Recurring concern

Unreliable completion and tracking of requested clinical investigations

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First reported 25 Feb 2014•Latest report 22 Aug 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated process for initiating, conducting, recording, tracking or verifying requested clinical investigations, including investigations prompted by episodes of loss of consciousness, where the deficiency risks an investigation being missed or its completion being misunderstood.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to interpretation, communication or clinical action after an investigation has been reliably completed unless the report also identifies a completion or tracking failure.
  • Excludes investigation-result management concerns where the investigation was completed but its result was delayed, lost, misinterpreted or not acted upon.
  • Excludes generic clinical record-keeping, staffing or documentation deficiencies that are not specifically tied to completion or tracking of requested clinical investigations.
  • Excludes formal incident, complaint, police or inquest investigations that are not clinical investigations for patient care.
Reports
9

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
11

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
7

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Ministry of Justice2
NHS England2
Care Quality Commission1
County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Doncaster Royal Infirmary1
East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust1
Forest Bank Prison1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust1
Mildmay Medical Practice1
Milton Keynes University Hospital1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
Sodexo1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Lee James STAMMERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee Stammers attended Doncaster Royal Infirmary on 10 February 2025 with chest pain, shortness of breath and nausea, suffered a cardiorespiratory arrest later that day, and was pronounced deceased at 20:00 hours. The report identified missed opportunities to detect myocardial ischaemia, including incomplete or unreported electrocardiography and blood tests not being performed. Concerns also included poor documentation, communication and systems for tracking investigations, and the ability of unidentified staff to cancel tests without rationale or accountability.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of systems and documentation to identify whether requested investigations had been performed

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Poor documentation, Communication, and systems– There were no clear communication, documentation, or systems in place, to identify if investigations had been performed as requested. For example, the medical records indicated blood had been obtained and collected by the laboratory and the result was awaited. When blood had not been obtained. Inaccurate information in the medical records and poor communication, led to a failure of urgent tests being undertaken. A comparable situation occurred, in relation to confusion regarding the performance of the electrocardiogram. Poor communication, documentation, and systems allowed tests/actions to be cancelled by student nurses, temporary staff and locum clinicians, who can also access the system and cancel tests without any rationale, accountability or identifying themselves in the records. These individuals were referred to as “unknown” at the inquest and have not been identified. Finally, there was clear and consistent evidence of poor documentation throughout the medical records, from admission to the emergency department continuing through to the resuscitation attempts. ”

    Source location

    Lee James STAMMERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the identified communication and documentation immediate safety actions in the Emergency Department under senior-doctor oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mr Stammers’ case was formally presented to the Learning from Patient Safety Events (LFPSE) Panel with the declaration of a Patient Safety Incident Investigation (PSII). During this meeting, Immediate Safety Actions were identified and shared with the relevant division to ensure prompt implementation.”

    Source location

    Response from Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement a chest-pain standing operating procedure defining required clinical assessment and investigations in the Emergency Department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Safety Recommendation 2 - The ED should develop Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) to ensure standardised care within the ED when patients present with chest pain. This should include expectations of the clinical assessment and investigation required. Once implemented, this should be followed by education and training for all ED staff.”

    Source location

    Response from Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a local Emergency Department quality-improvement initiative focused on communication and contemporaneous documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Safety Recommendation 4 – The ED to introduce a local quality improvement initiative focusing on enhancing communication and contemporaneous documentation in both emergency and non-emergency situations.”

    Source location

    Response from Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 September 2025

    Open published response
  2. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Karl Fraser DUNSTAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karl Dunstan died at Milton Keynes University Hospital on 14 January 2025 from a pulmonary embolism arising from a deep vein thrombosis. The investigation identified missed opportunities to investigate and treat the pulmonary embolism, including the declined CT pulmonary angiogram request, failure to complete D-dimer testing, and lack of emergency treatment when his condition deteriorated.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete D-dimer testing during pulmonary embolism investigation

    Wider context from the report

    “That the investigation of a pulmonary embolism was not carried out in accordance with NICE guidance, and a request for a CT pulmonary angiogram by the consultant was rejected by the radiology department because it did not meet the threshold of the Wells score used by the Hospital and yet a D-dimer test was not completed, that if positive, would have resulted in a CTPA. The policy and procedure is in need of an urgent review. ”

