Recurring concern

Inadequate pilot training and competence for abnormal aircraft handling

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First reported 8 Dec 2016•Latest report 18 Jun 2018

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in pilot licensing, training, proficiency testing or competence assurance that leave pilots insufficiently prepared for abnormal aircraft-handling scenarios, including partial engine-power loss, spins, stalls, loss of control and aircraft-specific recovery techniques.

Not included

  • Excludes routine pilot training or licence administration where no deficiency in preparation for abnormal aircraft handling is identified.
  • Excludes aircraft design, airworthiness, maintenance, equipment-warning and carbon-monoxide controls unless the assertion directly concerns pilot training or competence for abnormal handling.
  • Excludes general medical fitness, licensing self-declaration and revalidation controls where the unsafe condition is not pilot competence for abnormal aircraft handling.
  • Excludes failures in flight operations after pilots have been reliably trained and their competence assured.
Reports
2

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
3

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2016–2018

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
0

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department for Transport2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Bryan Allsop · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Bryan Allsop died very soon after a light aircraft he was piloting crashed shortly after take-off on 28 May 2017. The inquest found that the aircraft’s fuel vapour return line, use of unauthorised E5 Mogas, warm conditions and the engine’s failure to reach full power were contributory factors. The principal concern was that light-aircraft pilot licences did not mandatorily require instruction and testing for partial loss of engine power scenarios.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of mandatory instruction and testing in partial loss of engine power scenarios for light aircraft pilot licences

    Wider context from the report

    “The court heard evidence that neither the pilot training leading to issue of a pilot’s license (for light aircraft) nor the biennial pilot license revalidation have mandatory requirements for instruction and testing in partial loss of engine power scenarios. This is the case for both EASA and non-EASA licences. The court also heard evidence that a significant number of aircraft crashes and near crashes occur in the context of partial loss of engine power scenarios. Reference was made to Australian research and also awareness of the issue at the AAIB and the LAA. The court was informed that pilot licenses require instruction and testing in full loss of engine power scenarios but that a partial loss of engine power, particularly at low altitude, presents distinct and very difficult challenges to pilots. My specific concern relates to there being no mandatory requirement for instruction and testing in partial loss of engine power scenarios in relation to light aircraft pilot’s licences. If this is also the case for more powerful classes of aircraft for license purposes this would also be a concern. ”

    Source location

    Mr Bryan Allsop · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

  2. North Yorkshire (East)

    AI-generated summary

    Ajvir Singh Sandhu and Cameron James Forster · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 30 April 2016, Flying Officers Ajvir Singh Sandhu and Cameron James Forster were flying a Slingsby T67 Firefly during aerobatics near Castle Howard when the aircraft entered a spin and crashed, killing both occupants. Concerns included that neither occupant was wearing a parachute, parachutes were not supplied, and that regulations might be needed regarding parachute provision and spin recovery training for light aircraft. Evidence also raised concern that Mr Sandhu’s spin recovery training had taken place on different aircraft rather than the Slingsby Firefly.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of mandatory spin recovery training before flying specific types of light aircraft and carrying out aerobatics

    Wider context from the report

    “2 That there should be a review taking place of whether regulations should be introduced to make spin recovery training mandatory on specific types of light aircraft before a person can fly that light aircraft and carry out aerobatics. ”

    Source location

    Ajvir Singh Sandhu and Cameron James Forster · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure aircraft-specific handling training and proficiency in recovering from uncontrolled conditions

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Evidence was given from the AAIB that whilst it was clear that Mr Sandhu had had spin recovery training within the Royal Air Force that spin recovery training had taken place on two different aircraft and not the Slingsby Firefly. Concern has been expressed within the Inquest that in an aircraft well understood to have areas requiring specific handling techniques it should be established that the persons who fly them are trained and proficient in those areas and have the ability to recover the aircraft from an uncontrolled condition. ”

    Source location

    Ajvir Singh Sandhu and Cameron James Forster · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026