Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

Caring Limited1
Community Disability Nurse1
Independent Futures1
Southwinds1
Springbank Care Home Limited1

Most commonly raised concerns

Non-SUDEP 68 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

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  1. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.5 reportsSelected
  2. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.5 reportsSelected
  3. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  4. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.4 reportsSelected
  5. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  6. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.3 reportsSelected
  7. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  8. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  9. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  10. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  11. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  12. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  13. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  14. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  15. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  16. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.2 reportsSelected
  17. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  18. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  19. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  20. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.2 reportsSelected
  21. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  22. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  23. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.2 reportsSelected
  24. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  25. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.2 reportsSelected
  26. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.2 reportsSelected
  27. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  28. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  29. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.2 reportsSelected
  30. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.2 reportsSelected
  31. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  32. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  33. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

Reports matching this classification and recurring concern

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 2 reports

Classification: non-sudepRecurring concern: Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attention
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Only concerns related to the selected recurring concern and their linked actions and positions are shown. Other concerns are counted within each report.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Keith Edwards, aged 64, was admitted to a care home for respite and subsequently suffered falls, seizures, reduced mobility, pressure sores and a rapid decline before dying in a nursing home on 19 December 2016. Concerns included inadequate care-home policies and care, failures to seek medical assistance and recognise deterioration, poor record-keeping, and inappropriate placement for his complex needs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek medical assistance following seizures

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek and communicate appropriate medical follow-up for deteriorating residents

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Medical advice was sought appropriately, and no urgent referral was recommended or documented by the out-of-hours doctor.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. Medical advice for Mr Edwards was sought at the appropriate time. The Doctor was provided with full information and all questions raised by him were answered. There is no recollection as to the out of hours Doctor suggesting any urgent referral and no documentation (other than a prescription – which was obtained straight away) was left by the Doctor.”

    Source location

    2018-0015-Response-Southwinds-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response
  2. Cardiff & the Vale of Glamorgan

    AI-generated summary

    Sandra Wordingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sandra Wordingham, a resident of Springbank nursing home, was found unconscious after a suspected epileptic fit on 22 July 2013 and remained unconscious overnight before being taken to hospital. She died in hospital on 26 July 2013; the medical cause of death was recorded as intracerebral haemorrhage. The principal concern was that no medical opinion was sought despite her remaining unconscious for longer than expected after an epileptic fit, creating a risk to similarly treated residents.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek medical opinion for prolonged unconsciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Sandra Wordingham, was put to bed in the nursing home in an unconscious state after a suspected epileptic fit. In fact she had suffered a sudden primary intracerebral haemorrhage. No medical opinion was sought even though Sandra Wordingham remained unconscious throughout the night for a longer period than would be expected after an epileptic fit. ”

    Source location

    Sandra Wordingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide all staff with first-aid and life-support training focused on the immediate care of unconscious residents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improved First Aid & Life Support Training All staff to attend training with specific training element for the immediate care of the unconscious person Persons Responsible: ████████ Operations Manager Springbank & ████████ Manager Date By: Planned for March 2014.”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assess nurses’ competency in recognising consciousness levels, providing and documenting life support, conducting neurological observations, and following relevant guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ensuring Nursing Staff Competency Following training and instruction nurses will have an assessment of their competency to:”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Instruct staff to summon emergency services promptly for unconscious residents, follow valid DNNAR instructions, and use a protocol available to all staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Summoning Emergency Assistance”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inform nurse agencies and provide their head offices with the unconscious-person management protocol.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Providing & Sharing Information about the management of unconscious people with Bank and Agency Nurses working occasional shifts”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide the unconscious-person management protocol to occasional staff through agency induction materials.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Providing & Sharing Information about the management of unconscious people with Bank and Agency Nurses working occasional shifts”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update residents’ risk assessments and care plans with specific information about causes of unconsciousness, including detailed epilepsy seizure types and recovery periods.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Knowledge of probable reasons and causes for residents who may become unconscious due to epilepsy (and other illnesses)”

    Source location

    2013-0373-Response-by-Springbank-Nursing-Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 December 2013

    Open published response

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Classification: non-sudep19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attention
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