Recurring concern

Unreliable emergency-service incident grading and response-time coordination

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First reported 1 Apr 2014•Latest report 23 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls dedicated to grading emergency incidents, defining or communicating response-time requirements, and coordinating police and ambulance dispatch functions where inconsistent understanding can delay or misdirect emergency attendance.

Not included

  • Excludes general emergency-service staffing, resource or attendance delays where no failure in incident grading, response-time requirements or dispatch coordination is identified.
  • Excludes failures confined to ambulance call triage or police incident allocation when the response-time coordination or cross-service understanding issue is not material.
  • Excludes generic training, communication or policy deficiencies that are not directly tied to emergency-service incident grading or response-time coordination.
Reports
8

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
9

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
18

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England2
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Department of Health and Social Care1
East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Essex Police1
HM Prison and Probation Service1
Independent Office for Police Conduct1
Isle of Wight NHS Trust1
Lancashire Constabulary1
Ministry of Justice1
Northumbria Police1
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1
Ofcom1
Recipient name withheld1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Teesside and Hartlepool

    AI-generated summary

    Peter COATES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter Coates, who had very severe COPD and relied on mains-powered respiratory equipment, died at home after an unplanned electrical power failure stopped that equipment. The report identifies delays in ambulance attendance and a concern that the ambulance response categories have a gap for patients who are not in cardiac or respiratory arrest but require an immediate response, particularly when alone and unable to update the ambulance service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an immediate-response category for patients who require urgent ambulance attendance but do not meet Category 1 criteria

    Wider context from the report

    “In respect of the National Ambulance Response Programme, I understand from the evidence that: - Category 1 is an immediate response to a life-threatening condition. It should only be used for a patient who requires resuscitation or emergency intervention from the ambulance service, for example, a patient who is in cardiac or respiratory arrest. Mortality rates are high where a difference of one minute in response time is likely to affect outcome and there is evidence to support the fastest response. The national standard is for 90% of Category 1 patients to have received a response within 15 minutes; and for the overall average response time to be within 7 minutes. - Category 2 is for serious conditions, for example stroke or chest pain, that may require rapid assessment and/or urgent transport. Mortality rates are lower; a difference of an extra 15 minutes’ response time is unlikely to affect outcome and there is evidence to support an early dispatch. The national standard is for 90% of patients to have received a response within 40 minutes; and for the overall average response time to be within 18 minutes. My concern is that there are circumstances in which a patient is not, at the time a 999 call is made to request an Ambulance, in a condition such as cardiac or respiratory arrest; but where an immediate response is still required on the basis that delay in ambulance attendance could pose a risk to their life. That is, I am concerned that there is a category of patients who do not meet the criteria for a category 1 response, but who do nonetheless require an immediate response, and that there is, therefore, a “gap” between categories 1 and 2. This includes for patients who are alone at the time of calling 999 and who are therefore unable to update the Ambulance Service should they progress to cardiac or respiratory arrest. ”

    Source location

    Peter COATES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement national ambulance response standards to prioritise the sickest patients and provide appropriate responses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2017, following the largest clinical ambulance trials in the world, NHS England implemented new ambulance standards across the country. This was to ensure that the sickest patients get the fastest response and that all patients get the right response first time.”

    Source location

    Response from NHSE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing Category 1 and 2 ambulance categorisations are sufficient for effective triage and timely intervention for life-threatening and emergency conditions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The current ambulance categorisations ensure that all emergency responses are prioritised appropriately; Category 1 covers the most urgent, life-threatening cases, while Category 2 addresses emergency but less critical incidents. These two categories are sufficient for effective triage and timely intervention for life threatening and emergency conditions.”

    Source location

    Response from NHSE
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Development of 999 triage question sets and instructions is assigned to the approved triage system provider.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The primary purpose of triage is to quickly identify priority symptoms (e.g. unconsciousness, difficulty breathing, chest pain) and to assign an appropriate response priority. The outcome (disposition) reached based on the information provided by the caller is mapped to one of the five national categories (Categories 1 – 5) set out within the NHS Constitution and Ambulance Service 999 contracts. The development of triage question sets and instructions lies within the remit of the triage system provider.”

