Recurring concern

Failure to reliably detect illicit drug use

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First reported 24 Jul 2017•Latest report 4 Mar 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls specifically intended to detect illicit drug use, including drug-testing regimes, offender monitoring or comparable safety-critical detection arrangements, where the reports identify that illicit drug use could occur without being detected.

Not included

  • Excludes controls concerned solely with preventing drug access or supply, treating intoxication, or providing drug-related support when no failure to detect illicit drug use is identified.
  • Excludes detection of prescription medicines, medication misuse or non-illicit substances unless the assertion explicitly concerns illicit drug use.
  • Excludes generic monitoring, testing or information-sharing deficiencies where illicit drug-use detection is not the bounded safety concern.
  • Excludes isolated factual drug-use outcomes without an identified deficiency in a dedicated detection control.
Reports
8

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
9

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2017–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
6

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Ministry of Justice2
Birmingham City Council1
College of Policing1
Department for Education1
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Haulage Contractors Ltd1
Health and Safety Executive1
Home Office1
Learning Together CIC1
Ministry of Defence1
NHS England1
Office for Students1
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust1
Probation Service1
Recipient name withheld1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Lee Martin Hughes, also known as Martin Lee Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee Martin Hughes was found deceased in his cell at HMP Wandsworth on 25 December 2021 while remanded in custody. The medical cause of death was methadone and benzodiazepine intoxication, and the jury concluded that drug-related misadventure was contributed to by neglect. Concerns included the assessment and prescribing of methadone, failure to respond appropriately to signs of sedation and impaired consciousness, and inadequate communication and escalation between healthcare disciplines.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of near-patient illicit-drug testing for assessing intoxication

    Wider context from the report

    “6. That there should be tests available for illicit drugs from near patient testing to allow a clinician to better assess a patient showing signs of intoxication. ”

    Source location

    Mr Lee Martin Hughes, also known as Martin Lee Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Stock and mandate near-patient urine drug testing for patients presenting with sedation of unknown cause, making tests available to clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. HMP Wandsworth has investigated the commercially available near patient urine tests for drugs, including psychoactive substances (‘spice’). HMP Wandsworth now stock a test which detects a wider variety of prescribed and illicit drugs. These tests are now mandated for patients who present with sedation of unknown cause. The limitations of these tests, particularly false negatives, are well known to substance misuse practitioners. However, they are a useful aid to the management of patients whose urine test suggests continuing illicit drug use on a prison wing. These tests are currently being used and are available to all clinicians.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing urine testing is considered sufficient to inform clinical reviews and substance misuse prescribing decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. There should be tests available for illicit drugs for near patient testing to allow clinicians to better assess a patient showing signs of intoxication.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response
  2. Hertfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    KRISTOPHER COREY JAMIE LEE TILBURY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kristopher Corey Jamie Lee Tilbury died in his prison cell at HMP The Mount after smoking a synthetic cannabinoid and consuming alcohol, causing respiratory depression. The report raised concerns that illicit drugs and alcohol remained widely available at the prison, including on a wing for prisoners with substance misuse issues, creating a significant risk of future deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete suspicion drug tests

