Epilepsy, 19 Sep 2013 – 19 Jun 2026

Epilepsy-related Prevention of Future Deaths reports

All dates19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

Custom range

Based on PFD publication date. Dates are available up to the published snapshot: 7 Sep 2026. Preset periods end on this date.

90All reports 19SUDEP 68Non-SUDEP

Select SUDEP or Non-SUDEP to filter concerns and reports. 3 reports could not be assigned and remain in All only. Counts are PFD reports, not deaths.

About this dataset

We searched all 6,433 reports in the published corpus using a fixed text-search method, then assessed 317 candidates against source-based inclusion criteria. Ninety reports were included. Epilepsy had to be materially relevant to the death or a substantive coroner’s concern; incidental mentions were excluded.

Eligibility and SUDEP assignment were assessed with GPT-5.6 Sol and checked for valid source quotations. Assignment uses a balance-of-probabilities threshold: SUDEP or non-SUDEP must be more likely than not on the report’s evidence. The exact term SUDEP need not appear. Genuinely unclear eligible reports remain in All only. These are model-assisted documentary assessments, not independently validated clinical diagnoses.

The search can miss reports with sparse terminology or incomplete source text. This dataset does not represent all epilepsy deaths. Recurring concerns and responses are taken from the existing published evidence. Published corpus snapshot: 7 September 2026. Cohort selection updated 5 November 2026. The title shows the first and last included reports’ publication dates.

Reports over time

Matching reports published each year within the selected date range.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Matching reports sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care12
NHS England12
HM Prison and Probation Service6
Department for Transport5
Care Quality Commission4
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence3
Practice Plus Group3
Royal College of General Practitioners3
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health3
Association Of British Neurologists2
College of Policing2
Department for Education2
General Medical Council2
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust2
Ministry of Justice2
National Police Chiefs’ Council2
Office of the Chief Coroner2
Pentonville Prison2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
BNF Publications1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Bedfordshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council1
Brook Medical Centre1
Caring Limited1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Choice Support1
Cleveland Police1
Coastal Homecare – Hove Branch1
Community Disability Nurse1
DW Fitness First1
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy1
Disclosure and Barring Service1
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset County Council1
Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust1
Dorset Police1
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency1
Dwf LLP1
East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust1
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Emsworth Surgery1
Epilepsy Action1
Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust1
European Care & Lifestyles (UK) Limited1
Forest Bank Prison1
General Pharmaceutical Council1
GeoAmey PECS Limited1
George Abbot School1
Gloucestershire Health and Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Gloucestershire Social Services1
Godfrey Care1
Grant Shapps MP1
Great Ormond Street Hospital1
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership1
Greater Manchester Police1
Greenshades Coach Travel Limited1
Grosvenor Medical Centre1
Grupo de Turismo Gaviota S.A.1
Guy'S and St Thomas' NHS Foundation Trust1
HM Prison Service1
Hampshire and Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Hazelmere Medical Centre1
Health and Safety Executive1
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust1
High Down Prison1
Home Office1
Independence Homes Limited1
Independent Futures1
James Paget University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee1
Kendal Calling1
Kettering General Hospital1
King Street Medical Centre1
Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust1
Lindholme Prison1
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital1
Medacs Healthcare Limited1
Medway NHS Foundation Trust1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
Midway Pharmacy1
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government1
NHS Birmingham and Solihull Integrated Care Board1
NHS Dorset Integrated Care Board1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
NHS Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Integrated Care Board1
NHS South West London Integrated Care Board1
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust1
North London NHS Foundation Trust1
Northfield Medical Centre1
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust1
Parc Prison and Young Offender Institute1
Parents of the deceased1
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Pentree Lodge1
Recipient name withheld1
Richmond Medical Centre (Solihull)1
Rochester Prison1
Royal College of Emergency Medicine1
Royal College of Physicians1
Royal College of Psychiatrists1
Royal College of Surgeons of England1
Royal London Hospital1
Sheffield Health Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Skills for Care Ltd1
Sodexo1
South Tees Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Southwinds1
Springbank Care Home Limited1
Springfield Medical Centre1
St Edward's School1
St George'S University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Stepping Hill Hospital1
Stockport Borough Council1
Suffolk County Council1
Sundon Medical Centre1
Surrey County Council1
Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust1
Sussex Police1
Tameside Borough Council1
Tameside General Hospital1
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust1
Tewkesbury Borough Council1
Thameside Prison1
The Children's Trust1
The Roehampton Surgery1
The Society Of British Neurological Surgeons1
Thomas Cook Tour Operations Limited1
Transport for London1
UCB Pharma1
University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals Dorset NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals of North Midlands NHS Trust1
Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc1
Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust1
ukactive1

Most commonly raised concerns

All classifications 90 reports 19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026

