Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service1
High Down Prison1
Ministry of Justice1
Parc Prison and Young Offender Institute1

Most commonly raised concerns

Non-SUDEP 68 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

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  1. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.5 reportsSelected
  2. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.5 reportsSelected
  3. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  4. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.4 reportsSelected
  5. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  6. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.3 reportsSelected
  7. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  8. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  9. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  10. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  11. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  12. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  13. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  14. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  15. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  16. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.2 reportsSelected
  17. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  18. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  19. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  20. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.2 reportsSelected
  21. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  22. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  23. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.2 reportsSelected
  24. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  25. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.2 reportsSelected
  26. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.2 reportsSelected
  27. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  28. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  29. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.2 reportsSelected
  30. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.2 reportsSelected
  31. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  32. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  33. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

Reports matching this classification and recurring concern

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 2 reports

Classification: non-sudepRecurring concern: Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutions
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Only concerns related to the selected recurring concern and their linked actions and positions are shown. Other concerns are counted within each report.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Ryan Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ryan Harding died overnight between 7 and 8 January 2023 in his prison cell after consuming drugs. Concerns included prison infrastructure and gatehouse security measures that required upgrading to reduce illicit materials entering the prison, and a delayed morning welfare check due to insufficient staffing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain the gate house at a security level that restricts entry of illicit materials

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The gate house continues to require upgrading to enable enhanced security to be afforded to reduce the ability of illicit materials including drugs and mobile phones to enter the prison. ”

    Source location

    Ryan Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain prison-block windows at a security level that restricts entry of illicit materials

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The inquest heard evidence that the windows of Alpha and Bravo blocks did in 2023 and continue to require upgrading in order to reduce the ability of illicit materials including drugs and mobile phones to enter the prison. ”

    Source location

    Ryan Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Plan expansion works for a new Gate House and refurbishment of the existing Gate House to accommodate Enhanced Gate Security.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HMP & YOI Parc is designated a Category C prison, and as such, was not originally funded or risk assessed to provide full Enhanced Gate Security. Increased and changing security challenges, including those enabled by technological advancements and changes to the make-up and nature of contraband items, have led to agreement by HMPPS that the prison should now be funded and risk assessed for Enhanced Gate Security, and the Director has, since June 2024, prioritised addressing identified requirements in Enhanced Gate Security provision.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use specialist screening equipment routinely to screen staff, professional visitors and social visitors entering the prison.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The conventional scanning equipment which is part of the traditional Enhanced Gate Security model will be installed within the new Gate House building once it is constructed. Pending construction of the new Gate House building, G4S identified a solution to the current logistical restriction by purchasing specialist technological equipment, similar to the latest equipment used in some airports. This equipment is now routinely used to screen staff, professional visitors and social visitors coming into the prison. HMP & YOI Parc was the first prison in the UK to deploy this technology, following a review of best practice across other sectors.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Fund and deploy additional external dog patrols to reduce contraband throwovers and support searching.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Enhanced Gate Security is provided by a range of additional tools and measures which are already being used at HMP & YOI Parc. Bag scanners and handheld metal detectors are routinely used by staff to support improved searching when visitors and staff enter the prison. The Director has expanded the size of the Special Searching Team, significantly increasing the frequency and quality of searches, and there are now an average of approximately 1,700 staff entry and exit searches per month, which represents a significant increase compared with 2022. This compares favourably with the majority of establishments within the prison’s comparative prison group. G4S has funded additional external dog patrols which have worked to significantly reduce the number of throwovers experienced at HMP & YOI Parc.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a business case seeking funding for staffing and additional dogs to support searching seven days a week during core hours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The prison is currently in communication with the Authority around submission of a business case seeking funding for additional staffing to support searching seven days a week during core hours (from the time the door opens until it is secured for night state), together with additional searching dogs to support this activity.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand the Special Searching Team to increase the frequency and quality of staff and visitor searches.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Enhanced Gate Security is provided by a range of additional tools and measures which are already being used at HMP & YOI Parc. Bag scanners and handheld metal detectors are routinely used by staff to support improved searching when visitors and staff enter the prison. The Director has expanded the size of the Special Searching Team, significantly increasing the frequency and quality of searches, and there are now an average of approximately 1,700 staff entry and exit searches per month, which represents a significant increase compared with 2022. This compares favourably with the majority of establishments within the prison’s comparative prison group. G4S has funded additional external dog patrols which have worked to significantly reduce the number of throwovers experienced at HMP & YOI Parc.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver the phased replacement of vulnerable prison windows to reduce contraband ingress.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In mid-2024, agreement was reached to move forward with a programme of window replacement works to replace the designated windows as quickly as possible, whilst maintaining the integrity of the establishment, allowing HMP & YOI Parc to remain fully operational. The significant cost of the replacement works (each replacement window unit costing in excess of £3,500) is being shared by HMPPS and G4S. A timetable for the replacement programme has been agreed with the Authority.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A temporary gatehouse extension was not pursued because existing interim searching measures were considered a better use of finances, though less comprehensive.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “G4S previously submitted a proposal to HMPPS for a temporary extension (modular building) to accommodate Enhanced Gate Security. Understandably, this was not seen as the best use of finances since the local team had introduced interim measures to support and enhance the searching of staff and visitors, albeit not to the same level of searching achievable with Enhanced Gate Security provision. Any changes to the design of the building must be approved and funded by HMPPS.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    HMPPS must approve and fund building-design changes, while G4S is contracted only to manage and maintain the existing facility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “His Majesty’s Prisons & Probation Service (HMPPS) (“the Authority”) oversaw the construction of HMP & YOI Parc leading to the establishment becoming operational in 1997. Following sign-off and approval of the construction works, operational responsibility for HMP & YOI Parc was handed over by HMPPS to G4S Care & Justice Services (UK) Limited (G4S).”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Window replacement cannot be completed widescale or faster because approved suppliers, specialist contractors, prisoner relocation and security logistics constrain delivery.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Practical issues dictate the speed at which window replacement works can be achieved. The windows, by their very nature and purpose, require specialist manufacture and there are a very limited number of HMPPS approved suppliers manufacturing the windows to the requisite specification. Such suppliers are in demand, not only in relation to manufacturing replacement windows for existing prisons across the nationwide prison estate, but also manufacturing windows for new establishments currently under construction.”