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) In May 2018 (16 months before Mr Tilbury’s death) HMP the Mount was subject to an inspection by HM Inspectorate for Prisons. The Inspectors found that levels of violence were comparatively high and mostly related to drugs and debt. They found that less than half of required intelligence led searches were completed and most suspicion drugs tests were missed. They reported that mandatory drug testing indicated that nearly a third of prisoners were using illicit drugs, and that this undermined the prison’s ability to remain safe. The inspectors found that drug supply reduction work was weak and not embedded in the wider strategy, and that half of the prisoners said it was easy to access illicit drugs. The proportion of positive mandatory drug tests, including for psychoactive substances (████████), was high at 32%. (2) In the report of the Independent Monitoring Board for the year to February 2019 it was noted that drugs were widely available in the prison. (3) Mr Tilbury died on 24th September 2019 and was found dead in his cell. The medical cause of his death was established by the pathologist at the inquest as respiratory depression caused by the combined use synthetic cannabinoids and alcohol. (4) The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman carried out an independent investigation into the death of Mr Tilbury on 24th September 2019 at the Mount. The report was produced, as a result of this investigation, in March 2020. The report concluded that it was extremely troubling that Mr Tilbury was able to access and use illicit substances, including Psychoactive Substances, with apparent ease at The Mount, particularly as he lived on a wing for prisoners with substance misuse issues. The report concluded that much more needed to be done to tackle the issue of illicit substances at the prison, and the Governor should ensure that key drug issues at the Mount are identified and that the prison’s local drug strategy be appropriately revised to address them. (5) Since the death of Mr Tilbury, and the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman’s, report four other prisoners have died at HMP The Mount as a result of taking ████████, namely: a. Prisoner X ████████ – died on 14th July 2022 b. Prisoner Y ████████ – died on 25th July 2022 c. Prisoner Z ████████ – died on 6th January 2023 d. Prisoner W ████████ – died on 26th January 2023 (6) At the inquest the court heard evidence from prison officers that they encountered ‘spice’ every day in the prison and the problem of drugs in the prison in seems to be the same as it was in 2019. (7) At the inquest the Head of Safety at HMP The Mount advised the court that the percentage of positive Mandatory Drug Tests in 2023 (at the date of the inquest) was 26.21% (compared to 32% in 2018). ████████The Head of Safety advised that drugs are brought into HMP The Mount by a number of ways ████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ (9) Four years after the death of Mr Tilbury, drugs and alcohol are still widely available in HMP The Mount, and continue to create a significant risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    KRISTOPHER COREY JAMIE LEE TILBURY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Darrell Lee DEVLIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darrell Lee Devlin died at home on 23 February 2021 after being unwell with a chest infection and while receiving methadone treatment. The inquest record reported active bronchopneumonia and an extremely high level of Flubromazolin in his bloodstream. Concerns focused on reliance on telephone contacts, the absence of in-person assessment and drug testing, and the resulting difficulty in assessing and supporting him while receiving treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to test drug and alcohol service clients for drug use

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Darrell first came into contact with Unity (the drug and alcohol service that your trust was contracted to provide for Cumbria) in 2015. and his final episode of care began on 30th January 2020 when he self referred to ask for treatment for daily heroin use. At the time of his death he was receiving a daily dose of ████████ Methadone supplied every week. Evidence heard at the inquest covered the final 7 months of this treatment episode, during this period I heard of 6 telephone contacts, the last just 18 days before Darrell died, however he was never seen in person and never tested for drug use. (2) Apart from admitting to a single bag of heroin on 1 occasion Darrell consistently told his drug workers that he was abstinent from illicit drugs or alcohol and was well maintained on his daily dose of methadone. The forensic toxicology report (of which I attach a copy for your information) however indicates he was almost certainly not truthful. I am concerned that reliance on remote contacts and lack of testing make it very difficult for drug workers to accurately assess and support their clients, and put the clients at risk of harm or death due to excessive dosage or polydrug exposure on top of their regular medication, as in this case. I am aware that face to face appointments were avoided where possible due to the Covid pandemic but feel this case highlights a need for more effective supervision than that given to Darrell. ”

    Source location

    Darrell Lee DEVLIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issued staff guidance requiring first appointments to be face to face and ensuring each service user receives a drug test within 12 months.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For high-risk service users face to face reviews were always maintained, however, for the remaining service users, action plans were put in place to re-introduce face-to-face appointments for all other service users. The service issued guidance to all staff advising all first appointments should be face to face and specific guidance in ensuring everybody had been drug tested within a 12-month period. Service User contact information is closely monitored by the Senior Leadership Team monthly and by local managers on a weekly basis.”

