Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care1
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust1

Most commonly raised concerns

All classifications 90 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

  1. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.9 reportsSelected
  2. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.7 reportsSelected
  3. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.6 reportsSelected
  4. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.4 reportsSelected
  5. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  6. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.4 reportsSelected
  7. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.4 reportsSelected
  8. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  9. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  10. Failure to provide timely clinical follow-up after medication prescribingPrescribed medication is not reliably followed up for effectiveness, safety, collection, adherence and patient response.3 reportsSelected
  11. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.3 reportsSelected
  12. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  13. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  14. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  15. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.3 reportsSelected
  16. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.3 reportsSelected
  17. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.3 reportsSelected
  18. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.3 reportsSelected
  19. Unsafe interoperability between prison custody and healthcare proceduresReports identify failures in the bounded interface between prison custody, contracted custody providers and healthcare services, where procedures, responsibilities and safety-relevant information do not operate together reliably.3 reportsSelected
  20. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  21. Failure to communicate safety-critical care information effectively between care providers and familiesReports identify unsafe communication between care providers and families, including failures to convey risks, care instructions, concerns or other information needed to support safe care and decision-making.2 reportsSelected
  22. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  23. Failure to ensure safe prisoner transfersRecurring concern that the end-to-end prisoner transfer process is unreliable, leaving transferred prisoners exposed to unmanaged risks or interruptions in essential support.2 reportsSelected
  24. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  25. Failure to reliably document the rationale for consequential decisionsDifferent reports identify missing or inadequate records explaining the rationale and evidential basis for consequential decisions, including the anchor’s crucial decisions and comparable mental-capacity, NRPF and transfer decisions. The shared concern is unreliable rationale documentation for decisions that affect safety, accountability and continuity of care, rather than any one decision type or record system.2 reportsSelected
  26. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  27. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  28. Failure to reliably refer patients to required specialist servicesThe anchor identifies a required physiotherapy referral that was not completed. A different report identifies delayed referrals to physiotherapy, occupational therapy, dietetics and Parkinson’s specialist services. Together these support an end-to-end concern with required specialist referrals not being made promptly and reliably, rather than a concern limited to one physiotherapy referral.2 reportsSelected
  29. Failure to secure and control medicationReports identify medication as remaining accessible, unsecured or inadequately controlled, creating risks of misuse, overdose, theft or access by people other than the intended patient.2 reportsSelected
  30. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  31. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  32. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  33. Incomplete clinical history-takingReports identify an unsafe clinical assessment condition in which relevant patient history is not obtained sufficiently to support recognition of symptoms, risks and appropriate care.2 reportsSelected
  34. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  35. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  36. Unreliable access to emergency communicationReports identify failures in dedicated emergency communication arrangements that can delay summoning or contacting emergency help.2 reportsSelected
  37. Unreliable communication of critical medication information to GPsRecurring deficiency in the medication-information exchange process between services and GPs, including information needed to maintain supplies, assess prescribing safety and support continuity of treatment.2 reportsSelected
  38. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  39. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  40. Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated careThe anchor identifies absent agreed communication means and inaccessible shared patient information between mental health agencies. Other canonical reports identify relevant risk information not being shared between agencies and poor inter-agency information sharing preventing coordinated care, supporting a recurring concern with the reliability of inter-agency care information sharing rather than only the anchor's repository or communication-channel failure.2 reportsSelected
  41. Unreliable management of medication doses not takenThe anchor identifies missing guidance for monitoring prescribed medication that self-administering patients do not take when dispensed. A different report identifies inconsistent procedures for responding when service users refuse or do not take medication. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of detecting, monitoring and escalating omitted or refused medication doses, rather than a concern limited to one guidance document or one home's procedure.2 reportsSelected
  42. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  43. Unreliable observation of people in custodyThe anchor report identifies failure to transfer and replicate medically required observation levels when a detained person moves into GEO AMEY custody, while a different report identifies uncertainty about whether the correct observation level, including constant watch, was provided to a person in prison custody. Together these support a recurring concern about the reliability of the custody observation process rather than only one handover or level-setting failure.2 reportsSelected
  44. Unreliable recording of required observations in care and custodyDifferent reports identify inaccurate, delayed, anticipatory or falsified records of required observations, including 15-minute observations in prison custody and patient-care settings. The shared unsafe condition is that observation records do not reliably reflect when and how observations were actually conducted, rather than any one observation frequency, recording location or electronic system.2 reportsSelected
  45. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  46. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  47. Unreliable urgent mental health referral and assessment pathwaysUrgent mental-health referral pathways do not reliably secure timely access, coordination and specialist assessment.2 reportsSelected
  48. Unreliable welfare-check processes for people whose health is of concernThe anchor identifies unclear purpose and use of the welfare sheet for monitoring prisoners whose health is of concern. A separate report identifies inconsistent criteria for what constitutes a welfare check and when it is recorded. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the bounded welfare-check process, rather than only the sheet or recording component.2 reportsSelected
  49. Unsafe cell-sharing decisions for prisonersRecurring deficiencies in the prison cell-sharing risk system can leave prisoners exposed to unsafe pairings or prevent them from understanding changes affecting their cell-sharing status.2 reportsSelected
  50. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

Reports matching this recurring concern

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 3 reports

Classification: all classificationsRecurring concern: Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacity
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Only concerns related to the selected recurring concern and their linked actions and positions are shown. Other concerns are counted within each report.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. East Riding and Hull

    AI-generated summary

    Kenneth John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth John Morris, aged 78, died at Hull Royal Infirmary on 10 December 2025 after a second unwitnessed ward fall caused intracranial haemorrhage, brain damage and early post-traumatic epilepsy. The principal concern was that he did not receive required one-to-one nursing care because of understaffing and more pressing cases, and evidence indicated that similar deaths may occur while resources remain critically stretched.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide required one-to-one nursing care

