Recurring concern

Failure to reliably learn from medication incidents and implement safeguards

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 7 May 2024•Latest report 19 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the dedicated medication incident learning and governance process, including incident follow-up, review, identification of safeguards, and implementation or communication of medication-safety learning.

Not included

  • Excludes generic incident investigation or organisational learning failures not explicitly concerning medication incidents.
  • Excludes failures in medication prescribing, administration, monitoring or allergy checking unless the asserted deficiency is specifically the subsequent medication incident learning or safeguard process.
  • Excludes general communication or follow-up failures that are not tied to medication incident learning.
Reports
5

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
5

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2024–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
8

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Coastal Homecare – Hove Branch1
Department of Health and Social Care1
General Pharmaceutical Council1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
Midway Pharmacy1
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence1
NHS England1
St George'S University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust1
Warwick Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    John Malcolm FISHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Malcolm Fisher was admitted to hospital on 22 April 2025 with persistent focal seizures that developed into status epilepticus, and he died on 4 May 2025 after the seizures could not be controlled. The report raises concerns about inaccurate or incomplete medication information during transfers between community services and the omission of sodium valproate from the care agency’s medication record, resulting in six days without that medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow up medication incidents for learning affecting vulnerable patients

    Wider context from the report

    “6) Coastal Homecare management then self-reported the incident to the local Adult Safeguarding Team and also the Care Quality Commission but at the time of the inquest there has been no follow-up by either organisation to ascertain if there are any lessons to learn for the benefit of other vulnerable patients. ”

    Source location

    John Malcolm FISHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a themed review of UCR medication incidents involving MAR charts and report findings through Trust governance structures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A themed review of medication incidents involving MAR charts within UCR is underway to inform ongoing quality improvement, training, and assurance.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  2. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Barry Clive Loxston · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Barry Clive Loxston died at St George’s Hospital on 30 July 2023 after complications following renal transplant surgery, including electrolyte imbalance and delayed graft function. The report identifies concerns about failures to recognise his unfitness for surgery, inadequate patient handling, unsupervised medication administration, insufficient investigation, incomplete review of blood tests, and gaps in systems for assessing transplant-list suitability and communication between nephrology teams.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of investigation of medication maladministration concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “3. That lack of investigation of the matter outlined in 2 increases the risk to patients of the concern outlined in 2. ”

    Source location

    Mr Barry Clive Loxston · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review reported incidents, provide feedback, and operate PSIRF-based divisional incident review and escalation processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Matter 3: It is acknowledged that there was a lack of investigation and a lack of process in the management of medication safety incidents across the directorate. It is also acknowledged that there was a culture of under reporting incidents and, therefore, investigations that should have taken place did not. Since March 2024 the care group has seen a rise in incident reporting, especially near miss incidents. This is believed to be due to the changes in culture and education; incident reporting is widely welcomed by the senior team and all incidents are reviewed and fed back to the reporter.”

    Source location

    Response from St George's University Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 November 2025

    Open published response
  3. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    David Joseph Crompton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Joseph Crompton, who had epilepsy, was left without his prescribed Tegretol for approximately 10 days in April 2024 and again in December 2024. His falls in both periods occurred when he was without the medication, and the inquest recorded a fall downstairs on 13 December 2024, with causes of death including hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy, out-of-hospital cardiac arrest and cervical spine injury. The principal concerns were delays in supplying essential anti-epileptic medication, reliance on family members to seek alternative supplies, and the absence of clear systems for managing medication shortages.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn lessons from potentially dangerous medication supply intervals

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The inquest was informed that following the April 2024 episode, hospital specialists commented that the absence of Tegretol for around 10 days “will likely have contributed to your seizure activity”. It is questionable whether lessons were learnt from this potentially dangerous interval. ”