    Source location

    2021-0397-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Drug-test service users who have not received testing within the previous 12 weeks using urinalysis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted in your findings, it was highlighted that Mr Develin had not been seen face to face nor was a drug screen provided in his last treatment episode with Unity. Humankind’s mobilisation strategy for Cumbria, which reflects the national Humankind approach, concentrates on the following:”

    Source location

    2021-0397-Response-from-Humankinds_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain at least 12-weekly drug testing and face-to-face reviews for service users.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Humankind follows best practice as stated in NICE guidelines and The Drug Misuse and Dependence guidelines on clinical management (Orange Book), in respect of ensuring that the following takes place every 12 weeks as a minimum:”

    Source location

    2021-0397-Response-from-Humankinds_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Routine drug screening was replaced by clinically risk-based testing during COVID-19 restrictions, and wider benzodiazepine screening was not considered clinically indicated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Due to the restrictions related to Covid-19, Unity had not been completing routine drug screens on the usual basis. Instead, the use of the drug screens was determined by clinical risk and need.”

    Source location

    2021-0397-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Available drug-testing technologies could not detect flubromazolam, preventing its identification through testing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mr Devlin was prescribed clonazepam by his GP to treat his epilepsy, meaning any drug test for benzodiazepines would be expected to show as positive. Furthermore, Unity had no suspicion that Mr Devlin was using illicit benzodiazepines and, as flubromazolam is a novel benzodiazepine, none of the drug testing technologies afforded to Unity used would have been able to detect it. The Verum screen which became available after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic (July 2020) can detect up to 50 substances, could allow the identification of a wider range of benzodiazepines but based on Mr Devlin’s history, Unity would not have considered this was clinically indicated throughout his treatment.”

    Source location

    2021-0397-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Humankind, the current Cumbria service provider, was developing its own response and would take forward the reported issues.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. I note that since Darrell's death the contract to provide drug and alcohol services in Cumbria has transferred to Humankind, and thus I am addressing the report to them as well while acknowledging that they played no part in Darrell's care.”

    Source location

    2021-0397-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 November 2021

    Open published response
  4. London City

    AI-generated summary

    Saskia Jones and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 29 November 2019, Usman Khan carried out a terrorist attack at Fishmongers’ Hall, fatally stabbing Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt before being fatally shot by firearms officers on London Bridge. The report raised concerns about risk assessment and communication for events involving high-risk offenders, and about the assessment, information-sharing, supervision and management of terrorist offenders released into the community.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to detect Class A drug use by terrorist offenders on licence

    Wider context from the report

    “The facts of this case give cause for concern that a terrorist offender on licence, who was subject both to strict licence conditions and to a priority investigation, could obtain and use Class A drugs without that being detected. ”

    Source location

    Saskia Jones and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 29 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assess how to make best use of drug-testing capabilities for offenders on licence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We are considering this recommendation to ensure that we are making best use of our drug testing abilities.”

    Source location

    2021-0362-Response-from-MoJ_Published
    Page 10 · response
    Published 3 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Other bodies are taking forward substantive work on the concerns, so further College guidance or training would risk duplicating their work.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In developing our response, we are grateful to the other addressees (and national Counter Terrorism policing) who have shared their responses with us. We note from their responses that these addressees have taken forward, or plan to take forward, substantive work to address the seven MCs listed above.”

    Source location

    2021-0362-Response-from-College-of-Policing_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 November 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Drug-testing licence conditions must satisfy necessity and proportionality requirements and specified statutory criteria, limiting wider testing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Currently, a licence condition to comply with drug testing is considered in all cases where substance abuse is linked to the index offence. All licence conditions must meet the ‘necessary and proportionate’ test and current policy (PI 2014 32) states that to impose a drug testing condition/requirement:”

    Source location

    2021-0362-Response-from-MoJ_Published
    Page 10 · response
    Published 3 November 2021

    Open published response
  5. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Mr John Gogarty · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr John Gogarty was unlawfully killed at his home on 13 July 2015 by two people who planned to steal money to pay a drug debt; he was stabbed 69 times. The report identified missed opportunities and inadequate monitoring by the Probation Service, including failures relating to licence breaches, drug testing and recall. It also identified a missed opportunity for information about an offender’s relationship with a female patient to be shared with the Probation Service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain random drug testing for people not resident at a Probation Hostel

