Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

College of Policing2
National Police Chiefs’ Council2
Association Of British Neurologists1
Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Dorset County Council1
Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset Police1
NHS Dorset Integrated Care Board1
Royal College of Psychiatrists1
Sussex Police1
University Hospitals Dorset NHS Foundation Trust1

Most commonly raised concerns

Non-SUDEP 68 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

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  1. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.5 reportsSelected
  2. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.5 reportsSelected
  3. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  4. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.4 reportsSelected
  5. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  6. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.3 reportsSelected
  7. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  8. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  9. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  10. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  11. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  12. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  13. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  14. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  15. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  16. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.2 reportsSelected
  17. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  18. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  19. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  20. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.2 reportsSelected
  21. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  22. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  23. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.2 reportsSelected
  24. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  25. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.2 reportsSelected
  26. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.2 reportsSelected
  27. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  28. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  29. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.2 reportsSelected
  30. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.2 reportsSelected
  31. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  32. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  33. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

Reports matching this classification and recurring concern

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 3 reports

Classification: non-sudepRecurring concern: Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crises
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Only concerns related to the selected recurring concern and their linked actions and positions are shown. Other concerns are counted within each report.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    Gaia Kima Pope-Sutherland · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gaia Kima Pope-Sutherland, who had epilepsy and mental health conditions, left her aunt’s address in a psychotic state on 7 November 2017 and was later found deceased on 18 November 2017. The jury concluded that she probably died from hypothermia between 15.59 on 7 November and 10.00 on 8 November 2017. Principal concerns included under-resourcing and poor communication between epilepsy, neurology and mental health services, as well as issues concerning police training, missing-person policies and record keeping, and communication and information sharing within mental health services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of police officer knowledge of life-threatening illnesses and their behavioural impact

    Wider context from the report

    “iii. As per paragraph 1(iv) above, there could be future deaths due to the lack of knowledge Police Officers in England and Wales have around life threatening illnesses, such as epilepsy and mental health illness, and I request that consideration is given by the College of Policing to providing national training to all staff across all police forces, on illnesses such as epilepsy and mental health illness, and the impact they have on individuals and their behaviour. I also request consideration to be given to these topics forming part of the syllabus for the College of Policing induction training for Police Officers. ”

    Source location

    Gaia Kima Pope-Sutherland · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete consideration of higher-level medical-condition training and conclude that the current policing approach remains appropriate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have recently considered this question in relation to other conditions, such as neuro diversity, and further concluded that seeking to give a higher level of expertise is unfortunately not practical. Policing deals with an almost limitless variety of incidents, some situations or medical issues may only being encountered by officers very rarely – their training would be almost irrelevant because of the time that had lapsed between the training and the time the knowledge was needed to deal with the incident.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include epilepsy, psychosis, medical conditions, medication and associated risks in operational first-aid training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The content of Vulnerability 4 will also be built into initial training for Police Officers, Call Handlers and PCSOs to ensure ongoing development of new staff into the Organisation. Furthermore, in 2023, there will be a similar opportunity to raise awareness further in relation to epilepsy, psychosis, medical conditions, medication and the effect of such on and individual and subsequent risks. The Organisation will work with the clinical lead to ensure such are covered in the First Aid Training which is rolled out to operational officers and staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Dorset Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Comprehensive training on epilepsy and mental health conditions is considered impractical because medical conditions and missing-person circumstances are too complex and variable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, the College is committed to providing the highest standards of training for those working in policing however, that training also must be accessible and practicable. Medical conditions can be very complex, those conditions in themselves can be variable and they do not exist in isolation. Different conditions have differing levels of severity that interact with the myriad of circumstances in which people go missing. The quantity of variables is simply too great to reasonably and effectively train.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing first aid, vulnerability training and authorised professional practice are considered proportionate and appropriate for responding to medical risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We recognise that policing must have some medical knowledge and this is provided through our first aid programme. This programme and medical knowledge makes explicit links to our vulnerability training. To ensure police responders are equipped to effectively respond to missing persons, our training focuses on managing the full spectrum of vulnerabilities through effective and proportionate risk management. In reality, this means that College standards require front line responders to ask good questions that enable an informed understanding of the range or risks affecting a missing person, on a case by case basis, to identify their severity and impact. Additionally, police responders should seek information from informed sources, such as family or doctor, to understand the impact and degree of any medical conditions potentially affecting a missing person.”

