Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

Brook Medical Centre1
Godfrey Care1
NHS England1
University Hospitals of North Midlands NHS Trust1

Most commonly raised concerns

All classifications 90 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

  1. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.9 reportsSelected
  2. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.7 reportsSelected
  3. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.6 reportsSelected
  4. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.4 reportsSelected
  5. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  6. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.4 reportsSelected
  7. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.4 reportsSelected
  8. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  9. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  10. Failure to provide timely clinical follow-up after medication prescribingPrescribed medication is not reliably followed up for effectiveness, safety, collection, adherence and patient response.3 reportsSelected
  11. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.3 reportsSelected
  12. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  13. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  14. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  15. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.3 reportsSelected
  16. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.3 reportsSelected
  17. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.3 reportsSelected
  18. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.3 reportsSelected
  19. Unsafe interoperability between prison custody and healthcare proceduresReports identify failures in the bounded interface between prison custody, contracted custody providers and healthcare services, where procedures, responsibilities and safety-relevant information do not operate together reliably.3 reportsSelected
  20. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  21. Failure to communicate safety-critical care information effectively between care providers and familiesReports identify unsafe communication between care providers and families, including failures to convey risks, care instructions, concerns or other information needed to support safe care and decision-making.2 reportsSelected
  22. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  23. Failure to ensure safe prisoner transfersRecurring concern that the end-to-end prisoner transfer process is unreliable, leaving transferred prisoners exposed to unmanaged risks or interruptions in essential support.2 reportsSelected
  24. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  25. Failure to reliably document the rationale for consequential decisionsDifferent reports identify missing or inadequate records explaining the rationale and evidential basis for consequential decisions, including the anchor’s crucial decisions and comparable mental-capacity, NRPF and transfer decisions. The shared concern is unreliable rationale documentation for decisions that affect safety, accountability and continuity of care, rather than any one decision type or record system.2 reportsSelected
  26. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  27. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  28. Failure to reliably refer patients to required specialist servicesThe anchor identifies a required physiotherapy referral that was not completed. A different report identifies delayed referrals to physiotherapy, occupational therapy, dietetics and Parkinson’s specialist services. Together these support an end-to-end concern with required specialist referrals not being made promptly and reliably, rather than a concern limited to one physiotherapy referral.2 reportsSelected
  29. Failure to secure and control medicationReports identify medication as remaining accessible, unsecured or inadequately controlled, creating risks of misuse, overdose, theft or access by people other than the intended patient.2 reportsSelected
  30. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  31. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  32. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  33. Incomplete clinical history-takingReports identify an unsafe clinical assessment condition in which relevant patient history is not obtained sufficiently to support recognition of symptoms, risks and appropriate care.2 reportsSelected
  34. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  35. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  36. Unreliable access to emergency communicationReports identify failures in dedicated emergency communication arrangements that can delay summoning or contacting emergency help.2 reportsSelected
  37. Unreliable communication of critical medication information to GPsRecurring deficiency in the medication-information exchange process between services and GPs, including information needed to maintain supplies, assess prescribing safety and support continuity of treatment.2 reportsSelected
  38. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  39. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  40. Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated careThe anchor identifies absent agreed communication means and inaccessible shared patient information between mental health agencies. Other canonical reports identify relevant risk information not being shared between agencies and poor inter-agency information sharing preventing coordinated care, supporting a recurring concern with the reliability of inter-agency care information sharing rather than only the anchor's repository or communication-channel failure.2 reportsSelected
  41. Unreliable management of medication doses not takenThe anchor identifies missing guidance for monitoring prescribed medication that self-administering patients do not take when dispensed. A different report identifies inconsistent procedures for responding when service users refuse or do not take medication. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of detecting, monitoring and escalating omitted or refused medication doses, rather than a concern limited to one guidance document or one home's procedure.2 reportsSelected
  42. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  43. Unreliable observation of people in custodyThe anchor report identifies failure to transfer and replicate medically required observation levels when a detained person moves into GEO AMEY custody, while a different report identifies uncertainty about whether the correct observation level, including constant watch, was provided to a person in prison custody. Together these support a recurring concern about the reliability of the custody observation process rather than only one handover or level-setting failure.2 reportsSelected
  44. Unreliable recording of required observations in care and custodyDifferent reports identify inaccurate, delayed, anticipatory or falsified records of required observations, including 15-minute observations in prison custody and patient-care settings. The shared unsafe condition is that observation records do not reliably reflect when and how observations were actually conducted, rather than any one observation frequency, recording location or electronic system.2 reportsSelected
  45. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  46. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  47. Unreliable urgent mental health referral and assessment pathwaysUrgent mental-health referral pathways do not reliably secure timely access, coordination and specialist assessment.2 reportsSelected
  48. Unreliable welfare-check processes for people whose health is of concernThe anchor identifies unclear purpose and use of the welfare sheet for monitoring prisoners whose health is of concern. A separate report identifies inconsistent criteria for what constitutes a welfare check and when it is recorded. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the bounded welfare-check process, rather than only the sheet or recording component.2 reportsSelected
  49. Unsafe cell-sharing decisions for prisonersRecurring deficiencies in the prison cell-sharing risk system can leave prisoners exposed to unsafe pairings or prevent them from understanding changes affecting their cell-sharing status.2 reportsSelected
  50. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

Reports matching this recurring concern

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 2 reports

Classification: all classificationsRecurring concern: Unreliable medication dosage verification and communication
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Only concerns related to the selected recurring concern and their linked actions and positions are shown. Other concerns are counted within each report.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent

