Recurring concern

Unreliable completion and receipt of incident review reports

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First reported 2 Jul 2014•Latest report 30 Jan 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the dedicated incident review-report process involving preparation, completion, responsible sign-off, transmission, receipt or tracking of reports needed for safety review and corrective action.

Not included

  • Excludes failures in the underlying incident investigation or the quality of its analysis where completion or receipt of the report is not deficient.
  • Excludes generic patient-safety incident reporting, post-incident learning or action implementation failures unless the assertion specifically concerns completion or receipt of an incident review report.
  • Excludes ordinary clinical or operational records and reports that are not incident review reports or their directly equivalent safety-review reports.
  • Excludes delays caused solely by external legal, coronial or regulatory proceedings when the incident review-report process itself is not deficient.
Reports
13

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
13

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
14

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB2
United Lincolnshire Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust2
Care Quality Commission1
Department for Education1
East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust1
Essex County Council1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Grendon Prison1
Hellesdon Hospital1
Hereford County Hospital1
London Borough of Bromley1
Mills Family Limited1
NHS England1
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    James Collier SIDDONS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Collier Siddons, who had very severe frailty and multiple co-morbidities, was admitted to hospital after sustaining a fractured left humerus at a nursing home. He subsequently developed aspiration pneumonia and pyelonephritis and died suddenly from sepsis on 31 January 2022. Concerns were raised that the investigation into his fracture was flawed, that the organisation lacked detailed investigation guidance and routine training, and that relevant issues were not communicated promptly by the local authority.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in receipt of provider-led report requests resulting in investigations without all relevant issues known

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Mills did not receive the request for the provider led report from LBB until almost a month after the incident. The investigation was started promptly but had to be conducted without Mills being satisfied that all the relevant issues were known ”

    Source location

    James Collier SIDDONS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch a Prevention and Intervention Service with a dedicated Safeguarding Hub to manage safeguarding referrals, initial information gathering and immediate safety actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On an organisational level, there is nothing to suggest that delays in sharing PLE forms are a wider concern, and this appears to be an isolated incident. That said, LBB is committed to continuous learning and system enhancement. On April 14, 2025, we will launch our Prevention and Intervention Service, which includes a Safeguarding Hub. This Hub, staffed by dedicated and experienced practitioners, will respond to safeguarding referrals and determine whether a Section 42 Safeguarding Enquiry as outlined by the Care Act 2014 is required. The Safeguarding Hub will manage all initial information gathering and take immediate action to ensure the person's safety, working closely with both statutory and non-statutory partners, as well as the individual and/or their representative.”

    Source location

    Response from London Borough of Bromley
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the contents of the Provider Lead Enquiry form.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Local Authority are also going to embark on a review of the contents of the PLE form.”

    Source location

    Response from London Borough of Bromley
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in sharing Provider Lead Enquiry forms are not a wider concern and the incident appears isolated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On an organisational level, there is nothing to suggest that delays in sharing PLE forms are a wider concern, and this appears to be an isolated incident. That said, LBB is committed to continuous learning and system enhancement. On April 14, 2025, we will launch our Prevention and Intervention Service, which includes a Safeguarding Hub. This Hub, staffed by dedicated and experienced practitioners, will respond to safeguarding referrals and determine whether a Section 42 Safeguarding Enquiry as outlined by the Care Act 2014 is required. The Safeguarding Hub will manage all initial information gathering and take immediate action to ensure the person's safety, working closely with both statutory and non-statutory partners, as well as the individual and/or their representative.”

    Source location

    Response from London Borough of Bromley
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 January 2025

    Open published response
  2. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Alan Stanley FALLOWS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan Stanley Fallows was admitted to hospital after a fall at home and later sustained further unwitnessed falls while an inpatient, including a fracture to his right neck of femur. He subsequently developed severe bilateral aspiration pneumonia and died on 28 March 2024. The principal concerns were delayed completion of a Datix report, unclear automated approval processes, and the use of templates that could result in incorrect or incomplete incident information and missed patient-safety learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Automated Datix review and approval failing to ensure human identification of patient-safety incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Secondly, I was concerned to read that the Datix relating to the fall of 12 February (code U454194) appears to have undergone some kind of automated approval and sign off process in June 2024, and regrettably staff were unable to shed any light during the inquest on what happened/happens during this process. This is in contrast to the Datix relating to the second fall (code U441480) which appears to have gone through a “manual” approval and sign off process and the matter closed on 06/06/2024 (with the name of the approver being redacted on the form). I am concerned that if the Trust has any kind of automation process for the review and approval of Datix reports, there may be missed opportunities for humans to correctly identify any incident that compromises patient safety and which give rise to a risk of death; ”

