Recurring concern

Failure to reliably escalate suicidal intent information

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First reported 13 Feb 2014•Latest report 18 Jun 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of healthcare, care or police processes specifically dedicated to recognising, transferring, reviewing or escalating expressed or recorded suicidal intent or related imminent self-harm information, including delayed escalation, omitted handover information and failure to act on documented suicidal intent.

Not included

  • Excludes general mental-health deterioration, suicide-risk assessment, observation, treatment or safeguarding failures where suicidal-intent information escalation is not the specific unsafe condition.
  • Excludes generic communication, documentation or handover deficiencies without an identified suicidal-intent or imminent self-harm information context.
  • Excludes failures to escalate unrelated clinical abnormalities, welfare concerns or staffing problems.
  • Excludes failures concerning access to self-harm means or protective-factor provision where the information-escalation process is not deficient.
Reports
10

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
12

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
12

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England4
Home Office2
Metropolitan Police Service2
Calderdale Borough Council1
Cygnet Health Care Limited1
Dyfed-Powys Police1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
HM Prison Service1
Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust1
Manchester Prison1
Ministry of Justice1
NHS Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Integrated Care Board1
Samaritans1
Springfield University Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Jacob Lee Shorter · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jacob Lee Shorter, who was receiving support after leaving long-term foster care, died after entering the train tracks at Heeley Loop in Sheffield on 1 January 2024 and being struck by a train. The report raised concern that an independent visitor’s knowledge of Jacob’s previous suicidal ideation was not shared with his foster carer or other relevant people, and that the training and escalation arrangements for such disclosures were unclear.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to pass on suicidal ideation information to foster carers or other relevant people

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Whilst the Independent Visitor was made aware of previous suicidal ideation this was not passed on to the foster carer or anyone else. Calderdale were unable to tell me of the training they receive or the escalation route for concerns or disclosures of this type. There is a clear risk that if this type of information is not passed on and adequate training is not provided in terms of mental health then this could cause future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Jacob Lee Shorter · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver comprehensive safeguarding, confidentiality, disclosure, welfare and mental-health training to Independent Visitor volunteers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Training”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale Council
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Independent Visitor volunteers to follow a safeguarding code and health-and-safety procedure specifying when concerns must be reported or disclosed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All Independent Visitors Volunteers adhere to the Council’s “Safeguarding Code of Conduct for Independent Visitors.” The Code forms part of the agreement for Independent Visitors to work as a volunteer. The Safeguarding Code is specific and sets out the circumstances in which disclosure should take place by stating:”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale Council
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Relevant information was promptly passed to the Pathways Team, and no imminent risk justified sharing it with the foster carer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Independent Visitor volunteer called the Independent Visitor team on Monday 4th December 2023 and reported in detail what Jacob had disclosed.”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale Council
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 June 2024

    Open published response
  2. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew David Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew David Harris was found suspended in his cell at HMP Long Lartin on 27 May 2022 and died from his injuries at Alexandra Hospital, Redditch, on 29 May 2022. The inquest concluded that he died by suicide. The principal concern was that recent suicidal ideation disclosed during a police interview was not recorded on the documents accompanying him between police custody, court and prison, potentially leading to the risk of suicide or self-harm being underestimated or ignored.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record suicidal ideation on Person Escort Records and Suicide and Self-Harm Warning forms

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Following his arrest, and before he was interviewed about the alleged offence of murder, Mr. Harris was assessed by a consultant forensic psychiatrist, ████████ concluded that Mr. Harris was fit to be detained and fit to be interviewed, he did not possible symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, likely due to some trauma in Mr. Harris’ background, possible symptoms of a personality disorder, and “potentially a psychotic process, with potential underlying delusional beliefs”; (2) During his police interview on 14.5.22, when describing his movements before the alleged murder had taken place, Mr. Harris told officers he had ████████ intending to jump off in order to take his own life, but had decided against it because “I thought no, I’ve got to reveal all this first”; (3) Despite the fact that these comments revealed very recent suicidal ideation on Mr. Harris’ part, no mention of them appears to have been made in any of the following documents: (a) The Person Escort Record ( PER ) and Suicide and Self-Harm ( SASH ) Warning forms which accompanied Mr. Harris from police custody at Haverfordwest Police Station to Haverfordwest Magistrates’ Court on 16.5.22; (b) The PER and SASH Warning forms which accompanied Mr. Harris from Haverfordwest Magistrates’ Court to HMP Swansea later that same day. (4) Although I was quite satisfied that the omission of these comments from the above documents made no difference to the sad outcome in this case, I am concerned that the failure by Dyfed-Powys Police officers to realise that such comments ought to be included on a PER and SASH Warning form, if repeated in future, may lead to a person in custody’s risk of suicide and/or self-harm, being either underestimated, or ignored completely. ”