    AI-generated summary

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joshua Ethan Burgess, who had epilepsy and Lennox-Gastaut syndrome, died at home on 19 November 2022 after vomiting and aspirating during an epileptic seizure. The report identifies concerns about communication and prescribing processes for Brivaracetam, including failures to update the prescription, medication being withheld for several days, and a subsequent increase to 10ml twice daily despite information that 4ml twice daily was appropriate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to refer dosage-clarification correspondence to a clinician

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to refer medication-change correspondence to a clinician for consideration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to give the prescribing GP express instructions to amend Brivaracetam prescriptions after dosage changes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain a reliable written basis for Brivaracetam dosage administration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a local medication policy covering medication receipt, transcription, altered labels, missed doses, written prescribing confirmation and triangulation between prescribers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Reviewed Policies and Procedures The following actions will be implemented by 1st April 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review internal policies and procedures against the coroner’s concerns and identify necessary changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Godfrey Care Response We intend to review our internal policies and procedures considering the coroners concerns and identify where changes need to be made. Below, we respond to the coroner’s areas of concern, setting out what we have already done, what we are doing now, and what we intend to do in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update staff medication competency assessments to test clarification of unclear directions, MAR-label discrepancies and verbal medication changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3 The Staff Medication Competency Assessment has been reviewed and now includes the following questions.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have a GP review and triage all neurology correspondence and clinic letters received by Brook Medical Centre.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have discussed the above process with nominated individuals from the ICS. Due to the timeframes that would be required for the creation of standardised template for clinic letters within the ‘Medisec’ system across the Trust, we are reiterating the Trust standards and ████████ has agreed, with immediate effect, that all clinic letters received from neurology will be reviewed by a GP at Brook Medical Centre. This has been implemented due to the acknowledgement that neurological conditions are often complex, and it is more likely that they will require frequent medication changes, titration and/or closer monitoring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require GP review and triage of all neurology correspondence received by Brook Medical Centre.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have discussed the above process with nominated individuals from the ICS. Due to the timeframes that would be required for the creation of standardised template for clinic letters within the ‘Medisec’ system across the Trust, we are reiterating the Trust standards and ████████ has agreed, with immediate effect, that all clinic letters received from neurology will be reviewed by a GP at Brook Medical Centre. This has been implemented due to the acknowledgement that neurological conditions are often complex, and it is more likely that they will require frequent medication changes, titration and/or closer monitoring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standardised Medisec clinic-letter template specifying medication changes and clear prescribing actions for primary care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The Trust’s outpatient clinic letter standards describe the structure of clinic letters based on standard headings. You will recall that ████████ (GP) gave evidence at the inquest to the effect that there were areas in the acute Trust setting which already provided discharge information which he considered to be of a ‘gold standard.’ The Trust is committed to working towards improving compliance with these standards. To support this, we are working towards creation of a standardised template in our ‘Medisec’ system (system where letters are created). This will include a section for changes to medications and clear actions for those in the primary care setting, for example, instructions for the prescribing GP to amend prescriptions.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update weekly and monthly managers’ medication audits to verify written authorisation, dosage changes and timely receipt of replacement prescriptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Run through the reviewed managers monthly medication audit to ensure expectations are clear.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standardised clinic-letter template specifying medication changes and clear actions for prescribing GPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The Trust’s outpatient clinic letter standards describe the structure of clinic letters based on standard headings. You will recall that ████████ (GP) gave evidence at the inquest to the effect that there were areas in the acute Trust settings which already provided discharge information which he considered to be of a ‘gold standard.’ The Trust is committed to working towards improving compliance with these standards. To support this, we are working towards creation of a standardised template in our ‘Medisec’ system (system where letters are created). This will include a section for changes to medications and clear actions for those in the primary care setting, for example, instructions for the prescribing GP to amend prescriptions.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A standardised clinic-letter template cannot be created immediately because implementation across the Trust requires substantial timeframes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have discussed the above process with nominated individuals from the ICS. Due to the timeframes that would be required for the creation of standardised template for clinic letters within the ‘Medisec’ system across the Trust, we are reiterating the Trust standards and ████████ has agreed, with immediate effect, that all clinic letters received from neurology will be reviewed by a GP at Brook Medical Centre. This has been implemented due to the acknowledgement that neurological conditions are often complex, and it is more likely that they will require frequent medication changes, titration and/or closer monitoring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The delay in administering medication did not contribute to the death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Whilst this concern is not directly addressed to the acute Trust (UHNM) or Brook medical Centre, it has been considered as part of the wider learning following Joshua’s death. Medications for epilepsy is considered across the healthcare economy to be ‘critical’. The National Patient Safety Agency (2010) defined critical medicines as ‘medicines which can result in patient death or serious harm if there are delays in their administration’. Whist the Coroner found that the delay in administering medications on this occasion did not contribute to Joshua’s death, we believe that further education within the care home setting is required. With this in mind, we will work together with the local authority to ensure that up to date communications are shared across the Stoke on Trent and North Staffordshire health and social care economy to reiterate this message.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response
  2. Hertfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    John Paul SKINNER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Paul SKINNER was admitted to Watford Hospital on 15 May 2020 after suffering tonic clonic seizures and was given phenytoin. A verbal communication failure led to 15 mg/kg being heard as 50 mg/kg, resulting in an overdose; he arrested and died. The principal concern was that unclear communication of dosage could lead to foreseeable medication errors in hospitals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use clear and non-confusable communication and expression of numbers for medication dosages

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Junior doctor instructed to administer phenytoin did not know the required dosage and asked his more senior colleague for advice. The senior doctor's reply 15mk/kg was heard by the junior doctor as 50mg/kg resulting in administration of a significant overdose. This is a readily foreseeable confusion which could apply in any hospital and could be avoided by use of clearer and less confusable means of communication and expression of number ”

    Source location

    John Paul SKINNER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

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Classification: all classifications19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: Unreliable medication dosage verification and communication
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