    Source location

    Alan Stanley FALLOWS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incidents are not automatically approved: every incident receives individual review before closure, although low-harm records are automatically stamped after managerial review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All reported incidents are reviewed by an individual before the approval and sign off/closure process. We do not have an automated approval and sign off process for incidents and all incidents are closed following review by an individual. For low level incidents, such as the incident relating to the first fall where the level of harm is low, these incidents are closed following review by a local manager. Following this review an automatic closure process is run which ‘stamps’ the record with the final approver as ‘automated’.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Birmingham
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 August 2024

    Open published response
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    MORGAN-ROSE HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Morgan-Rose Hart, who was detained on a female mental health ward, died on 12 July 2022 after being found unresponsive with a ligature around her neck. The report identified concerns about missed and falsified observations, failures to complete physical welfare checks after bathroom alerts, inadequate escalation of risk, shortcomings in investigation and record keeping, and insufficient suitable placements for people with autism and mental health and self-harm risks in Essex.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays and premature sign-off in Trust investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Trust investigation was materially incomplete and there was a lost an opportunity to: a. Understand concerns of the Family b. Acknowledge errors and learn lessons from the circumstances of the death. The Director of Operations and Matron informed the Trust Senior Management that the PSII Report had omissions. The Trust evidence was that it was an early adopter of the new NHS investigation process. The lead investigator did not report on material issues as to how Morgan-Rose was observed on the ward and the report was significantly delayed. Evidence was there was a pressure to sign the report off although it remained incomplete and did not contain a note about the limitations. c. d. Escalate concerns about staff observations - About 2 weeks after the death the Matron received a report that staff observations had not been appropriately conducted. This prompted a review of CCTV from the afternoon of Morgan-Rose’s death. There was insufficient scrutiny of the CCTV that showed that multiple observations entries made on 6 July 2022 after 14:06 hours could not be correct. e. Understand security issues on a locked mental health ward - It has not been possible to establish the identity of the person that reset the bathroom alert triggered for Morgan-Rose on 6 July 2022 at 15:31. The Trust does not have an accurate records of Trust staff pass allocation. The Trust investigation did not establish that staff borrowed each other's security passes. On the day of Morgan-Rose’s death a visitor pass issued had had access to the nursing office. The Trust was unable to provide the identity of this person. ”

    Source location

    MORGAN-ROSE HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Refine patient-safety incident processes and reporting templates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improvement activities include:”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the PSIRF policy to set learning-response timescales, sign-off requirements, safety-action-plan management and organisation-wide learning dissemination.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ The PSIRF Policy is being updated to reflect best practice. The policy includes time scale for completion of a learning response review and timely sign off. The policy also includes process for the management of safety action plan and cascading of learning across the trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response
  4. North West Wales

    AI-generated summary

    Eifion Wyn Huws · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eifion Wyn Huws, aged 63, died by suicide at his daughter’s home on 10 June 2022 after being found suspended by a ligature. Concerns included the Emergency Department not having access to a very urgent mental-health referral held in hard-copy notes, and delays in completing and sharing the Health Board’s investigation and implementing resulting actions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in completing and sharing investigations into deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “2. An investigation was commenced by the Health Board into Eifion’s death which appears to have been concluded in July 2022 but did not appear to be finalised and ready for sharing / disseminating until March 2023. I have previously issued Prevention of Future Death Reports to the Health Board pertaining to the lack of timeliness of their investigations, specifically in relation to investigations from deaths in 2020 and 2021. Whilst I have previously been advised of improvements into investigation processes in respect of more recent deaths the issue of timeliness remain. Eifion died in 2022 and yet the time it took for the investigation to be completed and shared, with actions undertaken has been too long. I am concerned that deaths will occur when the actions arising are not acted upon in a timely manner. ”