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence showed that there was appropriate random drug testing for ████████ whilst he was resident at the Probation Hostel. However, when he left the hostel there was no system in place for random testing. This, in the view of the court, was a relevant issue. It is accepted that the evidence further showed that there is now a system in place for random testing of those not resident at a Probation Hostel. However, the purpose of this Regulation 28 report is to underline the courts view of the importance of such testing. Should a time come in the future when the operation of random testing becomes more difficult, whether through financial restraint or otherwise, the court will be concerned if random testing was stopped. ”

    Source location

    Mr John Gogarty · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Austin Allen Ellsum THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Austin Allen Ellsum THOMAS died after being struck by a Volvo shovel loader truck while walking on the factory floor at a paper mill on 6 February 2017. The concerns identified were the potential distraction caused by music played at high volume in heavy machinery and the absence of random drug testing for employees operating heavy machinery, particularly drivers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of random drug testing for drivers operating heavy machinery

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) I heard evidence from an expert vehicle examiner who upon examination of the volvo shovel loader truck involved in the fatal accident found a CD in the CD compartment within the drivers cab of the truck. This CD player allowed CD’s to be played to a volume level of 32. I heard no evidence as to when the CD was last listened to however, I am concerned that there exists an inbuilt facility for drivers to listen to music at high levels when operating heavy machinery in a confined space such as the warehouse. Whilst I heard evidence that a new radio communication system would cut out any music playing in the truck cab I am concerned that the levels of volume are such that they could provide a distraction for a driver. I also heard evidence that whilst instances of pedestrians and vehicles moving on the factory floor at the same time had been significantly reduced, it had not been eliminated altogether. The combination of a driver being distracted listening to music in a contained environment where heavy machinery is being operated presents a risk of future deaths. Whilst neither the existence of the CD player nor the playing of any CD was involved in this inquest, having raised the concern at the end of the inquest, no policy or working rules or regulations relating to the listening of music and or CD’s whilst operating machinery for employees at the paper mill factory or any factory owned and operated by Downtons or UPM was brought to my attention. I make it clear that this issue played no part in the inquest of the deceased. (2) The inquest heard evidence as to the levels of cannabis in the blood of the driver of the shovel loader truck some 7 hours after the fatal incident. No evidence was available as to the levels of cannabis in the drivers system at the time of the fatal incident. The inquest heard evidence from the driver himself as to his cannabis use which included an admission that he had smoked cannabis on his own evidence the night before commencing an early shift the following day. The inquest also heard evidence that the drivers admitted use of cannabis was not consistent with the levels detected in his blood. I have been provided with a drugs policy from the factory operator which provides for drug testing on a ‘show cause’ basis only. There is no policy in relation to random testing particularly for drivers operating heavy machinery. Given the evidence heard at the inquest I am concerned that an employee may use drugs without the knowledge of his employer and continue to operate heavy machinery creating a risk of future deaths. I note that the policy I have been provided with does not appear to have been reviewed or updated following the incident resulting in the death of Mr Thomas in February 2017. ”

    Source location

    Austin Allen Ellsum THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Imtiaz Mohammed · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Imtiaz Mohammed died in a serious road traffic collision in Birmingham on 17 December 2017, when a taxi was struck by an Audi travelling at between 94 and 100 mph. Toxicology showed the taxi driver was over the legal drug-driving limit for a cocaine metabolite, and concerns were raised that there was no system to monitor whether taxi drivers were over the drug limit while driving.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of monitoring and testing of taxi drivers for compliance with drug-driving limits

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Toxicology was obtained for the deceased who was driving the Taxi involved in the collision. This confirmed the following blood levels: Cocaine 0.010mg/l Benzoylecgonine (a cocaine metabolite) 0.40mg/l Carboxy THC 0.10 mg/l The level of the cocaine metabolite would have resulted in the deceased being over the legal drug driver limit. This did not contribute to this collision. However the Midlands Police raised concerns at the inquest that there was presently no system in place to monitor and check whether taxi drivers are over the drug limit whilst driving. They confirmed in evidence that some sort of testing was required for the safety of passengers. ”

    Source location

    Imtiaz Mohammed · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mandatory drug screening for professional drivers is not planned because police roadside powers address suspected drug or alcohol impairment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the present time, there are no plans to introduce mandatory drug screening procedures for professional drivers. Police already have powers to stop drivers at the roadside if they believe that the driver is impaired by drugs (such as cocaine and cannabis) or alcohol and to charge them if they are found to be driving while unfit, through drink or drugs.”

