Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care12
NHS England12
HM Prison and Probation Service6
Department for Transport5
Care Quality Commission4
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence3
Practice Plus Group3
Royal College of General Practitioners3
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health3
Association Of British Neurologists2
College of Policing2
Department for Education2
General Medical Council2
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Ministry of Justice2
National Police Chiefs’ Council2
Office of the Chief Coroner2
Pentonville Prison2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
BNF Publications1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council1
Brook Medical Centre1
Caring Limited1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Choice Support1
Cleveland Police1
Coastal Homecare – Hove Branch1
Community Disability Nurse1
DW Fitness First1
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy1
Disclosure and Barring Service1
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset County Council1
Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset Police1
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency1
Dwf LLP1
East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust1
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Emsworth Surgery1
Epilepsy Action1
Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust1
European Care & Lifestyles (UK) Limited1
Forest Bank Prison1
General Pharmaceutical Council1
GeoAmey PECS Limited1
George Abbot School1
Gloucestershire Health and Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Gloucestershire Social Services1
Godfrey Care1
Grant Shapps MP1
Great Ormond Street Hospital1
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership1
Greater Manchester Police1
Greenshades Coach Travel Limited1
Grosvenor Medical Centre1
Grupo de Turismo Gaviota S.A.1
Guy'S and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust1
HM Prison Service1
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Hazelmere Medical Centre1
Health and Safety Executive1
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust1
High Down Prison1
Home Office1
Independence Homes Limited1
Independent Futures1
James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee1
Kendal Calling1
Kettering General Hospital1
King Street Medical Centre1
Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust1
Lindholme Prison1
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital1
Medacs Healthcare Limited1
Medway NHS Foundation Trust1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
Midway Pharmacy1
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government1
NHS Birmingham and Solihull Integrated Care Board1
NHS Dorset Integrated Care Board1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
NHS Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Integrated Care Board1
NHS South West London Integrated Care Board1
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust1
North London NHS Foundation Trust1
Northfield Medical Centre1
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust1
Parc Prison and Young Offender Institute1
Parents of the deceased1
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Pentree Lodge1
Recipient name withheld1
Richmond Medical Centre (Solihull)1
Rochester Prison1
Royal College of Emergency Medicine1
Royal College of Physicians1
Royal College of Psychiatrists1
Royal College of Surgeons of England1
Royal London Hospital1
Sheffield Health Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Skills for Care Ltd1
Sodexo1
South Tees Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Southwinds1
Springbank Care Home Limited1
Springfield Medical Centre1
St Edward's School1
St George'S University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Stepping Hill Hospital1
Stockport Borough Council1
Suffolk County Council1
Sundon Medical Centre1
Surrey County Council1
Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust1
Sussex Police1
Tameside Borough Council1
Tameside General Hospital1
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust1
Tewkesbury Borough Council1
Thameside Prison1
The Children's Trust1
The Roehampton Surgery1
The Society Of British Neurological Surgeons1
Thomas Cook Tour Operations Limited1
Transport for London1
UCB Pharma1
University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Dorset NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals of North Midlands NHS Trust1
Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc1
Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust1
ukactive1

Most commonly raised concerns

All classifications 90 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

  1. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.9 reportsSelected
  2. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.7 reportsSelected
  3. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.6 reportsSelected
  4. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.4 reportsSelected
  5. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  6. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.4 reportsSelected
  7. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.4 reportsSelected
  8. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  9. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  10. Failure to provide timely clinical follow-up after medication prescribingPrescribed medication is not reliably followed up for effectiveness, safety, collection, adherence and patient response.3 reportsSelected
  11. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.3 reportsSelected
  12. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  13. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  14. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  15. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.3 reportsSelected
  16. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.3 reportsSelected
  17. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.3 reportsSelected
  18. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.3 reportsSelected
  19. Unsafe interoperability between prison custody and healthcare proceduresReports identify failures in the bounded interface between prison custody, contracted custody providers and healthcare services, where procedures, responsibilities and safety-relevant information do not operate together reliably.3 reportsSelected
  20. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  21. Failure to communicate safety-critical care information effectively between care providers and familiesReports identify unsafe communication between care providers and families, including failures to convey risks, care instructions, concerns or other information needed to support safe care and decision-making.2 reportsSelected
  22. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  23. Failure to ensure safe prisoner transfersRecurring concern that the end-to-end prisoner transfer process is unreliable, leaving transferred prisoners exposed to unmanaged risks or interruptions in essential support.2 reportsSelected
  24. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  25. Failure to reliably document the rationale for consequential decisionsDifferent reports identify missing or inadequate records explaining the rationale and evidential basis for consequential decisions, including the anchor’s crucial decisions and comparable mental-capacity, NRPF and transfer decisions. The shared concern is unreliable rationale documentation for decisions that affect safety, accountability and continuity of care, rather than any one decision type or record system.2 reportsSelected
  26. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  27. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  28. Failure to reliably refer patients to required specialist servicesThe anchor identifies a required physiotherapy referral that was not completed. A different report identifies delayed referrals to physiotherapy, occupational therapy, dietetics and Parkinson’s specialist services. Together these support an end-to-end concern with required specialist referrals not being made promptly and reliably, rather than a concern limited to one physiotherapy referral.2 reportsSelected
  29. Failure to secure and control medicationReports identify medication as remaining accessible, unsecured or inadequately controlled, creating risks of misuse, overdose, theft or access by people other than the intended patient.2 reportsSelected
  30. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  31. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  32. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  33. Incomplete clinical history-takingReports identify an unsafe clinical assessment condition in which relevant patient history is not obtained sufficiently to support recognition of symptoms, risks and appropriate care.2 reportsSelected
  34. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  35. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  36. Unreliable access to emergency communicationReports identify failures in dedicated emergency communication arrangements that can delay summoning or contacting emergency help.2 reportsSelected
  37. Unreliable communication of critical medication information to GPsRecurring deficiency in the medication-information exchange process between services and GPs, including information needed to maintain supplies, assess prescribing safety and support continuity of treatment.2 reportsSelected
  38. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  39. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  40. Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated careThe anchor identifies absent agreed communication means and inaccessible shared patient information between mental health agencies. Other canonical reports identify relevant risk information not being shared between agencies and poor inter-agency information sharing preventing coordinated care, supporting a recurring concern with the reliability of inter-agency care information sharing rather than only the anchor's repository or communication-channel failure.2 reportsSelected
  41. Unreliable management of medication doses not takenThe anchor identifies missing guidance for monitoring prescribed medication that self-administering patients do not take when dispensed. A different report identifies inconsistent procedures for responding when service users refuse or do not take medication. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of detecting, monitoring and escalating omitted or refused medication doses, rather than a concern limited to one guidance document or one home's procedure.2 reportsSelected
  42. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  43. Unreliable observation of people in custodyThe anchor report identifies failure to transfer and replicate medically required observation levels when a detained person moves into GEO AMEY custody, while a different report identifies uncertainty about whether the correct observation level, including constant watch, was provided to a person in prison custody. Together these support a recurring concern about the reliability of the custody observation process rather than only one handover or level-setting failure.2 reportsSelected
  44. Unreliable recording of required observations in care and custodyDifferent reports identify inaccurate, delayed, anticipatory or falsified records of required observations, including 15-minute observations in prison custody and patient-care settings. The shared unsafe condition is that observation records do not reliably reflect when and how observations were actually conducted, rather than any one observation frequency, recording location or electronic system.2 reportsSelected
  45. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  46. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  47. Unreliable urgent mental health referral and assessment pathwaysUrgent mental-health referral pathways do not reliably secure timely access, coordination and specialist assessment.2 reportsSelected
  48. Unreliable welfare-check processes for people whose health is of concernThe anchor identifies unclear purpose and use of the welfare sheet for monitoring prisoners whose health is of concern. A separate report identifies inconsistent criteria for what constitutes a welfare check and when it is recorded. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the bounded welfare-check process, rather than only the sheet or recording component.2 reportsSelected
  49. Unsafe cell-sharing decisions for prisonersRecurring deficiencies in the prison cell-sharing risk system can leave prisoners exposed to unsafe pairings or prevent them from understanding changes affecting their cell-sharing status.2 reportsSelected
  50. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