    Source location

    Matthew David Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inform investigation and custody staff, anonymously, about the omission of relevant suicidal-ideation information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To confirm, on 1st August 2023 via my Head of Custody Services, all staff involved in investigations and those responsible for the care of detainees whilst in police custody have been informed, in an anonymized manner, of the nature of the omission in this case.”

    Source location

    Response from Dyfed-Powys Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Instruct custody officers to ask interviewing officers about information relevant to ongoing detainee risk assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Custody Officers have been instructed to specifically ask interviewing officers whether they have any information that is relevant to the ongoing duty of risk assessment; information needed to best manage the welfare of the detainee.”

    Source location

    Response from Dyfed-Powys Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind investigators to inform custody officers about disclosures relevant to ongoing risk management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, investigators have been reminded of their duty to inform the custody officer of any information disclosed to them that should be considered as part of ongoing risk management.”

    Source location

    Response from Dyfed-Powys Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Heather Findlay was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act at Mile End Hospital and ran away while on escorted leave on 11 June 2020. She was later found by a member of the public in a nearby park; the inquest concluded that she died by suicide, with a medical cause of death of hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and ████████ toxicity. The principal concerns included staff preparedness and procedures when a detained patient absconds, unclear responsibilities between ELFT and the police, communication of suicide risk, and the adequacy of risk grading and organisational learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate the appropriate level of suicide risk to police

    Wider context from the report

    “6. ELFT staff all told me that, after Ms Findlay had run off, they still graded her as medium rather than high risk. She had had long term suicidal thoughts, had made previous attempts on her life and, prior to being admitted to hospital on 20 May 2020 had purchased ████████ and had planned to take this to kill herself. However, she had appeared to improve in hospital, and had been granted 15 minutes’ escorted leave twice a day since 1 June without incident. At one point in her evidence it appeared to me that the matron, taking the point that by running away Ms Findlay had acted in a manner that was wholly unexpected by the trust, was of the view that Ms Findlay should then have been re-categorised as high risk. However, following re-examination by counsel for ELFT the matron appeared to retract this and to return to her former position that, even after she had run away Ms Findlay was only of medium risk to herself. It is of course a matter of clinical opinion what risk grading a patient should be given, and no person can see into the future. However, • the jury found a failure by ELFT to recognise that, by 11 June 2020, Ms Findlay was at imminent risk of suicide by ████████; and • any investigation following a death like Heather Findlay’s presents an opportunity for sober and searching reflection. So I am concerned that an element of positional bias may have influenced the thinking of ELFT staff. I am concerned about this particularly because, when giving evidence at inquest, the ELFT serious incident investigation author was adamant that it was only appropriate for the HCA who called the police on 11 June 2020 after Ms Findlay had run away, to tell the police of a risk of self harm not of a risk of suicide. Her rationale for this was that the last time Ms Findlay had articulated a plan to kill herself, was when she was found in hospital with a ligature round her neck on 28 May 2020. This position seems lacking the necessary reflection. I draw your attention to earlier prevention of future deaths reports (PFDs) as follows: • Sent to ELFT on 8 June 2023 by Assistant Coroner Buckett following the inquest touching the death of Hilary (Billy) Guedalla, including concern regarding the failure of ELFT to inform the police of the serious suicide risk that the deceased posed to themselves; and the confusion among staff about who should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing. • Sent to ELFT on 25 January 2023 by me following the inquest touching the death of Andrew Largin, including concern about omissions from a serious incident investigation. • Sent to ELFT on 20 October 2021 by me following the inquest touching the death of Freeda Glausiusz, including concern about a lack of learning culture at ELFT. ”