    Source location

    Response from NHSE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Whether call handlers stay on the line with deteriorating patients is an operational decision for each ambulance service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In cases where there is risk of a patient’s condition deteriorating whilst waiting for an ambulance to arrive, the call handler could stay on the line with the patient; this is an operational decision to be made by each ambulance service. Moreover, the provision of instructions or actions to be taken in the case of worsening patients is a standard component of call exit scripts, whereby patients are advised that if their condition worsens, they should call 999 back. This provides an opportunity for a call to be re-triaged and potentially upgraded to a higher category response if this is clinically indicated.”

    Source location

    Response from NHSE
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2026

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Scott Darren TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Scott Darren Taylor died at Basildon Hospital on 13 August 2022 following multiorgan failure and rhabdomyolysis associated with cocaine use, physical exertion, prone restraint and Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome. The report raised concerns about inconsistent ambulance response categorisation for acute behavioural disturbance with active restraint, terminology and training, police training, and the removal of restraints during conveyance.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent ambulance response categorisation for Acute Behavioural Disturbance with active restraint

    Wider context from the report

    “b. The East of England Ambulance NHS Trust provide ambulance services across 6 counties and that also includes police/healthcare professionals reporting Acute Behavioural Disturbance and active police restraint. There is concern that there is a different response applied and that this discrepancy between Category 1 and Category 2 responses is significant and could affect the survival of patients. Evidence heard from police trainers and expert witnesses is that Acute Behavioural Disturbance has a high rate of fatality and requires an urgent response, particularly where police officers with training in this condition are reporting to ambulance service and with active restraint. ”

    Source location

    Scott Darren TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a standalone procedure for suspected or confirmed Acute Behavioural Disturbance, removing “excited delirium” terminology and requiring Category 1 escalation with clinical review for possible downgrade.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the inquest a working group was set up with the intention of revising the guidance for patients exhibiting signs of Acute Behavioural Disturbance and establishing the most appropriate way to respond to those patients within the Emergency Operations Centre.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update, approve and disseminate the detained-patient procedure and Emergency Operations Centre escalation guidance to reflect the Acute Behavioural Disturbance procedure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The procedure has also been updated to reflect that a Category 1 coding is now applied to all calls where the police are actively restraining a patient; or reporting agitation/behaviour changes; or the police use the term Acute Behavioural Disturbance. The call handler will immediately escalate this to a Call Handler Team Leader who will upgrade the call to a Category 1 and the response will be dispatched on this basis. If, at this point, the Call Handler Team Leader or Dispatcher believe this may not be a Category 1 call, the call will be highlighted to a Clinical Navigator who will complete a clinical review and triage to establish if a downgrade is required.”

    Source location

    Response from East of England Ambulance Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National ambulance response categories are determined by NHS England’s ECPAG, not by AACE.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to the required classification for ambulance response to emergencies, AACE do not set the categories nationally of ambulance response. Ambulance call codes are determined by NHS England by the Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG). We are aware that cases of suspected ABD should be assigned a Category 2 response, which is the immediate dispatch of an emergency ambulance. However, ambulance services are advised that a senior clinician within the”

    Source location

    Response from Association of Ambulance Chief Executives
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 February 2026

    Open published response
  3. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Lucy Ann THORNTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lucy Ann THORNTON died on 18 February 2025 after suspending herself; the time of death and whether there was a missed opportunity to prevent this could not be ascertained. The report raises concerns about call handlers’ training and understanding of procedures for incidents involving hanging, including response categorisation and failure to telephone THORNTON for further information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient understanding of Category 1 response criteria for hanging incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “The level of training and understanding of relevant call handling procedures and processes by those employed as call handlers in relation to incidents concerning hanging: 1 The procedures direct a Category 1 response (7 minutes) when the person has the means to suspend themselves and has stated that is there present intention. The call handler believes that a Category 1 response is, "When they are going to die now". 2 The procedures direct that when the call handler does not have all relevant information they should telephone the person and ask questions in relation to the person's present situation. The call handler was on the Isle of Wight. THORNTON was in Southsea. The call handler did not call THORNTON as she felt she was too remote (geographically). ”

    Source location

    Lucy Ann THORNTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Request national review of whether Category 1 disposition is appropriate for patients threatening to hang themselves.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This incident and your Prevention of Future Deaths report will be formally reported to the national NHS Pathways group. It has also been raised at the National Heads of Emergency Operations Centre meeting, with a request that existing pathways be reviewed to consider whether a Category 1 disposition is appropriate in such circumstances.”

