Recurring concern

Unreliable crisis-team access and communication

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First reported 19 May 2014•Latest report 28 May 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the dedicated crisis-team access and communication process, including unreliable telephone access, ineffective routes for sending information directly to the crisis team, and failures to provide or receive relevant information from referring parties when these impair access to timely crisis support.

Not included

  • Excludes general mental-health service access, treatment or staffing deficiencies that are not specifically tied to reaching or communicating with the crisis team.
  • Excludes failures of crisis-team clinical assessment, care continuity or referral disposition after communication has been successfully established, unless the communication-access failure is also identified.
  • Excludes generic telephone, communication or information-sharing deficiencies without an explicit crisis-team context.
  • Excludes failures belonging to a distinct named pathway, such as emergency call handling or Crisis Team referral triage, where the crisis-team access and communication process is not the unsafe condition.
Reports
10

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
13

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
12

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

North London NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust1
Depaul UK1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust1
Killick Street Health Centre1
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust1
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust1
St Pancras Hospital1
The Priory Hospital Cheadle1
Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Julie Sheila Beasley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie Sheila Beasley was found deceased at home on 16 March 2023 and died from multiple drug misuse involving a fatal amount of morphine and concomitant prescribed medications. She had deteriorating mental health, increasing suicidal thoughts and plans, and repeatedly requested mental health assessment and a medication review. The report identifies failures to complete required assessments and medication review, inadequate communication and record keeping, and insufficient exploration of information she sought to share about her risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate accurate assessment and appointment information

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Mrs Beasley had been requesting an urgent appoint and responded immediately to a letter from the Trust informing her she needed an urgent psychiatric appointment. When Mrs Beasley contacted the crisis team, she was again informed incorrectly that she had recently had a V4 psychiatric assessment and did not require an urgent appointment. The crisis team were not communicating effectively either with Mrs Beasley, her GP or internally within their own team. ”

    Source location

    Julie Sheila Beasley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of effective communication within and across mental health services

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Mrs Beasley had been requesting an urgent appoint and responded immediately to a letter from the Trust informing her she needed an urgent psychiatric appointment. When Mrs Beasley contacted the crisis team, she was again informed incorrectly that she had recently had a V4 psychiatric assessment and did not require an urgent appointment. The crisis team were not communicating effectively either with Mrs Beasley, her GP or internally within their own team. ”

    Source location

    Julie Sheila Beasley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide reflective supervision to the staff member involved in the missed communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “By way of further assurance, reflective supervision is being undertaken with the individual staff member who did not speak with Mrs Beasley.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send patient contact details and highlighted actions to GPs through administrative support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “By way of evidence provided to the Court, the team have clear processes for GPs to be emailed following any patient contact. Clinical staff are supported by the Team administrative personnel who are tasked with sending assessment details to GP’s, which includes highlighted actions.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Route crisis-team communications and psychiatrist review requests to multidisciplinary team mailboxes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A process has also been initiated whereby communication is not sent to an individual, but will be sent to the MDT. This ensures there are no delays in communication / actions requiring attention.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 June 2025

    Open published response
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Igor Kacper SZALAPSKI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Igor hanged himself in his room at a hostel for homeless young people on 30 April 2023. Concerns included failures to re-contact the crisis team after staff found him drowsy and incoherent, insufficient meaningful staff contact and welfare checks, inadequate engagement with partner agencies and family contact, a lack of self-harm and suicide awareness training, and a chaotic hostel culture.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to re-contact the crisis team after a concerning change in a resident’s condition

    Wider context from the report

    “1. On 14 April 2023, staff found Igor outside, drowsy and incoherent, cold and wet, but did not re-contact the crisis team. 2. Igor was a vulnerable young man, recently homeless, but the last time that any member of staff had a meaningful conversation with him was on 20 April 2023, ten days before he died. 3. The Depaul executive director of services recognised at inquest that there should have been more staff conversation with Igor throughout his time at the London Youth Hub. 4. She also acknowledged that greater attempts should have been made by staff to engage with partner agencies regarding Igor’s care and welfare. 5. Igor was only 18 years old and his father did visit him, but the hostel did not have any contact details for his family. ”

    Source location

    Igor Kacper SZALAPSKI · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    DePaul disputes that it failed to identify behavioural deterioration or raise concerns, citing referrals to mental-health services and safeguarding teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6.9 Though DePaul have reflected following this incident and put in place the above measures and action plan, as discussed at 3.2.1, DePaul raised issues of a deterioration in mental health with the Crisis Team and were told that it was a substance use issue not a mental health issue. This is after he had expressed an intention to take his own life through electrocution in the shower. The GP refused to prescribe his medication given that he had taken 4 weeks supply in 14 days (as detailed at paragraph 3.2.1). DePaul did identify changes in behaviour and raised those concerns with the appropriate mental health services and safeguarding.”