    Source location

    Karl Fraser DUNSTAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Held cross-departmental discussions to review and optimise pulmonary embolism screening and triage systems across patient groups.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In light of this case, we have:”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake an audit of pulmonary embolism pick-up rates against recorded Wells scores and D-dimer use, including appropriateness of scoring-system application.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We do plan to undertake an audit to look at pick up rates (of pulmonary embolus) versus the Wells score and D-dimer. Clearly it is important to understand whether the request and scoring systems are being used appropriately. Specifically:”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Trial and evaluate for six months a process escalating unapproved CTPA requests to the duty radiologist, with requester contact when further information or investigation is needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We plan to trial a system for six months (and evaluate) whereby if a CTPA cannot be approved by the radiographer, it will be brought to the attention of the duty radiologist. If the radiologist is satisfied (from the request narrative) that a D-dimer is not required, he/she may authorise the study. If the radiologist is not satisfied, efforts will be made by the radiographer to contact the requester by bleep / telephone to inform them of this and to invite them to undertake a D-dimer or to discuss further investigation with the duty radiologist as appropriate (in addition to the current system of the primary communication being electronic).”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust considers management reasonable and says earlier D-dimer or CTPA would not probably have changed the outcome.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I shall come on to address the substantive content of the regulation 28 report, but I do find it necessary to comment on the text of your narrative conclusion before doing so. Specifically, you assert that a failure to undertake a D-dimer test and therefore to obtain an urgent CT pulmonary angiogram (to make a definitive diagnosis of a pulmonary embolus) meant that thrombolysis was not started when he later collapsed (in cardiorespiratory arrest). You imply that thrombolysis would perhaps have altered the sad outcome in describing ‘missed opportunities [which] more than minimally contributed to his death’. For avoidance of doubt, we consider that whilst a different course of events and actions might potentially have influenced the ultimate outcome, it would not – on the balance of probabilities – have done so.”

    Source location

    Response from Milton Keynes University Hospital
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response
  3. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Alan Hodgson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Alan Hodgson died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 14 January 2021. The report describes failures to recognise the severity of his condition, delays in acting on and reporting imaging, failures to follow the vascular pathway, inadequate communication and continuity of care, and an insufficient review of the circumstances leading to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in CTA being performed

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Poor communication between medical and radiology doctors resulting in: a) delays in CTA being performed; b) inadequate imaging being performed; and c) a complete lack of urgency in reporting the findings of the CTA to the requesting doctors. ”

    Source location

    Mr Alan Hodgson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    Lynda Pedersen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lynda Pedersen died on 7 September 2018 in hospital from aspiration pneumonitis, pneumonia and fluid overload due to a stricture caused by an adenocarcinoma of the oesophagogastric junction. The adenocarcinoma was not identified during her admission or during earlier medical care following an admission for dysphagia. Concerns included the lack of a pathway for investigating dysphagia caused by a stricture, which contributed to the need to investigate malignancy being lost, and deficiencies in fluid balance charting and recording of fluid output before her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a pathway for investigating dysphagia caused by an oesophageal stricture

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Lynda Pedersen was admitted to William Harvey Hospital on 6th September 2017 with dysphagia. A gastroscopy conducted two days later identified a stricture within the oesophagus with the appearance of the mucosa suggestive of a submucosal infiltration. A CT scan did not identify a malignancy but indicated that the area of concern could not be evaluated as it had not been distended by the orally ingested contrast. Lynda Pedersen had a number of further gastroscopies to attempt to dilate her oesophagus between 2017 and 2018 some of which reported a benign appearance but the cause of the stricture was never investigated despite the risk of variceal bleeding having been significantly reduced by a TIPS procedure having been conducted on 11th October 2017. It was accepted that a biopsy should have been undertaken but the need for investigation as to whether there was a malignancy was lost in that the clinicians’ focus was on attempting to improve her nutritional status and quality of life. The reason for the loss of the need for an investigation was twofold: there was no pathway in place for dysphagia presentation caused by a stricture and the fact of multiple presentations. It was agreed by the treating clinicians and an independent expert that had there been a pathway in place, the investigation for cancer was less likely to have been lost. The clinicians who gave evidence at the Inquest were of the view that this was a matter most appropriately addressed by NHS England and NHS Improvements. ”

    Source location

    Lynda Pedersen · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Developing clinical pathways for oesophageal stricture is outside NHS England and NHS Improvement’s role.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While it is not the role of NHS England and Improvement to develop clinical pathways for conditions such as oesophageal stricture, other national bodies have done this. For example, the British Society of Gastroenterology 2018 guideline on managing dysphagia states: “obtain biopsies from all strictures to exclude malignancy” and “repeat biopsy after cross-sectional imaging in cases where biopsies are negative but clinical or endoscopic features are atypical or suspicious of malignancy”.”