  1. Unreliable seizure care and managementControls dedicated to recognising, assessing, monitoring, responding to and managing seizures are not reliably provided.9 reportsSelected
  2. Incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable clinical and care recordsClinical and care records are incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent, unavailable or otherwise unreliable for safe care.7 reportsSelected
  3. Unsafe medication administrationA recurring failure of the medication-administration system to ensure that medicines are administered safely, accurately, promptly and as prescribed.6 reportsSelected
  4. Failure to ensure clinical investigation results are reliably available, interpreted and acted uponRecurring deficiency in the end-to-end management of clinical investigation results, including their availability, transmission, checking, review, interpretation, follow-up and escalation when needed.4 reportsSelected
  5. Inadequate driver licensing controls for road safetyDriver licensing systems do not reliably identify, record, review or restrict drivers whose inexperience, health or vehicle-related risk requires additional safeguards.4 reportsSelected
  6. Inadequate staff competence to provide first aidReports identify an unsafe first-aid capability condition across healthcare, care, custody and other staff. The recurring concern is the unreliability of staff competence to recognise emergencies and provide appropriate first aid, rather than any single training, refresher, assessment or practical-performance failure.4 reportsSelected
  7. Unreliable hospital discharge processesHospital discharge does not reliably bring together planning, clinical readiness, relevant organisations, safe execution and required follow-up.4 reportsSelected
  8. Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care servicesRecurring concern that clinically important guidance, decisions and patient information are not kept accurate, current and available to the clinicians and emergency services who need them.3 reportsSelected
  9. Failure to provide required medication promptly when clinically neededThe anchor identifies delayed prescribing of a patient's usual medication after an unexpected admission, while another report identifies delayed prescribing and non-provision of urgent therapeutic medication. These support a recurring concern about timely provision of clinically required medication rather than only the anchor's admission or prescribing-step failure.3 reportsSelected
  10. Failure to provide timely clinical follow-up after medication prescribingPrescribed medication is not reliably followed up for effectiveness, safety, collection, adherence and patient response.3 reportsSelected
  11. Failure to seek medical attention when a person's condition warrants itReports identify an unreliable escalation control in which care staff or other responders do not promptly seek medical or paramedic assistance when a person's injury, pain, fall or deterioration warrants clinical attention.3 reportsSelected
  12. Insufficient police training for safe recognition and response to mental-health and behaviour-related medical crisesReports identify insufficient police training to recognise and respond safely to mental-health crises and behaviour-related medical emergencies.3 reportsSelected
  13. Insufficient qualified healthcare staffing capacityHealthcare services lack enough appropriately qualified staff to provide the required clinical coverage and patient care safely for the workload, acuity and specialist needs.3 reportsSelected
  14. Unreliable DVLA medical fitness notification arrangementsThe anchor identifies limited professional awareness and uncertain effectiveness of guidance for notifying the DVLA about medically relevant driving risks. A different report identifies clinicians failing to advise patients with cough syncope to stop driving and notify the DVLA, while another identifies failure to notify the DVLA of relevant medical conditions. These support the named DVLA medical-fitness notification process rather than guidance awareness alone.3 reportsSelected
  15. Unreliable communication of patient-care information between clinical staffClinical staff responsible for the same patient's care do not reliably exchange relevant information about care, treatment and risk.3 reportsSelected
  16. Unreliable healthcare patient transfer processesHealthcare transfers do not reliably provide the procedures, responsibility, documentation and clinical information needed for safe movement and continuity of care.3 reportsSelected
  17. Unreliable mental health referral pathwaysReports identify different failures within the mental health referral process, including referrals not being made when indicated, received referrals not being actioned, and frontline practitioners lacking clarity about when and where to refer. These support a recurring concern with the reliability of mental health referral pathways rather than any single referral or awareness failure.3 reportsSelected
  18. Unreliable patient observation arrangementsPatient observation systems do not reliably set, support and deliver the observation level required by assessed safety risk.3 reportsSelected
  19. Unsafe interoperability between prison custody and healthcare proceduresReports identify failures in the bounded interface between prison custody, contracted custody providers and healthcare services, where procedures, responsibilities and safety-relevant information do not operate together reliably.3 reportsSelected
  20. Electronic patient records failing to make relevant clinical information available and actionableRecurring concern that electronic patient-record systems do not reliably present, preserve, share or prompt action on clinically relevant information across the patient’s care.2 reportsSelected
  21. Failure to communicate safety-critical care information effectively between care providers and familiesReports identify unsafe communication between care providers and families, including failures to convey risks, care instructions, concerns or other information needed to support safe care and decision-making.2 reportsSelected
  22. Failure to conduct required welfare checks on people in distressThe anchor identifies a risk that care home staff will not check a resident in distress, while a different canonical report identifies failure to conduct a later welfare check on a person left in potential medical distress. Together these support a recurring concern about welfare checks not being completed when a person may require assistance.2 reportsSelected
  23. Failure to ensure safe prisoner transfersRecurring concern that the end-to-end prisoner transfer process is unreliable, leaving transferred prisoners exposed to unmanaged risks or interruptions in essential support.2 reportsSelected
  24. Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learningDifferent reports identify failures of reporting, review and learning arrangements to retain, recognise and address substantive or recurring patient-safety issues, rather than merely failures to complete one specific corrective action.2 reportsSelected
  25. Failure to reliably document the rationale for consequential decisionsDifferent reports identify missing or inadequate records explaining the rationale and evidential basis for consequential decisions, including the anchor’s crucial decisions and comparable mental-capacity, NRPF and transfer decisions. The shared concern is unreliable rationale documentation for decisions that affect safety, accountability and continuity of care, rather than any one decision type or record system.2 reportsSelected
  26. Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguardsThe medication incident learning process is unreliable: incidents are not consistently followed up or reviewed to identify, communicate and implement safeguards that protect patients from recurrence.2 reportsSelected
  27. Failure to reliably recognise and respond to acute clinical deteriorationClinical deterioration is not reliably recognised, monitored, escalated and acted upon with the urgency it requires.2 reportsSelected
  28. Failure to reliably refer patients to required specialist servicesThe anchor identifies a required physiotherapy referral that was not completed. A different report identifies delayed referrals to physiotherapy, occupational therapy, dietetics and Parkinson’s specialist services. Together these support an end-to-end concern with required specialist referrals not being made promptly and reliably, rather than a concern limited to one physiotherapy referral.2 reportsSelected
  29. Failure to secure and control medicationReports identify medication as remaining accessible, unsecured or inadequately controlled, creating risks of misuse, overdose, theft or access by people other than the intended patient.2 reportsSelected
  30. Inadequate control of illicit substance use and supply in secure institutionsThe anchor identifies an ongoing failure to mitigate illicit substance entry, distribution and use in a secure hospital, while assertions from different reports identify continuing illicit-drug influx, widespread access and weak supply-reduction controls in prisons. These distinct manifestations support a bounded concern about controlling illicit substances in secure institutional settings, rather than only room searches, drug testing or a prison-specific strategy.2 reportsSelected
  31. Inadequate controls on contraband mobile phones in prisonsDifferent reports identify failures in the prison control system for preventing and mitigating access to contraband mobile phones, including their easy availability to prisoners and their use to facilitate drug dealing and other prison-security risks.2 reportsSelected
  32. Inadequate recording of medication prescribing decisionsReports identify unreliable medication prescribing records that can obscure prescribing status, rationale, changes or safety-critical decisions and thereby allow unsafe medication to be prescribed or administered.2 reportsSelected
  33. Incomplete clinical history-takingReports identify an unsafe clinical assessment condition in which relevant patient history is not obtained sufficiently to support recognition of symptoms, risks and appropriate care.2 reportsSelected
  34. Unreliable Care Programme Approach care coordinationReports identify different failures within the named Care Programme Approach, including the absence of a structured medication review and failures to allocate coordinators, complete required reviews, maintain care plans and follow up patients. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliable operation of CPA care coordination rather than medication review alone.2 reportsSelected
  35. Unreliable RIO clinical-record functionsThe anchor identifies an unclear timeliness standard for RIO entries, while different reports identify failures of RIO to support complete information capture, cross-team access and usable observation records. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the named RIO clinical-record system rather than only one entry-timing or documentation manifestation.2 reportsSelected
  36. Unreliable access to emergency communicationReports identify failures in dedicated emergency communication arrangements that can delay summoning or contacting emergency help.2 reportsSelected
  37. Unreliable communication of critical medication information to GPsRecurring deficiency in the medication-information exchange process between services and GPs, including information needed to maintain supplies, assess prescribing safety and support continuity of treatment.2 reportsSelected
  38. Unreliable escalation by care staff for required medical attentionCare staff do not reliably recognise and escalate deterioration, pain or other safety concerns to obtain timely medical assessment or advice.2 reportsSelected
  39. Unreliable implementation of medication changesReports identify different failures in the medication-change process, including failure to act on a prescribed reduction, failure to ensure carers acknowledge changes, and difficulty implementing specialist-directed changes accurately. Together these support the wider unsafe condition that medication changes are not reliably implemented across prescribing, communication and follow-up controls.2 reportsSelected
  40. Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated careThe anchor identifies absent agreed communication means and inaccessible shared patient information between mental health agencies. Other canonical reports identify relevant risk information not being shared between agencies and poor inter-agency information sharing preventing coordinated care, supporting a recurring concern with the reliability of inter-agency care information sharing rather than only the anchor's repository or communication-channel failure.2 reportsSelected
  41. Unreliable management of medication doses not takenThe anchor identifies missing guidance for monitoring prescribed medication that self-administering patients do not take when dispensed. A different report identifies inconsistent procedures for responding when service users refuse or do not take medication. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of detecting, monitoring and escalating omitted or refused medication doses, rather than a concern limited to one guidance document or one home's procedure.2 reportsSelected
  42. Unreliable medication dosage verification and communicationReports identify unsafe failures to ensure that medication dosages are accurately verified, clarified and communicated across prescribing, dispensing and administration activities.2 reportsSelected
  43. Unreliable observation of people in custodyThe anchor report identifies failure to transfer and replicate medically required observation levels when a detained person moves into GEO AMEY custody, while a different report identifies uncertainty about whether the correct observation level, including constant watch, was provided to a person in prison custody. Together these support a recurring concern about the reliability of the custody observation process rather than only one handover or level-setting failure.2 reportsSelected
  44. Unreliable recording of required observations in care and custodyDifferent reports identify inaccurate, delayed, anticipatory or falsified records of required observations, including 15-minute observations in prison custody and patient-care settings. The shared unsafe condition is that observation records do not reliably reflect when and how observations were actually conducted, rather than any one observation frequency, recording location or electronic system.2 reportsSelected
  45. Unreliable review and action on clinically significant incoming correspondenceReports identify failures across the incoming clinical-correspondence process, including failure to identify GP medication-review requests, failure to bring action-requiring correspondence to medical staff, and correspondence being filed without GP review or action. The shared unsafe condition is that clinically significant correspondence may not reliably reach the responsible clinician or trigger the required clinical response.2 reportsSelected
  46. Unreliable safety CCTV monitoring systemsDifferent reports identify failures in the operation of CCTV used as a safety control, including absent staff access arrangements, inadequate coverage, non-working cameras, insufficient monitoring and unclear staff instructions. Together these support the reliability of safety CCTV monitoring as the parent concern rather than any single access, coverage, equipment or training failure.2 reportsSelected
  47. Unreliable urgent mental health referral and assessment pathwaysUrgent mental-health referral pathways do not reliably secure timely access, coordination and specialist assessment.2 reportsSelected
  48. Unreliable welfare-check processes for people whose health is of concernThe anchor identifies unclear purpose and use of the welfare sheet for monitoring prisoners whose health is of concern. A separate report identifies inconsistent criteria for what constitutes a welfare check and when it is recorded. Together these support a recurring concern with the reliability of the bounded welfare-check process, rather than only the sheet or recording component.2 reportsSelected
  49. Unsafe cell-sharing decisions for prisonersRecurring deficiencies in the prison cell-sharing risk system can leave prisoners exposed to unsafe pairings or prevent them from understanding changes affecting their cell-sharing status.2 reportsSelected
  50. Unsafe medication prescribingReports identify unsafe prescribing decisions in which the medication, indication, dose or relevant clinical circumstances are not adequately evaluated before prescribing.2 reportsSelected