    Source location

    Eifion Wyn Huws · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the incident process to improve incident handling and learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In my previous letter to you on 09 May 2023, I was able to inform you of the changes that have taken place within the Health Board; these included a review of the incident process, and the quality control process delivered by the quality governance teams. The Health Board have also implemented rapid learning panels and incident learning panels. The MHLD Division have prioritised the completion of overdue investigations and action plans and there has been a significant reduction in the number overdue. The Division continues to meet weekly to address any remaining overdue investigation reports and to ensure that actions are monitored for completion. I recognise the importance of ensuring this improvement is maintained and I am assured that we have the mechanisms in place to monitor this and to take further action as required.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Local Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement rapid learning panels and incident learning panels.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In my previous letter to you on 09 May 2023, I was able to inform you of the changes that have taken place within the Health Board; these included a review of the incident process, and the quality control process delivered by the quality governance teams. The Health Board have also implemented rapid learning panels and incident learning panels. The MHLD Division have prioritised the completion of overdue investigations and action plans and there has been a significant reduction in the number overdue. The Division continues to meet weekly to address any remaining overdue investigation reports and to ensure that actions are monitored for completion. I recognise the importance of ensuring this improvement is maintained and I am assured that we have the mechanisms in place to monitor this and to take further action as required.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Local Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prioritise overdue investigations and action plans, meeting weekly to resolve remaining work and monitor actions through completion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In my previous letter to you on 09 May 2023, I was able to inform you of the changes that have taken place within the Health Board; these included a review of the incident process, and the quality control process delivered by the quality governance teams. The Health Board have also implemented rapid learning panels and incident learning panels. The MHLD Division have prioritised the completion of overdue investigations and action plans and there has been a significant reduction in the number overdue. The Division continues to meet weekly to address any remaining overdue investigation reports and to ensure that actions are monitored for completion. I recognise the importance of ensuring this improvement is maintained and I am assured that we have the mechanisms in place to monitor this and to take further action as required.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Local Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 June 2023

    Open published response
  5. Herefordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Keith Hodson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith Hodson had a complex medical history, with delays before an ambulance was called, in ambulance attendance, on hospital admission and in receiving appropriate treatment. Concerns included failure to consistently use an appropriate triage system in Accident and Emergency, inadequate escalation and monitoring, insufficient senior oversight, delays in signing off serious incident reports, and untimely communication with the next of kin.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in responsible sign-off of S.I. reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) S.I. reports are not signed off in a timely fashion by a responsible individual. ”

    Source location

    Keith Hodson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Serious incident report completion and closure are jointly owned by the Trust and ICS, with final sign-off assigned to the ICB.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust takes the investigation and production of serious incident reports very seriously. The length of time the investigation takes depends on multiple factors such as complexity, the number of clinicians involved and whether an independent opinion is required. The Trust endeavours to have all reports completed in a timely fashion and apologise if this is not always the case. SI reports have a designated investigating officer who is responsible for collating information, collecting statements or speaking with staff and writing the report. This involves collating the learning points to avoid similar incidents in the future. This report is then sent for divisional sign off by the divisional leads. Once the division approve the report this is then sent for executive sign off.”

    Source location

    Response from Wye Valley NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 April 2023

    Open published response
  6. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Tracy Dawn WOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tracy Wood was admitted to Hellesdon Hospital with a history of self-harm and suicidal ideation and died on 3 June 2021 after being found unresponsive in her room following an earlier incident involving a prohibited item. The principal concerns included insufficient staffing and one-to-one support, failures in clinical assessment and risk management, inadequate record keeping, delayed emergency response, and shortcomings in the investigation and incident report.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in completing and providing patient safety incident investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “10. A draft Patient Safety Incident Investigation Report (PSII) has been prepared. Evidence was heard that this is now used rather than a Serious Incident Requiring Investigation Report and has the advantage of being “more timely” and providing more learning. The report was still in draft form at the date of the inquest (nine months following Tracy’s death) and the draft was only available to me on the morning of the first day of the inquest, despite assurances at Pre Inquest Review Hearings that it would be available prior to the inquest. ”

    Source location

    Tracy Dawn WOOD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Jude Daryl Lloyd · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jude Daryl Lloyd was found dead at home on 8 May 2019 and died from diabetic ketoacidosis. The report identified concerns about inadequate diabetes monitoring and management, capacity assessment, communication and care transfer between services, follow-up with primary care, clinical review, and record keeping.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain crucial witness evidence, learn lessons, and adequately oversee SUI report sign-off

    Wider context from the report

    “h. The GMMH SUI investigation report contained several factual errors and misinterpretations. The CMHT Responsible Clinician did not provide a statement or was interviewed despite him being a crucial witness. This meant the all the lessons for future care and planning were not learnt. There was inadequate overview of the report before it was signed off. ”

    Source location

    Jude Daryl Lloyd · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the Trust review findings with inpatient and CMHT teams through a learning event.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The findings of the Trust’s review were presented to the Inpatient and CMHT Teams in a learning event on 28 September 2021.”