All reports in this date range

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 90 reports

Showing all concerns and their linked actions and positions from reports in this date range. Select a recurring concern above to narrow the evidence.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Donald Berry · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Donald Berry suffered severe injuries after being electrocuted while working at the Kendal Calling Festival on 22 July 2010, and died from ongoing health complications on 23 August 2016. The inquest heard concerns that a clearly visible high-voltage power line over the site had not been identified or addressed, despite an Event Safety Plan and the licensing process. It also heard that the issue had not been noted by any of the authorities involved and that site-visit arrangements were not replicated nationally.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of relevant authorities to identify high voltage power lines over event sites

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard that the organisers of the event Kendal Calling had not identified that a clearly visible high voltage power line was running over the site and no steps had been taken to minimise the risk although an Event Safety Plan had been submitted to the licensing authority. 2. the inquest heard that the lack of identification of such a significant risk and need to take steps had been missed despite all the steps required by law to licensing such an event had taken place and an indication that the guidance in the Purple Book had been adhered to by the organisers . None of the authorities involved had noted the issue. Eden District Council (EDC)had now taken steps to do site visits for similar events within their area but this was not replicated nationally and was only done within EDC’s area for large events such as this. ”

    Source location

    Donald Berry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of nationally replicated site visits for large events

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard that the organisers of the event Kendal Calling had not identified that a clearly visible high voltage power line was running over the site and no steps had been taken to minimise the risk although an Event Safety Plan had been submitted to the licensing authority. 2. the inquest heard that the lack of identification of such a significant risk and need to take steps had been missed despite all the steps required by law to licensing such an event had taken place and an indication that the guidance in the Purple Book had been adhered to by the organisers . None of the authorities involved had noted the issue. Eden District Council (EDC)had now taken steps to do site visits for similar events within their area but this was not replicated nationally and was only done within EDC’s area for large events such as this. ”

    Source location

    Donald Berry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify high voltage power lines over event sites

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard that the organisers of the event Kendal Calling had not identified that a clearly visible high voltage power line was running over the site and no steps had been taken to minimise the risk although an Event Safety Plan had been submitted to the licensing authority. 2. the inquest heard that the lack of identification of such a significant risk and need to take steps had been missed despite all the steps required by law to licensing such an event had taken place and an indication that the guidance in the Purple Book had been adhered to by the organisers . None of the authorities involved had noted the issue. Eden District Council (EDC)had now taken steps to do site visits for similar events within their area but this was not replicated nationally and was only done within EDC’s area for large events such as this. ”

    Source location

    Donald Berry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to minimise risks from high voltage power lines over event sites

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard that the organisers of the event Kendal Calling had not identified that a clearly visible high voltage power line was running over the site and no steps had been taken to minimise the risk although an Event Safety Plan had been submitted to the licensing authority. 2. the inquest heard that the lack of identification of such a significant risk and need to take steps had been missed despite all the steps required by law to licensing such an event had taken place and an indication that the guidance in the Purple Book had been adhered to by the organisers . None of the authorities involved had noted the issue. Eden District Council (EDC)had now taken steps to do site visits for similar events within their area but this was not replicated nationally and was only done within EDC’s area for large events such as this. ”

    Source location

    Donald Berry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise awareness of the incident with industry stakeholders and underline the importance of following event safety guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I consider that the current available guidance enables event organisers and other relevant persons and bodies to identify the risks arising from overhead power lines. I will however take the opportunity to raise awareness of this incident with industry stakeholders, underlining the importance of all people involved in event organising and planning to adhere to the standards set out in guidance.”