All reports in this date range

19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 · 90 reports

Showing all concerns and their linked actions and positions from reports in this date range. Select a recurring concern above to narrow the evidence.

Actions and positions describe what recipients stated in published responses. Select a statement to read its source wording.

  1. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Jorge Emanuel Mousinho Assabay E Castro · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jorge Emanuel Mousinho Assabay E Castro died at home on 16 October 2014 after being found collapsed and unresponsive. He had post-traumatic epilepsy but had not received sodium valproate after 3 July 2014, despite attending his GP practice three times without the medication issue being reviewed. The principal concerns were the lack of systems to identify uncollected prescriptions and to alert GPs to medication-adherence concerns, particularly for vulnerable patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review hospital consultant alerts about medication adherence

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the Inquest evidence was heard that: i. Jorge had not received sodium valproate medication for administration after 3rd July 2014 and he had been diagnosed with post traumatic epilepsy in February 2014 requiring regular treatment with sodium valproate as an anti-epileptic medication. ii. Jorge had been seen by General Practitioners at the Springfield Medical Centre on three occasions after the 3rd July 2014 without any review of the fact that he had not collected prescriptions for sodium valproate and the fact that the General Practitioner had received a letter from ████████ alerting the General Practitioner to an issue in relation to his regular adherence with his anti-epileptic medication. iii. Jorge was known to be a vulnerable person, who consumed excess amounts of alcohol on a regular basis and who was being treated with Citalopram for depression prior to his injuries on the 20th June 2013 and subsequently on the 18th September 2014 prior to his death. iv. The General Practitioner’s surgery at Springfield Medical Centre does not appear to have any systems to identify and highlight a patient who has not collected prescriptions, particularly in relation to vulnerable patients who will be dependent on medication for the control of a diagnosed condition and, as in the case of Jorge, to reduce the risk of episodes of seizure. In particular the computerised records do not have a system of highlighting any outstanding prescriptions at subsequent consultations so that a General Practitioner was not alerted to the fact that Jorge had not collected his prescriptions and would not have had a supply of his anti-epileptic medication after the 3rd July 2014 at any of the appointments following the 3rd July 2014. v. The evidence raised concerns that there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken to review the above issues. 2. I request you to consider the above concerns, particularly with regard to the following: i. The procedures and systems to highlight and alert General Practitioners in relation to concerns or issues raised by a Hospital Consultant, namely in Jorge’s case by ████████ with regard to Jorge’s regular adherence with his anti-epileptic medication. ii. A review of your systems and procedures to alert General Practitioners in relation to the issue of prescriptions and the failure of a patient to collect prescriptions for prescribed medications, particularly in relation to vulnerable patients who have not collected or received their prescriptions for a period of time. iii. Training of all staff, both professional and administrative, in relation to record keeping and checks in relation to outstanding prescriptions, particularly when a vulnerable patient has not collected a prescription and has not received necessary and prescribed medications for a period of time. ”