    Source location

    Response from Isle of Wight NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 January 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver mandatory refresher training and updated materials on suicidal-patient call management, escalation, response categories, information gathering, and risk assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Additional training has been introduced for all call handlers to reinforce the appropriate management of calls involving suicidal patients.”

    Source location

    Response from Isle of Wight NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 January 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with national bodies to strengthen guidance and NHS Pathways for risks involving suicidal patients and potential hanging.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust remains fully committed to learning from this incident and to strengthening its systems and processes to reduce the risk of similar occurrences in the future. We will continue to work with national bodies to ensure that guidance and NHS Pathways appropriately reflect the risks associated with suicidal patients, including those involving potential hanging.”

    Source location

    Response from Isle of Wight NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 January 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National NHS Pathways bodies are responsible for deciding whether Category 1 responses are appropriate for potential hanging incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At present, there is no NHS Pathways outcome that results in a Category 1 response for a patient threatening to hang themselves, even where means are present. A Category 1 response is only triggered where a patient is actively in the process of hanging.”

    Source location

    Response from Isle of Wight NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 January 2026

    Open published response
  4. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Mark Edward TUCKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Mark Edward Tucker was detained under the Mental Health Act and admitted to hospital following self-harm and suicidal thoughts, but was discharged on 22 April 2022 despite ongoing concerns about his mental state and risk. He ingested a lethal quantity of a substance later that evening and died. The report identifies concerns about risk assessment and care planning, named-nurse allocation, staff skills in engaging patients, emergency response to confirmed ingestion, and the accessibility of online suicide forums.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of 999 call grading to trigger a category 1 ambulance response for confirmed ingestion of a potent poison

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I am concerned that confirmed ingestion of ████████ during a 999 call does not trigger a category 1 response from the Ambulance Service Dan ingested ████████ at around 20:30 on 22 April 2022. His friend informed the 999 call handler that he had done so during a first 999 call at 20:39. That call was correctly graded as requiring a category 2 response, as Dan was both conscious and awake. 14 minutes later, at 20:53, Dan collapsed. His friend’s second 999 call was correctly graded as requiring a category 1 response, as Dan had become unconscious, his breathing agon al. The first ambulance crew arrived at 21:04. Dan went into cardiac arrest at approximately 21:24. Consideration was given by the ambulance crew to ‘scoop and run’ to arrange a rendezvous to administer the necessary “drugs to counter ████████”, but this was no considered longer feasible once Dan had gone into cardiac arrest. The inquest heard evidence from a consultant toxicologist that even in very small quantities ████████ (or ████████) is lethal; it is a potent poison. I understand it is also, tragically, an increasingly common means of suicide. Mental health professionals who gave evidence expressed deep concern at its easy availability and growing popularity for vulnerable people seeking to end their own lives. The expert toxicological evidence indicated that its acute toxic effects can be rapid (as short as 20 minutes after ingestion, depending on dose) and can quickly become irreversible. This suggests that almost any case involving the ingestion of ████████ or ████████ is likely to be a time critical life-threatening event. Yet it is does not currently fall within that category for the purposes of grading 999 calls, unless the patient is unconscious or not breathing. While there was no evidence that a category 1 response would have prevented Dan’s death, I believe there is a risk that other deaths will occur if ingestion of ████████ continues to require a category 2 response. ”

