Recurring concern

Unreliable chest drain insertion and management

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First reported 1 Aug 2014•Latest report 27 Jul 2020

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the dedicated chest-drain process, including independent assessment of indications, consent, procedural guidance, competency and training, imaging guidance, staffing and specialist availability, procedural checklists, observations, ward communication, post-procedure monitoring and escalation of complications.

Not included

  • Excludes generic radiology, respiratory, staffing, training or communication deficiencies unless they directly impair the chest-drain insertion or management process.
  • Excludes unrelated drains, catheters and invasive procedures unless the assertion explicitly concerns chest drains or intercostal drains.
  • Excludes failures in treating a complication after appropriate chest-drain management and escalation have already occurred.
  • Excludes general diagnostic-imaging access or interpretation failures where chest-drain insertion or management is not the material unsafe condition.
Reports
7

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
21

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2020

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
20

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care2
Cardiff & Vale University LHB1
Care Quality Commission1
Circle Health Group Limited1
East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust1
Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust1
General Medical Council1
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership1
NHS England1
Royal College of Anaesthetists1
Royal College of Emergency Medicine1
Royal College of Radiologists1
Royal Surrey County Hospital1
The British Thoracic Society1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Samuel Garner · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Samuel Garner had an accidental fall at a nursing home on 8 October 2019 and was admitted to hospital three days later, where rib fractures and a traumatic pneumothorax were diagnosed. He died in hospital on 19 October 2019. Concerns included treatment in the Emergency Department corridor, delays in draining his chest, and a significant delay in transfer to a surgical ward because of competing demands and limited bed capacity.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in performing clinically required chest drainage due to competing staff demands

    Wider context from the report

    “3. He waited a number of hours for his chest to be drained (after it was identified that was what was required) due to competing demands on clinical staff. He was in significant distress whilst waiting. ”

    Source location

    Samuel Garner · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Stockport health system partners are responsible for taking action to address urgent and emergency care safety concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is essential that health system partners in Stockport take the necessary action, quickly, to respond to these findings and improve the safety and quality of urgent and emergency services in Stockport.”

    Source location

    2020-0145-Response-from-DHSC_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 October 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The chest drain was inserted within 100 minutes of the decision; delays reflected clinical requirements, not competing staff demands.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Therefore, the decision to insert the chest drain was made at 2030hrs when the ST1 documents the advice from cardiothoracics. The drain had been inserted no more than 100 minutes later. Mr Garner was moved from cubicle 13 to resus bed 2 at 2054hrs which would imply no actual delay, as he needed to be in the right place and such a procedure requires equipment and personnel to be assembled, and then the procedure takes some time. The attending doctor records it to have been an uncomplicated procedure. Oramorph was given at 1823hrs and IV paracetamol after the drain was inserted, and often significant amounts of analgesia are necessary to facilitate the drain insertion, but that was not required. There are multiple nursing entries that do not suggest him to be in pain or discomfort. His oxygen requirement improved dramatically after the drain.”

    Source location

    2020-0145-Response-from-GMHSCP_Redacted.pdf
    Page 4 · response
    Published 1 October 2020

    Open published response
  2. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    David Robert Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Robert Griffiths died after a pleural drain inserted to treat a pleural effusion penetrated his heart during a procedure at the University Hospital of Wales on 29 September 2016. Concerns included the absence of local protocols and specific training for intercostal drain insertion, and the unavailability of real-time ultrasound guidance despite its support in relevant guidelines.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of specific training for new medical and nursing staff in intercostal drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence revealed that there were no local cardiothoracic department protocols that were available to guide the insertion of intercostal drains and no specific training given to new medical and nursing staff. ”

    Source location

    David Robert Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of real-time ultrasound guidance for fluid chest drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The British Thoracic Society Guidelines strongly support the use of real time ultrasound guidance when inserting chest drains for fluid. Real time ultrasound guidance was not available in this case. ”

    Source location

    David Robert Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of local cardiothoracic department protocols for intercostal drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence revealed that there were no local cardiothoracic department protocols that were available to guide the insertion of intercostal drains and no specific training given to new medical and nursing staff. ”

    Source location

    David Robert Griffiths · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the need for specific chest drain induction with the Welsh Deanery.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This group will also consider the requirement for specific induction in relation to chest drain insertion, on the basis, that registrars and specialist registrars across specific specialties are employed on the basis, that they are already competent in a number of core and essential skills, which would include chest drain insertion. The UHB is currently liaising with the Welsh Deanery on this issue.”