    Source location

    Response from DePaul
    Page 19 · response
    Published 21 November 2023

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Mark Largin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Mark Largin died by suicide after asphyxiating himself in the early hours of 6 February 2022 at the home where he lived. Concerns included delays in allocation to the neighbourhood rehabilitation team, failure by the crisis team to reassess him after being told he remained very depressed, inadequate recording and investigation of decision-making, and a lack of clarity about referral pathways and response times between teams.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about neighbourhood team referral back to the crisis team

    Wider context from the report

    “9. Finally, the operations lead for the neighbourhood team had great difficulty in giving me clear evidence about whether his team would or could refer a patient back to the crisis team if they felt the circumstances warranted. He demonstrated a lack of clarity on the point that I found very concerning. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Mark Largin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Resume regular Neighbourhood Team and Crisis Pathway meetings and produce an action plan to communicate shared referral processes and criteria.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additionally, the Deputy Borough Director for City and Hackney has confirmed that the Neighbourhood Teams and Crisis Pathway teams (which includes HTT) are resuming their regular pathways meeting on 7 April 2023. They will produce an action plan around communicating a shared understanding of referral process and criteria.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 30 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a six-month rolling training programme for Neighbourhood Teams on clinical risk, referral processes, and risk indicators.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, the Trust is implementing a training programme for all Neighbourhood Teams to highlight issues of clinical risk when triaging incoming referrals. This programme, due to start on 22 March 2023, will run monthly for 6 months in a rolling fashion. Its aim is to train staff and maintain a constant discussion in how to think about complex issues of risk for patients referred to the Neighbourhood Teams, whether that is from Crisis Pathway Teams (which include HTT), GPs, or elsewhere. It will use didactic teaching, role play with actors, sample cases, discussion, and reflection, and will be facilitated by an experienced Consultant Psychiatrist, as well as the Associate Clinical Director for the Neighbourhood Teams. An important part of this training will be to improve understanding of referrals and risk signifiers from the Crisis Team to the Neighbourhood Team.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 30 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing procedures are considered sufficient for neighbourhood team clinicians to refer service users back to the crisis team when necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. Referral to Crisis Team”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 30 January 2023

    Open published response
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Benjamin Rajinder O’HARA · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Benjamin Rajinder O’Hara died after jumping from the fourth floor balcony of his home on 2 November 2020, following repeated contacts with mental health services and episodes of suicidal thoughts and psychosis. Concerns included that professionals did not ask permission to contact his family, an outdated hospital-admission alert was not reviewed, a review was not a formal mental health assessment, and he had no care co-ordinator or other community mental health team member overseeing his care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate that a review was not a formal mental health assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The review undertaken on 3 October was with a s12 approved doctor and an approved mental health professional, but was not a formal mental health assessment. If the crisis team had been aware of this, they might have sought a formal mental health assessment when Mr O’Hara disengaged from their care on 4 October. ”

    Source location

    Benjamin Rajinder O’HARA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve communication between crisis and other Trust teams by requiring further discussion of concerning decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Despite ICRT feeling like the option of MHAA was closed to them, they did not explore this further with the duty team who advised on these matters. The report has made a recommendation to improve communication between the crisis teams and other teams in the Trust, so that in future the crisis team ensure they discuss further any decisions by other teams which are of concern to them. Progress against this action will be reviewed in August 2021.”