    Source location

    Daniel Mark Edward TUCKER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue overdose and suicidal-intent guidance requiring further clinical intervention or automatic response upgrades and TOXBASE review for overdose incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England issued guidance for Ambulance Services relating to overdoses and suicidal intent in April 2021. The guidance highlights the critical importance of clinical oversight and review and sets out that:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update overdose guidance to include callers receiving a Category 5 disposition.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Most recently, the overdose guidance was updated in November 2023 to include callers who reach a Category 5 disposition (hear and treat). This followed a review by the Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG, NHS England) and the National Ambulance Service Medical Director’s Group (NASMeDG, Association of Ambulance Chief Executives) to ensure it remained clinically fit for purpose.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop specific training and a protocol for first-party callers in crisis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MPDS also has protocols for overdose patients as well as those patients with mental health conditions that are suffering any self-harm or suicidal thoughts. Since the time of this call, specific training and a new protocol have been developed specifically for first party callers in crisis.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ingestion of a potentially fatal substance does not, by itself, justify assigning a Category 1 ambulance response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ambulance Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) use one of two approved triage tools to take 999 emergency calls – Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS) or NHS Pathways. At the time of the calls being made to East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust (EMAS) in Dan’s case, EMAS were users of the protocols within the MPDS, for which there is a protocol. This protocol generates a specific ‘Determinant Code’ for overdose, following the initial assessment of the patient. This then allows the relevant Ambulance Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), in this case that of EMAS, to consider the Determinant Code and locally determine and apply a local response mode or ‘Category’. The response modes are underwritten by the UK Government Emergency Call Prioritisation Ambulance Group (ECPAG) and sent to NHS Ambulance Service Trusts in England for implementation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing overdose protocols, intentional-overdose coding and clinical oversight enable appropriate prioritisation regardless of the substance ingested.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ambulance Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) use one of two approved triage tools to take 999 emergency calls – Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS) or NHS Pathways. At the time of the calls being made to East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust (EMAS) in Dan’s case, EMAS were users of the protocols within the MPDS, for which there is a protocol. This protocol generates a specific ‘Determinant Code’ for overdose, following the initial assessment of the patient. This then allows the relevant Ambulance Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), in this case that of EMAS, to consider the Determinant Code and locally determine and apply a local response mode or ‘Category’. The response modes are underwritten by the UK Government Emergency Call Prioritisation Ambulance Group (ECPAG) and sent to NHS Ambulance Service Trusts in England for implementation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The relevant ambulance Emergency Operation Centre, including EMAS in this case, determines and applies the local response category.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Ambulance Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) use one of two approved triage tools to take 999 emergency calls – Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS) or NHS Pathways. At the time of the calls being made to East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust (EMAS) in Dan’s case, EMAS were users of the protocols within the MPDS, for which there is a protocol. This protocol generates a specific ‘Determinant Code’ for overdose, following the initial assessment of the patient. This then allows the relevant Ambulance Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), in this case that of EMAS, to consider the Determinant Code and locally determine and apply a local response mode or ‘Category’. The response modes are underwritten by the UK Government Emergency Call Prioritisation Ambulance Group (ECPAG) and sent to NHS Ambulance Service Trusts in England for implementation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Listing every potentially fatal substance for dispatcher-led response assignment is impractical and risks dangerous over-triage because caller information may be unreliable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While ingestion of ████████ can lead to fatality, this can unfortunately be said of an array of substances, ranging from prescription medicines to over-the-counter household products and other agents available commercially or over the internet. The MPDS does specifically code some common overdose/poisoning agents, but this is for the provision of specific therapies and information for responders rather than for specific response assignment.¹ The listing of all possible fatal agents would likely lead”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing intentional-overdose coding and clinician review are considered sufficient; listing every potentially fatal agent would cause over-triage and delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On your concern regarding ingestion of ████████, Ambulance Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) use one of two approved triage tools to take 999 emergency calls – Medical Priority Dispatch System (MPDS) or NHS Pathways. At the time of the calls being made to East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust (EMAS) in Mr Tucker’s case, EMAS were users of the protocols within the MPDS. This protocol generates a specific ‘Determinant Code’ for overdose, following the initial assessment of the patient. This then allows the relevant Ambulance Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), in this case that of EMAS, to locally determine and apply a local response mode or ‘Category’. The response modes are underwritten by the NHS England Emergency Call Prioritisation Advisory Group (ECPAG) and sent to NHS Ambulance Service Trusts in England for implementation.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 March 2024

    Open published response
  5. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    KAREN JANE BINGHAM · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karen died by hanging at her home on 18 November 2017 after contacting police and ambulance services. The jury identified concerns about the safeguarding plan used when she was informed that her perjury allegation was being filed, including insufficient information gathering, failure to involve mental health services, and inadequate multi-agency planning. The report also identified concerns about police mental health training and the understanding between police and ambulance services of each other’s triage and dispatch processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient understanding between police and ambulance dispatch functions of each other’s triaging, dispatching processes and response times

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Those responsible for the dispatch of emergency services in the police and ambulance services do not have a sufficient understanding of the triaging and dispatching processes used by each other’s service nor their response times. ”