    Source location

    Jorge Emanuel Mousinho Assabay E Castro · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of systems to identify and highlight outstanding prescriptions

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the Inquest evidence was heard that: i. Jorge had not received sodium valproate medication for administration after 3rd July 2014 and he had been diagnosed with post traumatic epilepsy in February 2014 requiring regular treatment with sodium valproate as an anti-epileptic medication. ii. Jorge had been seen by General Practitioners at the Springfield Medical Centre on three occasions after the 3rd July 2014 without any review of the fact that he had not collected prescriptions for sodium valproate and the fact that the General Practitioner had received a letter from ████████ alerting the General Practitioner to an issue in relation to his regular adherence with his anti-epileptic medication. iii. Jorge was known to be a vulnerable person, who consumed excess amounts of alcohol on a regular basis and who was being treated with Citalopram for depression prior to his injuries on the 20th June 2013 and subsequently on the 18th September 2014 prior to his death. iv. The General Practitioner’s surgery at Springfield Medical Centre does not appear to have any systems to identify and highlight a patient who has not collected prescriptions, particularly in relation to vulnerable patients who will be dependent on medication for the control of a diagnosed condition and, as in the case of Jorge, to reduce the risk of episodes of seizure. In particular the computerised records do not have a system of highlighting any outstanding prescriptions at subsequent consultations so that a General Practitioner was not alerted to the fact that Jorge had not collected his prescriptions and would not have had a supply of his anti-epileptic medication after the 3rd July 2014 at any of the appointments following the 3rd July 2014. v. The evidence raised concerns that there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken to review the above issues. 2. I request you to consider the above concerns, particularly with regard to the following: i. The procedures and systems to highlight and alert General Practitioners in relation to concerns or issues raised by a Hospital Consultant, namely in Jorge’s case by ████████ with regard to Jorge’s regular adherence with his anti-epileptic medication. ii. A review of your systems and procedures to alert General Practitioners in relation to the issue of prescriptions and the failure of a patient to collect prescriptions for prescribed medications, particularly in relation to vulnerable patients who have not collected or received their prescriptions for a period of time. iii. Training of all staff, both professional and administrative, in relation to record keeping and checks in relation to outstanding prescriptions, particularly when a vulnerable patient has not collected a prescription and has not received necessary and prescribed medications for a period of time. ”

    Source location

    Jorge Emanuel Mousinho Assabay E Castro · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review patients’ non-collection of prescribed medication

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the Inquest evidence was heard that: i. Jorge had not received sodium valproate medication for administration after 3rd July 2014 and he had been diagnosed with post traumatic epilepsy in February 2014 requiring regular treatment with sodium valproate as an anti-epileptic medication. ii. Jorge had been seen by General Practitioners at the Springfield Medical Centre on three occasions after the 3rd July 2014 without any review of the fact that he had not collected prescriptions for sodium valproate and the fact that the General Practitioner had received a letter from ████████ alerting the General Practitioner to an issue in relation to his regular adherence with his anti-epileptic medication. iii. Jorge was known to be a vulnerable person, who consumed excess amounts of alcohol on a regular basis and who was being treated with Citalopram for depression prior to his injuries on the 20th June 2013 and subsequently on the 18th September 2014 prior to his death. iv. The General Practitioner’s surgery at Springfield Medical Centre does not appear to have any systems to identify and highlight a patient who has not collected prescriptions, particularly in relation to vulnerable patients who will be dependent on medication for the control of a diagnosed condition and, as in the case of Jorge, to reduce the risk of episodes of seizure. In particular the computerised records do not have a system of highlighting any outstanding prescriptions at subsequent consultations so that a General Practitioner was not alerted to the fact that Jorge had not collected his prescriptions and would not have had a supply of his anti-epileptic medication after the 3rd July 2014 at any of the appointments following the 3rd July 2014. v. The evidence raised concerns that there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken to review the above issues. 2. I request you to consider the above concerns, particularly with regard to the following: i. The procedures and systems to highlight and alert General Practitioners in relation to concerns or issues raised by a Hospital Consultant, namely in Jorge’s case by ████████ with regard to Jorge’s regular adherence with his anti-epileptic medication. ii. A review of your systems and procedures to alert General Practitioners in relation to the issue of prescriptions and the failure of a patient to collect prescriptions for prescribed medications, particularly in relation to vulnerable patients who have not collected or received their prescriptions for a period of time. iii. Training of all staff, both professional and administrative, in relation to record keeping and checks in relation to outstanding prescriptions, particularly when a vulnerable patient has not collected a prescription and has not received necessary and prescribed medications for a period of time. ”

    Source location

    Jorge Emanuel Mousinho Assabay E Castro · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver a half-day training workshop for staff involved in repeat-prescription generation to support the revised systems and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Training of all staff in relation to prescribing As a practice we have taken this opportunity to look at our prescribing systems and the changes above do require staff training. However, we have also looked at the possibility of external facilitators who may bring further advice and expertise to the practice of effective management of repeat prescribing. We can confirm that a half-day workshop has been arranged for Thursday 25th June and we would be open to any further recommendations on this day.”

    Source location

    2015-0170-Response-by-Springfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Notify and collaborate with local pharmacies regarding interruptions to weekly medication collection or supply, and disseminate the significant-event learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Weekly prescriptions are all sent to the patient’s nominated pharmacy. We have written to our local pharmacies and asked them to kindly inform us if there is any interruption to any of these patients’ medication collection or supply.”

    Source location

    2015-0170-Response-by-Springfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the prescribing system to highlight overdue prescriptions after three months and prompt timely clinical follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “time period and the practice has made the necessary amendments so that in future any staff viewing a patient’s prescriptions will be alerted sooner (from 3 months) and appropriate action can be taken to mitigate any risk to the patient. This would include immediate notification to the General Practitioner who would then liaise with the patient, carers, family and pharmacy as appropriate. The practice can then work with all necessary individuals or agencies to help support the patient with compliance of their medication.”

    Source location

    2015-0170-Response-by-Springfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement patient-record alerts when medication-compliance concerns are raised, with staff notifying management so alerts are activated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “medication. As a practice we have considered how our IT system can support the practice team in alerting us to similar issues with patients. It is possible for an alert to flag up when any member of staff enters the patient’s records and this will now be implemented for any patients who, similar to Mr Castro, are known to have compliance issues with their medication. All practice staff, clinical and administrative, have been advised to inform the practice management team immediately of any patient where compliance issues have been raised by family, carers or any other health care professionals. The management team will then ensure that an alert is activated on the patient’s records.”

