Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

College of Policing1
Community Disability Nurse1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Independent Futures1
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
National Police Chiefs’ Council1
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust1
Rochester Prison1
Southwinds1
Sussex Police1

Most commonly raised concerns

Non-SUDEP 68 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

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  1. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.5 reportsSelected
  2. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.5 reportsSelected
  3. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  4. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.4 reportsSelected
  5. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  6. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.3 reportsSelected
  7. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  8. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  9. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  10. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  11. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  12. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  13. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  14. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  15. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  16. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.2 reportsSelected
  17. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  18. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  19. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  20. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.2 reportsSelected
  21. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  22. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  23. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.2 reportsSelected
  24. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  25. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.2 reportsSelected
  26. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.2 reportsSelected
  27. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  28. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  29. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.2 reportsSelected
  30. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.2 reportsSelected
  31. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  32. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  33. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

Reports matching this classification and recurring concern

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 4 reports

Classification: non-sudepRecurring concern: Unreliable seizure care and management
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Only concerns related to the selected recurring concern and their linked actions and positions are shown. Other concerns are counted within each report.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    John Allen Martin HENDERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Allen Martin Henderson was found dead in his bunk at HMP Rochester on 27 May 2021. The inquest recorded natural causes, namely ischaemic heart disease, following a fatal haemorrhage into the wall of the left circumflex artery. Concerns included delayed medical investigations, the absence of a welfare check at the start of the day, and a lack of a clear process for sharing relevant medical information with front-line prison staff.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide closer monitoring for prisoners with seizure activity

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of evidence, I also established that John was not being monitored any more closely than other prisoners due to his seizure activity. That was confirmed by ████████ ████████ in the course of their evidence. They indicated to me that sometimes they will be asked to monitor prisoners more closely but this had not been applied to John. Likewise, nobody had checked the welfare of John at the start of the day on 27 May 2021. ”

    Source location

    John Allen Martin HENDERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement Personal Management Plans to obtain consent, share relevant medical alerts and guidance, record required observations, and review at multidisciplinary prison meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since this inquest, Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust has worked closely with HMPPS to introduce a Personal Management Plan (PMP) which provides a way of sharing information between healthcare staff and prison officers.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxleas Forensic and Offender Healthcare Services
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2023

    Open published response
  2. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Raphael Jeffery Gill · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Raphael Jeffery Gill was stopped by police, arrested for drug-related offences, and suffered multiple seizures, including seizures in police care and an ambulance. The inquest identified delays in ambulance response and hospital assessment, failure to recognise the combination of seizures and cocaine as a medical emergency, and omission or delay in carrying out a venous blood gas test. The medical cause of death was recorded as multiple seizures associated with an underlying seizure disorder, cocaine and prescribed medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise the combination of seizures and cocaine as a medical emergency

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence of the medical expert was that Mr Gill was so unwell by the time he arrived at hospital that it was more likely than not that his life was not rescuable with sooner treatment. Whilst Mr Gill was taken to hospital, it was not under blue lights and sirens, and the most senior clinician drove so was not on hand to provide emergency treatment that the technician was unqualified to provide. It was apparent that the ambulance crew were not aware that the combination of seizures and cocaine represented a medical emergency, a fact expressly found in the jury’s conclusion. (2) Whilst it was reasonable for the LAS staff to suspect a link between the arrest and seizures, the arrest unduly influenced the assessment of urgency. ”

    Source location

    Raphael Jeffery Gill · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the PFD report with the JRCALC Chair for consideration of further review of guidance on cocaine use and seizure activity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst we note that there was no undue delay on the scene once the conveying ambulance had arrived, we are aware that your view is that the clinicians were unaware that seizures on the background of cocaine use may present a marked clinical concern. Our Consultant Paramedic has reviewed the guidance within the Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee (JRCALC) Clinical Guidelines and is of the view that these contain a detailed set of guidelines for the management of patients who have used cocaine and seizure activity is specifically detailed. Our Chief Medical Officer will share your PFD report with the Chair of the JRCALC to allow for consideration of further review of the guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from London Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce and publish an internal clinical refresher for frontline clinicians on cocaine-related risks and red-flag presentations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of the LAS, we will produce an internal clinical refresher for all frontline clinicians, which will be shared in our internal 'Clinical Update' publication around the risks associated with cocaine to continue highlighting the 'red flag' presentations in respect of patients who have used cocaine. This is planned to be published in early Autumn 2022.”