    Source location

    2018-0324-Response-by-HSE_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish web-based event safety guidance addressing risks from overhead high-voltage power lines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HSE has published web-based event safety guidance to help event organisers comply with their legal duties – see http://www.hse.gov.uk/event-safety/index.htm. The guidance helps organisers identify risks, such as those arising from contact with overhead high voltage power lines”

    Source location

    2018-0324-Response-by-HSE_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Appoint Ground Control to undertake all safety and event management activity for Kendal Calling.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ground Control were appointed the season following the incident to undertake all safety and event management activity for Kendal Calling. They are industry leading professionals and have a joined up approach on safety and event production.”

    Source location

    2018-0324-Response-by-Kendal-Calling
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local authorities are responsible for enforcing health and safety law at individual events within their geographical areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “HSE leads on national occupational health and safety policy for the entertainments and leisure sector, whilst Local Authorities are responsible for enforcing the law at individual events in their geographical area. In this case, Eden Council successfully prosecuted the event organisers for breaches of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 in March 2013.”

    Source location

    2018-0324-Response-by-HSE_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Current available guidance is considered sufficient to enable event organisers and relevant bodies to identify risks from overhead power lines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I consider that the current available guidance enables event organisers and other relevant persons and bodies to identify the risks arising from overhead power lines. I will however take the opportunity to raise awareness of this incident with industry stakeholders, underlining the importance of all people involved in event organising and planning to adhere to the standards set out in guidance.”

    Source location

    2018-0324-Response-by-HSE_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for health and safety risks at work rests with the Health and Safety Executive.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note that in your report you identify that the organisers of the event did not properly consider the health and safety risk of high voltage electrical installation at the place of the event. This is not an issue relating to the safety of an electrical appliance, which would fall within my Department’s remit. As this is a health and safety at work issue, it falls within the remit of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), who are sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions. I note you have sent this notice to the Acting Chief Executive of the HSE. My officials have contacted the Principal Inspector at the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to inform him of your letter.”

    Source location

    2018-0324-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Energy-Industrial-Strategy
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Health and safety risks from high-voltage electrical installations fall outside the department’s product-safety remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note that in your report you identify that the organisers of the event did not properly consider the health and safety risk of high voltage electrical installation at the place of the event. This is not an issue relating to the safety of an electrical appliance, which would fall within my Department’s remit. As this is a health and safety at work issue, it falls within the remit of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), who are sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions. I note you have sent this notice to the Acting Chief Executive of the HSE. My officials have contacted the Principal Inspector at the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to inform him of your letter.”

    Source location

    2018-0324-Response-by-Department-for-Business-Energy-Industrial-Strategy
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 February 2019

    Open published response
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Catherine Mary Gibbon suffered a seizure while swimming at a gym on 1 June 2018 and remained face down in the water for around ten minutes. She sustained a hypoxic-ischaemic brain injury following non-fatal drowning and died. Concerns included inadequate pool monitoring and CCTV arrangements, a broken camera, insufficient staff training and emergency equipment, and gaps in first-aid certification systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to train and guide reception staff in CCTV monitoring

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The pool was not under continuous supervision and there was no legal requirement for a lifeguard, but it was under CCTV surveillance. The CCTV monitor was in reception. However, no training or guidance was given to the gym receptionist about what she should look for on the monitor and what she should do if all was not as she expected. Most especially, she was not given any instruction as to how frequently to check the monitor. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate CCTV screen visibility for pool activity

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The receptionist also gave evidence that in her opinion, the screens (the monitor was split into four screens for the four cameras) were too small to see the pool activity clearly. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of continuous monitoring for swimmers with epilepsy

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There was also no clear understanding across staff of what additional help, if any, could be offered to a swimmer with epilepsy. Any understanding seemed to concentrate upon Ms Gibbon obtaining a doctor’s letter authorising swimming. Whilst there is of course merit in prompting a discussion with a potential swimmer’s doctor about the advisability of swimming, Fitness First indicated that constant monitoring of such a swimmer will not be offered. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain CCTV cameras and provide alternative surveillance when one is non-operational

    Wider context from the report

    “5. In fact, one of the four cameras had been broken since 24 May. It had not reported and no alternative measures had been taken since it had become non operational. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share and act on learning from comparable pool deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “Fitness First have taken steps to address some of these issues, and told me that such learning is shared at a national level. However, at inquest Fitness First national lead for health and safety told me that he was unaware that I sent a prevention of future deaths report to Bannatyne’s on 13 August 2018, regarding a death in similar circumstances in Maida Vale on 10 October 2017. I did copy this report to Swim England, but this does not appear to have prompted a national conversation among private pool providers. I leave that now with UK Active. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of a defibrillator at poolside

    Wider context from the report

    “8. There was a defibrillator in the gym, but there was not another at poolside. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent first aid certificate lapses through a failsafe renewal system

    Wider context from the report

    “9. Fitness First had made the decision that all first aid certificates would be renewed after one year rather than the usual three, but then the certificates were allowed to lapse because one person made an error and there was no failsafe system. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear arrangements for additional help for swimmers with epilepsy

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There was also no clear understanding across staff of what additional help, if any, could be offered to a swimmer with epilepsy. Any understanding seemed to concentrate upon Ms Gibbon obtaining a doctor’s letter authorising swimming. Whilst there is of course merit in prompting a discussion with a potential swimmer’s doctor about the advisability of swimming, Fitness First indicated that constant monitoring of such a swimmer will not be offered. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a building-wide audible emergency alarm

    Wider context from the report

    “6. There was no panic button that would activate an audible alarm throughout the building, so anyone pressing a button would not know if it had alerted others, and staff elsewhere (other than at reception) would be unaware that there was an emergency. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear guidance and staff understanding of medical conditions relevant to exercise