    Source location

    2015-0170-Response-by-Springfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create and regularly update a register of patients receiving weekly prescriptions, with monthly administrative checks and GP review of omissions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, even this system has its limitations, as it would only highlight the issue of overdue prescriptions when a member of the practice team is actually in the patient’s records and looking at the repeat medication screen. As a practice we have over 3000 patients on regular repeat medication. Each prescription is usually for 1 to 2 months duration. However, approximately 300 of these patients, like Mr Castro, are issued medications on a weekly basis. This system is usually for patient safety or as a compliance aid. We have thus decided to create a register of all patients who are receiving prescriptions on a weekly basis. These prescriptions are issued in 4 weekly batches and the administrative staff will be checking the prescriptions have been issued for each patient every month. Those that have not been issued will be passed to a General Practitioner for review.”

    Source location

    2015-0170-Response-by-Springfield-Medical-Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2015

    Open published response
  2. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Elizabeth Ann Cox · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Elizabeth Ann Cox, who was 84 and had a high risk of falls, fell from her hospital bed on 18 July 2014 after the equipment accepted as necessary—a Hi-Lo bed and crash mats—had not been provided. Her condition deteriorated and she died at Kingsmill Hospital on 10 August 2014; the report found a clear link between the fall and her death. The report also raised concerns about insufficient night staffing and the lack of equivalent additional staffing support during night hours.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient overnight ward staffing capacity for patient workloads

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence of senior nursing staff involved with this ward and with the trust’s internal investigation made it clear that those working on the ward on the night of 17/18 July felt they needed further staff to cope with the demands of the patients they were looking after. We heard that the ward sister followed hospital protocol to request assistance. When it was clear that no one was available from neighbouring wards, a bank nurse was requested. Unfortunately, the bank nurse cancelled at very short notice. The duty nurse manager was called, but noone was available to assist at short notice. 1. During daytime hours, where additional staff are needed, the Reducing Harm Team can be contacted to provide the necessary resources. I was told, although this is currently under review, that,as matters stand, this (or an equivalent) is not available during the night. 2. It has been suggested as part of a trust-wide review that the number of staff available on the wards at night be reduced – from 3 registered and 2 unregistered currently, to 3 registered and 1 unregistered. I am aware that this is merely a proposal – and not currently in place – but should this come into effect, I am concerned that events like these may re-occur, where staff simply do not have the capacity to look after their patients safely, because of workloads. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Elizabeth Ann Cox · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of overnight additional staffing resources

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence of senior nursing staff involved with this ward and with the trust’s internal investigation made it clear that those working on the ward on the night of 17/18 July felt they needed further staff to cope with the demands of the patients they were looking after. We heard that the ward sister followed hospital protocol to request assistance. When it was clear that no one was available from neighbouring wards, a bank nurse was requested. Unfortunately, the bank nurse cancelled at very short notice. The duty nurse manager was called, but noone was available to assist at short notice. 1. During daytime hours, where additional staff are needed, the Reducing Harm Team can be contacted to provide the necessary resources. I was told, although this is currently under review, that,as matters stand, this (or an equivalent) is not available during the night. 2. It has been suggested as part of a trust-wide review that the number of staff available on the wards at night be reduced – from 3 registered and 2 unregistered currently, to 3 registered and 1 unregistered. I am aware that this is merely a proposal – and not currently in place – but should this come into effect, I am concerned that events like these may re-occur, where staff simply do not have the capacity to look after their patients safely, because of workloads. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Elizabeth Ann Cox · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Drive a nurse recruitment strategy to recruit the registered nurses required for medical wards to adopt the new staffing model.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our medical wards have not been as successful with nurse recruitment. This is a national problem but the Trust has developed and are currently driving a nurse recruitment strategy to recruit more Registered Nurses. Our medical wards, including the ward in which Mrs Cox was cared for, are currently being maintained on the post Keogh numbers as described below.”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor staffing levels and their impact on quality and safety through the Trust Board and Quality Committee.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Requests for enhanced care and 1-1 support will continue to be supported when required. During this period of change the Trust Board and the Quality Committee continue to robustly monitor the staffing levels and the impact upon quality and safety.”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide assessed enhanced one-to-one care day and night using ward, bank or agency staffing when additional resources are required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. A risk assessment form is completed on the ward identifying the level of enhanced care that is required.”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the approved nursing staffing model of five registered and two unregistered staff by day and three registered and one unregistered staff by night.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “New Investment Numbers: RN Days Numbers: 5 HCA Days Numbers: 2 RN Nights Numbers: 3 HCA Nights Numbers: 1 Overall Numbers: 5+2 Days; 3+1 Nights”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Medical wards cannot adopt proposed staffing levels until approximately 100 additional registered nurses are recruited, anticipated to take a further 12 months.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our medical wards have not been as successful with nurse recruitment. This is a national problem but the Trust has developed and are currently driving a nurse recruitment strategy to recruit more Registered Nurses. Our medical wards, including the ward in which Mrs Cox was cared for, are currently being maintained on the post Keogh numbers as described below.”

    Source location

    2015-0094-Response-by-Sherwood-Forest-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 March 2015

    Open published response
  3. Southampton and the New Forest

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Stickland · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Stickland, aged 17, was found collapsed after falling from his bed at his residential school on 14 May 2014, following two seizures earlier that day. He was taken to hospital and pronounced dead the following day; concerns included inadequate handovers, inaccurate or inaccessible logs, and no clear central method for recording significant medical events.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete movement logs accurately and with sufficient detail

    Wider context from the report

    “(2)Movement log that was not completed accurately or with enough detail ”

    Source location

    Daniel Stickland · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a written handover between evening and night supervisors

    Wider context from the report

    “(1)Lack of a written handover between evening and night supervisors at St Edwards School ”

    Source location

    Daniel Stickland · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Daily logs failing to provide accessible and reliable information

    Wider context from the report

    “(3)Daily log that was not easily accessible and was misleading ”

    Source location

    Daniel Stickland · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear central method for accurately recording significant medical events

    Wider context from the report

    “(4)No clear method of centrally and accurately recording significant medical events to facilitate passage of information to non -school persons. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Stickland · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Rutland and North Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Jason Edward Lawson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jason Edward Lawson, who had epilepsy and schizophrenia, was found dead in his prison cell at HMP Stocken on 17 March 2013; the time of death was uncertain but likely late on 16 March or early on 17 March. Concerns included welfare checks that did not establish that he had died, systems that did not reliably identify medication non-attendance or lapsed prescriptions, access delays to healthcare, and the absence of a specific policy for 24-hour medical observation where constant medical supervision was unavailable.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a computer-driven system to flag prescription non-attendance

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The current system relies on healthcare staff/pharmacy staff recognising that prisoners have not attended to collect their prescription, without having a computer driven system to flag up non-attendance. ”

