Recurring concern

Failure to carry out required overnight checks

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First reported 28 Mar 2013•Latest report 28 Oct 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to carry out, complete or maintain required overnight checks or observations for care recipients, including missed checks caused by staff being occupied with other service users.

Not included

  • Excludes failures involving daytime or non-overnight checks unless they are part of the same explicitly required overnight checking process.
  • Excludes deficiencies in training, staffing, documentation or policy where the reports do not directly establish a failure of required overnight checks.
  • Excludes clinical escalation, treatment, handover or environmental-checking concerns that are not specifically manifestations of missed overnight checks.
Reports
8

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
9

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
17

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Care Quality Commission1
Care UK1
Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Home Office1
Independence Homes Limited1
Northside House1
Phoenix Care Centre1
Priory Group1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Alan HORROCKS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan Horrocks was admitted to hospital on 19 February 2025 with a suspected stroke, later diagnosed as viral encephalitis. He deteriorated, developing a Hyperosmolar Hyperglycaemic State and an upper gastrointestinal haemorrhage, and died on 17 March 2025 after treatment was withdrawn. The hospital investigation identified that overnight observations were not completed in accordance with escalation guidance and raised concerns about increased ward capacity without a corresponding increase in nursing establishment, alongside gaps in the existing nursing establishment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete ward observations in accordance with escalation guidance

    Wider context from the report

    “Following Mr Horrocks death an investigation was undertaken by the hospital, the report in respect thereof being provided to the court late on the afternoon 22 October 2025. The hospital investigation identified inter alia that observations were not completed on the ward overnight on 14 March 2025 in accordance with escalation guidance with no documented reason. Whilst the evidence did not identify Mr Horrocks "baseline" NEWS score, evidence at the inquest hearing from consultants involved in Mr Horrocks care identified a NEWS score of 5 required further observations and possible escalation. Further, that it was likely that there was an ongoing deterioration from late on 14 march 2025 into 15 March 2025 which was only appreciated further observations were undertaken shortly before midday on 15 March 2025 identifying an increase in the NEWS score to 12. The evidence indicated however that in Mr Horrocks case, even if his deterioration had been identified sooner, on a balance of probabilities, it would not have avoided his death when it occurred. The hospital investigation also identified that during this period the ward bed capacity had been increased from 27 to 33 beds owning to winter pressures with no corresponding change to the nursing establishment on the ward. Further, during this period there were gaps in the existing nursing establishment on the ward. Whilst the hospital investigation had identified these matters, there were no recommendations that these were issues for wider learning or how, if at all, these issues were to be addressed. ”

    Source location

    Alan HORROCKS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide documented staff feedback and mandatory retraining on NEWS escalation requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Once the patient safety event was recorded actions included local informal investigation, documented feedback, and mandatory retraining on NEWS.”

    Source location

    Response from Bradford Teaching Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate incident learning through ward safety huddles and the Sisters’ meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Lessons learned were shared through ward safety huddles at every handover for the week following the reporting of the incident in March 2025. Those in attendance at ward safety huddles are all ward nursing staff on that shift. They occur every morning and every night. To ensure embedding of the actions, the incident was discussed again by Matron at the Sisters’ meeting on 10th October 2025.”

    Source location

    Response from Bradford Teaching Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct weekly audits of patient observation charts and report the results to the Clinical Governance Committee.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, a weekly audit of 10 patient observation charts was commenced immediately following the incident being identified. No further omissions have been identified since implementation. Audit reports are retained for inspection. They are also reported to the Clinical Governance Committee.”

    Source location

    Response from Bradford Teaching Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response
  2. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Giuseppe TABONE and Andrew EVANS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Giuseppe Tabone and Andrew Evans died at HMP Lewes after intentionally inhaling isotonitazene, a synthetic opioid. Prison staff failed to carry out required roll checks at 7.30pm and 8.45pm on 27 June 2022, and the report raises concerns about staff compliance with, understanding of, and monitoring of required prisoner checks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out required prisoner roll checks