    Source location

    2021-0077-Response-from-St-Pancras-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 March 2021

    Open published response
  5. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Cyril Kiernan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Cyril Kiernan, who had a history of depression, alcohol use and cannabis use, made threats to harm himself and had contact with emergency services during the night of 3–4 June 2017. He was later found hanging from a tree in nearby woodland. The principal concern was the ineffectiveness of the pathway for communicating information directly to the RDaSH Crisis Team, with the crisis team not being notified.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ineffectiveness of the pathway for communicating information directly to the crisis team

    Wider context from the report

    “The ineffectiveness of the pathway for communicating information direct to the RDaSH Crisis Team. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Cyril Kiernan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing signposting and consent-based referral during the 999 call provide the available pathway to crisis services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Addressing your concern as to “the ineffectiveness of the pathway for communicating information direct to the RDaSH Crisis Team”, I can state that there is a facility to:”

    Source location

    2017-0304-Response-Yorkshire-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 November 2017

    Open published response
  6. Avon

    AI-generated summary

    John Gerard JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Gerard JONES had been receiving support because of a perceived risk of suicide, and admission to hospital was recommended but not undertaken. He later took his own life by drowning in the River Avon on or around 1 February 2016. The principal concern was that his GP was not notified of his discharge from the Crisis Team for approximately a week, leaving uncertainty about community support during that period.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in notifying GPs of Crisis Team discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Mr Jones was initially referred to the Crisis Team because his GP believed that Mr Jones’ suicide risk could not be safely managed within the community. (2) When Mr Jones was in due course discharged from the Crisis Team's care it was approximately a week before his GP was notified of that discharge. That notification was received by fax. (3) This meant that during the important period immediately after discharge from the Crisis Team's care there was a period of approximately a week when Mr Jones was (notionally) back under the care of his GP, but his GP was unaware that this was the case: this meant that Mr Jones would have had no support within the community during this period aside from a single follow up / post-discharge call from the Crisis team. (4) In evidence the GP indicated that it would have been helpful to have been contacted by telephone at the time of Mr Jones’ discharge and notified of it. (5) It did not appear to me that there was any clear provision within the Crisis Team’s training / structure / protocols for the sort of communication envisaged by Mr Jones’ GP. ”

    Source location

    John Gerard JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear Crisis Team training, structural or protocol provision for discharge communication

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Mr Jones was initially referred to the Crisis Team because his GP believed that Mr Jones’ suicide risk could not be safely managed within the community. (2) When Mr Jones was in due course discharged from the Crisis Team's care it was approximately a week before his GP was notified of that discharge. That notification was received by fax. (3) This meant that during the important period immediately after discharge from the Crisis Team's care there was a period of approximately a week when Mr Jones was (notionally) back under the care of his GP, but his GP was unaware that this was the case: this meant that Mr Jones would have had no support within the community during this period aside from a single follow up / post-discharge call from the Crisis team. (4) In evidence the GP indicated that it would have been helpful to have been contacted by telephone at the time of Mr Jones’ discharge and notified of it. (5) It did not appear to me that there was any clear provision within the Crisis Team’s training / structure / protocols for the sort of communication envisaged by Mr Jones’ GP. ”

    Source location

    John Gerard JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Rutland and North Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony John Preston · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony John Preston was admitted to The Priory Hospital in October 2013, discharged home on 11 November 2013, and was admitted to The Bradgate Unit four days later after becoming extremely anxious and depressed. He hanged himself in May 2014. Concerns included the lack of robust documentary evidence that his discharge had been communicated to the Leicestershire Crisis Team, the absence of immediate follow-up, and the resulting lack of support for him and his main carer when he was considered at high risk; the report states that no causal connection was suggested between his death and the discharge arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide immediate written discharge and high-risk notification to the crisis team

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) There was no immediate follow up by email or fax to the Crisis Team to notify the discharge, and the fact that Mr Preston was at high risk because of the anxiety created when he was living at home. ”

    Source location

    Anthony John Preston · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Patrick DANIELS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Patrick Daniels hanged himself following several contacts with South Camden Crisis Response and Resolution Team. The principal concerns were failures to carry out and record planned visits, communicate within the team and with crisis houses, progress a crisis-house referral promptly, and consider hospital admission despite identified suicide risk and Mr Daniels stating that he did not feel safe at home.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of communication within the crisis team and with crisis houses

    Wider context from the report

    “You will see from the determination attached, that I found there was a failure by the crisis team: - to visit Mr Daniels twice a day, despite a plan so to do; - to record why twice daily visits were not attempted; - to communicate within the team and with the two crisis houses; - to progress the referral to a crisis house promptly; - to consider hospital admission, despite the fact that Mr Daniels was known to have made several suicide attempts; had told staff he did not feel safe at home; was observed to be keeping a rope at home; told staff he would kill himself, albeit not immediately; said he wanted to be in a contained environment; and there was apparently no prospect of prompt admission to crisis house. I gained the impression of a lack of cohesion and clinical direction. ”