    Source location

    2017-0013-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide bespoke thoracic ultrasound training for the Cardiothoracic Directorate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is of paramount importance that staff are appropriately trained to insert intercostal drains using the ultrasound equipment that has been purchased.”

    Source location

    2017-0013-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and oversee ongoing ultrasound training and competence assessment across the Health Board.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is recognised that arrangements for ongoing training and competence assessment must be in place across the Health Board and this will be implemented and overseen by the task and finish group.”

    Source location

    2017-0013-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement direct ultrasound guidance for chest drain insertion and discontinue marked-spot insertion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The UHB has considered the findings of the investigation and has taken the decision to discontinue the practice of inserting chest drains at a ‘marked”

    Source location

    2017-0013-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Purchase two additional ultrasound machines suitable for chest drain and pleural procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am pleased to be able to advise you that ████████ Consultant Physician and Respiratory Lead has also coordinated the purchase of two additional ultrasound machines suitable for use in these clinical circumstances. The purchase has been supported by the Health Board’s Medical Equipment Group and Procurement Department.”

    Source location

    2017-0013-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Explore implementing a safety checklist for chest drain insertion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A similar safety notice was published in NHS England in September 2015. Resources are therefore developed for use in NHS England that can be adapted and adopted for use in NHS Wales. The task and finish group intends to explore the implementation of a safety checklist for chest drain insertion. An example of such a tool, developed by the Intensive Care Society, is attached in Appendix 1.”

    Source location

    2017-0013-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response
  3. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Critall, an 80-year-old man, developed a haemothorax after insertion of a chest drain while being treated for pneumonia and died on 6 July 2014 after further deterioration and emergency treatment. The report raised concerns about the necessity and technique of the drain insertion, the failure to confirm its position, inadequate monitoring and resuscitation, and the hospital’s lack of appropriate emergency facilities and protocols. It also recorded that his family were not contacted after he became unwell or died.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Outdated chest drain management protocol lacking complication actions

    Wider context from the report

    “7. Best practice measures had not been instituted in the radiology department to safeguard patients undergoing radiologically interventions. This included completion of an appropriate consent detailing complications, radiological indications for insertion of a chest drain independent of the respiratory consultant, a WHO checklist, no observations (BP, HR, temp etc) before or after the chest drain procedure on a backround of poor communication with the ward staff as to what plan was in place other than an outdated protocol for management of chest drains on the ward which did not address action was to be taken if complications arose. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete consent detailing chest drain complications

    Wider context from the report

    “7. Best practice measures had not been instituted in the radiology department to safeguard patients undergoing radiologically interventions. This included completion of an appropriate consent detailing complications, radiological indications for insertion of a chest drain independent of the respiratory consultant, a WHO checklist, no observations (BP, HR, temp etc) before or after the chest drain procedure on a backround of poor communication with the ward staff as to what plan was in place other than an outdated protocol for management of chest drains on the ward which did not address action was to be taken if complications arose. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Poor communication of the post-procedure care plan to ward staff

    Wider context from the report

    “7. Best practice measures had not been instituted in the radiology department to safeguard patients undergoing radiologically interventions. This included completion of an appropriate consent detailing complications, radiological indications for insertion of a chest drain independent of the respiratory consultant, a WHO checklist, no observations (BP, HR, temp etc) before or after the chest drain procedure on a backround of poor communication with the ward staff as to what plan was in place other than an outdated protocol for management of chest drains on the ward which did not address action was to be taken if complications arose. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Proactive chest drain insertion without objective clinical evidence

    Wider context from the report

    “9. The court heard evidence there was a ‘local’ proactive approach for the insertion of chest drains based on no objective evidence other than a belief that the very smallest catheters were safer and more comfortable and reduced referral for surgical management of an empyema. This view was against expert evidence at inquest and concern was raised that this approach inevitably led to an excess of chest drains being inserted unnecessarily particularly when BTS guidelines were not being routinely applied and/or no evidence of a developing or actual empyema. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use real-time ultrasound guidance for chest drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Real time ultrasound visualisation was not used to guide the chest drain insertion against ‘best practice’. I was led to believe ‘best practice’ was not commonly practiced at the Royal Surrey County Hospital and in many other hospitals nationally. I also heard evidence real time ultrasound visualisation would have assisted the insertion as the effusion was small and lay in an awkward position close to tethering of the lung to the chest wall (which was not documented in the hospital notes or radiologist’s statement but was clearly present on ultrasound pictures examined by ████████ and acknowledged to be present by the radiologist who undertook the chest drain insertion in oral testimony). ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish clinical necessity for chest drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The insertion of a chest drain on the 4th July was not supported by British Thoracic Society (BTS) guidelines and was attempted on a background of an improving clinical picture without repeat of relevant investigations (e.g. inflammatory markers) or evidence of a developing or actual empyema or a further medical review, by either the radiologist or responsible clinician, to confirm its necessity. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient nursing competence in resuscitation and chest drain management