    Source location

    KAREN JANE BINGHAM · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add NHS Pathways and response-time input from SECambs Clinical Operations to the online Mental Health training package.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a revised online Mental Health training package which is to be mandated for all officers and staff to refresh their knowledge and skills in this area, including recognising common behaviours in those with mental health conditions. This will feature an input from SECambs Clinical Operations Manager on NHS Pathways and response times. This will also be supplemented by training input at officers’ annual officer safety refresher training during the autumn.”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-Chief-Constable-of-Surrey-Police_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train Contact Centre and Force Control Room staff on NHS Pathways, ambulance response categories, response times and surge arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. In the summer and autumn of 2018 (since Karen’s death) all staff from the Contact Centre and Force Control Room (resource dispatch) received training from South East Coast Ambulance (SECambs). This included input on NHS Pathways (as described during the inquest), Ambulance Response Programme (categories of response and associated time frames) and their Operational Business Plan Surge (which protects calls with the highest clinical need where there is excess demand).”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-Chief-Constable-of-Surrey-Police_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct staff exchanges between Surrey Police and SECambs contact and dispatch functions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To supplement the training a number of staff “exchanges” between Surrey Police and SECambs to gain a better understanding of the roles of their respective contact and dispatch functions.”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-Chief-Constable-of-Surrey-Police_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare and distribute partner-organisation guidance on ambulance call categorisations and response targets.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “████████ gave evidence to the inquest of the actions taken by SECamb to ensure that our police colleagues are aware of our call categorisations and response targets. At the time the Ambulance Response Programme was rolled out in SECamb (on 22 November 2017) a comprehensive document was prepared for our partner organisations and distributed to them. This includes the three police forces”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-SECAmb_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create and disseminate guidance explaining the Surge Management Plan, call prioritisation, response targets, triggers and resulting actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “with whom we principally work: Surrey, Sussex and Kent. We created and disseminated a further document for our partner agencies explaining our Surge Management Plan, including information on how we triage/prioritise calls, ARP response targets, SMP triggers and our actions. We also have in place a system for notifying Police Force Control Rooms by email when we reach the levels of our Surge Management Plan whereby there is a substantial risk that we will struggle to reach our target response times.”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-SECAmb_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Notify police force control rooms by email when Surge Management Plan thresholds indicate substantial risk of missing target response times.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “with whom we principally work: Surrey, Sussex and Kent. We created and disseminated a further document for our partner agencies explaining our Surge Management Plan, including information on how we triage/prioritise calls, ARP response targets, SMP triggers and our actions. We also have in place a system for notifying Police Force Control Rooms by email when we reach the levels of our Surge Management Plan whereby there is a substantial risk that we will struggle to reach our target response times.”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-SECAmb_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Surge Management Plan with the three local police forces to discuss joint actions and opportunities for closer control-room collaboration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Notwithstanding the efforts we have previously made to ensure our police colleagues are aware of our processes, we have considered, in light of this case, whether we could go further. ████████ and the EOC Operating Unit Manager responsible for dispatch ████████ are in the early stages of a review of our Surge Management Plan. We consider that it would be constructive to involve all three police forces in our area as part of that review to discuss possible joint actions that could be taken when certain levels of stress on our system are reached. There are many options that we consider worth joint discussion, some of which could lead to closer working of our respective control rooms. ████████ will work with our Blue Light Collaboration Manager to liaise with our police colleagues to explore opportunities for closer collaborative working.”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-SECAmb_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The first matter of concern concerns Surrey Police alone and is outside the respondent’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am not able to respond to the first matter of concern raised in your report as this concerns Surrey Police alone. I therefore confine my response to the second matter of concern, namely:”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-SECAmb_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing EOC procedures and clinical oversight make staff knowledge of police dispatching processes sufficient for safe, appropriate functions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In light of the above, I consider that the knowledge of my EOC staff of police dispatching processes is sufficient at present to enable them to carry out their functions safely and appropriately.”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-SECAmb_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Each police force is responsible for internally cascading the respondent’s ambulance processes and response information to relevant personnel.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “SECamb rely on our police partners to disseminate internally the information that we provide. It is for each force to ensure that all relevant materials are cascaded to all those who need to know of their contents.”