    Source location

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Right Care, Right Person approach with health partners, aligning policies, terminology and information requirements for risk assessment and police support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, ████████, wrote to Health and Social Care Partners on 24th May 2023, to set out the Met Police’s intention to implement the national Right Care, Right Person approach. Under Assistant Commissioner ████████ a team is now working to put this in place, and an initial senior board has taken place with senior health and social care providers to work towards RCRP implementation. This is also in parallel with the work being done by health care providers on the London mental health concordat. A key aspect of this is working with all of the”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Many concerns concern East London Foundation Trust and Metropolitan Police policy, making NHS England inappropriate to respond to them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The concerns in your Report relate to organisational policy at East London Foundation Trust as well as policy within the Metropolitan Police Service. NHS England is not therefore the appropriate organisation to respond to many of the concerns raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response
  4. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Imane Bouasbia · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Imane Bouasbia was sexually assaulted on 1 January 2020 and subsequently expressed suicidal thoughts to police. On 3 January 2020, she stepped in front of a moving Central Line tube train at Newbury Park Station and was killed instantly. The principal concerns were failures to communicate her suicidal thoughts, complete a self-harm or suicide risk assessment, and respond adequately to her text message indicating suicidal thoughts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate expressed suicidal intent in the handover

    Wider context from the report

    “a. The failure of Officer 1 to effectively communicate to Officer 2 either verbally or in the CRIS handover, that Ms Bouasbia had expressed the view that she wished to end her own life following the attack she sustained on 1st Jan 2020. ”

    Source location

    Imane Bouasbia · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Trial the THRIVE+ vulnerability assessment framework to assess and document vulnerability, including suicidal thoughts, and support ongoing risk review and information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MPS has introduced a THRIVE+ vulnerability assessment, which is currently being trialled and is anticipated to be rolled out across the organisation in April 2021. It is a set of principles and a framework to assess the type of policing response or investigation required for a particular set of circumstances. THRIVE covers: Threat – Harm – Risk – Investigation – Vulnerability – Engagement + Prevention/Intervention. The framework is a tool that aligns to, and enhances, the National Decision Model and includes the assessment and ongoing review of risk during investigations. It also provides a common language around risk to improve information sharing and decision-making.”

    Source location

    2020-0234-Response-from-MPS-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish an Operational Notice requiring staff to review police indices before victim contact, communicate identified vulnerabilities, and record them on the CRIS report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To immediately address the lessons learned prior to the full introduction of THRIVE+, on 18th December 2020 an Operational Notice was published on the MPS internal website informing all staff, including SOIT officers, that they must review all police indices, including the CAD, prior to contact with the victim. Any identified vulnerabilities must be communicated to the investigating officer or their supervisor and noted on the CRIS report. This will also be addressed in future Continuous Professional Development days for all officers, commencing in February 2021 for SOIT officers.”

    Source location

    2020-0234-Response-from-MPS-Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a mandatory enhanced SOIT risk assessment covering suicide, cultural complexities and honour-based violence, with police-indices review, CRIS recording and supervisor escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MPS has introduced a newly enhanced SOIT risk assessment that specifically covers suicide, cultural complexities and concerns around honour-based violence. It also mandates that the SOIT officer review all police indices including the CAD. The new risk assessment is mandatory for all SOIT officers to complete before speaking to a complainant and must be recorded on the CRIS report and brought to the attention of a supervisor if there is anything of concern.”