    Source location

    2020-0112-Response-from-NHS-England-and-NHS-Improvement_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2020

    Open published response
  5. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Richard HINTON attended A&E with right calf pain and swelling after being advised to attend because of a possible clot. He was discharged before a markedly raised D-Dimer result became available; the inquest recorded pulmonary embolus due to deep vein thrombosis and bleeding duodenal ulcer, with a conclusion of “Preventable Natural Cause”. Concerns included failures in recording and communicating the D-Dimer request and result, delayed testing, inadequate documentation, and other system and process failures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record blood-test requests, reasons and outstanding results

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The information chain. a) When Mark (as the family wish him to be referred to) attended A&E he informed the triage nurse (nurse A) that he had contacted 111 who advised to go to A&E due to possible ‘clot’. That information was not recorded or passed on to others. Recorded examination of Mark included pain and obvious swelling to right calf. b) The Staff Nurse (nurse B) who then carried out observations on Mark came to the view that he ‘could probably do with a D-Dimer’. That nurse states she passed that information to the next (third) nurse (nurse C). c) Nurse C states that information was not passed to her. She was unaware that Mark had pain in his calf and therefore had no reason to request bloods, particularly a D-Dimer test, and had no knowledge of them being requested. d) At or around 19:33 hours it appears that bloods, including a D-Dimer test were requested. However there is no record of these (8) test being recorded or who ordered them or why. e) When the attending doctor first saw Mark at 21:06 hours he saw the results of 7 blood tests none of which indicated to him the presence of a possible DVT. The 8th blood test (i.e. the D-Dimer test) was not shown and as there was no record of it having been requested he did not know it was outstanding and nor in his opinion, was it required. Upon the information before that doctor he medically discharged Mark from hospital. Following Marks’ discharge from hospital the result of the D-Dimer test became available which would have led to Mark being admitted with treatment which probably would have saved his life. ”

    Source location

    Mark Richard HINTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit ED staff compliance with documentation requirements and repeat the audit monthly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Agreed. The Trust relies on the integrity of individuals to maintain professional standards of completing documentation. There are clear guidelines issued by both the NMC and the GMC which should be adhered to. An action from the RCA was to audit whether the ED staff were compliant in completing documentation. The initial audit results showed poor compliance and the plan is for the audit to be repeated monthly. The results have been discussed by the senior ED management team who are tasked with bringing improvement.”

    Source location

    2019-0142-Response-by-The-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The alert facility existed; failure to complete it was attributed to human factors rather than a system failure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a. The system did not require or mandate the person who requested blood tests, specifically in this case a D-Dimer test, to record that request or the reason for it. There was no alert system which would have alerted the final decision maker of that request. At that time a health care assistant, staff nurse or doctor could have requested the tests. Only a doctor may do so now.”

    Source location

    2019-0142-Response-by-The-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
  6. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    A 79-year-old woman was admitted to hospital on 15 March 2015 with hypothermia, reduced responsiveness and reduced mobility. She developed pneumonia, sepsis and acute respiratory distress syndrome, and died on 23 March 2015. The principal concerns were failures in investigations and handover, mental-capacity assessment, monitoring and escalation of deterioration, and staffing competence and seniority.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure completion or handover and documentation of outstanding A & E investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Ensuring all investigations/assessments are completed before a patient leaves A & E and ensuring an appropriate handover. It is appreciated that it will not be possible for all investigations and tests to be performed before a patient leaves the A & E department but if that is the case then the receiving ward should be informed and there should be a clear documented audit trail so it is clear what is outstanding. ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Rita Paton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rita Paton, who had type 2 diabetes, hypertension, chronic kidney disease and dementia, died on 8 December 2014 from ischaemic and hypertensive heart disease, contributed to by chronic kidney disease and diabetes mellitus. Concerns included the lack of a system to ensure requested blood tests were completed and reported, the absence of a clear process for involving family when a patient lacks capacity to make decisions about appointments, and limited access to patients’ medical and medication information for attending medical crews.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure requested blood tests are taken and reported back to GP practices

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) I am concerned that there is no system in place to ensure that requested blood tests are actually taken and reported back to the GP practice. Although there was no evidence that this issue caused or contributed to Mrs Paton’s death, I am concerned that there is a risk of deaths occurring in similar circumstances, unless this issue is appropriately addressed. ”