    Wider context from the report

    “This gentleman should have received one to one nursing care but due to a combination of understaffing and more pressing cases on the ward, he did not receive such care. Evidence was heard that had he received such care he would not have fallen and died. Evidence was also heard that within the Hull Trust and probably throughout the NHS, resources are critically stretched and whilst improvements are being proposed, I believe that the current situation makes it probable that similar deaths will occur. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth John Morris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish a new 10 Year Workforce Plan to support appropriate NHS staffing and workforce distribution.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In our 10 Year Health Plan we committed to publishing a new 10 Year Workforce Plan. The plan, which will be published this year, will help ensure the NHS has the right people in the right places to deliver the best care for patients.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Individual NHS trusts and employers are responsible for determining staffing levels and workforce composition.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have carefully considered the situation. Individual NHS Trusts and other employers are responsible for determining staffing levels and workforce composition. They are best placed to understand their services and the needs of their patients in order to deliver safe and effective care. I would expect Hull University Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust and all other NHS Trusts to ensure that their staffing arrangements, are appropriate following the tragic death of Mr Morris.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 June 2026

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wilfrid Pearson was admitted to Tameside Hospital on 22 April 2015 with epilepsy, developed status epilepticus, and died at a local hospice about a month later. Concerns included possible failures in updating and communicating the status epilepticus protocol, unclear and incomplete records, inadequate escalation of care, staffing pressures, and the legal basis for detaining him after he left the ward.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient junior medical staffing capacity

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There appears to have been a huge stress on the junior medical staff and I was told that “the ITU Registrar refused to attend the ward, but it is not normal for the ITU registrar to refuse to attend” and one of the junior doctors said “we were short staffed and overstretched”. This seems to have added to the omissions of care which were apparent. ”

    Source location

    Wilfrid Pearson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review medical staffing rotas to maximise senior cover and monitor staffing levels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the time of Mr Pearson’s admission the rotas for medical staffing have been reviewed to maximise appropriate levels of senior cover and to monitor the levels of medical staffing.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue recruiting medical staff and collaborate with Health Education North West and junior doctors to improve training experience and long-term attraction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These take into account the mix in relation to substantive staff and locum staff. The Trust maintains an ongoing recruitment programme and has been working with Health Education North West and junior doctors to improve the experience of junior doctors in training and to attract medical staff long term.”

    Source location

    W-Pearson-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2016

    Open published response
  3. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Elizabeth Ann Cox · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Elizabeth Ann Cox, who was 84 and had a high risk of falls, fell from her hospital bed on 18 July 2014 after the equipment accepted as necessary—a Hi-Lo bed and crash mats—had not been provided. Her condition deteriorated and she died at Kingsmill Hospital on 10 August 2014; the report found a clear link between the fall and her death. The report also raised concerns about insufficient night staffing and the lack of equivalent additional staffing support during night hours.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient overnight ward staffing capacity for patient workloads

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence of senior nursing staff involved with this ward and with the trust’s internal investigation made it clear that those working on the ward on the night of 17/18 July felt they needed further staff to cope with the demands of the patients they were looking after. We heard that the ward sister followed hospital protocol to request assistance. When it was clear that no one was available from neighbouring wards, a bank nurse was requested. Unfortunately, the bank nurse cancelled at very short notice. The duty nurse manager was called, but noone was available to assist at short notice. 1. During daytime hours, where additional staff are needed, the Reducing Harm Team can be contacted to provide the necessary resources. I was told, although this is currently under review, that,as matters stand, this (or an equivalent) is not available during the night. 2. It has been suggested as part of a trust-wide review that the number of staff available on the wards at night be reduced – from 3 registered and 2 unregistered currently, to 3 registered and 1 unregistered. I am aware that this is merely a proposal – and not currently in place – but should this come into effect, I am concerned that events like these may re-occur, where staff simply do not have the capacity to look after their patients safely, because of workloads. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Elizabeth Ann Cox · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Drive a nurse recruitment strategy to recruit the registered nurses required for medical wards to adopt the new staffing model.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our medical wards have not been as successful with nurse recruitment. This is a national problem but the Trust has developed and are currently driving a nurse recruitment strategy to recruit more Registered Nurses. Our medical wards, including the ward in which Mrs Cox was cared for, are currently being maintained on the post Keogh numbers as described below.”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor staffing levels and their impact on quality and safety through the Trust Board and Quality Committee.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Requests for enhanced care and 1-1 support will continue to be supported when required. During this period of change the Trust Board and the Quality Committee continue to robustly monitor the staffing levels and the impact upon quality and safety.”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide assessed enhanced one-to-one care day and night using ward, bank or agency staffing when additional resources are required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. A risk assessment form is completed on the ward identifying the level of enhanced care that is required.”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the approved nursing staffing model of five registered and two unregistered staff by day and three registered and one unregistered staff by night.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “New Investment Numbers: RN Days Numbers: 5 HCA Days Numbers: 2 RN Nights Numbers: 3 HCA Nights Numbers: 1 Overall Numbers: 5+2 Days; 3+1 Nights”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Medical wards cannot adopt proposed staffing levels until approximately 100 additional registered nurses are recruited, anticipated to take a further 12 months.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our medical wards have not been as successful with nurse recruitment. This is a national problem but the Trust has developed and are currently driving a nurse recruitment strategy to recruit more Registered Nurses. Our medical wards, including the ward in which Mrs Cox was cared for, are currently being maintained on the post Keogh numbers as described below.”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response

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Classification: all classifications19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacity
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