    Source location

    Response from London Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing JRCALC clinical guidelines already provide detailed guidance on cocaine use, including specifically addressing seizure activity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst we note that there was no undue delay on the scene once the conveying ambulance had arrived, we are aware that your view is that the clinicians were unaware that seizures on the background of cocaine use may present a marked clinical concern. Our Consultant Paramedic has reviewed the guidance within the Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee (JRCALC) Clinical Guidelines and is of the view that these contain a detailed set of guidelines for the management of patients who have used cocaine and seizure activity is specifically detailed. Our Chief Medical Officer will share your PFD report with the Chair of the JRCALC to allow for consideration of further review of the guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from London Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 May 2022

    Open published response
  3. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Duncan Tomlin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Duncan Tomlin died on 29 July 2014 after cardiac arrest following the use of drugs and police prone restraint, including handcuffs, leg restraints and incapacitant spray. The report identified concerns about insufficient emphasis on the heightened breathing risks of multiple factors, delayed opportunities to assess and reposition him, inadequate guidance on monitoring, the timing of CPR, and understanding atypical or post-seizure behaviour.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient training on atypical seizure and post-seizure behaviour

    Wider context from the report

    “Understanding aspects of Epilepsy and Seizures 5. The training material which has been provided to me on behalf of Sussex Police covers many aspects of epilepsy and seizure that were explored during the inquest. The training material indicates that if it is available to the trainer, participants will be shown a video which informs the viewer of the way in which a person may present post seizure, namely confused, vulnerable, perceiving aggression from others and at risk of lashing out due to misunderstanding. I have also been provided with a copy of a training manual provided by Epilepsy Action which was sent to ACPO in 2011. Aspects of the evidence from the family in this inquest were entirely consistent with the less common presentations of a person in an atypical or post seizure state. Although epilepsy was not found to be causative in the death in this Inquest, in another situation with a similar set of circumstances, the reactions of a person suffering an atypical seizure or in a post seizure state, could be misconstrued as violence and resistance were officers not to appreciate that fact that their presentation may be part of a medical condition and restraint in such circumstances could have inherent and fatal risks. It is therefore of importance that training extends beyond the two more well known types of seizure and that post seizure behaviour is also understood in general terms. ”

    Source location

    Duncan Tomlin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include an epilepsy video in initial officer training and refresh it during refresher training every three years.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to epilepsy in particular, there is a video which is included in the initial officer training course and is refreshed every 3 years in the refresher training. Sussex Police are considering hosting a link to that video on their internal website for all officers to be able to view.”

    Source location

    2019-0135-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Basic first-aid training provides officers with knowledge and skills suitable for their policing role.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Police officers are not trained to the level of medical practitioners. All police officers have basic first aid training (First Aid – Module 2 of the College of Policing curriculum which includes conducting CPR and managing a casualty who is convulsing) which gives them the knowledge and skills suitable for their role. It is the expectation that they recognise signs and symptoms of a wide variety of medical conditions. It is unrealistic to expect officers to have the knowledge of medical professionals, as the risks posed to themselves and others in trying to take action in which they are not trained is too great. Officers will carry out a dynamic risk assessment of any risk posed by a violent individual – whether the violence is caused by a medical condition or otherwise – and make a decision based on that risk assessment at that time”

    Source location

    2019-0135-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changes to nationally agreed police training packages require approval through national policing bodies rather than unilateral force action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are currently delivering nationally agreed training packages and any alteration to these should be agreed nationally with approval of all parties. The benefit in delivering training packages (for all mandatory training, not just Personal Safety Training) is they are consistent across the UK, all police officers are trained in the most current, relevant and up to date thinking which is designed using the latest research and learning from all Forces. We are aware this is currently being reviewed by NPCC and any alterations passed onto Forces in order for them to include in their training. It would be expected these alterations would be completed by the end of 2020.”

    Source location

    2019-0135-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Officers cannot reasonably be expected to possess medical professionals’ knowledge because attempting untrained interventions could pose excessive risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Police officers are not trained to the level of medical practitioners. All police officers have basic first aid training (First Aid – Module 2 of the College of Policing curriculum which includes conducting CPR and managing a casualty who is convulsing) which gives them the knowledge and skills suitable for their role. It is the expectation that they recognise signs and symptoms of a wide variety of medical conditions. It is unrealistic to expect officers to have the knowledge of medical professionals, as the risks posed to themselves and others in trying to take action in which they are not trained is too great. Officers will carry out a dynamic risk assessment of any risk posed by a violent individual – whether the violence is caused by a medical condition or otherwise – and make a decision based on that risk assessment at that time”

    Source location

    2019-0135-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
  4. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Keith Edwards, aged 64, was admitted to a care home for respite and subsequently suffered falls, seizures, reduced mobility, pressure sores and a rapid decline before dying in a nursing home on 19 December 2016. Concerns included inadequate care-home policies and care, failures to seek medical assistance and recognise deterioration, poor record-keeping, and inappropriate placement for his complex needs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek medical assistance following seizures

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of a seizure policy not specific to the resident

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The absence of a resident-specific seizure policy did not indicate inadequate care because no seizure history was disclosed and general epilepsy procedures were followed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. There was no seizure policy supplied upon admission. Southwinds general policy as to epilepsy was followed. Upon admission there was no indication that Mr Edwards had had seizures. If there is a history of seizures then it was usual for a specific policy for that resident to accompany upon admission, which would then be followed. Mr Edwards was not prescribed any epilepsy medication to the knowledge of Southwinds.”

    Source location

    2018-0015-Response-Southwinds-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

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Classification: non-sudep19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: Unreliable seizure care and management
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