    Source location

    Jason Edward Lawson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a specific policy for prisoners requiring 24-hour medical observation where constant medical supervision is unavailable

    Wider context from the report

    “5. There is no specific policy to deal with the situation where a prisoner needs 24 hour observation from medical staff where the prison is not equipped for constant medical supervision. ”

    Source location

    Jason Edward Lawson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a computer-driven system to flag lapsed prescriptions

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The current system relies on healthcare staff/pharmacy staff recognising that prescriptions have lapsed without having a computer driven system to flag it up. ”

    Source location

    Jason Edward Lawson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Distance and waiting times inhibiting prisoner attendance at the medical centre

    Wider context from the report

    “2. On some wings there is still some distance to walk to the medical centre and the time to wait mitigates against prisoners bothering to do attend. ”

    Source location

    Jason Edward Lawson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of welfare checks to ascertain death

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The welfare check did not ascertain that he had died. He was certainly dead at the time of the check at 7.30am and 8.20am on the 17th March. ”

    Source location

    Jason Edward Lawson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Eve Cullen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eve Cullen, who had epileptic seizures and a fluctuating peri-ictal confusional state, went missing from her family home on 17 July 2014 and was later found dead in an alleyway on 9 August 2014. The concerns were that a hospital referral was not actioned, two urgent referrals were not treated as urgent, and there was no uniform definition or timeframe for urgent referrals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to action received mental health referrals

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The failure to action the referral from the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (2) The failure to treat the 2 referrals on the 14th & 15th July 2014 as urgent (3) The lack of any uniform agreement as to what constitutes an 'urgent' referral I received evidence from ████████ Clinical Lead, for the Redditch & Bromsgrove CMHT who confirmed that there was no evidence on the file that the referral on file had been actioned at all. She confirmed that (as set out in the root cause analysis which has been prepared), there is no service wide definition of what might constitute an urgent referral (nor any agreed definition of such terms as 'very urgent', 'immediate', 'routine') and further when referrals are made no suggested timeframe is recorded. She also told me that once the referral is received it is a matter for the psychiatrist as to when the patient is seen, even though the psychiatrist would not have had any contact with a new patient referred in this way. Although it is impossible to tell whether faster action may have changed the outcome in this case it seems that when 2 mental health professionals ask for an urgent referral but no action is proposed for some 8 days that this amounts to a lost opportunity to intervene and possibly save the life of the patient. I would ask the Trust to consider that terms such as 'very urgent, 'urgent', 'routine' etc. should be defined with a view to there being a service wide understanding of what is expected in terms of timely action upon referrals that are made. ”

    Source location

    Eve Cullen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of service-wide definitions for referral urgency levels

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The failure to action the referral from the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (2) The failure to treat the 2 referrals on the 14th & 15th July 2014 as urgent (3) The lack of any uniform agreement as to what constitutes an 'urgent' referral I received evidence from ████████ Clinical Lead, for the Redditch & Bromsgrove CMHT who confirmed that there was no evidence on the file that the referral on file had been actioned at all. She confirmed that (as set out in the root cause analysis which has been prepared), there is no service wide definition of what might constitute an urgent referral (nor any agreed definition of such terms as 'very urgent', 'immediate', 'routine') and further when referrals are made no suggested timeframe is recorded. She also told me that once the referral is received it is a matter for the psychiatrist as to when the patient is seen, even though the psychiatrist would not have had any contact with a new patient referred in this way. Although it is impossible to tell whether faster action may have changed the outcome in this case it seems that when 2 mental health professionals ask for an urgent referral but no action is proposed for some 8 days that this amounts to a lost opportunity to intervene and possibly save the life of the patient. I would ask the Trust to consider that terms such as 'very urgent, 'urgent', 'routine' etc. should be defined with a view to there being a service wide understanding of what is expected in terms of timely action upon referrals that are made. ”

    Source location

    Eve Cullen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to treat clinically identified urgent referrals as urgent

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The failure to action the referral from the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (2) The failure to treat the 2 referrals on the 14th & 15th July 2014 as urgent (3) The lack of any uniform agreement as to what constitutes an 'urgent' referral I received evidence from ████████ Clinical Lead, for the Redditch & Bromsgrove CMHT who confirmed that there was no evidence on the file that the referral on file had been actioned at all. She confirmed that (as set out in the root cause analysis which has been prepared), there is no service wide definition of what might constitute an urgent referral (nor any agreed definition of such terms as 'very urgent', 'immediate', 'routine') and further when referrals are made no suggested timeframe is recorded. She also told me that once the referral is received it is a matter for the psychiatrist as to when the patient is seen, even though the psychiatrist would not have had any contact with a new patient referred in this way. Although it is impossible to tell whether faster action may have changed the outcome in this case it seems that when 2 mental health professionals ask for an urgent referral but no action is proposed for some 8 days that this amounts to a lost opportunity to intervene and possibly save the life of the patient. I would ask the Trust to consider that terms such as 'very urgent, 'urgent', 'routine' etc. should be defined with a view to there being a service wide understanding of what is expected in terms of timely action upon referrals that are made. ”

    Source location

    Eve Cullen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record a suggested timeframe for action on referrals

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The failure to action the referral from the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (2) The failure to treat the 2 referrals on the 14th & 15th July 2014 as urgent (3) The lack of any uniform agreement as to what constitutes an 'urgent' referral I received evidence from ████████ Clinical Lead, for the Redditch & Bromsgrove CMHT who confirmed that there was no evidence on the file that the referral on file had been actioned at all. She confirmed that (as set out in the root cause analysis which has been prepared), there is no service wide definition of what might constitute an urgent referral (nor any agreed definition of such terms as 'very urgent', 'immediate', 'routine') and further when referrals are made no suggested timeframe is recorded. She also told me that once the referral is received it is a matter for the psychiatrist as to when the patient is seen, even though the psychiatrist would not have had any contact with a new patient referred in this way. Although it is impossible to tell whether faster action may have changed the outcome in this case it seems that when 2 mental health professionals ask for an urgent referral but no action is proposed for some 8 days that this amounts to a lost opportunity to intervene and possibly save the life of the patient. I would ask the Trust to consider that terms such as 'very urgent, 'urgent', 'routine' etc. should be defined with a view to there being a service wide understanding of what is expected in terms of timely action upon referrals that are made. ”

    Source location

    Eve Cullen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unstructured allocation of initial review timing to an individual psychiatrist