    Source location

    2020-0234-Response-from-MPS-Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 December 2020

    Open published response
  5. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Rebecca Jane Hursey · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rebecca Jane Hursey died at St George’s Hospital on 4 May 2018 after taking an aspirin overdose while detained under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act and receiving care on the Avalon Ward. The report identifies concerns about suicidal-risk information not being verbally communicated during handover, observations and searches not mitigating her self-harm risk, and the prolonged failure to find a suitable alternative placement.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to verbally communicate increased suicidal risk to the responsible nurse

    Wider context from the report

    “2. That practitioners who recognise increase in suicidal risk of a patient should pass this on verbally to the nurse on charge of the ward or the nurse allocated to the patient. ”

    Source location

    Rebecca Jane Hursey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    John Michael KIRBY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Michael KIRBY took his own life, according to the conclusion of the inquest. The concerns included delays in his care, the handling of an ADHD diagnosis and Concerta prescribing, inadequate monitoring, and failures to respond appropriately to information about suicidal thoughts, a reported suicide attempt, substance use and an A&E admission.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise and act on recorded information about suicidal intent

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The delay in dealing with Mr Kirby between August 2017 and March 2018. (2) I am concerned about the decision to ask him to complete ADHD questionnaires and apparently suggest that he should be prescribed Concerta. (3) I am concerned that although ████████ told me he had made a diagnosis of ADHD in October 2017 he did not follow the NICE Guidance, inform the GP, start prescribing, consider alternatives to prescribing, have a formal note made of the consultation with John when the impact of this diagnosis was discussed with him or discuss the diagnosis with his immediate next of kin. (4) On the last occasion when John was seen, ie. on March the 20th diagnosis of ADHD was discussed and ████████ decided not to prescribe Concerta. A few weeks later, in April, he received a letter from Mr Kirby’s GP explaining that John wanted to be prescribed Concerta and also saying that he had had an admission to A&E. This did not provoke any further review of Mr Kirby, he was simply prescribed the medication without any discussion as to his previous drug abuse or current dependence on Diazepam, suicidal tendencies or binge drinking. This is outwith the Guidance issued by NICE. (5) Why was Mr Kirby prescribed Concerta without any (further) review? (6) Why was he not properly monitored as he should have been had the NICE Guidance been adhered too? (7) Even if Concerta had not been prescribed the GP letter and the information in the electronic records as to the A&E admission on the 4th-5th April should have alerted the Trust to the information John had given that he was suicidal and “wanted to die”. (8) Why did those interviewing John in A&E not take more details of the suicide attempt when he said that recently he had tried to hang himself and only failed because the rope broke? ”

    Source location

    John Michael KIRBY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create an information-sharing protocol between the Mental Health Liaison Team and Pavillions A&E liaison service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am informed that the evidence at the Inquest showed that Mr Kirby provided the Pavillions A&E liaison nurse with this suicide attempt information but that our Mental Health Liaison nurse was not aware of it. As this has identified a gap in the working between the two services the manager responsible for our Mental Health Liaison Team has worked with her Pavillions counter-part to create an information sharing protocol”

    Source location

    2018-0379-Response-by-Sussex-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The A&E attendance did not heighten concern because the presentation was previously seen with alcohol use and liaison staff did not recommend re-referral.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ informs me that he reviewed the details of Mr Kirby’s A&E admission upon receipt of the letter from the GP seeking the prescribing advice. His clinical opinion at that time was that Mr Kirby’s presentation at A&E was not new; that is to say that he had previously presented similarly when under the influence of alcohol. ████████ also took into account that Mr Kirby was assessed by the Mental Health Liaison Team who didn’t consider re-referring him. Therefore ████████ concern for Mr Kirby was not heightened by this attendance at A&E.”

    Source location

    2018-0379-Response-by-Sussex-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 May 2019

    Open published response
  7. Central Hampshire

    AI-generated summary

    Haydn James Burton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Haydn James Burton, a prisoner at HMP Winchester, was found suspended from a ligature point in his cell on 15 July 2015 and died in hospital on 18 July 2015 from the delayed effects of ligature suspension. The concerns included inadequate implementation of ACCT plans and observations, uncertainty about confidentiality rules in the Prison Listener scheme, and limitations in recording and communicating information about closed ACCT plans.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to train Listeners to pass information about imminent suicide risk to prison staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Prison Listener scheme rules as to prisoner confidentiality appeared to be confusing to the listener involved in this case. The HMP Winchester Listener Scheme Protocol dated October 2012 makes no reference to situations where an “at risk” prisoner admits to having made active plans for suicide and threatens to self harm in the future (as in this case). I consider the protocol for Listeners should make it another exception to the principle of confidentiality so that they can pass such information to prison staff and that Listeners should be trained to do so if they have reason to believe there is an imminent risk of suicide even if the prisoner is already subject to an ACCT. ”