    Source location

    Rita Paton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Redmond Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Redmond Johnson, aged 67, suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest while being transferred to Ipswich Crown Court on 25 November 2011 and died after transfer to Ipswich Hospital. The report identified concerns about the assessment of his fitness for transfer, including a record stating that he had no known medical risks despite the healthcare professional not having seen him. It also identified concerns about the management and documentation of his complex healthcare needs in custody, including liaison with community providers, specialist appointments, investigations, medication and care monitoring.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inadequate documentation confirming completion and clinical review of requested investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) If medical tests or investigations are requested, there must be clear and adequate documentation to confirm that those investigations have actually been conducted and the results seen by a healthcare professional. ”

    Source location

    Redmond Johnson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee Terence Curran died on 3 May 2011 while in custody at Forest Bank Prison, with naturally occurring ischaemic heart disease identified as the prime cause of death. Before his death, he experienced multiple episodes of transient loss of consciousness that were not diagnosed, and concerns were raised that recommended investigations and follow-up were not provided. Further concerns included incomplete implementation of recommendations, potentially misleading medical-note entries, and inadequate awareness or application of relevant clinical guidelines.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to fully investigate prisoners’ reported episodes of loss of consciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) Evidence given at the Inquest also revealed a need for the training of Doctors working in prisons in that Doctors who provided general practice sessions at the prison (and in the community) gave evidence that they were unaware of the NICE Guidelines for Transient Loss of Consciousness Management in Adults and Young People despite such episodes being common in a prison environment. Additionally evidence was given by a Doctor that efforts were not made to fully investigate Lee Terence Curran’s episodes of loss of consciousness because, the Doctor explained, it was common for prisoners to claim to have suffered losses of consciousness as a form of drug seeking behaviour. ”

    Source location

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct NICE-compliant investigations of loss of consciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman investigated Lee Terence Curran’s death. At the conclusion of that investigation certain recommendations were made, two of which were as follows: a. “The Head of Healthcare should ensure that healthcare staff take full account of family history when arranging clinical investigations for prisoners who report, or are observed to have possible signs of high cholesterol or hypertension”. b. “The Head of Healthcare should develop a protocol that is NICE compliant for investigating episodes of loss of consciousness and should ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes.” Both of these recommendations were accepted. However the evidence given at the Inquest in relation to the implementation of recommendation a. was that all prisoners coming to Forest Bank Prison undertake the reception screening process and any prisoner with any identified, or any sign of, hypertension is referred to the hypertension clinic. A full account of the prisoner’s family history is then taken at that clinic. There was no evidence that any action had been taken to address that part of the Ombudsman’s recommendation that related to prisoners (such as Lee Terence Curran) who reported or showed signs of having high cholesterol. Likewise with recommendation b. The evidence given at the Inquest with regard to the implementation of that recommendation was that any individual who had a loss of consciousness would be automatically referred to a Doctor. That action does not encompass the whole of the Ombudsman’s recommendation. Particularly it does not ensure that investigations of episodes of loss of consciousness are NICE compliant nor does it ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes. It should be remembered here that Doctors saw Lee Terence Curran on five occasions following episodes of loss of consciousness and the NICE guidelines were not followed at any time. ”

    Source location

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct clinical investigations of prisoners experiencing loss of consciousness

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman investigated Lee Terence Curran’s death. At the conclusion of that investigation certain recommendations were made, two of which were as follows: a. “The Head of Healthcare should ensure that healthcare staff take full account of family history when arranging clinical investigations for prisoners who report, or are observed to have possible signs of high cholesterol or hypertension”. b. “The Head of Healthcare should develop a protocol that is NICE compliant for investigating episodes of loss of consciousness and should ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes.” Both of these recommendations were accepted. However the evidence given at the Inquest in relation to the implementation of recommendation a. was that all prisoners coming to Forest Bank Prison undertake the reception screening process and any prisoner with any identified, or any sign of, hypertension is referred to the hypertension clinic. A full account of the prisoner’s family history is then taken at that clinic. There was no evidence that any action had been taken to address that part of the Ombudsman’s recommendation that related to prisoners (such as Lee Terence Curran) who reported or showed signs of having high cholesterol. Likewise with recommendation b. The evidence given at the Inquest with regard to the implementation of that recommendation was that any individual who had a loss of consciousness would be automatically referred to a Doctor. That action does not encompass the whole of the Ombudsman’s recommendation. Particularly it does not ensure that investigations of episodes of loss of consciousness are NICE compliant nor does it ensure that staff conduct clinical investigations of prisoners who experience such episodes. It should be remembered here that Doctors saw Lee Terence Curran on five occasions following episodes of loss of consciousness and the NICE guidelines were not followed at any time. ”

    Source location

    Lee Terence Curran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026