Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

Cleveland Police1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Hazelmere Medical Centre1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
NHS England1
NHS Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Integrated Care Board1
Northfield Medical Centre1
South Tees Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust1

Most commonly raised concerns

Non-SUDEP 68 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Reset
  1. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.5 reportsSelected
  2. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.5 reportsSelected
  3. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  4. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.4 reportsSelected
  5. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  6. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.3 reportsSelected
  7. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  8. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  9. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  10. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  11. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  12. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  13. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  14. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  15. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  16. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.2 reportsSelected
  17. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  18. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  19. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  20. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.2 reportsSelected
  21. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  22. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  23. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.2 reportsSelected
  24. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  25. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.2 reportsSelected
  26. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.2 reportsSelected
  27. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  28. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  29. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.2 reportsSelected
  30. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.2 reportsSelected
  31. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  32. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  33. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

Reports matching this classification and recurring concern

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 5 reports

Classification: non-sudepRecurring concern: Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records
Reset

Only concerns related to the selected recurring concern and their linked actions and positions are shown. Other concerns are counted within each report.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Chloe Anne Tapp · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Chloe Anne Tapp, a 20-year-old with epilepsy and other medical conditions, suffered seizures and respiratory and cardiac arrest on 7 October 2021 and died in hospital on 8 October 2021. The principal concerns included delays transferring her to adult neurology, a telephone consultation despite her being non-verbal, an incorrect and inadequately documented medication tapering regime, and unanswered attempts to obtain clarification. Broader concerns were raised about staffing shortages, unsafe backlogs and difficulties responding to patients and carers within the neurology department.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record medication tapering regimes in clinical notes

    Wider context from the report

    “No note was made of the tapering regime for the medication change in Chloe’s notes. ”

    Source location

    Chloe Anne Tapp · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit neurology clinic records for record-keeping compliance and conduct quarterly reviews for divisional governance assurance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To ensure adherence to the expected standards we have completed an audit of neurology clinic records during February and March 2024.The results of this audit showed overall good compliance with dictation, headers, footers, and onward referrals. Small deviations that were picked up were fed back to the team and actioned. Audit reviews will continue quarterly to provide assurance to the divisional governance meeting. These are in addition to the Trust wide record keeping audits.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate and reinforce the requirement that medication tapering regimes are recorded in notes and scanned into electronic patient records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is our usual practice to record tapering regimes in patient notes, and this is the expected standard as set out in our clinical record keeping standards policy. The regime was recorded in the letter to Chloe’s GP dated 8 September 2021, however the related table drawn up by the Consultant should have been included in Chloe’s notes.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a GIRFT review visit to Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust’s neurology department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Having considered your Report and the concerns raised, a GIRFT visit to Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust has been arranged to review the specific situation within their Neurology department.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Many concerns about Chloe’s care fall within the NHS Foundation Trust’s remit rather than NHS England’s national programme or policy remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In your Report you raise concerns over pressures being placed on neurology departments and that there was a recognised shortage of neurologists amid an increase in demand. This response focuses on the concerns raised relevant to NHS England national programme or policy. Many of your concerns around the quality of care delivered to Chloe sit within the remit of Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust, and I note that you have also addressed your Report to them.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response
  2. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Francis James Lea, who was living in a care home, was transferred to a new GP without his family being informed. After a hospital admission for a seizure, his prescribed anti-epileptic medication was not continued because the new GP was unaware of the admission and prescription. The report raised concerns about involving next of kin, recording the rationale and consent or capacity assessment for changing GP, and ensuring a safe transfer of care between the care home and GP surgeries.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record the rationale and patient consent for a change of GP

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There appeared to be no notes on the patient's medical record regarding the rationale for this change, or any consent from the patient that he was in agreement that it should take place. There was also no record of whether any consideration of his capacity had been undertaken, and if so what the outcome of that decision was. ”