    Wider context from the report

    “1. When Ms Gibbon joined the gym, she was given a health pledge to read. In this, she agreed to inform a member of staff if she had a medical condition that might interfere with exercise. However, she was not given any assistance in understanding which medical conditions would come in to this category. Even the staff taking her through the health pledge did not have a clear understanding of this. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of immediate poolside telephone access for summoning medical assistance

    Wider context from the report

    “7. There was no landline at poolside that could be used to call an ambulance in case of emergency, to enable medical assistance to be summoned immediately by someone who actually had sight of the casualty. ”

    Source location

    Catherine Mary GIBBON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. London (West)

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin Freely · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin Freely, aged 61, died at home on 12 October 2016 after a lighted cigarette caused his bedclothes to catch fire while he was bedbound and unable to escape. The principal concern was that warnings about the fire hazard associated with paraffin-based emollient skin products were not being heeded by patients and care organisations providing care in people’s homes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure by patients and care organisations to heed safety guidance on fire hazards from paraffin-based skin products

    Wider context from the report

    “The NHS National Patient Safety Agency brought out a Rapid Response Report 4 on 26th November 2007 entitled “Fire hazard with paraffin based skin products on dressings and clothing”. I am concerned that this message within the 2007 Safety Report is not being heeded by patients and Care Organisations responsible for caring for patients in their own homes. ”

    Source location

    Kevin Freely · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Freddie Oliver DOBINSON-EVANS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Freddie Dobinson-Evans had undiagnosed Dravet syndrome and died from causes recorded as post-cardiac arrest syndrome and Dravet syndrome. A genetic test report was communicated to his father as “absolutely normal”, although Freddie had a pathogenic SCN1A gene mutation; the report identified the potential for significant consequences for another child.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate genetic test results accurately

    Wider context from the report

    “Following a testing request made for Freddie on 20 February 2017, a report was issued from the laboratory at Great Ormond Street Hospital on 7 June 2017. It was headlined: No clearly pathogenic variant detected. Diagnosis not confirmed. ████████ spoke to Freddie’s father the following day and told him that Freddie’s genetic test results were “absolutely normal”. In fact, Freddie did have a pathogenic gene mutation in the SCN1A gene and died as a result of Dravet Syndrome. By the time the report was issued, Freddie had already sadly died and so of course the misdiagnosis had no consequences for him, but such a situation could have significant consequences for another child. ”

    Source location

    Freddie Oliver DOBINSON-EVANS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of genetic testing to detect a pathogenic gene mutation

    Wider context from the report

    “Following a testing request made for Freddie on 20 February 2017, a report was issued from the laboratory at Great Ormond Street Hospital on 7 June 2017. It was headlined: No clearly pathogenic variant detected. Diagnosis not confirmed. ████████ spoke to Freddie’s father the following day and told him that Freddie’s genetic test results were “absolutely normal”. In fact, Freddie did have a pathogenic gene mutation in the SCN1A gene and died as a result of Dravet Syndrome. By the time the report was issued, Freddie had already sadly died and so of course the misdiagnosis had no consequences for him, but such a situation could have significant consequences for another child. ”

    Source location

    Freddie Oliver DOBINSON-EVANS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure effective ongoing communication between the paediatric neurology team and clinical scientists to clarify genetic test results.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. I will ensure that myself and the paediatric neurology team members keep effective communication with the Clinical scientists shall there remain in clarities.”

    Source location

    2018-0078-Response-by-Barts-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response
  5. Northamptonshire

    AI-generated summary

    Andrea McHugh · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrea McHugh, who had epilepsy and continued to experience seizures after brain surgery, died after being found floating in the sea while snorkelling during a boat trip in Cuba on 17 June 2016. The report raised concerns that the participant waiver did not mention the dangers of swimming in the sea for people with epilepsy and did not request participants’ past medical history.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of participant waivers to mention the dangers of sea swimming for participants with epilepsy

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Marinas Gaviota S.A allegedly require participants in the boat and snorkelling trip to sign a waiver. (copy attached). The waiver does not mention the dangers of swimming in the sea if a participant suffers from epilepsy. 2) Additionally the waiver does not request details of participants past medical history. ”

    Source location

    Andrea McHugh · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of participant waivers to request participants' past medical history

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Marinas Gaviota S.A allegedly require participants in the boat and snorkelling trip to sign a waiver. (copy attached). The waiver does not mention the dangers of swimming in the sea if a participant suffers from epilepsy. 2) Additionally the waiver does not request details of participants past medical history. ”

    Source location

    Andrea McHugh · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage Gaviota to request adding epilepsy as a relevant medical condition to the Sunrise excursion waiver.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Thomas Cook has assessed the position carefully and has decided to immediately engage with Grupo Turismo Gavíota S.A. (“Gaviota”) to request that they amend their waiver form for the Sunrise excursion to include reference to epilepsy as a relevant medical condition which may make it dangerous for our customers to go in to the sea due to the increased risk of injury.”

    Source location

    2018-0060-Response-by-Thomas-Cook
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review whether to request further waiver amendments covering medical history that may make sea excursions dangerous.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Thomas Cook then intends to review whether we request Gaviota make further amendment to their waiver to include reference to any medical history that may make it dangerous for our customers to go in to the sea and therefore should be included in the waiver. If further amendment is required it is envisaged that it will be necessary for Thomas Cook to obtain expert medical advice in respect of this to ensure appropriate relevant medical history is included.”