    Source location

    David Joseph Crompton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    MARY MARGARET WHITLOCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Margaret Whitlock died at Broomfield Hospital on 23 August 2023 after sustaining cervical fractures in a fall and subsequently suffering aspiration following assisted feeding while experiencing swallowing difficulties. The report identified concerns about delayed provision of a recommended collar, inadequate planning and communication regarding swallowing and oral intake, medication administration despite recorded opioid allergies, understaffing, and the absence of discharge and safety-netting advice to her care home.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review medication safety incidents and raise safeguards

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Morphine in the form of 5mg Oramorph and then 2.5mg Intravenous morphine was administered for a patient where the medication record noted allergy to Tramadol, Codeine and Buprenorphine. Naloxone was required to reverse the effect. Whilst this did not cause or contribute to this death this matter was not part of the Trust review, and no safeguards was raised. ”

    Source location

    MARY MARGARET WHITLOCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share learning from the opioid analgesia incident with Emergency Department colleagues to inform future practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In retrospect, the clinicians consider that a smaller dose than 2.5mg, of 1mg increments of opiate would have been more appropriate given her noted allergies. Learning from this case has been shared with Emergency Department colleagues accordingly for future practise.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Opioid analgesia was within acceptable clinical decision-making, so further review or safeguarding was not considered necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The choice of analgesia was not included as a term of reference for our review as it was within an acceptable range of clinical decision making, and a safeguarding was not triggered or indicated for this event. The use of opioid analgesia was made on a balance of risk basis and the risks of allergy were carefully managed.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2024

    Open published response
  5. Warwickshire

    AI-generated summary

    David RILEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Riley developed a pericardial effusion after atrial fibrillation ablation and later suffered a stroke before dying on 10 June 2023. Concerns included inconsistent decisions about pausing Apixaban, delays in restarting it, inadequate communication and continuity of care, and difficulties using computerised clinical records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to specify and disseminate learning from the DOAC pausing incident

    Wider context from the report

    “Although the Warwick hospital conducted a Root Cause Analysis Investigation Report (RCAIR) of 6 July 2023 which indicated that the pausing of the DOAC was a lesson learned, it did not indicate what was learned. The only further action was limited to the incident being presented at the Grand Round, but this had not taken place at the time of the inquest, some 9 months after publication of the RCAIR. There are remaining outstanding matters of concern. ”

    Source location

    David RILEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Report and consider whether learning should be shared across Midlands integrated care boards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Regional Chief Pharmacist in the Midlands has also been asked to review your Report and consider whether any learnings need to be shared across the ICBs within the Midlands region.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss received Prevention of Future Deaths reports through the Regulation 28 Working Group and share their learning nationally and regionally.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would also like to provide further assurances on the national NHS England work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learnings and insights around events, such as the sad death of David, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us to pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the report with Agilio Software for awareness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will share your report with Agilio Software for their awareness.”

    Source location

    Response from NICE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Present the incident and related learning at the cardiology Grand Round.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can only apologise that, over a year after his death, Mr Riley’s case has still not been presented at the Trust’s Grand Round. His case will be presented by one of our Cardiology consultants to Grand Round on 19 July – and will incorporate the learning from the concerns you have raised in your Regulation 28 report.”

    Source location

    Response from S. Warwickshire NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prioritise Grand Round slots for cases whose formal investigations recommend presentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Grand Round is an “open to all staff” learning forum – held weekly both in person and online – and there are always a large number topics vying for attention. This, combined with staff availability, means that there can sometimes be a significant time lag between an incident occurring and the learning being shared. That said, the delay in this particular instance is unacceptable, and we have asked our Medical Education Co-ordinator (who manages the programme) to ensure that priority slots are given to those cases where a formal investigation recommends that a case be discussed at Grand Round.”

    Source location

    Response from S. Warwickshire NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational responsibility for delivering health services and responding to related concerns lies with NHS England.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England is operationally responsible for delivering health services across the country and will be responding directly to your concerns at length. NHS England is an executive non-departmental public body, sponsored by the Department of Health and Social Care.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026