    Source location

    2018-0170-Response-by-Department-for-Transport
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response
  8. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Ben Alan Jukes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ben Alan Jukes was an army captain serving in the Royal Corps of Signals; the supplied text does not state the circumstances or date of his death. The report identified concerns that army drug testing failed to detect his regular heroin and cocaine use, that he was forewarned of at least one test and evaded it, and that he supplied heroin to homeless drug users in Manchester city centre.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of army drug-testing to detect illicit drug use

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Whatever drug-testing regime may have been operated by the army during the five year period failed to detect Captain Jukes' regular use of heroin and cocaine. More regular testing by the army in that period would have increased the likelihood of detection. ”

    Source location

    Ben Alan Jukes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of drug testing to remain random and unannounced

    Wider context from the report

    “3. It appears that on at least one occasion as set out above Captain Jukes was forewarned of a drug test. 4. Thus forewarned, Captain Jukes was easily able to evade the drug test which would as a near certainty have exposed him as a user of heroin and cocaine. 5. Unless drug testing is random and unannounced it will fail to detect illicit drug use among servicemen and women. Failure to detect illicit drug use increases the likelihood of further deaths as a result of the same. ”

    Source location

    Ben Alan Jukes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reiterate the need for absolute discretion to units when notifying them of compulsory drug-testing visits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The initial notification of the visit will be made through the Adjutant, who is expected to notify the Commanding Officer. Prior notification is necessary to enable this core element of the unit command structure to plan the support required from the unit to facilitate the testing and to make contingencies for the disruption of unit activity that will occur as a result of testing. It will also enable the Adjutant to make an assessment of the number of personnel expected to be in barracks and thus available for testing at the time of the scheduled CDT visit. In doing so, the Commanding Officer and his immediate team will manage the information with the utmost discretion to avoid pre-warning anyone not required to know in advance. In future, the need for absolute discretion will be reiterated to units as part of their initial notification.”

    Source location

    2017-0335-Response-by-MOD
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Frequent testing sufficient to ensure detection of all drug misuse is impracticable because traces may leave the body before testing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is further acknowledged that CDT can only act as a deterrent – it cannot detect misuse at a time after the traces of misuse have left the body and are no longer detectable. It is therefore impracticable for the Army to test each soldier and officer frequently enough to ensure that all drugs misuse is always detected. Nonetheless, the combined effect of education and deterrence are assessed to have effect. The 2015/16 Crime Survey of England and Wales reports drug misuse across society to be at 8.4% or 1 in 12. While any misuse in the Army is unacceptable and strenuous efforts to reduce it continue, the level of misuse in the Army is reported at 0.7 – 0.9%.”

    Source location

    2017-0335-Response-by-MOD
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Education and deterrence through the existing drug misuse strategy are assessed as effective despite testing not detecting every instance of misuse.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Army’s drug misuse strategy was revised in November 2016. It is based on three pillars: prevention through education, deterrence through testing, and regulation. Education begins from initial entry into military service, whether it be as an officer or a soldier. It is made quite clear through education to all Service Personnel that the misuse of controlled drugs is incompatible with military service. It is also made clear during this education that Service Personnel have a personal responsibility to adhere to these values and standards.”

    Source location

    2017-0335-Response-by-MOD
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Advance notification of testing is necessary to plan operational support and manage disruption, although information is to be handled discreetly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CDT visits are scheduled by the CDT team with unit notification usually made with as little as 24 hours’ notice. This period of notice will only be varied in exceptional circumstances, such as when security clearances for Northern Ireland are required or where there is a specific intelligence led need.”

    Source location

    2017-0335-Response-by-MOD
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2017

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026