    Source location

    Haydn James Burton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Listener Scheme protocol to specify an exception to confidentiality for imminent suicide risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Prison Listener scheme rules as to prisoner confidentiality appeared to be confusing to the listener involved in this case. The HMP Winchester Listener Scheme Protocol dated October 2012 makes no reference to situations where an “at risk” prisoner admits to having made active plans for suicide and threatens to self harm in the future (as in this case). I consider the protocol for Listeners should make it another exception to the principle of confidentiality so that they can pass such information to prison staff and that Listeners should be trained to do so if they have reason to believe there is an imminent risk of suicide even if the prisoner is already subject to an ACCT. ”

    Source location

    Haydn James Burton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Winchester will not add an exception to Listener confidentiality because national confidentiality arrangements are considered necessary to preserve prisoners’ trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As the Samaritans have set out in their separate response to your report, the principle of total confidentiality is central to their work, and applies equally to the work of Listeners. This is reflected in the national partnership agreement between NOMS and the Samaritans that governs the operation of the Listener scheme, and the NOMS safer custody policy set out in PSI 64/2011. In the light of this it is not appropriate for Winchester to adopt a different policy on this point. Without the assurance of confidentiality, prisoners may not feel able to approach Listeners and talk freely in an atmosphere of total trust. Any change to this approach may lead to a reduction in the number of prisoners accepting this vital source of support and sharing their concerns.”

    Source location

    2016-0346-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 October 2016

    Open published response
  8. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    STEWART AKINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 25 May 2015, Stewart Akins took his own life by placing himself in the path of a train after being released on conditional bail following his arrest. The report raised concerns that his repeated statements indicating a high risk of suicide or self-harm were not communicated to the prosecution or Magistrates’ Court, resulting in the risk being significantly downplayed and no objection to bail being made.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate custody-recorded suicide and self-harm risks for full MG7 preparation

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Throughout Mr. Akins' time in custody, entries were made on the custody record which recorded his repeatedly stated intention to end his own life. Statements to that effect were recorded as having been made, inter alia, to the Custody Sergeant, ████████ to a nurse, to a Forensic Medical Examiner ████████ and to the officer in charge of the investigation ████████ at the end of his police interview. The view was taken that he presented a high risk of suicide/self-harm. (2) The officer in charge of the investigation into the offences with which Mr. Akins was eventually charged, ████████ submitted an MG7 remand application form for consideration by the Crown Prosecution Service, and with a view to bail being opposed in the Magistrates' Court. In that form, she set out of objections on a number of grounds including a remand for Mr. Akins' own protection. However, in giving details substantiating that particular ground for opposing bail she stated: "AKINS has a problem with alcohol and mental health, clearly a combination that does not mix well. AKINS spoke of his suffering with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and there is a real concern that, being charged with offences and now being NFA, he may pose a significant risk to not only those he encounters, but also to himself. It is therefore requested that a remand in custody be sought for AKINS own protection." (3) ████████ evidence at the inquest was that those details substantiating that ground for opposing bail ( for Mr. Akins' own protection ) were based solely on her own dealings with Mr. Akins, and not on what was recorded in the Custody Record. In fact, she was not aware of any of the entries recorded on the Custody Record and was therefore not aware of the level of risk of suicide/self-harm which those in charge of his detention felt that Mr. Akins presented. She had not sought to check the Custody Record for any such entries, nor to speak to the Custody Sergeant, nor had the Custody Sergeant sought to make her aware of such entries. (4) Because ████████ was unaware of the contents of these entries in the Custody Record, the description in the MG7 of the risk of suicide/self-harm which Mr. Akins presented was significantly downplayed. (5) In addition to that under-reporting of risk, prior to the hearing in the Magistrates' Court ████████ was informed by the Senior Crown Prosecutor that she was considering agreeing to bail with certain conditions. Those conditions did not address the issue of risk of suicide/self-harm, but ████████ accepted that she had not sought to raise this with the prosecutor. (6) A direct result of that under-reporting of risk of suicide/self-harm, and of ████████ failure to raise it with the prosecutor, was that the prosecutor was minded to agree to conditional bail as proposed. No objections to bail were raised with the Magistrates, and conditional bail was duly granted. (7) I am therefore concerned that no chain of communication appeared to be in place whereby ████████ had made aware of the risks highlighted in the Custody Record, so that an MG7 could be properly and fully prepared. (8) The explanations for this appear to be either: (i) that provision does not exist generally for such a chain of communication to be in place; or (ii) that provision does exist, and that ████████ and/or the Custody Sergeant(s) failed to operate in accordance with such provision. ”