    Source location

    Mark Patrick DANIELS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement measures across all Crisis Teams and Crisis Houses to address the identified concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ Associate Divisional Director for the Acute division has considered your concerns and put in place a comprehensive action plan to address them – the action plan is appended at the end of this letter. As you can see from the action plan updates, several”

    Source location

    2015-0208-Response-by-Camden-and-Islington-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 June 2015

    Open published response
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Elliot FROST · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Elliot Frost, aged 34, took his own life after jumping in front of an underground train on 25 September 2014. The report identified concerns about a lack of shared understanding between the crisis team and general practitioner, incomplete recording of information, and an inadequate pager messaging service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient information captured by the crisis team pager messaging service

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The pager messaging service used by the crisis team simply takes the name of the patient and a telephone number to call, nothing more. This means that valuable time was wasted by the crisis team, trying to track down the police officer who had rung to find out more detail, most especially Mr Frost’s address. This is time that could be used treating patients. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Elliot FROST · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Peter Franklin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter Franklin, who had longstanding mental health difficulties and increasingly frequent hospital attendances, died after jumping from a motorway bridge following an attempted jump earlier that day. The concerns included unclear communication about whether a referral, advice or assessment was required, relevant information not being passed on, and delays in sharing information with his GP.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Confusion and lack of clarity in terminology for out-of-hours CRISIS team calls

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There was confusion in the terminology used between nursing staff or doctors and the CRISIS team when out of hours calls were made such that it was not clear between parties whether a referral, advice or assessment was sought. ”

    Source location

    Peter Franklin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the CRISIS team to provide relevant information or advice to referring parties

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Relevant information/advice was not provided by the CRISIS team to parties who had made referrals ”

    Source location

    Peter Franklin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use and monitor a referral flow chart clarifying whether urgent referrals require advice or assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have developed a clear process outlining the pathway for urgent referrals through a referral flow chart which includes confirmation as to whether advice or assessment is being requested. This is being monitored by the Liaison Psychiatry Service Manager and at the monthly interface meeting between the two Trusts.”

    Source location

    2014-0230-Response-by-Kent-Medway-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update the Liaison Psychiatry out-of-hours roles and responsibilities protocol to improve staff guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition we have reviewed and updated the Liaison Psychiatry roles and Responsibilities Out of Hours Protocol. This provides improved guidance to staff.”

    Source location

    2014-0230-Response-by-Kent-Medway-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the SMART Tool in the Emergency Department, finalise its design, incorporate it into the Junior Doctor Handbook, and use it with the Mental Health Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Firstly I would like to address the issue of confusion in terminology 5(1). The use of a SMART Tool was discussed and agreed at the Emergency Directorate Clinical Governance meeting on 1st July 2014. It is being implemented from an Emergency Department perspective by Dr Bell, Consultant in A&E Medicine and Cliff Evans, Consultant Nurse. Once the design is finalised this will be incorporated into the Junior Doctor Handbook. A copy of the format is attached for your information. This will be used in conjunction with the Mental Health Trust.”

    Source location

    2014-0230-Response-by-Tunbridge-Wells-Hospital
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce requirements for staff to provide complete, accurate information to carers and referring agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It has been reinforced to the CRISIS Team that we expect our staff to provide full and accurate information to carers and referring agencies. The Clinical Records Policy has been amended to reflect the importance of recording the outcome of urgent patient contact immediately on Rio, the KMPT wide electronic records system. The adherence to relevant KMPT Trust policy is monitored through supervision and audit. If there are concerns about performance this is managed through the Trust’s Performance Management Framework. Steps that can be taken include training, mentoring, working under supervision and where necessary formal capability management.”

    Source location

    2014-0230-Response-by-Kent-Medway-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor compliance with relevant policies through supervision and audit, managing performance concerns under the Trust’s performance framework.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It has been reinforced to the CRISIS Team that we expect our staff to provide full and accurate information to carers and referring agencies. The Clinical Records Policy has been amended to reflect the importance of recording the outcome of urgent patient contact immediately on Rio, the KMPT wide electronic records system. The adherence to relevant KMPT Trust policy is monitored through supervision and audit. If there are concerns about performance this is managed through the Trust’s Performance Management Framework. Steps that can be taken include training, mentoring, working under supervision and where necessary formal capability management.”

    Source location

    2014-0230-Response-by-Kent-Medway-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026