    Source location

    2020-0081-Response-from-SECAmb_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2020

    Open published response
  6. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Cherylee Yvette Shennan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Cherylee Yvette Shennan, a 40-year-old woman, was murdered on 17 March 2014 by a former offender who had subjected her to domestic abuse, including serious violence. The report raised concerns about inadequate inter-agency communication and management of the perpetrator, including the absence of a mandatory process for sharing information when an offender with a known history of domestic abuse was managed at MAPPA Level 1.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deficiencies in initial grading of calls to identify initial responses

    Wider context from the report

    “Following the death of Cherylee, her death, and actions taken in the months leading up to it were the subject of two detailed reviews. Following the Domestic Homicide Review a number of recommendations were made by the author of the Individual Management Report, Mr Gary Fishwick including concerns regarding initial grading of calls to identify initial responses, the obtaining of information as part of initial attendances on reported domestic abuse incidents and the carrying and use of personal protective equipment. Whilst the recommendations were made, Mr Fishwick could give no evidence at the inquest into the death of Cherylee to indicate whether those recommendations had in fact been actioned or not, and accordingly whether anything had changed following the death of Cherylee and the learning exercise that were subsequently undertaken. In particular reference was made to, but unsupported by documentation, or any other form of evidence: • Policies reflecting recommended changes; • Information sharing agreements between agencies; • MARAC emergency policy or notes; • DASH Training or policy regarding obtaining GP details; and • Audits of Grade 2 ‘Ethical fails’ and reasons for such fails. ”

    Source location

    Cherylee Yvette Shennan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Olive JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Olive JOHNSON died within 24 hours of admission to Pilgrim Hospital on 11 May 2018. The concerns raised relate to the absence of a first responder, emergency response times, how response delays were recorded after regrading, and whether EMAS had sufficient conveying resources to meet its targets.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to include time from the initial call to regrading in response-time measurement

    Wider context from the report

    “c) Is it fair that if a patient is regarded whilst awaiting an initial response the total time from the initial call to the regrading is cancelled out? ”

    Source location

    Olive JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to meet response times

    Wider context from the report

    “b) How many occasions have EMAS exceeded their response times since 01/01/2108 to date? ”

    Source location

    Olive JOHNSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Agree contract terms securing additional investment for clinical staff, ambulances and other response resources.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2018, new contract terms were agreed by the Trust with Hardwick Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG), providing extra investment during 2018-2019 and 2019-2020. Hardwick CCG which manages the EMAS contract on behalf of 22 CCGs across the region, signed off the terms for up to £9m funding for clinical staff, ambulances and other resources being provided in the first year. This could potentially rise to approximately £19m next year, dependent on performance targets being met and other financial agreements made as part of the contract terms.”

    Source location

    2019-0031-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Invest additional funding in clinical staff, ambulances and other resources to improve ambulance response times and consistency.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In 2018, new contract terms were agreed by the Trust with Hardwick Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG), providing extra investment during 2018-2019 and 2019-2020. Hardwick CCG which manages the EMAS contract on behalf of 22 CCGs across the region, signed off the terms for up to £9m funding for clinical staff, ambulances and other resources being provided in the first year. This could potentially rise to approximately £19m next year, dependent on performance targets being met and other financial agreements made as part of the contract terms.”

    Source location

    2019-0031-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The response clock for re-categorised calls starts at regrading because this timing was decided from a national perspective.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c) Is it fair that if a patient is regraded whilst awaiting an initial response, the total time from the initial call to the regrading is cancelled out?”

    Source location

    2019-0031-Response-by-East-Midlands-Ambulance-Service-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 May 2019

    Open published response
  8. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Vincent Gibson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Vincent Gibson was fatally injured while crossing Whiteleas Way, South Shields, when he was struck by a police vehicle travelling at speed in response to a Grade 1 emergency call. The principal concerns related to inadequate coordination, management, monitoring and control of the incident, including the failure to communicate that the caller remained in contact with the call taker, unclear roles, insufficiently informed risk assessment, resource allocation, route planning and uncertainty about response speed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear training and understanding of graded-incident response times

    Wider context from the report

    “Such an apparent conflict of understanding of what that time response meant or means when attached to a grade 1 incident or indeed a grade 2, or any of the other five graded responses underlines an essential need for this process to be taken into some effective control and to be the subject of particular training and clear understanding on the part of both management and staff. ”

    Source location

    Vincent Gibson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026