    Wider context from the report

    “At the inquest, two prison staff admitted that they had independently failed to carry out the required roll checks on L wing at 7.30pm and 8.45pm on the evening of 27 June 2022. One officer recorded on the wing log book that he had carried out the 7.30pm check, even though he did not do so. The other gave evidence that he did not carry out the 8.45pm check because he was distracted by the day shift officers, who were watching videos in the control room and were not responding to prisoner's cell bell calls. The staff members concerned have been subject to disciplinary proceedings, but continue to work at the prison. It was not possible to say on the evidence whether Andrew or Giuseppe’s lives could have been saved had the required roll checks been carried out. Evidence was given that, since this incident, staff have been provided with ‘bite size’ training on roll checks, although neither of the staff members concerned had received this training. I remain concerned that there is a risk of future deaths caused by prison staff at HMP Lewes failing to carry out the required checks on prisoners, particularly during the night state. The purpose of roll checks is to ensure that each prisoner is present and alive and well. If a roll check is not carried out, there is a risk that a prisoner in need of medical attention and unable to ring the cell bell could remain undiscovered until the morning. There was confusion from staff at the prison as to when full roll checks are required. Further, I am concerned that staff may know when roll checks are required but not fully understand the importance of carrying out every required check. Both staff members concerned were aware that the roll check was required, but did not carry it out because they thought that checks had been carried out by other staff members. I am also concerned that there are insufficient measures in place to monitor staff to ensure that all required checks are being carried out. There may be lessons that can be learnt from other prisons as to how to ensure checks are always carried out. ”

    Source location

    Giuseppe TABONE and Andrew EVANS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and clarify the roll-check local operating procedure, including required times and recording arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Governor of HMP Lewes has informed me that the prison’s LOP on roll checks was reviewed in August 2023 and clearly sets out the times that roll checks are required to be carried out and where staff must sign to confirm that the checks have been completed. The LOP provides guidance on checks during the week, on weekends and during the night state so that staff understand what their duties are at all times.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish staff notices reinforcing the importance of completing roll checks and prompting key safety observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am also informed that the prison has published notices to staff highlighting the importance of carrying out roll checks in line with expectations. A notice to staff was issued in August 2023 which prompts staff to consider three points when carrying out roll checks:”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue taking appropriate action, including disciplinary action where necessary, when staff fail to meet roll-check expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Staff are aware that CCTV is in use around the establishment and that their actions may be scrutinised following an incident such as a death in custody. If staff are found to have failed to carry out the required tasks or when there is a question over their performance and ability there will be a thorough investigation to determine what has happened and to ensure that staff who fail to uphold the values of HMPPS by putting prisoner’s safety at risk are held to account through disciplinary procedures. Staff are aware that failure to carry out the duties entrusted to them will result in disciplinary action, and that, depending on the circumstances, the outcome may range from advice and guidance in order to support them to perform better, to dismissal from the service.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver further bite-size roll-check training sessions, prioritising staff who previously lacked the training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that HMP Lewes has planned further sessions of ‘bite size’ training on roll checks. The two members of staff who gave evidence that they had not received the training will be required to attend as a priority. Additionally, the prison has received support from the standards coaching team, a national resource, which consisted of a team of experienced prison staff shadowing officers at HMP Lewes to provide support and on-the-job training. The team covered roll checks as part of the support.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide on-the-job roll-check support and training through standards coaching team staff shadowing officers at HMP Lewes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that HMP Lewes has planned further sessions of ‘bite size’ training on roll checks. The two members of staff who gave evidence that they had not received the training will be required to attend as a priority. Additionally, the prison has received support from the standards coaching team, a national resource, which consisted of a team of experienced prison staff shadowing officers at HMP Lewes to provide support and on-the-job training. The team covered roll checks as part of the support.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing roll-check assurance measures and staff accountability are considered sufficient; staff must be trusted to perform required duties.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that evidence was given at the inquest on the assurance measures in place for roll checks at the prison but that you remain concerned that the measures are insufficient. Whilst I am also concerned to learn of instances where staff have not carried out their duties in line with clear expectations, we must be able to trust staff to carry out the required tasks that are fundamental to their role. HMP Lewes also holds a daily briefing which provides an opportunity to update and remind staff of the duties to be carried out as well as to convey any other important information.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison and Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response
  3. Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Sheila Rosamund JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheila Rosamund JOHNSON died at Butterfly Hospice on 14 February 2021 after an unwitnessed fall at her care home caused multiple rib fractures and fatal injuries. Concerns included an inadequate generic falls prevention policy, unlocked doors to unoccupied rooms, an unlit night light in common areas, no bell-ringing signage, and inadequate records of nightly observations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequacy of periodic nightly observations

    Wider context from the report

    “5.Inadequate periodic nightly observations recorded at inquest. ”

    Source location

    Sheila Rosamund JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use an electronic care-planning system to record night checks and link them directly to residents’ care plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Inadequate periodic nightly observations recorded at inquest Our night checks are done every 2 hours and have always been done. We do not recall being asked about these records at the inquest. Care plans were submitted, but records of night checks are kept separate.”