    Source location

    Francis James Lea · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require care homes to confirm patients’ awareness, consent and appropriate next-of-kin notification when capable residents change GP practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to avoid such a situation arising again, we will as a practice be liaising with the care homes to request that:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Contact care homes to recommend policies and documentation standards for staff signing on behalf of residents who can consent but cannot physically sign.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During the course of the investigation it was established that the care home manager had signed the form on behalf of Mr Lea although this was not made clear to the Practice. Therefore we will be contacting all care homes to recommend:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue standard practice application forms to membership practices, including a section for signing on behalf of another person.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the time of this incident, we have issued standard practice application forms to all of our membership practices. This includes a section for signing on behalf of somebody else.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require providers to document discussions and information received from residents, record potential changes in care plans and clinical systems, and update records promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Residents/patients are assumed to have capacity unless proved otherwise. As part of this project residents were given the choice as to whether to move practice. In future projects of this type, ELR CCG makes the following recommendations:”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-East-Leicestershire-and-Rutland-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Care homes are responsible for confirming patient awareness, consent and, where appropriate, next-of-kin notification when facilitating GP practice changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Where a patient, with capacity, who is resident in a care home, changes GP practice and this change is facilitated by the care home, arrangements are put in place for the care home to provide written confirmation that the patient is aware of the change, the patient gives consent to the change and that where appropriate the patient’s next of kin have been informed.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Northfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There is usually no need to record the rationale for changing a patient's registered GP in the medical record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is usually no need for documenting on patients medical records regarding rationale for change of GP.”

    Source location

    2016-0447-Response-by-Hazelmere-Medical-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2017

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wilfrid Pearson was admitted to Tameside Hospital on 22 April 2015 with epilepsy, developed status epilepticus, and died at a local hospice about a month later. Concerns included possible failures in updating and communicating the status epilepticus protocol, unclear and incomplete records, inadequate escalation of care, staffing pressures, and the legal basis for detaining him after he left the ward.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate clarity, accuracy and completeness of medical and nursing notes

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The medical and nursing notes for Mr Pearson left much to be desired in terms of their clarity, accuracy and completeness. ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise nursing documentation and reinforce Ward Manager and Matron monitoring of documentation quality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am disappointed that HM Coroner found the medical and nursing records left much to be desired and I am sorry that you found this to be the case. HM Coroner will be aware that individual nursing and medical clinicians are responsible for their own professional standards. The Trust has a standard for medical record keeping and expects records to be timed and reflect an actual chronology. The Clinicians carrying out the assessment should document the time the assessment was carried out as well as the time of the medical entry. This is our Trust standard and the Trust encourage and promote this. The Trust has, since Mr Pearson’s admission, revised some of the nursing documentation and reinforced the role of Ward Managers and Matrons in monitoring the quality of documentation completed by staff.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit key aspects of medical clinical documentation through the Trust’s Clinical Audit programme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust’s Clinical Audit programme, the Trust’s Clinical Lead for Clinical Audit has been working with doctors in training and audits have been undertaken which include key aspects of medical clinical documentation.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response
  4. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Frederick Davidson was admitted to Epsom General Hospital with aspiration pneumonia after recurrent seizures and later died following a pneumothorax caused by an unnoticed and incorrectly placed nasogastric tube. Concerns included inadequate documentation and communication, the use and checking of the tube, delayed recognition and treatment of the pneumothorax, and delays in radiology reporting.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unexplained gaps in clinical notes

    Wider context from the report

    “Staff’s note keeping practices, in relation to the placement of the nasogastric tube, were inadequate. • The inappropriateness of the use of a naso gastric tube given Mr Davidson’s known history of advanced dementia and seizures • Unexplained and important gaps in the clinical notes • Breakdown in communication between the junior doctor and consultant. • The lack of recognition of the pneumothorax on the x ray and the subsequent delayed medical treatment. • The junior Doctor authorised feeding by way of the naso gastric tube prior to full checks being made. There was no note of this authorisation. • Delay in the forwarding and receipt of x ray reports from radiology ”

    Source location

    Frederick Davidson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Teesside

    AI-generated summary

    STUART ARRON COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stuart Arron Collins was taken to hospital while intoxicated and fully conscious, but was discharged several hours later with a reduced level of consciousness. After arriving at an address, he became unconscious and suffered cardiorespiratory arrest before being returned to hospital, where he died later that day. Concerns included uncertainty about his assessment on arrival, the absence of required hourly nursing observations, incomplete nursing records, and the possible accessibility of alcohol hand sanitiser gel.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to keep A&E nursing notes complete and up to date

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Evidence was given that the nursing notes in A&E were not fully completed and were not kept up to date. There was no apparent recording about Mr Collins’s epilepsy or the need for the hand sanitiser gel to be moved out of his reach. ”

    Source location

    STUART ARRON COLLINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

Export data

Your Excel file will include all 5 matching reports.

Classification: non-sudep19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care records
Choose the tabs to include