    Source location

    2018-0060-Response-by-Thomas-Cook
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response
  6. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Keith Edwards, aged 64, was admitted to a care home for respite and subsequently suffered falls, seizures, reduced mobility, pressure sores and a rapid decline before dying in a nursing home on 19 December 2016. Concerns included inadequate care-home policies and care, failures to seek medical assistance and recognise deterioration, poor record-keeping, and inappropriate placement for his complex needs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate falls management policy

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure availability and administration of prescribed medication

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of placement and disability nursing visits to identify deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek medical assistance following seizures

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of a non-patient-specific mattress

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise residents’ deteriorating condition

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to deal with significant bruising

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek and communicate appropriate medical follow-up for deteriorating residents

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of a seizure policy not specific to the resident

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of non-patient-specific dressings for pressure sores

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a pressure sore prevention and care policy

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide a care placement able to cope with complex care needs

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Retrospective completion of care records

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The mattress provided was not shown to be incorrect or improperly used.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “10. There was never any suggestion that the mattress provided for Mr Edwards was in any way incorrect or improperly used.”

    Source location

    2018-0015-Response-Southwinds-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Medical advice was sought appropriately, and no urgent referral was recommended or documented by the out-of-hours doctor.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. Medical advice for Mr Edwards was sought at the appropriate time. The Doctor was provided with full information and all questions raised by him were answered. There is no recollection as to the out of hours Doctor suggesting any urgent referral and no documentation (other than a prescription – which was obtained straight away) was left by the Doctor.”

    Source location

    2018-0015-Response-Southwinds-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The absence of a resident-specific seizure policy did not indicate inadequate care because no seizure history was disclosed and general epilepsy procedures were followed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. There was no seizure policy supplied upon admission. Southwinds general policy as to epilepsy was followed. Upon admission there was no indication that Mr Edwards had had seizures. If there is a history of seizures then it was usual for a specific policy for that resident to accompany upon admission, which would then be followed. Mr Edwards was not prescribed any epilepsy medication to the knowledge of Southwinds.”

    Source location

    2018-0015-Response-Southwinds-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The dressing applied for comfort was not shown to be incorrect.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “9. There was never any suggestion that the dressing applied for the comfort of Mr Edwards was in any way incorrect.”

    Source location

    2018-0015-Response-Southwinds-Limited
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 March 2018

    Open published response
  7. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kate Louise Pierce became unwell on 29 March 2006 and was discharged from hospital after being diagnosed with viral tonsillitis. She returned approximately 36 hours later in a deteriorated condition, was diagnosed with pneumococcal meningitis, and later died in Florida on 19 March 2013 after suffering brain damage and other health conditions. The principal concerns were uncertainty about when a sick child should receive senior paediatric assessment before discharge, and a lack of clearly defined and consistently applied processes for identifying and acting on learning opportunities after adverse events or re-presentation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reliably identify matters requiring investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) I heard evidence at length from the Health Board’s current Clinical Lead for Paediatrics about (inter alia) the measures which are in place to ensure that lessons can be learnt (and acted upon) promptly when things do not go to plan. Specifically I heard about steps taken to learn lessons from situations in which a child might re-present in a worse condition following an earlier discharge – a situation which might result from a missed diagnosis. I did not emerge from this evidence with any confidence that there exist clearly defined and consistently applied criteria from ensuring that learning opportunities are being actively sought out and acted upon. For example, I was told that there is no defined list of triggers; with much left to judgement of individuals in the senior management team. This evidence, supplemented by the relevant contents of the letter of 4 October 2017, leaves me concerned that too much is left to chance in the identification of matters requiring investigation; in the selection of staff and in the urgency of lessons being learnt and acted upon. The current system might therefore warrant a review (perhaps including consideration of best practice elsewhere, in other hospitals outside the Health Board) to see whether grounds for improvement exist. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of defined and consistently applied criteria for identifying and acting on learning opportunities

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) I heard evidence at length from the Health Board’s current Clinical Lead for Paediatrics about (inter alia) the measures which are in place to ensure that lessons can be learnt (and acted upon) promptly when things do not go to plan. Specifically I heard about steps taken to learn lessons from situations in which a child might re-present in a worse condition following an earlier discharge – a situation which might result from a missed diagnosis. I did not emerge from this evidence with any confidence that there exist clearly defined and consistently applied criteria from ensuring that learning opportunities are being actively sought out and acted upon. For example, I was told that there is no defined list of triggers; with much left to judgement of individuals in the senior management team. This evidence, supplemented by the relevant contents of the letter of 4 October 2017, leaves me concerned that too much is left to chance in the identification of matters requiring investigation; in the selection of staff and in the urgency of lessons being learnt and acted upon. The current system might therefore warrant a review (perhaps including consideration of best practice elsewhere, in other hospitals outside the Health Board) to see whether grounds for improvement exist. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about senior paediatric assessment requirements before discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There remains uncertainty about the circumstances in which a sick child should be seen by a senior Paediatrician (Registrar or above) prior to discharge. During the hearing I was shown a document headed ‘Guidance to Paediatric Junior Doctors on Discharge [sic] Children From Assessment Unit’, which I was given to understand reflects current practice and represents an improvement on the position in 2006. The information in the letter of 4 October 2017 is broadly consistent with it. Both documents are silent as to whether a parental request for a second opinion should automatically lead to an examination of the child by the senior doctor, as was opined in court, where the importance and significance of parents’ views were noted. . I am concerned that a lack of clarity about the Health Board’s expectations in this respect may continue to allow for the possibility of a child being discharged without a sufficient (and sufficiently senior) assessment having been made. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reliably select appropriate staff for investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) I heard evidence at length from the Health Board’s current Clinical Lead for Paediatrics about (inter alia) the measures which are in place to ensure that lessons can be learnt (and acted upon) promptly when things do not go to plan. Specifically I heard about steps taken to learn lessons from situations in which a child might re-present in a worse condition following an earlier discharge – a situation which might result from a missed diagnosis. I did not emerge from this evidence with any confidence that there exist clearly defined and consistently applied criteria from ensuring that learning opportunities are being actively sought out and acted upon. For example, I was told that there is no defined list of triggers; with much left to judgement of individuals in the senior management team. This evidence, supplemented by the relevant contents of the letter of 4 October 2017, leaves me concerned that too much is left to chance in the identification of matters requiring investigation; in the selection of staff and in the urgency of lessons being learnt and acted upon. The current system might therefore warrant a review (perhaps including consideration of best practice elsewhere, in other hospitals outside the Health Board) to see whether grounds for improvement exist. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure timely learning and action from investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) I heard evidence at length from the Health Board’s current Clinical Lead for Paediatrics about (inter alia) the measures which are in place to ensure that lessons can be learnt (and acted upon) promptly when things do not go to plan. Specifically I heard about steps taken to learn lessons from situations in which a child might re-present in a worse condition following an earlier discharge – a situation which might result from a missed diagnosis. I did not emerge from this evidence with any confidence that there exist clearly defined and consistently applied criteria from ensuring that learning opportunities are being actively sought out and acted upon. For example, I was told that there is no defined list of triggers; with much left to judgement of individuals in the senior management team. This evidence, supplemented by the relevant contents of the letter of 4 October 2017, leaves me concerned that too much is left to chance in the identification of matters requiring investigation; in the selection of staff and in the urgency of lessons being learnt and acted upon. The current system might therefore warrant a review (perhaps including consideration of best practice elsewhere, in other hospitals outside the Health Board) to see whether grounds for improvement exist. ”