    Source location

    Response from Phoenix Care Centre 2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use an electronic care-planning system to record two-hourly night checks and link them directly to residents’ care plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Inadequate periodic nightly observations recorded at inquest Our night checks are done every 2 hours and have always been done. We do not recall being asked about these records at the inquest. Care plans were submitted, but records of night checks are kept separate.”

    Source location

    Response from Phoenix Care Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Two-hourly night checks, previously inspected records, and electronic recording are considered sufficient observation arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Inadequate periodic nightly observations recorded at inquest Our night checks are done every 2 hours and have always been done. We do not recall being asked about these records at the inquest. Care plans were submitted, but records of night checks are kept separate.”

    Source location

    Response from Phoenix Care Centre 2
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Night checks were conducted every two hours, recorded separately or electronically, and regarded as standard practice accepted during regulatory inspections.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Inadequate periodic nightly observations recorded at inquest Our night checks are done every 2 hours and have always been done. We do not recall being asked about these records at the inquest. Care plans were submitted, but records of night checks are kept separate.”

    Source location

    Response from Phoenix Care Centre
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response
  4. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen Mark SHAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen Mark SHAYLOR was found hanging in his cell at HMP Exeter in the early hours of 1 January 2014 and was pronounced dead at 03:35. He was on a drug stabilisation regime and subject to healthcare night welfare checks. Concerns included the inadequacy of checks conducted through cell-door hatches, the absence of continuous CCTV monitoring, and the failure to carry out the 02:00 check.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Intermittent night welfare checks and ACCT observations

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Night welfare checks and observations on an ACCT document are at best intermittent and rely on continuous CCTV monitoring could spot a prisoner self-harming. ”

    Source location

    Stephen Mark SHAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct overnight welfare checks using daily printed checklists and review completed checks the following day.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Night welfare checks are carried out by Health Care Assistants (HCAs). At the start of the night shift, the nurse and HCA will print off the relevant welfare check list which will show all new additions made that day, as well as those prisoners who are already on the list. HCAs will then use that list and the printed template to assist them in conducting checks overnight. A copy of the template used was provided under cover of my first letter.”

    Source location

    2017-0380-Response-by-Care-UK
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have healthcare staff attend ACCT reviews, record their participation, and contribute substance-misuse and detoxification risk information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The ACCT process is a prison process and is operated and owned by HMPPS using prison documentation. To that extent, the overview and monitoring of the ACCT process does not sit with the healthcare team. However, any member of staff working at the prison can open an ACCT if they identify risks. Healthcare staff from the SMS, primary health or mental health team will attend ACCT reviews and record this on SystmOne. Therefore, these health care staff are responsible for contributing their knowledge regarding any risk factors which may include issues pertaining to substance misuse or detox. In my previous letter I had intended to underline that the use of the night welfare check has never been intended to replace ACCT documentation. This is simply because there are many prisoners suffering from substance withdrawal who would not require an ACCT; i.e.”

    Source location

    2017-0380-Response-by-Care-UK
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    HMPPS owns and operates the ACCT process; healthcare staff contribute risk information but do not oversee or monitor it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The ACCT process is a prison process and is operated and owned by HMPPS using prison documentation. To that extent, the overview and monitoring of the ACCT process does not sit with the healthcare team. However, any member of staff working at the prison can open an ACCT if they identify risks. Healthcare staff from the SMS, primary health or mental health team will attend ACCT reviews and record this on SystmOne. Therefore, these health care staff are responsible for contributing their knowledge regarding any risk factors which may include issues pertaining to substance misuse or detox. In my previous letter I had intended to underline that the use of the night welfare check has never been intended to replace ACCT documentation. This is simply because there are many prisoners suffering from substance withdrawal who would not require an ACCT; i.e.”