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The admission of an acutely unwell patient with pneumonia to a private hospital dealing primarily with elective surgical procedures with no HDU/ITU facilities in case of deterioration. The most senior doctor in the hospital, other than visiting clinicians was an RMO of unclear experience who usually has the care of more than 50 patients at any one time but can be as many as 72. This is alongside nursing staff who have no significant grounding in resuscitation and an unclear understanding of chest drain insertion for pneumonic pleural effusions, usually having to deal with malignant pleural effusions. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of independent radiological indications for chest drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “7. Best practice measures had not been instituted in the radiology department to safeguard patients undergoing radiologically interventions. This included completion of an appropriate consent detailing complications, radiological indications for insertion of a chest drain independent of the respiratory consultant, a WHO checklist, no observations (BP, HR, temp etc) before or after the chest drain procedure on a backround of poor communication with the ward staff as to what plan was in place other than an outdated protocol for management of chest drains on the ward which did not address action was to be taken if complications arose. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Chest drain insertion decisions influenced by the day of the week

    Wider context from the report

    “4. I heard evidence that the insertion of a chest drain may pre-empt difficulties that may arise if Mr Critall deteriorated over the approaching weekend. This was contrary to expert evidence that chest drain insertion should only be considered as a necessity and should not be influenced by the day of the week. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to radiologically confirm the position of a non-draining chest drain

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The position of the non-draining (second attempt) chest drain was not radiologically confirmed, against expected practice, particularly as it was not draining. I heard exert evidence that this resulted in a delay in the recognition and prompt management of the haemothorax which contributed to Mr Critall’s death. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record observations before and after chest drain procedures

    Wider context from the report

    “7. Best practice measures had not been instituted in the radiology department to safeguard patients undergoing radiologically interventions. This included completion of an appropriate consent detailing complications, radiological indications for insertion of a chest drain independent of the respiratory consultant, a WHO checklist, no observations (BP, HR, temp etc) before or after the chest drain procedure on a backround of poor communication with the ward staff as to what plan was in place other than an outdated protocol for management of chest drains on the ward which did not address action was to be taken if complications arose. ”