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The failure to action the referral from the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (2) The failure to treat the 2 referrals on the 14th & 15th July 2014 as urgent (3) The lack of any uniform agreement as to what constitutes an 'urgent' referral I received evidence from ████████ Clinical Lead, for the Redditch & Bromsgrove CMHT who confirmed that there was no evidence on the file that the referral on file had been actioned at all. She confirmed that (as set out in the root cause analysis which has been prepared), there is no service wide definition of what might constitute an urgent referral (nor any agreed definition of such terms as 'very urgent', 'immediate', 'routine') and further when referrals are made no suggested timeframe is recorded. She also told me that once the referral is received it is a matter for the psychiatrist as to when the patient is seen, even though the psychiatrist would not have had any contact with a new patient referred in this way. Although it is impossible to tell whether faster action may have changed the outcome in this case it seems that when 2 mental health professionals ask for an urgent referral but no action is proposed for some 8 days that this amounts to a lost opportunity to intervene and possibly save the life of the patient. I would ask the Trust to consider that terms such as 'very urgent, 'urgent', 'routine' etc. should be defined with a view to there being a service wide understanding of what is expected in terms of timely action upon referrals that are made. ”

    Source location

    Eve Cullen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Gather data and review the effectiveness of the recently implemented referral process, identifying issues requiring attention.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst this process has recently been implemented, data is being gathered to enable a review to assess effectiveness and to identify any issues. A similar process is being implemented in Wyre Forest.”

    Source location

    2015-0002-Response-by-Worcestershire-Health-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a countywide standardised urgent-referral system with performance measures and a policy defining urgent and routine response timescales.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, it has not to date been the case that the same process applies in respect of the other areas in which the Trust provides services in Worcestershire, however we are working with the North CCG’s to address this, as it is our ambition to introduce a standardised system across the County. The Trust is working towards performance measures for all categories of referrals and will incorporate into a policy, which will distinguish between urgent and routine referrals with defined timescales for contact.”

    Source location

    2015-0002-Response-by-Worcestershire-Health-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the Redditch and Bromsgrove urgent-referral protocol, including triage within 24 hours and face-to-face assessment within 24 hours where required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I confirm that since receiving your correspondence the Trust has written to all general practitioners in Redditch & Bromsgrove on 4 February 2015 identifying a protocol for the referral of mental health patients and the timescales in which they can be seen. This clarifies that referrals marked urgent should be triaged within 24 hours. The triage process may involve a discussion with the referrer, a discussion with the individual and/or a face to face assessment.”

    Source location

    2015-0002-Response-by-Worcestershire-Health-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the standardised urgent-referral process in Wyre Forest.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst this process has recently been implemented, data is being gathered to enable a review to assess effectiveness and to identify any issues. A similar process is being implemented in Wyre Forest.”

    Source location

    2015-0002-Response-by-Worcestershire-Health-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The 4 July referral was received, and urgent follow-up was not initially indicated; it was scheduled for weekly multidisciplinary review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “One issue that I do need to raise with you is in respect of the referral from the Queen Elizabeth Hospital dated 4 July 2014 which you did not believe had been actioned by the community mental health team. Having reviewed this matter, it was clarified that the referral dated 4 July 2014 was received by the community mental health team on 11 July 2014. Discussion with the Queen Elizabeth RAID (rapid assessment interface, discharge) confirmed that at the point of the referral urgent follow-up was not indicated, as a result the referral was due to be reviewed by the weekly multidisciplinary team meeting.”

    Source location

    2015-0002-Response-by-Worcestershire-Health-Care-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 January 2015

    Open published response
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Ralph Stephen Goslin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ralph Stephen Goslin, an inpatient detained under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act, was found unresponsive in a bath on 21 June 2014 and died later that day in hospital. A concern was raised that a junior doctor did not recognise his sodium valproate level as subtherapeutic because of the reference range shown, delaying recognition of his failure to take anti-epilepsy medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of sodium valproate blood test reference ranges to clearly indicate the therapeutic range

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The junior doctor at St Pancras Hospital who first reviewed the UCH blood test result giving Mr Goslin’s sodium valproate level as less than 3, did not realise that this was sub therapeutic, because the reference range was given as less than 100, rather than 50-100 as it is in some other hospitals. This meant that Mr Goslin’s failure to take his anti epilepsy medication was not recognised as quickly as it could have been. ”

    Source location

    Ralph Stephen Goslin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    David Andrew Llewellyn O’GARRO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Andrew Llewellyn O’Garro suffered a sudden death in epilepsy while occupying a single cell at HMP Pentonville, with nobody present to raise the alarm during what was likely his final seizure. Concerns included the failure to complete or locate a cell sharing risk assessment and a lack of clarity and shared understanding among prison staff about ensuring prisoners with epilepsy had a cellmate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately record cell occupancy suitability

    Wider context from the report

    “The nurse who carried out the first reception screen of Mr O’Garro did not complete a cell sharing risk assessment (CSRA) indicating that he should share a cell, though she told me she knew that a person with epilepsy should not occupy a cell alone. She completed the computer record indicating that he was fit for any cell occupancy. No HMP Pentonville CSRA was ever found for Mr O’Garro. During the inquest: - one prison nurse appeared at times completely unfamiliar with the CSRA, and wholly unclear as to how to ensure (in 2012 or now) that prisoners with epilepsy would have a cellmate; - a prison doctor said that a locum doctor working at the prison might not even complete a CSRA because s/he would not know how the prison works; - one of the prison officers was unsure how a message from healthcare regarding cell sharing would reach any particular officer if s/he was away on the day it was entered into the observation book. Whilst I appreciate that you are making significant changes to the reception process for new prisoners, there appeared at inquest to be a lack of clarity and shared understanding among those working at HMP Pentonville. ”

    Source location

    David Andrew Llewellyn O’GARRO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure reliable communication of healthcare cell-sharing instructions to prison officers

    Wider context from the report

    “The nurse who carried out the first reception screen of Mr O’Garro did not complete a cell sharing risk assessment (CSRA) indicating that he should share a cell, though she told me she knew that a person with epilepsy should not occupy a cell alone. She completed the computer record indicating that he was fit for any cell occupancy. No HMP Pentonville CSRA was ever found for Mr O’Garro. During the inquest: - one prison nurse appeared at times completely unfamiliar with the CSRA, and wholly unclear as to how to ensure (in 2012 or now) that prisoners with epilepsy would have a cellmate; - a prison doctor said that a locum doctor working at the prison might not even complete a CSRA because s/he would not know how the prison works; - one of the prison officers was unsure how a message from healthcare regarding cell sharing would reach any particular officer if s/he was away on the day it was entered into the observation book. Whilst I appreciate that you are making significant changes to the reception process for new prisoners, there appeared at inquest to be a lack of clarity and shared understanding among those working at HMP Pentonville. ”

    Source location

    David Andrew Llewellyn O’GARRO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff knowledge and shared understanding of cell sharing risk assessment requirements