    Source location

    2017-0380-Response-by-Care-UK
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 February 2018

    Open published response
  5. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Thomas McManus · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Thomas McManus, who was detained under Section 37 of the Mental Health Act and resident at Chadwick Lodge, was found hanging from a bathroom door using a draw string bag after he was not visible during overnight checks on 8 December 2015. Concerns were raised about the unit’s observation system, including observations being conducted at fixed times, some not being carried out, and charts being completed retrospectively.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out required observations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The system of observations carried out within the unit, particularly at night is in need of reform. (2) Many of the nurses were conducting hourly observations every hour at the same time each hour, rather than randomly. (3) Some observations were not carried out and the observation chart completed at the end of the shift. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Thomas McManus · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Rebecca Gilbank · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rebecca Gilbank, a 25-year-old woman with severe myoclonic epilepsy and significant learning difficulties, was found unresponsive in bed at Clareville Lodge during the early hours of 12 May 2015. Staff were unable to obtain an outside telephone line from the office landline and used a personal mobile phone to call emergency services, while CPR was unsuccessful. The principal concerns were that a required 1.30am check had been missed because staff were attending to other service users, and that staff did not know how to obtain an outside line to emergency services, causing a delay of unknown duration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out required checks when staff are occupied with other service users

    Wider context from the report

    “Lack of check at 1.30am on 12 May 2015 Evidence at inquest revealed that the check was not carried out because the two members of waking night staff were busy dealing with other service users. The court heard evidence that this was not an isolated occurrence and that checks had been missed on other occasions in circumstances in which staff were dealing with other service users. ”

    Source location

    Rebecca Gilbank · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review available night staffing resources at services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have considered the staff resources that are available at our services during the night. We believe that sufficient waking night staff are made available at our services. If an individual’s assessed needs mean that they require one to one support or a higher ratio of waking night staff to service users, we note that it is the responsibility of the local authority or CCG to arrange a care and support package which meets those assessed needs and to fund it appropriately.”

    Source location

    2016-0266-Response-by-Independence-Homes
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing waking-night staffing is considered sufficient for assessed needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have considered the staff resources that are available at our services during the night. We believe that sufficient waking night staff are made available at our services. If an individual’s assessed needs mean that they require one to one support or a higher ratio of waking night staff to service users, we note that it is the responsibility of the local authority or CCG to arrange a care and support package which meets those assessed needs and to fund it appropriately.”

    Source location

    2016-0266-Response-by-Independence-Homes
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Local authorities or CCGs are responsible for arranging and funding higher staffing ratios required by assessed needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have considered the staff resources that are available at our services during the night. We believe that sufficient waking night staff are made available at our services. If an individual’s assessed needs mean that they require one to one support or a higher ratio of waking night staff to service users, we note that it is the responsibility of the local authority or CCG to arrange a care and support package which meets those assessed needs and to fund it appropriately.”

    Source location

    2016-0266-Response-by-Independence-Homes
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response
  7. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    JAMES DWAYNE CLARKE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Dwayne Clarke was involved in a motorcycle collision, became paraplegic and had a tracheotomy tube. After he was discharged home, carers failed to check him during parts of the night and did not notice that his tracheotomy tube had become blocked, resulting in his death. The principal concerns were that the standard of care was seriously lacking and that the carers had received theoretical but no practical training, potentially placing others receiving services at risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out required overnight checks

    Wider context from the report

    “My concerns are that two carers having been employed, the expectation was that one would be with James constantly. The written instructions from the care home said “Call is to check James throughout the night and carry out tracheotomy care/suction if necessary”. Whilst there was no further explanation of what “throughout the night” meant, the evidence I had was that the carers sat in a room on the other side of the corridor to James’ bedroom, they were watching television and playing computer games and talking, they did not check him between 1.a.m and 4.a.m. and again did not check him between 4.10 a.m and 6.a.m. and only then because his peg feed alarm sounded. He was found dead at that stage. The carers had had theoretical training, but no practical training had been given to them by the care company who employed them. Their employers were Complete Care Services, which is the trading name of C.C.S. Central Limited of West Midlands House, Gypsy Lane, Willenhall, Wolverhampton, West Midlands WV13 2HA and I was told that the company are registered with the Care Quality Commission. I was concerned that the standard of care provided for James was seriously lacking and that if that standard of care was reflected in the care given to others, to whom C.C.S. provided services, then there may be a risk to other members of the public. ”

    Source location

    JAMES DWAYNE CLARKE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear instructions defining required overnight checks