    Source location

    Kate Louise Pierce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Alter parent discharge information to state explicitly that parents may request escalation for a consultant review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst we are confident that the culture of the department is such that a parental request or indeed concern from any member of staff would lead to a consultant review, we have taken the decision to alter the parent discharge information to explicitly state this.”

    Source location

    2017-0312-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 November 2017

    Open published response
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Chadrack Mbala MULO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Chadrack Mbala Mulo, aged four, died of dehydration and acute protein-energy malnutrition after his mother died unexpectedly at home and he was left alone for approximately a fortnight. He was found about 48 hours after his death. The substantive concerns were that the school had contact details only for his mother, did not immediately visit the home when he failed to attend, and did not immediately contact the police when staff could not gain access.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in conducting a home welfare visit after unexplained non-attendance

    Wider context from the report

    “2. If a child unexpectedly fails to attend and no relevant adult can be contacted via phone, staff at the school do not now wait three to five days as they did then, but instead immediately send a member of staff to the family home. They now make a distinction between an attendance issue that may warrant a penalty (not the case for Chadrack because he was under the age of five years) and a potential welfare issue. ”

    Source location

    Chadrack Mbala MULO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of comparable non-attendance welfare response systems in other schools

    Wider context from the report

    “3. If there is no answer at the family home when staff members attend, they now immediately contact the police, who in most cases are likely to force entry. This protocol seems very sensible, but is clearly driven by the appalling tragedy of Chadrack’s death. It seems unlikely that other schools in Hackney, elsewhere in London, or indeed in the rest of England & Wales, have such a system in place. ”

    Source location

    Chadrack Mbala MULO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to immediately contact police when no one answers at the family home

    Wider context from the report

    “3. If there is no answer at the family home when staff members attend, they now immediately contact the police, who in most cases are likely to force entry. This protocol seems very sensible, but is clearly driven by the appalling tragedy of Chadrack’s death. It seems unlikely that other schools in Hackney, elsewhere in London, or indeed in the rest of England & Wales, have such a system in place. ”

    Source location

    Chadrack Mbala MULO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of multiple adult contact numbers for each child

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The school had a telephone number for Chadrack’s mother, but not for any other family member or friend. Now, they insist that for every child in the school they have the telephone number of three different adults. ”

    Source location

    Chadrack Mbala MULO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Examine how to update attendance and safeguarding guidance to clarify links between attendance management and welfare considerations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You make an important distinction in your report between attendance issues and welfare issues and underline that school staff should be considering welfare when managing attendance. In this area too, the Department will examine how best we can update attendance and safeguarding guidance to make this link clearer.”

    Source location

    2017-0120-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Identify how to reinforce guidance on escalating child safety or welfare concerns to children’s social care services or police.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would anticipate that guidance will continue to make clear that professional judgement should be used in deciding when child safety or welfare concerns should be escalated to children’s social care services and/or the police. I have also asked the Department to identify the best way to reinforce this point further in the attendance and safeguarding guidance.”

    Source location

    2017-0120-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Examine how to update safeguarding and attendance guidance to recommend that schools hold more than one contact number.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The school only held a single number for Chadrack’s mother and no contact number for any other family member or friend. I have asked Departmental officials to examine how we can best update the statutory ‘Keeping Children Safe in Education’ guidance and the ‘School Attendance’ guidance so that they reflect best practice and recommend that schools hold more than one contact number.”

    Source location

    2017-0120-Response-by-Department-for-Education
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2017

    Open published response
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rachal Marie Murphy died at home on 8 September 2015 after taking medication prescribed to other family members; the medical cause of death was recorded as acute hypoxia due to morphine overdose, and the conclusion was that she had taken her own life. The report identified concerns about fragmented inter-agency care, failures and delays in referrals and investigations, overlooked CAF documentation, and delays in Early Help case allocation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake annual liver function tests

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a failure to undertake annual liver function tests in 2014 and 2015 ”

    Source location

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review CAF documentation

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The CAF documentation was completely overlooked and simply placed in the medical records as read only which led to no GP involvement in the inter-agency framework and handling of this case. ”

    Source location

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about referral routes and acceptance by Psychological services

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a lack of understanding between medical professionals as to the means by which someone could be referred to Psychological services and whether there was a unclear message from Psychological services as to whether they were accepting referrals. ”

    Source location

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in reporting EEGs

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was as significant delay in the reporting of Rachals EEG and the Court heard that this remained the case in respect of reporting of EEGs at the time of the Inquest. ”