    Wider context from the report

    “The nurse who carried out the first reception screen of Mr O’Garro did not complete a cell sharing risk assessment (CSRA) indicating that he should share a cell, though she told me she knew that a person with epilepsy should not occupy a cell alone. She completed the computer record indicating that he was fit for any cell occupancy. No HMP Pentonville CSRA was ever found for Mr O’Garro. During the inquest: - one prison nurse appeared at times completely unfamiliar with the CSRA, and wholly unclear as to how to ensure (in 2012 or now) that prisoners with epilepsy would have a cellmate; - a prison doctor said that a locum doctor working at the prison might not even complete a CSRA because s/he would not know how the prison works; - one of the prison officers was unsure how a message from healthcare regarding cell sharing would reach any particular officer if s/he was away on the day it was entered into the observation book. Whilst I appreciate that you are making significant changes to the reception process for new prisoners, there appeared at inquest to be a lack of clarity and shared understanding among those working at HMP Pentonville. ”

    Source location

    David Andrew Llewellyn O’GARRO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete and retain cell sharing risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “The nurse who carried out the first reception screen of Mr O’Garro did not complete a cell sharing risk assessment (CSRA) indicating that he should share a cell, though she told me she knew that a person with epilepsy should not occupy a cell alone. She completed the computer record indicating that he was fit for any cell occupancy. No HMP Pentonville CSRA was ever found for Mr O’Garro. During the inquest: - one prison nurse appeared at times completely unfamiliar with the CSRA, and wholly unclear as to how to ensure (in 2012 or now) that prisoners with epilepsy would have a cellmate; - a prison doctor said that a locum doctor working at the prison might not even complete a CSRA because s/he would not know how the prison works; - one of the prison officers was unsure how a message from healthcare regarding cell sharing would reach any particular officer if s/he was away on the day it was entered into the observation book. Whilst I appreciate that you are making significant changes to the reception process for new prisoners, there appeared at inquest to be a lack of clarity and shared understanding among those working at HMP Pentonville. ”

    Source location

    David Andrew Llewellyn O’GARRO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Aimee Sarah VARNEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Aimee Sarah VARNEY died following a seizure from Sudden Unexpected Death in Epilepsy at her home address. The report identifies a concern that NICE guidance on referring patients with suspected epilepsy to a Specialist Tertiary Centre was not followed, and states that this represented a lost opportunity to diagnose and further treat her condition.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow NICE referral guidelines for patients with suspected epilepsy to a Specialist Tertiary Centre

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That the NICE Guidelines for referring a patient with suspected epilepsy to a Specialist Tertiary Centre were not followed. ”

    Source location

    Aimee Sarah VARNEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing systems for logging, disseminating and monitoring NICE guidelines are considered appropriate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Medical Director is responsible for ensuring every new NICE guideline is allocated to the relevant speciality. The appropriate Clinical Audit and Effectiveness Committee (CAEC) Lead, the Finance and the Clinical Director all receive copies for discussion and dissemination. As for all NHS bodies there are occasions where the hospital cannot immediately comply with NICE guidance. This can be due to resources and requires negotiation with our commissioners to fund, for example, high value new drug therapies.”

    Source location

    2014-0249-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 June 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NICE guidelines do not require rigid compliance; clinicians may appropriately depart from recommendations using professional clinical judgment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However it must be emphasised that they are guidelines, not tramlines that the treating clinician must rigidly follow. NICE state “...health and social care professionals are actively encouraged to follow our recommendations to help them deliver the highest quality care. Of course, our recommendations are not intended to replace the professional expertise and clinical judgement of health professionals, as they discuss treatment options with their patients.” There will be individual patients where the treating clinician uses their own judgement and does not follow the absolute guidance.”

    Source location

    2014-0249-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 June 2014

    Open published response
  9. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Clive William · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Clive William, a resident at Cae Glas Psychiatric Rehabilitation Care Home, died in bed on 21 October 2013. Concerns were raised about poor standards of care, missed medication and appointments, and a complaints process that could prevent concerns reaching senior management, potentially leaving residents at risk of harm.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the complaints procedure to escalate concerns to senior management

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Evidence was given by the family of Mr Clinton that they had complained to the manager of the Care Home on several occasions about the standard of care which was being provided to Mr Clinton, namely that they would often find him drenched in urine and faeces, that his soiled bedding and clothing would be left in his room, that there were occasions when he would not receive his prescribed medication and that he would sometimes medical appointments which had been arranged for him. (2) Evidence was also given by a representative of European Care who own the care home, confirming that although a complaints procedure exists within the organisation, the concerns of the family in this instance had not reached a senior level as should happen so that action could be taken. (3) My concerns relate to the apparent failings of a complaints procedure in which staff can effectively withhold concerns from senior management and the lack of information within the care home that could advise persons with concerns as to how they may direct their complaints to a more senior level of management within the organisation. In the absence of a truly robust system of complaint, it is possible that concerns may not be addressed in a timely fashion or at all and could ultimately place residents at risk of harm. ”

    Source location

    Clive William · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of information directing persons with concerns to senior management

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Evidence was given by the family of Mr Clinton that they had complained to the manager of the Care Home on several occasions about the standard of care which was being provided to Mr Clinton, namely that they would often find him drenched in urine and faeces, that his soiled bedding and clothing would be left in his room, that there were occasions when he would not receive his prescribed medication and that he would sometimes medical appointments which had been arranged for him. (2) Evidence was also given by a representative of European Care who own the care home, confirming that although a complaints procedure exists within the organisation, the concerns of the family in this instance had not reached a senior level as should happen so that action could be taken. (3) My concerns relate to the apparent failings of a complaints procedure in which staff can effectively withhold concerns from senior management and the lack of information within the care home that could advise persons with concerns as to how they may direct their complaints to a more senior level of management within the organisation. In the absence of a truly robust system of complaint, it is possible that concerns may not be addressed in a timely fashion or at all and could ultimately place residents at risk of harm. ”

    Source location

    Clive William · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Dafydd Rhys WATTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dafydd Rhys WATTS died of eosinophilic pericarditis and DRESS syndrome following treatment with levetiracetam for epilepsy. The report raised concern that the possibility of this exceptionally rare reaction and death was not drawn to physicians’ attention in the drug literature or BNF entry.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to draw physicians’ attention to the possibility of such an occurrence in drug literature or BNF entries

    Wider context from the report

    “Although the evidence suggests that this is only the fourth such death documented it appears that the possibility (albeit remote) of such an occurrence is not drawn to physicians attention in the drug literature or in the BNF entry. ”

    Source location

    Dafydd Rhys WATTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

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Classification: all classifications19 Sep 2013 – 7 Sep 2026 (Publication date)Recurring concern: all recurring concerns
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