    Source location

    2021-0329-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the serious-incident information-gathering process to obtain staff statements early and use them in investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust process for obtaining information from staff involved in an SI has been updated to ensure we gather statements from staff at an early stage following the SI and use these statements in the SI review.”

    Source location

    2021-0329-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 6 · response
    Published 13 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assign a Patient Safety Practitioner to support and advise serious-incident review teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “When a team of clinical staff are allocated to complete a review following a serious incident, they are allocated a Patient Safety Practitioner to support and advise the review team throughout the review process. The Patient Safety Practitioner is an experienced professionally qualified member of staff who has additional knowledge and skills in incident management.”

    Source location

    2021-0329-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 6 · response
    Published 13 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The omission of the Responsible Clinician’s interview would not have changed the Serious Incident investigation’s findings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We apologise if there were factual errors within the Trust Serious Incident (SI) investigation report. We acknowledge that the CMHT RC could have been interviewed as part of the review, although this would not have changed the findings of the review.”

    Source location

    2021-0329-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 6 · response
    Published 13 October 2021

    Open published response
  8. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Sarah Margaret Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sarah Margaret Clarke, a 23-year-old university student with significant mental health difficulties, was found deceased in her university accommodation on 21 November 2019 after sending an email indicating that she intended to end her life. The concerns included inadequate follow-up after she became extremely distressed, insufficiently robust systems for managing and safeguarding students at high risk of self-harm, and failure to implement relevant national guidance or provide adequate oversight and learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete a serious incident report on CWB working practices

    Wider context from the report

    “7. There was no serious incident report completed by US as to the working practices of the CWB and no reflection has taken place and no steps have been taken to put into place by CWB to provide more robust systems to confirm the safety of students such as Sarah. ”

    Source location

    Sarah Margaret Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Make internal reviews following future student suicides standard procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “f) Internal reviews after any future suicides will now be standard procedure”

    Source location

    Response from University of Surrey
    Page 10 · response
    Published 1 December 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The University was not required to produce a serious incident report because it is not a regulated healthcare service provider.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. There was no serious incident report completed by US as to the working practices of the CWB and no reflection has taken place and no steps have been taken to put into place by CWB to provide more robust systems to confirm the safety of students such as Sarah.”

    Source location

    Response from University of Surrey
    Page 7 · response
    Published 1 December 2022