    Source location

    Response from College of Policing
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for national training updates on life-threatening illnesses rests with the College of Policing through its clinical governance process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This concern is directed to Chief Constable ████████ at the College of Policing. I wish to formally record my support for the learning from the inquest in relation to life-threatening illnesses to be shared with the College to inform National knowledge and understanding. I have personally written to CC Marsh to offer to support this work and to utilise the Organisation’s learning from Gaia’s inquest to inform and enhance any National training provision. I am aware that any updates to training and information relating to medical issues would go through the College of Policing clinical governance group for appropriate oversight and to ensure guidance was implemented.”

    Source location

    Response from Dorset Police
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 September 2022

    Open published response
  2. Liverpool and the Wirral

    AI-generated summary

    Gary Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gary Williams died on 28 July 2017 after a pulmonary thromboembolism and deep venous thrombosis, with ictal automatism due to temporal lobe epilepsy also recorded as a cause. The report describes concerns about the lack of detailed information passed during handovers, omissions in medical records concerning restraint, use of force and injuries, and inconsistent communication between hospital departments. It also notes that ictal automatism was not included in College of Policing training materials on restraint.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of training on temporal lobe epilepsy-related ictal automatism during restraint

    Wider context from the report

    “Gary Williams suffered from Temporal lobe epilepsy. He was a retired police officer who was a very friendly and polite gentleman, when not unwell. He had previously had absences. However, nothing that can compare with the events in the eleven days before his death on the 28th July 2017. On the 18th July 2017 he suffered from an extreme acute behavioural disturbance, described as what appeared to be a psychotic delusional state in which array and violence to life and property was demonstrated. This was Ictal automatism due to temporal lobe epilepsy. A neurologist explained at the inquest that he felt sorry for the police, as they did not know the patient or with what they were dealing. He explained that there was no way to rationalise with some in this state - they are like a zombie and though they do not feel pain the use of PAVA, baton strikes and restraint will be responded to by the person’s fight and flight instincts. It is important to approach such a person with calm. In a neurological ward, it can take four experience health care professional and a fifth to sedate to deal with such a presentation. There is no treatment as such for this presentation just sedation and if necessary critical care support until the person has recovered. This condition is not part of the college of policing training materials with regard to use of restraint. You may consider that it would be helpful to include it in the minimum of 12 hours future mandatory annual restraint refresher training undertaken by all officers. In this case, officers, members of the public and health care professionals were distressed and exhausted but fortunately officers, healthcare professionals and the public did not suffer permanent serious or fatal harm. ”

    Source location

    Gary Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update and circulate the ABD Training Package for UK police forces, directing immediate delivery of the revised package.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Subsequently the ABD Training Package for UK Police Forces was updated and circulated in March 2021 with a direction for Forces to deliver the revised ABD package with immediate effect. Additionally, The Royal College of Emergency Medicine Best practice Guidelines: Guidelines for the Management of Excited Delirium/Acute Behaviour Disturbance (ABD) May 2016, was also circulated to forces in September 2021 which contains a section on ‘restraint’ in relation to medical settings.”

    Source location

    2021-0401-Response-from-NPCC_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate emergency medicine best-practice guidelines on excited delirium and acute behavioural disturbance to police forces.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Subsequently the ABD Training Package for UK Police Forces was updated and circulated in March 2021 with a direction for Forces to deliver the revised ABD package with immediate effect. Additionally, The Royal College of Emergency Medicine Best practice Guidelines: Guidelines for the Management of Excited Delirium/Acute Behaviour Disturbance (ABD) May 2016, was also circulated to forces in September 2021 which contains a section on ‘restraint’ in relation to medical settings.”

    Source location

    2021-0401-Response-from-NPCC_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Obtain specialist emergency and forensic medicine advice on ABD training materials and trainer guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Specialist advice was sought from experts in emergency and forensic medicine who provided expert advice to SDAR relating to the ABD PowerPoint, notes for trainers and the National Personal Safety Manual.”

    Source location

    2021-0401-Response-from-NPCC_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue reviewing learning from coroners, oversight bodies, stakeholders and police forces to inform restraint and self-defence training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Self Defence Arrest and Restraint (SDAR) working group led by DAC ████████, works closely with the College of Policing. This group reviews the learning from coroners, the Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC), Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS), stakeholders and police forces.”

    Source location

    2021-0401-Response-from-NPCC_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update the ABD PowerPoint and Personal Safety Training Manual with additional restraint training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the Oak inquest, the SDAR group immediately reviewed and updated the existing ABD power point and the PST Manual. This included incorporating additional training which was identified and documented within our response to the coroner overseeing the proceedings in this case.”