    Source location

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in allocation of cases within Early Help Services

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Court heard that there was a significant delay in the allocation of cases within Early Help Services and from the evidence the Court was not satisfied that this had been resolved. ”

    Source location

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of understanding of cases suitable for CAMHS referral

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Lack of understanding amongst medical professionals as to the cases which may or may not be suitable for referral to CAMHS. ”

    Source location

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of GP involvement in inter-agency case handling

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The CAF documentation was completely overlooked and simply placed in the medical records as read only which led to no GP involvement in the inter-agency framework and handling of this case. ”

    Source location

    Rachal Marie Murphy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement annual liver-function monitoring for patients prescribed sodium valproate, with due-date alerts, prescription checks and escalation of missed tests.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The British National Formulary issue 72 advises that LFTs “should be checked before sodium valproate therapy is commenced and during the first 6 months of treatment, especially in patients most at risk”. Although the BNF does not advise checking LFTs annually for patients on sodium valproate, we all accept this would be good practice in view of the risk of hepatic dysfunction and have agreed to adopt this policy within the Practice.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Response-by-Grosvenor-Medical-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Search current sodium-valproate patients’ records and invite those overdue for liver-function testing to attend for blood tests.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have done a search of the Practice list for all patients currently prescribed sodium valproate and noted when their last LFTs were checked. If this has not been within the last year, they have been sent a letter inviting them in for a blood test.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Response-by-Grosvenor-Medical-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Route incoming CAF documents to the duty doctor for same-day action assessment, then scan and circulate them to regular GPs when no same-day response is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CAF documents received through the post will now be given to the duty doctor on the day they arrive, to determine whether any action is required that day, such as responding to CAF meeting invitations, liaising with any other colleagues involved in the patient’s care or arranging any follow up required at the Practice. Should no same-day response be needed, the document is then scanned and sent to all regular GP’s at the practice to read, in order that they are all made aware of the information contained.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Response-by-Grosvenor-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Make written CAMHS referrals whenever paediatricians have reasonable cause for concern, without filtering referrals or predicting acceptance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust have in response to this case, made changes to their practices to ensure that referrals to CAMHS are made in writing in any case where the Consultant Paediatrician has reasonable cause for concern in respect of a child’s psychological wellbeing. The Consultants no longer filter referrals through Pennine Care staff nor do they consider the likely acceptance of referrals before making them. The referral is made and it is for CAMHS to determine how to proceed. I am informed that this change in approach has been successful to date with CAMHS appearing to be accepting more referrals in response.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Manage Healthy Young Minds referrals through a single point of entry and allocate them according to children’s needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of the Trust’s quality improvement work during early 2016 the Trust implemented a new referral process for all aspects of Tameside and Glossop Healthy Young Minds Services (formally CAMHS). All referrals are now managed via one single point of entry and then allocated to a range of possible professionals dependant on the child/young person’s needs e.g. Psychologists, Nurse, Psychiatrist or 3rd sector services. This allows for greater clarity and understanding of where to direct requests for help to for all professionals.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand the service offer document to name a contact for paediatric colleagues seeking advice and consultation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The document has just recently been reviewed and will be expanded to provide a named contact for colleagues in the Paediatric medical services to contact for advice and consultation. The Trust believes that this addresses the confusion and lack of understanding that you have identified in relation to Rachel’s care and treatment.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce and widely disseminate a Healthy Young Minds service offer document explaining referrals, advice access and appropriate referral problems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust have also produced a service offer document which details, how to make a referral, how to contact the service for advice and importantly the document contains information of the types of problems that are appropriate to refer to Tameside and”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Early Help caseloads and work allocation to identify and reduce allocation delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A thorough review has been undertaken of caseloads and allocation of work within the Early Help Service in part due to learning from cases such as this one and more recently our latest Ofsted inspection of children’s services. As a result, measures have been put in place which have led to a significant reduction of delay in the allocation of cases.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor Early Help allocations through a weekly Family Support Panel to support timely responses to children’s needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Managers within the Early Help Service continue to monitor this and are now vigilant in ensuring that the use of waiting lists is not common practice and that families receive a service at the point that need is identified.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate waiting-list families a worker within one month and have managers monitor families during the waiting period.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The table below provides quarterly data in relation to the number of families who have been entered onto a waiting list, having been identified as requiring a service from Early Help. The data gives a snapshot of the total number of families who were on the waiting list at the end of each quarter and gives clear evidence of the efforts that have been made to eradicate the use of a waiting list. The three cases that were on the waiting list at the end of the most recent quarter were allocated as soon as the holiday period came to an end and normal staffing levels were in place.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Submit six-monthly Early Help performance reports to the Safeguarding Children Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The future monitoring of this performance will be undertaken at a weekly Family Support Panel which will manage all allocations to Early Help and other services in order to maximise the timely response to children's needs. In addition, a report will be submitted to the Safeguarding Children Board on a six monthly basis to keep the Board updated on the progress of the Early Help Service and ensure a strong multi agency ownership.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apply epilepsy mental-health safeguards through tailored care plans, specialist nurse review and liaison, CAMHS referral, and immediate admission for high-risk self-harm or suicide concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust now have in place a number of safeguards to ensure that where a child being treated for epilepsy exhibits signs that may be consistent with mental health issues, that they are managed and referred to the appropriate organisation.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for action on delayed EEG reporting should be directed to the organisation controlling specialist EEG reporting and results delivery.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As indicated to you, in a letter from our solicitors dated 30 August 2016, 24 and 72 hour EEGs are performed and reported exclusively by Manchester Children’s Hospital (operated by Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Trust). Whilst the Trust can chase up the results, they are not in control of the timeframes for reporting and delivery of EEG results, although given their specialist nature a period of analysis is expected. A patient’s care is also not affected whilst awaiting the EEG result.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 7 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust cannot control reporting times or delivery of specialist EEG results performed exclusively by another NHS Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As indicated to you, in a letter from our solicitors dated 30 August 2016, 24 and 72 hour EEGs are performed and reported exclusively by Manchester Children’s Hospital (operated by Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Trust). Whilst the Trust can chase up the results, they are not in control of the timeframes for reporting and delivery of EEG results, although given their specialist nature a period of analysis is expected. A patient’s care is also not affected whilst awaiting the EEG result.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 7 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust disputes that medical professionals lacked understanding of CAMHS referrals, stating evidence showed the process was understood.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As indicated to you in a letter from our solicitors dated 30 August, it was the Trust’s contention that during the course of the inquest there was in fact no evidence to suggest a lack of understanding in relation to CAMHS referrals and where evidence perhaps suggested that knowledge was limited, the Trust demonstrated that practices have now changed. I understand that the Trust’s Consultant Paediatrician gave clear evidence that a CAMHS referral was not made by him in March 2015, not because he was unsure of the process, but because he knew how the process works and understood that without evidence of a more acute mental health problem, the referral would be refused (which it ultimately was) and it was therefore important to look at other avenues of how to manage Rachal’s behaviour.”

