Recurring concern

Temporary clinical staff may lack required safety policies and procedures

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First reported 17 Feb 2015•Latest report 16 Oct 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of arrangements specifically intended to provide agency, locum or other temporary clinical staff with timely access to, communication of and understanding of current safety-critical policies, procedures, reminders or updates relevant to their assigned clinical work.

Not included

  • Excludes generic dissemination or training failures affecting permanent staff where temporary clinical staff access is not the shared unsafe condition.
  • Excludes failures concerning the substantive adequacy or implementation of a named clinical pathway, such as sepsis management, unless the reported deficiency is specifically the temporary-staff policy-access control.
  • Excludes ordinary induction or competence deficiencies that do not concern access to current safety-critical policies and procedures.
  • Excludes generic communication, IT or staffing deficiencies without a direct effect on temporary clinical staff receiving required safety policies and procedures.
Reports
4

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
4

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
6

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Darnall Grange Nursing Home1
Mayday Healthcare plc1
North Manchester General Hospital1
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Christiana Betty Dawson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christiana Betty Dawson, known as Betty, was a resident at Darnell Grange who experienced at least ten falls and died in hospital on 19 March 2024 after surgery for a fractured neck of femur and with frailty. The concerns included the management of her falls risk, her return to residential care despite acknowledged difficulties managing that risk, and agency staff not being provided with home-specific training, policies or procedures about moving residents after a fall.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide agency staff with home-specific policies and procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “However, the Court also heard that the nurse involved in moving Betty into bed after her fall on 16 March 2024 was from an agency. The evidence was that agency nurses are not trained on, or provided with, policies and procedures from Darnell Grange and therefore the nurse would not have known the policy was not to move a resident after a fall but to keep them comfortable and preserve their dignity until medical assistance arrived. The Court heard it was presumed from their nursing training they would know not to move a resident after a fall. There is a clear risk of future deaths will occur if agency staff are not provided with home specific training, policies or procedures, not least given that it cannot be said whether the fracture was caused by the fall, or by moving Betty after the fall. ”

    Source location

    Christiana Betty Dawson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inform the agency provider about the policy breach and provide the company’s falls policies, procedures and protocols.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “These supporting documents along with our own falls management procedures make it clear that the nurse did not follow our procedures. The nurse involved no longer works for the agency as she has emigrated to Australia, but the agency has been informed in writing and provided with a copy of our very clear procedures and the need for these to be passed onto all future nurses that may work at Darnall Grange. As part of the agency induction sheet a post falls decision making tool and “I STUMBLE” a falls assessment tool are given to and signed for by ALL agency workers.”

    Source location

    Response from Darnell Grange Nursing Home
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update agency-worker induction with falls protocols, the I STUMBLE tool and post-fall decision-making tool.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We believe this addresses all the points highlighted by yourself as well as trying to clarify inaccuracies by third parties. We have included documentation including the original MAR Charts received every month, agency nurse induction which has been updated to include instumble and post fall protocol. If you would like a copy of the nurse/team leader attendance sheet this can be provided if required. There are only 2 members of the senior staff team that have not had the revised training session as they were both off sick and will have the training prior to them commencing back at work.”

    Source location

    Response from Darnell Grange Nursing Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 October 2024

    Open published response
  2. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    A 78-year-old woman developed severe sepsis and necrotising fasciitis following dental treatment. She was not triaged or assessed promptly at hospital, suffered a cardiac arrest, underwent emergency surgery, and died on 6 July 2019. The concerns included the currency and implementation of sepsis protocols, staff training and awareness, and timely recognition and treatment of sepsis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make new, locum and agency staff aware of sepsis protocols and policies

    Wider context from the report

    “3. That new or locum clinicians as well as agency nursing staff are made aware of the sepsis policies and protocols and act in accordance with them. ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide NHS Professionals, locum and agency staff with induction or local orientation covering HIVE, sepsis policies, procedures and relevant mandatory training before or during shifts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All NHS Professionals staff and long-term locum doctors will have a full induction programme and will be required to complete any relevant mandatory training prior to commencing shifts.”