    Source location

    2021-0401-Response-from-NPCC_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing ABD training materials and package updates address the concern, with the arrangements remaining subject to continual review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the Oak inquest, the SDAR group immediately reviewed and updated the existing ABD power point and the PST Manual. This included incorporating additional training which was identified and documented within our response to the coroner overseeing the proceedings in this case.”

    Source location

    2021-0401-Response-from-NPCC_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response
  3. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Duncan Tomlin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Duncan Tomlin died on 29 July 2014 after cardiac arrest following the use of drugs and police prone restraint, including handcuffs, leg restraints and incapacitant spray. The report identified concerns about insufficient emphasis on the heightened breathing risks of multiple factors, delayed opportunities to assess and reposition him, inadequate guidance on monitoring, the timing of CPR, and understanding atypical or post-seizure behaviour.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient training on atypical seizure and post-seizure behaviour

    Wider context from the report

    “Understanding aspects of Epilepsy and Seizures 5. The training material which has been provided to me on behalf of Sussex Police covers many aspects of epilepsy and seizure that were explored during the inquest. The training material indicates that if it is available to the trainer, participants will be shown a video which informs the viewer of the way in which a person may present post seizure, namely confused, vulnerable, perceiving aggression from others and at risk of lashing out due to misunderstanding. I have also been provided with a copy of a training manual provided by Epilepsy Action which was sent to ACPO in 2011. Aspects of the evidence from the family in this inquest were entirely consistent with the less common presentations of a person in an atypical or post seizure state. Although epilepsy was not found to be causative in the death in this Inquest, in another situation with a similar set of circumstances, the reactions of a person suffering an atypical seizure or in a post seizure state, could be misconstrued as violence and resistance were officers not to appreciate that fact that their presentation may be part of a medical condition and restraint in such circumstances could have inherent and fatal risks. It is therefore of importance that training extends beyond the two more well known types of seizure and that post seizure behaviour is also understood in general terms. ”

    Source location

    Duncan Tomlin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include an epilepsy video in initial officer training and refresh it during refresher training every three years.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to epilepsy in particular, there is a video which is included in the initial officer training course and is refreshed every 3 years in the refresher training. Sussex Police are considering hosting a link to that video on their internal website for all officers to be able to view.”

    Source location

    2019-0135-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Basic first-aid training provides officers with knowledge and skills suitable for their policing role.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Police officers are not trained to the level of medical practitioners. All police officers have basic first aid training (First Aid – Module 2 of the College of Policing curriculum which includes conducting CPR and managing a casualty who is convulsing) which gives them the knowledge and skills suitable for their role. It is the expectation that they recognise signs and symptoms of a wide variety of medical conditions. It is unrealistic to expect officers to have the knowledge of medical professionals, as the risks posed to themselves and others in trying to take action in which they are not trained is too great. Officers will carry out a dynamic risk assessment of any risk posed by a violent individual – whether the violence is caused by a medical condition or otherwise – and make a decision based on that risk assessment at that time”

    Source location

    2019-0135-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changes to nationally agreed police training packages require approval through national policing bodies rather than unilateral force action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are currently delivering nationally agreed training packages and any alteration to these should be agreed nationally with approval of all parties. The benefit in delivering training packages (for all mandatory training, not just Personal Safety Training) is they are consistent across the UK, all police officers are trained in the most current, relevant and up to date thinking which is designed using the latest research and learning from all Forces. We are aware this is currently being reviewed by NPCC and any alterations passed onto Forces in order for them to include in their training. It would be expected these alterations would be completed by the end of 2020.”

    Source location

    2019-0135-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Officers cannot reasonably be expected to possess medical professionals’ knowledge because attempting untrained interventions could pose excessive risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Police officers are not trained to the level of medical practitioners. All police officers have basic first aid training (First Aid – Module 2 of the College of Policing curriculum which includes conducting CPR and managing a casualty who is convulsing) which gives them the knowledge and skills suitable for their role. It is the expectation that they recognise signs and symptoms of a wide variety of medical conditions. It is unrealistic to expect officers to have the knowledge of medical professionals, as the risks posed to themselves and others in trying to take action in which they are not trained is too great. Officers will carry out a dynamic risk assessment of any risk posed by a violent individual – whether the violence is caused by a medical condition or otherwise – and make a decision based on that risk assessment at that time”

    Source location

    2019-0135-Response-by-Sussex-Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

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Classification: non-sudep19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crises
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