suicidal ideation. He was referred back to his General Practitioner by the Single Point of Access Team with a request that the General Practitioner refer him to access the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service. ii. On 20 November 2020 his General Practitioner referred him to the Single Point of Access Team again, requesting they liaise with the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service as per Trust guidelines. iii. Correspondence between the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service and the Single Point of Access Team revealed that whilst the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service offered work on living with chronic conditions, they did not have a programme specific to epilepsy. A referral to the Neurology Therapy Service was made and it was decided a request to the General Practitioner for the mental health nurse in the surgery to offer an assessment was appropriate. The surgery were not informed of this. iv. On 16 December 2020 the Single Point of Access Team received a referral from a consultant neurologist requesting a medication review as his anxiety levels were affecting his epilepsy treatment. It was felt at that as the General Practitioner was reviewing his medication, a review wasn’t required. This was not communicated to the consultant neurologist. v. On 29 April 2022 he called the Single Point of Access Team saying he was having a serious psychotic episode and thought he was going to kill someone. The call was treated as a crisis call during which he decided to attend the emergency department. Once there he was assessed by the Liaison Psychiatry Team. He was referred to the Home Treatment Team, but his consultant neurologist was not informed. vi. On 3 May 2022 a trial of anti-psychotic medication was discussed at a medical review. The required consultant review of whether to prescribe anti-psychotic medication with his epilepsy medication was not carried out. vii. On 4 May 2022 a referral to the Early Intervention Service was rejected as not meeting the criteria for first episode psychosis, despite clear evidence of psychosis in the assessment by the Liaison Psychiatry Team on 29 April 2022 and in subsequent contacts with the Home Treatment Team. viii. On 5 May 2022 a first referral was made to the Emotional Wellbeing Service via email asking for their input into his care. The email was sent to an address not manned daily. When a response was provided it was unclear whether a new treatment episode had been opened. ix. On 09 May 2022 he was discharged from the Home Treatment Team. The discharge was reliant on Emotional Wellbeing Service intervention and a follow up from his General Practitioner. A discharge summary was not sent to his General Practitioner. x. On 4 October 2022 a referral was sent to the Single Point of Access Team by his General Practitioner that he was presenting as paranoid and delusional with suicidal ideation. A screen for urgency found this was a routine referral. The referral was triaged on 22 November 2022 when he was invited to contact the Single Point of Access Team for a further discussion. ”

    Source location

    Bryan Andrews and Mary Andrews · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rachal Marie Murphy died at home on 8 September 2015 after taking medication prescribed to other family members; the medical cause of death was recorded as acute hypoxia due to morphine overdose, and the conclusion was that she had taken her own life. The report identified concerns about fragmented inter-agency care, failures and delays in referrals and investigations, overlooked CAF documentation, and delays in Early Help case allocation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about referral routes and acceptance by Psychological services

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a lack of understanding between medical professionals as to the means by which someone could be referred to Psychological services and whether there was a unclear message from Psychological services as to whether they were accepting referrals. ”

    Source location

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of understanding of cases suitable for CAMHS referral

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Lack of understanding amongst medical professionals as to the cases which may or may not be suitable for referral to CAMHS. ”

    Source location

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Make written CAMHS referrals whenever paediatricians have reasonable cause for concern, without filtering referrals or predicting acceptance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust have in response to this case, made changes to their practices to ensure that referrals to CAMHS are made in writing in any case where the Consultant Paediatrician has reasonable cause for concern in respect of a child’s psychological wellbeing. The Consultants no longer filter referrals through Pennine Care staff nor do they consider the likely acceptance of referrals before making them. The referral is made and it is for CAMHS to determine how to proceed. I am informed that this change in approach has been successful to date with CAMHS appearing to be accepting more referrals in response.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Manage Healthy Young Minds referrals through a single point of entry and allocate them according to children’s needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of the Trust’s quality improvement work during early 2016 the Trust implemented a new referral process for all aspects of Tameside and Glossop Healthy Young Minds Services (formally CAMHS). All referrals are now managed via one single point of entry and then allocated to a range of possible professionals dependant on the child/young person’s needs e.g. Psychologists, Nurse, Psychiatrist or 3rd sector services. This allows for greater clarity and understanding of where to direct requests for help to for all professionals.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand the service offer document to name a contact for paediatric colleagues seeking advice and consultation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The document has just recently been reviewed and will be expanded to provide a named contact for colleagues in the Paediatric medical services to contact for advice and consultation. The Trust believes that this addresses the confusion and lack of understanding that you have identified in relation to Rachel’s care and treatment.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce and widely disseminate a Healthy Young Minds service offer document explaining referrals, advice access and appropriate referral problems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust have also produced a service offer document which details, how to make a referral, how to contact the service for advice and importantly the document contains information of the types of problems that are appropriate to refer to Tameside and”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apply epilepsy mental-health safeguards through tailored care plans, specialist nurse review and liaison, CAMHS referral, and immediate admission for high-risk self-harm or suicide concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust now have in place a number of safeguards to ensure that where a child being treated for epilepsy exhibits signs that may be consistent with mental health issues, that they are managed and referred to the appropriate organisation.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that medical professionals lacked understanding of CAMHS referrals, stating evidence showed the process was understood.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As indicated to you in a letter from our solicitors dated 30 August, it was the Trust’s contention that during the course of the inquest there was in fact no evidence to suggest a lack of understanding in relation to CAMHS referrals and where evidence perhaps suggested that knowledge was limited, the Trust demonstrated that practices have now changed. I understand that the Trust’s Consultant Paediatrician gave clear evidence that a CAMHS referral was not made by him in March 2015, not because he was unsure of the process, but because he knew how the process works and understood that without evidence of a more acute mental health problem, the referral would be refused (which it ultimately was) and it was therefore important to look at other avenues of how to manage Rachal’s behaviour.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

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Classification: non-sudep19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: Unreliable mental health referral pathways
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