    Wider context from the report

    “My concerns are that two carers having been employed, the expectation was that one would be with James constantly. The written instructions from the care home said “Call is to check James throughout the night and carry out tracheotomy care/suction if necessary”. Whilst there was no further explanation of what “throughout the night” meant, the evidence I had was that the carers sat in a room on the other side of the corridor to James’ bedroom, they were watching television and playing computer games and talking, they did not check him between 1.a.m and 4.a.m. and again did not check him between 4.10 a.m and 6.a.m. and only then because his peg feed alarm sounded. He was found dead at that stage. The carers had had theoretical training, but no practical training had been given to them by the care company who employed them. Their employers were Complete Care Services, which is the trading name of C.C.S. Central Limited of West Midlands House, Gypsy Lane, Willenhall, Wolverhampton, West Midlands WV13 2HA and I was told that the company are registered with the Care Quality Commission. I was concerned that the standard of care provided for James was seriously lacking and that if that standard of care was reflected in the care given to others, to whom C.C.S. provided services, then there may be a risk to other members of the public. ”

    Source location

    JAMES DWAYNE CLARKE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carry out an unannounced responsive inspection of the care provider against safeguarding, risk, welfare and complaints requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of actions that we have undertaken, in May 2011 we carried out a responsive inspection unannounced. This was the service’s first inspection under the Health and Social Care Act 2008. This would have focused on the issues considered relevant at the point of inspection and any information of concern that we held. We inspected against four of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010. These were:”

    Source location

    2014-0398-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt the Health and Social Care Act 2008 fundamental standards, including requirements concerning personalised, safe and competent care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In April 2015 CQC will adopt the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, known as the “fundamental standards”. The changes in the regulations have emerged from the Robert Francis recommendations that there should be very obvious standards below which care must not fall. Regulation 9 will ensure that people receive care and treatment that is personalised for them and meets their needs; Regulation 12 is intended to prevent people from receiving unsafe care and treatment, and prevent avoidable harm or risk of harm. These regulations in particular will require providers to ensure that care is planned and delivered in a way that makes it crystal clear to care staff what is required of them, and that staff are experienced, trained and competent in the areas where they are providing that care.”

    Source location

    2014-0398-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop inspection processes using longer team-based inspections, consistent key lines of enquiry and service ratings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In implementing the new fundamental standards, our inspection processes have been developed. We will conduct longer, more in-depth inspections with a team approach designed to “get under the skin” of care services. We have key lines of enquiry which are explored and reported on consistently. Each care service will be rated either Outstanding, Good, Requires Improvement or Inadequate. We will continue to use our enforcement powers where services do not deliver safe services.”

    Source location

    2014-0398-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 September 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure the coroner’s report is noted and informs the provider’s next ratings inspection, including examination of processes and training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will ensure that your report is noted and informs the next ratings inspection that takes place of Complete Care Services; although the information is now a little dated the issues are well worth a further examination of their processes and training provision.”

    Source location

    2014-0398-Response-by-Care-Quality-Commission
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 September 2014

    Open published response
  8. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    SEBASTIAN VAUGHAN DAVIES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sebastian Vaughan Davies was a detained patient at the Norvic Clinic who became unresponsive after returning from unescorted leave and later died in hospital. The concerns related to whether hourly night-time observations adequately identified patients who had remained immobile or provided continuity between staff carrying out observations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to check whether patients have moved or remained immobile for an extended period during hourly observations

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence was given at the Inquest that there was a system of hourly observation checks on patients in their rooms during the course of a night shift. These consisted of shining a torch through the window in the door to the room and looking and listening for signs of breathing. However it was not routinely part of such observations to check whether the patient had moved or appeared to have remained immobile for an extended period unless there was a particular concern which there was not in Sebastian’s case. The observations were done in pairs and shared between the staff nurse on duty and the three support staff. However the same individuals did not carry out all the observations on any particular patient. There was therefore a lack of continuity. It was confirmed it was possible for a patient to be breathing but unconscious. Sebastian was heard to be snoring. Sebastian when found to be unresponsive at around 08:30 hours had a crush injury to his right arm. It was therefore apparent that he had been lying immobile on his arm for some extended period of time. Notwithstanding the Jury’s conclusion that the procedures at the Norvic Clinic could not have prevented Sebastian’s death I am nevertheless concerned that a failure to specifically check whether a patient has moved or rather remained immobile for an extended period on hourly observations (thereby indicating that perhaps they may have fallen unconscious) could in the future give rise to a preventable death and therefore there is a risk of future deaths occurring and that therefore a review may need to be undertaken of the procedure for night time hourly observations to specifically include whether a patient has moved or remained immobile for an extended period and whether a system can be devised to give better continuity of those undertaking observations of individual patients. ”

    Source location

    SEBASTIAN VAUGHAN DAVIES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026