    Source location

    Mr Critall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the chest-drain care protocol to align with British Thoracic Society guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. The protocol for the care of patients with a chest drain has been updated to align with British Thoracic Society (BTS) guidelines. Training and competencies for all radiology and nursing staff on the understanding of chest drain insertion is currently under review by BMI to be incorporated in the Acute Care Competencies.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include chest-drain complication management procedures within the patient pathway for ward staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The pathway includes the protocol for the management of chest drains on the ward which addresses actions to take if complications arise.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit and reinforce complete consent documentation, including procedural risks, benefits, complications and radiological indication for chest-drain insertion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2014 the WHO check list for procedures was introduced into the radiology department and is now every day practice and all consultants were aware of the requirement to undertake a comprehensive consent detailing risks and benefits of the procedure. Following the incident the consultant body were reminded of the necessity to ensure that documentation is complete detailing possible complications on each consent form. This process is subject to audit which confirms compliance with this standard.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a patient pathway linking ward and radiology teams, requiring pre- and post-procedure observations and clear handover communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. A patient pathway has been developed for patients undertaking this type of procedure to ensure improved communication between staff on the ward and in radiology. The pathway ensures base line observations are recorded prior to and following the procedure and requires clear communication on handover.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate British Thoracic Society diagnostic guidance into the pathway for managing patients with pleural infection.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Following the feedback from the coroner we have further strengthened the process for the management of patients with pleural infection, utilising the diagnostic algorithm for the management of such patients as described in the BTS guidelines 2010.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a consultant pathway presenting the patient’s clinical condition to support decisions about proceeding with interventional procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. We have developed a pathway which provides consultants with a clear picture of the patient’s clinical condition which will support any decision regarding the progression to an interventional procedure.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Make Fellows and members aware of the BTS Pleural Disease Guideline 2010 Quick Reference Guide.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the light of your report, we are taking steps later this month to make our Fellows and members aware once again of these important guidelines.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Royal-College-of-Radiologists
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Run regular unannounced resuscitation scenarios for staff and RMOs, identifying learning requirements for follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. All staff and RMO’s are involved with regular unannounced resuscitation scenarios run at the hospital by an externally appointed resuscitation training company engaged to teach resuscitation skills to all staff. Any learning requirements are identified to staff and to the RMOs and their agency.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train nursing staff and healthcare assistants in acute illness management and assess competencies for caring for deteriorating patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. All nursing staff and Health Care Assistants have attended AIMS (Acute Illness Management training) and completed competencies in the care of the deteriorating patient.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and incorporate chest-drain insertion training and competencies for radiology and nursing staff into Acute Care Competencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. The protocol for the care of patients with a chest drain has been updated to align with British Thoracic Society (BTS) guidelines. Training and competencies for all radiology and nursing staff on the understanding of chest drain insertion is currently under review by BMI to be incorporated in the Acute Care Competencies.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The radiology department already used the WHO procedural checklist, required comprehensive consent and audited compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2014 the WHO check list for procedures was introduced into the radiology department and is now every day practice and all consultants were aware of the requirement to undertake a comprehensive consent detailing risks and benefits of the procedure. Following the incident the consultant body were reminded of the necessity to ensure that documentation is complete detailing possible complications on each consent form. This process is subject to audit which confirms compliance with this standard.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 6 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continuous hospital and radiology staffing, including an on-call radiographer, meant chest-drain decisions need not be influenced by the day of the week.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The decision to insert a chest drain should not be influenced by the day of the week. The hospital is open and staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week as is the Radiology department. An on call radiographer is provided to enable procedures to be carried out whenever required. Consultants are not expected to make such clinical decisions based on the day of the week.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The proactive chest-drain approach was attributed only to the consultants concerned, with no evidence that other hospital consultants adopted it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The ‘local’ proactive approach described was specific to the consultants concerned based on their practice and experience. There is no evidence that any other consultants at the hospital adopted such an approach.”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 7 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Nursing staff had required resuscitation training, with senior nurses generally holding advanced life-support certification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Nursing staff - All hospital staff receive either advanced life support (ALS); basic life support (BLS) or immediate life support (ILS) resuscitation council accredited training. All nursing staff are ILS trained as a minimum requirement and the current senior nursing team are ALS trained with the exception of 1 member of the team. The requirement is for renewal every 4 years. In the intervening years between formal ALS training all ALS qualified staff attend an ALS refresher (previously this was an ILS refresher).”

    Source location

    2016-0187-Response-by-Mount-Alvernia-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 May 2016

    Open published response
  4. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Marie Gretta Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Marie Gretta Harding, who had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, was admitted with breathlessness and a left-sided pneumothorax requiring chest drains. A chest drain inserted on 12 October 2014 more likely than not penetrated her left lung, after which she deteriorated and died on 14 October 2014. The inquest identified a lack of Trust guidelines and up-to-date training for chest drain insertion, and unawareness of the availability of an on-call interventional radiologist.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of trust guidelines for chest drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest I heard that their was no trust guidelines for the insertion of chest drains, lack of up to date training on chest drain insertion and an unawareness of the existence of the on call weekend availability of interventional radiologist. Although I acknowledge that the Trust has now fully instigated remedial changes in this regard; ”

    Source location

    Marie Gretta Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of up-to-date training on chest drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the inquest I heard that their was no trust guidelines for the insertion of chest drains, lack of up to date training on chest drain insertion and an unawareness of the existence of the on call weekend availability of interventional radiologist. Although I acknowledge that the Trust has now fully instigated remedial changes in this regard; ”

    Source location

    Marie Gretta Harding · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Kenneth John WILLIAMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kenneth John Williams was admitted with shortness of breath and was diagnosed with tension pneumothorax, leading to insertion of a chest drain. The report states that the diagnosis was incorrect, the drain ruptured a pulmonary bulla and caused bleeding, and concerns included reviewing previous imaging and medical history and involving the respiratory team before and after chest-drain insertion.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to notify the respiratory team about patients with inserted chest drains

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Action is required to ensure the respiratory team is made aware of all patients who have had a chest drain inserted. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth John WILLIAMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek respiratory consultant opinion before chest drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Action is required to ensure respiratory consultants opinion is sought where possible before inserting a chest drain. ”

    Source location

    Kenneth John WILLIAMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Cascade instructions requiring respiratory-team involvement and notification for every patient who has had a chest drain inserted.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Action is required to ensure the respiratory team is made aware of all patients who have had a chest drain inserted.”