    Source location

    2016-0401-Responses
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response
  10. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Timothy Simon Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Timothy Simon Jones, who had Down syndrome, epilepsy and dementia and required PEG feeding, was admitted to hospital with breathing difficulties and aspiration pneumonia, was discharged and readmitted the same day, and died on 17 July 2016. Concerns included incomplete GP record keeping, unclear communication and documentation of requests for home visits, lack of GP clinical assessment despite deteriorating health and complex needs, a home-visit policy that did not address residents with complex chronic conditions, and antibiotic prescribing for aspiration pneumonia.

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prescribe the appropriate antibiotics for specific clinical situations

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The deceased was diagnosed with aspiration pneumonia when he was admitted to hospital. He was at high risk of aspiration pneumonia. I heard evidence that the best antibiotics for aspiration pneumonia are co-amoxiclav. The deceased was not prescribed these in the community he was given amoxicillin instead. Consideration needs to be given whether guidelines should be produced to clarify which antibiotics are required in specific situations. ”

    Source location

    Timothy Simon Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide GP clinical assessment for patients with deteriorating conditions and complex needs

    Wider context from the report

    “3. There was no clinical assessment of the deceased by a GP after the 25 May 2016 despite his deteriorating condition and complex needs. ”

    Source location

    Timothy Simon Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain accurate records of patient contacts and clinical decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I have concerns about record keeping at the practice. The residential home records recorded that the GP had visited the patient on 25 May 2016, however the GP could not find a record of that visit in the electronic notes. It is vital the accurate records are kept of contact with patients and clinical decisions made. ”

    Source location

    Timothy Simon Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the home visit policy to address complex chronic conditions in care or residential facilities

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The GP’s policy for home visits (copy attached) did not contain any reference to those with complex chronic conditions who were residents in care or residential facilities. The policy actively seeks to avoid home visits which may have influenced decision making in this case. ”

    Source location

    Timothy Simon Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to distinguish clinical assessment tasks from true administration tasks

    Wider context from the report

    “2. I heard evidence at the inquest that the residential home had requested several home visits from the GP, on 5 July 2016, 12 July 2016 and 13 July 2016, but the GP disputed this. The mechanism of communication within the GP practice caused concern in that several aspects of care were classified as “admin tasks” when they required further clinical assessment. The process of requesting and documenting requests for home visits needs to be clearer. The role of “admin tasks” needs to be clarified so that these are only used for true administration tasks. ”

    Source location

    Timothy Simon Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to clearly request and document home visits

    Wider context from the report

    “2. I heard evidence at the inquest that the residential home had requested several home visits from the GP, on 5 July 2016, 12 July 2016 and 13 July 2016, but the GP disputed this. The mechanism of communication within the GP practice caused concern in that several aspects of care were classified as “admin tasks” when they required further clinical assessment. The process of requesting and documenting requests for home visits needs to be clearer. The role of “admin tasks” needs to be clarified so that these are only used for true administration tasks. ”

    Source location

    Timothy Simon Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ask the Birmingham and Area Antimicrobial Group to consider including aspiration pneumonia in local primary-care antimicrobial guidelines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Birmingham and Solihull Area Prescribing Committee has approved local antimicrobial guidelines which are promoted to practices. These guidelines are based on the PHE guidance for the management of common infections in Primary Care and are adapted for local use by the Birmingham and Area Antimicrobial Group (BAAG) which has representation from primary and secondary care across Birmingham. Neither the PHE guidelines nor the local version include a recommendation for aspiration pneumonia. The recommended antimicrobial therapy for community acquired pneumonia for adults is amoxicillin. In addition to the actions above we are asking the BAAG via our local microbiologist to consider the inclusion of aspiration pneumonia within the local version of the Primary Care Guidelines.”

    Source location

    2016-0421-Response-by-Solihull-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue advice to practices on record keeping.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Advice will be issued to practices in respect of record keeping;”

    Source location

    2016-0421-Response-by-Solihull-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a learning alert to all Solihull member practices covering home-visit requests, policies, care-home requests and administrative-task classifications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• In addition a ‘learning alert’ will be issued to all Solihull member practices to highlight concerns and learning in relation to: ○ Recording of requests for home visits ○ GP home visit policies ○ Nursing/residential home requests for GP home visits ○ Classifications of administrative tasks”

    Source location

    2016-0421-Response-by-Solihull-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ask the Local Medical Committee to discuss consideration of a Solihull-wide home-visiting policy with its members.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The CCG will ask the Local Medical Committee to discuss with its members the consideration of a Solihull wide home visiting policy;”

    Source location

    2016-0421-Response-by-Solihull-Clinical-Commissioning-Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

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Classification: all classifications19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: all recurring concerns
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