    Source location

    Response form Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    One-off shift staff cannot complete all relevant mandatory training before shifts, so they receive induction and orientation instead.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not possible for staff undertaking one-off shifts to complete all the Trust’s relevant mandatory training in advance of this however, they will receive an induction/orientation before. They will be shown how to access and use the Trust’s new electronic patient record system (HIVE) as well as the Trust’s policies and procedures.”

    Source location

    Response form Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 October 2022

    Open published response
  3. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Mr. Isaac BAHAR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr. Isaac Bahar was admitted to hospital after a fall caused fractured ribs and a traumatic pneumothorax. Despite known stage four chronic kidney disease, he was prescribed and given codeine in contravention of national and local guidance, and later developed opioid toxicity and died. The inquest found the prescribing error was one of the causes of his death; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease was also deemed a contributory factor.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure locum staff awareness of analgesia guidance for patients with Chronic Kidney Disease

    Wider context from the report

    “Mr. Bahar was admitted to the Royal Sussex County Hospital on 10th November 2014 with pneumothorax due to fractured ribs. He was treated urgently and appropriately until his analgesia. He was a man with known Stage 4 Chronic Kidney Disease, yet in breach of the hospital’s own policy and in breach of national guidance he was prescribed and given four doses of Codeine over 18 hours. Although this was stopped by the ward Pharmacist as soon as she was able to review his drug chart, Mr. Bahar collapsed with severe opiate/opioid toxicity 30 hours later and died just under three hours after the collapse. The Jury at his Inquest found this error to be one of the causes of his death The Codeine was directed by a locum surgical consultant and the fatal error was compounded when a locum junior doctor wrote up the Codeine in Mr. Bahar’s drug chart. Their locum status must be relevant and if the Trust employs locum staff they must satisfy themselves that those staff are aware of such guidance particularly in such a common scenario (elderly patient with Chronic Kidney Disease needing analgesia). The Trust is responsible for ensuring their patients are in safe hands. Senior nurses should also be aware of such common pitfalls. They would then be in a position when caring for their patients to pick up anomalies. This is a serious failing and must be urgently addressed. ”

    Source location

    Mr. Isaac BAHAR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The medication error was not caused or contributed to by inadequate knowledge, education, or locum staff selection and induction.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust’s lead pharmacist in patient safety carried out a detailed investigation of this matter. She found no evidence that there was a failure in knowledge or education, or any failure in selection or induction of locum staff, which caused or contributed to the medication being prescribed outside the Trust’s recommended analgesia guidance. The British National Formulary (BNF) makes it clear that codeine and other opioid analgesics should be avoided or used with caution at reduced doses in patients with renal impairment.”

    Source location

    2015-0229-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 June 2015

    Open published response
  4. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    George Marks · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George Marks was admitted with confusion, immobility and a chest infection, and was later diagnosed with a deep vein thrombosis and a thrombus in the pulmonary artery. After his anticoagulant medication was changed to Rivaroxaban, he was not given it from the evening of 28 February until 4 March, and he died on 6 March 2014. The principal concerns were agency staff’s failures in medication administration, record-keeping and handover procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of agency staff to understand medication administration and medication refusal policies and procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Agency staff failed to have an understanding of the basic policies and procedures in place when administering medication and / or where a patient refused to take such medication. ”

    Source location

    George Marks · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send monthly SMS reminders to all staff about documentation, escalation, medication administration and compassion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A generic SMS has been sent to all staff detailing the importance of documentation, escalation, administration of medication and compassion. This is done once a month to remind all staff of their basic duties.”

    Source location

    2015-0057-Response-by-Mayday-Healthcare
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 February 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send quarterly formal letters to staff reinforcing documentation, escalation, medication administration and compassion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Formal letters sent to all staff, detailing the importance of documentation, escalation, administration of medication and compassion. This is currently being done every quarter.”

    Source location

    2015-0057-Response-by-Mayday-Healthcare
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 February 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the yearly training programme on documentation, escalation, medication administration and compassion beyond mandatory training requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Updated our yearly training program in regards to documentation, escalation, administration of medication and compassion, which is outside of the framework requirements for the Mandatory Training subjects”

    Source location

    2015-0057-Response-by-Mayday-Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 February 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026