    Source location

    2015-0135-Response-by-Epsom-and-St-Helier-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 March 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a spontaneous-pneumothorax pathway requiring respiratory-team discussion before chest-drain insertion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Action is required to ensure a respiratory consultants opinion is sought where possible before inserting a chest drain.”

    Source location

    2015-0135-Response-by-Epsom-and-St-Helier-University-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 March 2015

    Open published response
  6. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Herbert Chandler · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Herbert Chandler was admitted to William Harvey Hospital with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and a left pneumothorax. On 22 January 2013, an attempt to aspirate the left pneumothorax mistakenly aspirated the right lung first, after which the left lung was aspirated and he died soon afterwards. The concerns included the conservative management of the pneumothorax, medication prescribing, failures in clinical review and communication, the aspiration procedure, medical record format, and respiratory consultant cover.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to insert a chest drain for pneumothorax

    Wider context from the report

    “A series of failings by the Trust have caused or contributed to the cause of death, namely:- • A conservative approach to managing the left pneumothorax with antibiotics, • Inappropriate prescribing of medication, namely gentamicin and aminophylline, • A failure to put in a chest drain when the patient was reviewed on 22nd January by a Consultant Respiratory Physician, • A failure to communicate findings after a Consultant’s review on 22nd January to the medical on-call team, • The Medical Registrar’s failure to request a chest x ray before attempting the aspiration procedure given that more than 48 hours had elapsed since the previous x ray, • The Medical Registrar’s failure to check the radiology immediately prior to aspirating the right lung, The Medical Registrar’s failure to examine Mr Chandler immediately prior to aspirating the right lung to confirm her findings concurred with the radiology, • A confusing format of medical records which prevented sequential recording of entries by health care professionals, • A failure to provide Consultant on call respiratory cover. ”

    Source location

    Herbert Chandler · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    Gerald Trevor WERRETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gerald Trevor Werrett was admitted to hospital with an infective exacerbation of chronic obstructive airways disease and other co-morbidities. During treatment, a chest drain was mistakenly inserted on the left instead of the right after chest X-rays were inverted, mislabelled and misinterpreted. The inquest concluded that he died from bilateral bronchopneumonia, chronic obstructive airways disease and ischaemic heart disease, with his death contributed to by the misplaced chest drain; concerns included failures in X-ray marking, labelling, interpretation, review and examination before insertion.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to examine patients prior to chest drain insertion

    Wider context from the report

    “Chest drains are inserted by a number of medical disciplines and clearly this event has shown that basic failures can have catastrophic consequences, the areas identified during the inquest included: 1. A lead anatomical marker was not used when taking the chest x-ray 2. Both chest x-rays were incorrectly labelled, and this error was not identified by the clinician 3. The chest x-ray that was looked at was misinterpreted 4. Both chest x-rays were not considered. 5. The cardiac silhouette was not interpreted correctly 6. Mr. Werrett was not examined prior to the insertion of the chest drain. ”

    Source location

    Gerald Trevor WERRETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish and make freely accessible updated pleural disease guidance covering safe chest-drain insertion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2010 the British Thoracic Society published an 82 page update on management of pleural disease which includes safe insertion of chest drains (Thorax 2010 (August) Vol. 65, supplement 2). This publication is freely available in most medical libraries and, more importantly, is available on the British Thoracic Society website which is open to all individuals. It is one of the most frequently visited sections of the Society’s website.”

    Source location

    2014-0355-Response-by-British-Thoracic-Society
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 August 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with colleagues to identify, learn from and share lessons from the chest-drain incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “General aspects - The College was alerted to a specific chest drain insertion problem earlier this year which led to notification to our safety network in March 2014. The initial notification and subsequent alert were completely anonymised; however, from the detail you have provided we now believe this was the same incident you now highlight and our ongoing work with colleagues will focus on lessons to be learned and shared from this situation.”

    Source location

    2014-0355-Response-by-The-Royal-College-of-Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 August 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for reviewing and potentially reissuing the chest-drain safety alert lies with NHS England’s safety department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You would wish to be aware of an alert issued by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in May 2008 regarding chest drains (http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/?EntryId=45987) and this is still a key point of reference for anaesthetists and others in their safe use. Despite the closure of the NPSA we believe the responsibility for these alerts continues through the safety department within NHS England and we have advised them of this death, with anonymised detail, and requested they review the alert and consider its re-issue.”

    Source location

    2014-0355-Response-by-The-Royal-College-of-Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 August 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026