    Open published response
  9. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Frank Charles Medley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Frank Charles Medley presented with acute weakness in all four limbs, but an MRI scan that was considered urgent was delayed for four working days. He underwent surgery for multiple paraspinal abscesses and died on 14 July 2019. The principal concerns included delays and inadequate prioritisation of imaging, deficiencies in the Trust’s adverse incident review, and shortcomings in systems for detecting adverse outcomes and coordinating relevant departments.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in completing adverse-death review reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The Trust's review of this case was seriously deficient in the following instances: a. At no point were members of the family spoken to for their views or concerns regarding the death up to and including the inquest. b. The date of death was 14 July 2019. The Report was incomplete eight months later in March 2020 when it was suspended during the first Covid wave. The report was not completed before the inquest on 23 February 2021. This is not in accordance with NHS guidance; c. The case was inappropriately allocated to a structured judgement review; d. The "Summary of the Incident" contains substantial factual inaccuracies to such an extent that it is deeply misleading; e. Mr Medley's death was due to complications of sepsis. The report failed to note that due to admission for query sepsis at the same hospital 11 days before, that: i. the EWS score was sufficient to trigger the septic shock pathway; ii. the nurse correctly identified that the septic shock pathway should be followed and drew this to the attention of "a doctor"; iii. that due to the referrals taking place between specialties at this time the relevant specialty responsible for dealing with this issue cannot be identified and made no entry in the medical records (this raises similar issues to those concerns raised in the Regulation 28 report concerning Mrs Gillian McKinley at the same Trust); iv. that, despite the patient observations being readily available to the treating consultant orthopaedic surgeon the following morning and the nurse having documented the septic shock pathway should be activated in the notes, the consultant orthopaedic surgeon failed to note this both at the time and during the preparation of his witness statement for the inquest; v. the error was only detected by the Trust's Legal Services Department when preparing for the inquest 19 months after the event. f. That the consultant physician responsible for Mr Medley's care appreciated that his symptoms constituted a medical emergency, that the MRI scan should be completed on 2 July 2019 but took no action himself to expedite the scan. There is no documented evidence in the medical records regarding junior doctors attempts to expedite the scan; g. The consultant physician responsible for Mr Medley's care after input from the neurologists on 3 July 2019 made no attempts to expedite the scan or to contact tertiary neurosurgical services; h. On 2 July 2019 the treating clinicians suspected infective complications high in the cervical spine but only undertook a chest x-ray and blood cultures without considering sending a urine sample for analysis, considering an echocardiogram or OPG; i. Mr Medley's scan should have been completed within 24 hours of request in accordance with NICE guidance, which was not cited anywhere in the report, and that the priority attached to the scan on 2 July 2019 placed Mr Medley in the lowest priority category when he should have been in the highest priority category. This mistake was repeated on 3 July 2019 when Mr Medley was placed in the middle priority category. There is no documentation as to any rationale for the priority allocation; j. The scan when it was performed on 5 July 2019 was not a contrast scan necessary to accurately delineate foci of infection resulting in a further scan using contrast to be performed later that day. k. That prioritisation of scans within the radiology department depended to a considerable extent on a personal attendance by clinicians at the department or speaking to radiologists rather than solely on clinical need; l. There was insufficient senior clinical oversight of the conclusions drawn. ”

    Source location

    Mr Frank Charles Medley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a funded cohort of investigators and family liaison officers with allocated time, training and administrative support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A full review and update of investigation process has been completed, in line with Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. Funding has been agreed in support of a proposal to develop a cohort of investigators and family liaison officers with allocated time, specific training and administrative resource to enable timely and thorough investigations. This team will report to the Assistant Director of Safety and Risk and work in partnership with the legal team to coordinate investigations and learning on behalf of the trust.”

    Source location

    2021-0057-Response-from-Royal-Blackburn-Teaching-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 7 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce weekly Executive review of divisional investigations before SIRI Panel submission.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A weekly Executive review of Divisional investigations due at SIRI Panel has been introduced from 21 April to monitor the quality of reports prior to submission. This aims to ensure that the quality of the investigation may be identified earlier and at a senior enough level to require any further improvements to be made without delaying the process or submission to your court. A pro forma for Serious Incident investigations, with a front sheet for sign off each stage, has been developed in line with the National Patient Safety Strategy and PSIRF requirements; which prompts investigators to clearly link the problems, learning and recommendations to individual actions that are focused on preventing the same incident reoccurring. I understand a pilot version of this proforma was received favourably by one of your team at an inquest last week.”

    Source location

    2021-0057-Response-from-Royal-Blackburn-Teaching-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 7 · response
    Published 8 March 2021

    Open published response
  10. Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Dorothy Doreen BREISLIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dorothy Doreen BREISLIN was admitted to hospital after a fall at home and was initially treated for a pulmonary embolism. A later diagnosis identified a right eighth-rib fracture that led to massive bleeding and her death. Concerns included delays in receiving the Incident Review Report, uncertainty about an apology said to have been provided, and confirmation that the referenced Action Plan had not been implemented.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in receiving incident review reports

    Wider context from the report

    “1 The incident date was 27th January 2015. The Incident Review Report was not received in this office until 10th August 2017. Why the delay? ”

    Source location

    Dorothy Doreen BREISLIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clear the backlog of serious incident reports under oversight from the Medical Director and Director of Nursing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can only apologise for the unacceptable delay in not only recognising that this was an SI but for the delay in forwarding the final report to you. The Trust recognises that the SI process at that time was poor. We are working hard to clear our backlog of SI reports, which is being overseen by myself and the Director of Nursing and we are also implementing a new SI process. This incorporates training across the Trust on undertaking SI investigations.”

    Source location

    2017-0348-Response-United-Lincolnshire-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 February 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026