    Source location

    2026-0054 - Response from HM Prison Parc
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    OLIVER MULANGALA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Oliver Mulangala was in custody at HMP High Down, had epilepsy and a history of serious seizures, and was found dead in his cell on 13 July 2024 after suffering a drug-induced seizure. The report identifies concerns about the easy availability and use of illicit new psychoactive substances in HMP High Down, including their contribution to drug-related deaths, coercion and risks to prisoners. It also raises concerns about the availability of mobile phones and the use of drones to facilitate the delivery of drugs and other contraband into prisons.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of drones to deliver drugs and other contraband into prison

    Wider context from the report

    “It is of grave concern that: (1) New psychoactive substances, especially ███, are easily available in HM Prison High Down, as in many other prisons in England & Wales a. New psychoactive substances are dangerous illegal drugs of abuse (there is no clinical or medical use for them) and they are responsible for the death of a prisoner in England and Wales about every 5 days b. Prisoners are coming into prison without a drug habit and develop a drug habit in prison due to the ease of their availability c. Vulnerable prisoners are being forced to test new batches of illegal drugs coming into the prison (2) Mobile phones are easily available in HM Prison High Down, as in many other prisons in England & Wales a. The access to mobile phones facilitates prisoners’ conduct and finance of drug dealing, including the arranging for the delivery of drugs by drones to precise locations at specified times b. The access to mobile phones allows sharing information (including photographs and videos) across not only High Down prison, but across other prisons in England & Wales, presenting safety and security risks c. The access to mobile phones facilitates the highly lucrative, damaging and dangerous activities of the organised criminal gangs working in HM High Down, and other prisons in England & Wales (3) The use of ███ in HMP High Down, as in other prisons in England & Wales, presents a serious risk to prison safety and security a. ███ facilitate the delivery of drugs into prison to precise locations at specified times b. ███ can be used to bring in other contraband including weapons and even firearms c. The increasing sophistication of ███ (and their increasing payload) increases the risks and dangers to life (4) The Ministry of Justice advised the court that it does not hold statistics on drug-related deaths in prisons in England & Wales. Basic risk management requires risks to be quantified and assessed in order that they can be addressed. You cannot properly manage that which you do not measure. ”

    Source location

    OLIVER MULANGALA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Easy availability of new psychoactive substances in prison