    Source location

    STEWART AKINS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the responsible custody sergeant to verify and sign every Prisoner Escort Form before a detainee leaves or moves from custody, ensuring documented risks are communicated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is clear that there were failings in suitably communicating the degree of risk that was posed by Mr Akins following his movement from custody to the Magistrates Court. As a result of this incident West Mercia Police have immediately revised its’ practice to minimise risk and prevent future deaths by ensuring that all Prisoner Escort Forms (PER), whether completed by a detention officer or sergeant, are signed as accurate by the custody sergeant responsible for the detainees welfare prior to their release / movement from custody. The custody sergeant will have overall responsibility for ensuring that the risks are correctly documented and communicated. This practice will ensure that all known and documented risks contained within the custody record will travel with the person and properly inform their decision making processes.”

    Source location

    S-Akins-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 March 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include in mandatory custody-sergeant training the requirement to highlight known risks and concerns to the officer in charge when considering an MG7 remand application.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “West Mercia has also ensured that mandatory training for custody sergeants includes the awareness of highlighting known risks and concerns to the OIC upon consideration of a MG7 remand application. This will enable prosecutors and the courts to make fully informed decisions about a person’s vulnerabilities and needs.”

    Source location

    S-Akins-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 March 2016

    Open published response
  9. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Craig Douglas Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Craig Douglas Bell was found dead in his cell at HMP Manchester on 13 December 2012 after taking his own life by hanging using a self-constructed ligature. He had a history of self-harm and suicidal ideation and was subject to ACCT procedures. The principal concerns included inadequate sharing of risk information, insufficient senior psychiatric involvement in discharge planning, the lack of a graduated risk-management plan, and limited availability of safer or CCTV-monitored cells for prisoners at risk of suicide.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share timely information about risk and suicidal or self-harming behaviour between clinical and HMPS staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. I am concerned that the appropriate sharing of information relating to risk and suicidal or self harming behaviour did not take place between the clinical team and HMPS staff. For example, the direct threat of suicide made at the review on the 27 November 2012 was not disclosed to HMPS staff. Appropriate, timely mutual information exchange had not taken place and there is a concern that this may be vital but may be overlooked if steps are not taken to make this a matter of routine. It means that clinical staff have to be able to review the clinical record appropriately and share information with their HMPS colleagues. ”

    Source location

    Craig Douglas Bell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Lisa Marie Inkin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lisa Marie Inkin, who had severe anorexia nervosa and was on home leave from an eating disorders unit, took her own life by diving in front of a train at Victoria Station on 9 April 2013. The report raised concerns about the lack of local specialist inpatient eating disorder services, communication between local and out-of-area providers, inadequate escalation of information about suicidal intent, possible failures to record or answer calls, and the proposed lack of overnight supervision and transport difficulties in Kent.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to promptly escalate information about patients’ suicidal intent

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The failure on the part of the ward staff at Cygnet to appropriately escalate the information that they received about suicidal intent on Lisa’s part until the day after the information was received and it was too late for any preventative action to be taken. ”

    Source location

    Lisa Marie Inkin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of training or experience on when and how to escalate information about patients’ suicidal intent

    Wider context from the report

    “9. Possible lack of training or experience on the part of ward staff at Cygnet as to when and how to escalate information about suicidal intent expressed by a patient. ”

    Source location

    Lisa Marie Inkin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026