    Wider context from the report

    “It is of grave concern that: (1) New psychoactive substances, especially ███, are easily available in HM Prison High Down, as in many other prisons in England & Wales a. New psychoactive substances are dangerous illegal drugs of abuse (there is no clinical or medical use for them) and they are responsible for the death of a prisoner in England and Wales about every 5 days b. Prisoners are coming into prison without a drug habit and develop a drug habit in prison due to the ease of their availability c. Vulnerable prisoners are being forced to test new batches of illegal drugs coming into the prison (2) Mobile phones are easily available in HM Prison High Down, as in many other prisons in England & Wales a. The access to mobile phones facilitates prisoners’ conduct and finance of drug dealing, including the arranging for the delivery of drugs by drones to precise locations at specified times b. The access to mobile phones allows sharing information (including photographs and videos) across not only High Down prison, but across other prisons in England & Wales, presenting safety and security risks c. The access to mobile phones facilitates the highly lucrative, damaging and dangerous activities of the organised criminal gangs working in HM High Down, and other prisons in England & Wales (3) The use of ███ in HMP High Down, as in other prisons in England & Wales, presents a serious risk to prison safety and security a. ███ facilitate the delivery of drugs into prison to precise locations at specified times b. ███ can be used to bring in other contraband including weapons and even firearms c. The increasing sophistication of ███ (and their increasing payload) increases the risks and dangers to life (4) The Ministry of Justice advised the court that it does not hold statistics on drug-related deaths in prisons in England & Wales. Basic risk management requires risks to be quantified and assessed in order that they can be addressed. You cannot properly manage that which you do not measure. ”

    Source location

    OLIVER MULANGALA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver staff upskilling to improve responses to drone activity affecting prisons.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We also work closely with law enforcement organisations to tackle prisons being targeted by drones. The Director General of the National Crime Agency has directed police chiefs to work with HMPPS to jointly tackle the threat of drones. For example, there are 400m restricted fly zones around all closed prisons and Young Offender Institutions. These restrictions make all unauthorised drone incursions a crime and support police and prison staff to disrupt illegal drone use. Additionally, we have developed comprehensive guidance and are delivering upskilling to staff to improve the response to drone activity impacting our prisons. HMPPS also conducts vulnerability assessments across the estate to understand the risk so that we can develop and implement plans to mitigate the threat.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct vulnerability assessments across the prison estate to understand drone risks and inform mitigation plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We also work closely with law enforcement organisations to tackle prisons being targeted by drones. The Director General of the National Crime Agency has directed police chiefs to work with HMPPS to jointly tackle the threat of drones. For example, there are 400m restricted fly zones around all closed prisons and Young Offender Institutions. These restrictions make all unauthorised drone incursions a crime and support police and prison staff to disrupt illegal drone use. Additionally, we have developed comprehensive guidance and are delivering upskilling to staff to improve the response to drone activity impacting our prisons. HMPPS also conducts vulnerability assessments across the estate to understand the risk so that we can develop and implement plans to mitigate the threat.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Invest over £40 million in physical security across 34 prisons, including anti-drone measures at more than 15 priority prisons.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HMPPS is aware of the available routes for contraband, such as drugs and mobile phones, to enter prisons and how they are influenced by factors such as security measures, geographical location and prisoner cohort. Due to this, our approach to conveyance is multi-faceted. In the 2025/2026 financial year, HMPPS is investing over £40m in physical security measures across 34 prisons, including £10m on anti-drone measures, such as window replacements, external window grilles and specialist netting in over 15 priority prisons.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop comprehensive guidance for responding to drone activity affecting prisons.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We also work closely with law enforcement organisations to tackle prisons being targeted by drones. The Director General of the National Crime Agency has directed police chiefs to work with HMPPS to jointly tackle the threat of drones. For example, there are 400m restricted fly zones around all closed prisons and Young Offender Institutions. These restrictions make all unauthorised drone incursions a crime and support police and prison staff to disrupt illegal drone use. Additionally, we have developed comprehensive guidance and are delivering upskilling to staff to improve the response to drone activity impacting our prisons. HMPPS also conducts vulnerability assessments across the estate to understand the risk so that we can develop and implement plans to mitigate the threat.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide trace-detection equipment to all public sector prisons to identify drugs on physical items.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “illicit items by prisoners. Additionally, all public sector prisons have been provided with trace detection equipment, which is used to identify the presence of drugs on physical items. Furthermore, 54 priority establishments have airport-style enhanced gate security to screen staff and visitors, including archway metal detectors, handheld wands, and X-ray baggage scanners.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate X-ray body scanners in all adult male closed prisons to detect and deter internally concealed illicit items.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HMPPS utilises multiple countermeasures and initiatives to tackle the conveyance of drugs and mobile phones into our prisons. For example, all adult male closed prisons are equipped with X-ray body scanners, which are used to detect and deter the internal concealment of”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Equip 54 priority establishments with enhanced gate security, including metal detectors and X-ray baggage scanners, to screen staff and visitors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “illicit items by prisoners. Additionally, all public sector prisons have been provided with trace detection equipment, which is used to identify the presence of drugs on physical items. Furthermore, 54 priority establishments have airport-style enhanced gate security to screen staff and visitors, including archway metal detectors, handheld wands, and X-ray baggage scanners.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 December 2025

    Open published response

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Classification: non-sudep19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutions
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